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Preface 
This book is based on an elective course entitled Financial Risk Manage-
ment I have taught at University of Toronto for many years. The main 
focus of the book is on the risks faced by banks and other financial 
institutions, but much of the material presented is equally important to 
nonfinancial institutions. Like my popular text Options, Futures, and 
Other Derivatives, this book is designed to be useful to practitioners as 
well as college students. 
The book is appropriate for elective courses in either risk management 
or the management of financial institutions. It is not necessary for students 
to take a course on options and futures markets prior to taking a course 
based on this book, but if they have taken such a course much of the 
material in the first four chapters will not need to be covered. Chapter 13 
on credit derivatives and Chapter 17 on weather, energy, and insurance 
derivatives can be skipped if this material is covered elsewhere or is not 
considered appropriate. Chapter 18 on big losses and what we can learn 
from them is a great chapter for the last class of a course because it draws 
together many of the points made in earlier chapters. 
The level of mathematical sophistication in the way material is pre-
sented has been managed carefully so that the book is accessible to as 
wide an audience as possible. For example, when covering copulas in 
Chapter 6, I present the intuition followed by a detailed numerical 
example; when covering maximum-likelihood methods in Chapter 5 
and extreme value theory in Chapter 9, I provide numerical examples 
and enough details for readers to develop their own Excel spreadsheets. 
This is a book about risk management and so there is very relatively little 
material on the valuation of derivatives contracts. (This is the main focus 
my other two books Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives and 
Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets.) For reference, I have 
included at the end of the book appendices that summarize some of 
the key derivatives pricing formulas that are important to risk managers. 
x v i Preface 
Slides 
Several hundred PowerPoint slides can be downloaded from my website. 
Instructors who adopt the text are welcome to adapt the slides to meet 
their own needs. 
Questions and Problems 
End-of-chapter problems are divided into two groups: "Questions and 
Problems" and "Assignment Questions". Solutions to Questions and 
Problems are at the end of the book, while solutions to Assignment 
Questions are made available by the publishers to adopting instructors 
in the Instructors' Manual. 
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Introduction 
Imagine you are the Chief Risk Officer of a major corporation. The CEO 
wants your views on a major new venture. You have been inundated with 
reports showing that the new venture has a positive net present value and 
will enhance shareholder value. What sort of analysis and ideas is the 
CEO looking for from you? 
As Chief Risk Officer it is your job to consider how the new venture fits 
into the company's portfolio. What is the correlation of the performance 
of the new venture with the rest of the company's business? When the rest 
of the business is experiencing difficulties, will the new venture also 
provide poor returns—or will it have the effect of dampening the ups 
and downs in the rest of the business? 
Companies must take risks if they are to survive and prosper. The risk 
management function's primary responsibility is to understand the port-
folio of risks that the company is currently taking and the risks it plans to 
take in the future. It must decide whether the risks are acceptable and, if 
they are not acceptable, what action should be taken. 
Most of this book is concerned with the ways risks are managed by 
banks and other financial institutions, but many of the ideas and 
approaches we will discuss are equally applicable to other types of 
corporations. Risk management is now recognized as a key activity 
for all corporations. Many of the disastrous losses of the 1990s, such 
as those at Orange County in 1994 and Barings Bank in 1995, would 
have been avoided if good risk management practices had been in place. 
Probability 
0.05 
0.25 
0.40 
0.25 
0.05 
Return 
+50% 
+30% 
+10% 
- 1 0 % 
- 3 0 % 
2 Chapter 
This opening chapter sets the scene. It starts by reviewing the classica 
arguments concerning the risk/return trade-offs faced by an investor who 
is choosing a portfolio of stocks and bonds. It then considers whether the 
same arguments can be used by a company in choosing new projects and 
managing its risk exposure. After that the focus shifts to banks. The 
chapter looks at a typical balance sheet and income statement for a bank 
and examines the key role of capital in cushioning the bank from adverse 
events. It takes a first look at the main approaches used by a bank in 
managing its risks and explains how a bank avoids fluctuations in net 
interest income. 
1.1 RISK vs. RETURN FOR INVESTORS 
As all fund managers know, there is a trade-off between risk and return 
when money is invested. The greater the risks taken, the higher the return 
that can be realized. The trade-off is actually between risk and expected 
return, not between risk and actual return. The term "expected return' 
sometimes causes confusion. In everyday language an outcome that is 
"expected" is considered likely to occur. However, statisticians define the 
expected value of a variable as its mean value. Expected return is therefore 
a weighted average of the possible returns where the weight applied to a 
particular return equals the probability of that return occurring. 
Suppose, for example, that you have $100,000 to invest for one year 
One alternative is to buy Treasury bills yielding 5% per annum. There if 
then no risk and the expected return is 5%. Another alternative is to 
invest the $100,000 in a stock. To simplify things a little, we suppose that 
the possible outcomes from this investment are as shown in Table 1.1 
There is a 0.05 probability that the return will be +50%; there is a 0.2' 
probability that the return will be +30%; and so on. Expressing the 
Table 1.1 Return in one year from 
investing $100,000 in equities. 
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returns in decimal form, the expected return per year is 
0 05 x 0.50 + 0.25 x 0.30 + 0.40 x 0.10 
+ 0.25 x (-0.10) + 0.05 x (-0.30) = 0.10 
This shows that in return for taking some risk you are able to increase your 
expected return per annum from the 5% offered by Treasury bills to 10%. 
If things work out well, your return per annum could be as high as 50%. 
However, the worst-case outcome is a —30% return, or a loss of $30,000. 
One of the first attempts to understand the trade-off between risk and 
expected return was by Markowitz (1952). Later Sharpe (1964) and others 
carried the Markowitz analysis a stage further by developing what is 
known as the capital asset pricing model. This is a relationship between 
expected return and what is termed systematic risk. In 1976 Ross developed 
arbitrage pricing theory—an extension of the capital asset pricing model 
to the situation where there are several sources of systematic risk. The key 
insights of these researchers have had a profound effect on the way 
portfolio managers think about and analyze the risk/return trade-offs 
that they face. In this section we review these insights. 
Quantifying Risk 
How do you quantify the risk you take when choosing an investment? 
A convenient measure that is often used is the standard deviation of 
return over one year. This is 
where R is the return per annum. The symbol E denotes expected value, so 
that E(R) is expected return per annum. In Table 1.1, as we have shown, 
E(R) = 0.10. To calculate E(R2), we must weight the alternative squared 
returns by their probabilities: 
E(R2) - 0.05 x 0.502 + 0.25 x 0.302 + 0.40 x 0.102 
+ 0.25 x (-0.10)2 + 0.05 x (-0.30)2 = 0.046 
The standard deviation of returns is therefore V0.046-0 .1 2 = 0.1897, 
or 18.97%. 
Investment Opportunities 
Suppose we choose to characterize every investment opportunity by its 
expected return and standard deviation of return. We can plot available 
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Figure 1.1 Alternative risky investments. 
risky investments on a chart such as Figure 1.1, where the horizontal axis 
is the standard deviation of return and the vertical axis is the expected 
return. 
Once we have identified the expected return and the standard deviation 
of return for individual investments, it is natural to think about what 
happens when we combine investments to form a portfolio. Consider two 
investments with returns R1 and R2. The return from putting a propor-
tion of your money in the first investment and a proportion 
in the second investment is 
The expected return of the portfolio is 
(1.1) 
where is the expected return from the first investment and is the 
expected return from the second investment. The standard deviation of 
the portfolio return is given by 
(1.2) 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
15% 
14% 
13% 
12% 
11% 
10% 
24.00% 
20.09% 
16.89% 
14.87% 
14.54% 
16.00% 
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Table 1.2 Expected return, and standard deviation of return, 
from a portfolio consisting of two investments. The expected 
returns from the investments are 10% and 15%, the standard 
deviation of the returns are 16% and 24%, and the correlation 
between the returns is 0.2. 
where and are the standard deviations of R1 and R2, and is the 
coefficient of correlation between the two. 
Suppose that is 10% per annum and is 16% per annum, while 
is 15% per annum and is 24% per annum. Suppose also that the 
coefficient of correlation, between the returns is 0.2 or 20%. Table 1.2 
Figure 1.2 Alternative risk/return combinations from two investments 
as calculated in Table 1.2. 
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shows the values of and for a number of different values of and 
The calculations show that by putting part of your money in the first 
investment and part in the second investment a wide range of risk/return 
combinations can be achieved. These are plotted in Figure 1.2. 
Most investors are risk-averse. They want to increase expected return 
while reducing the standard deviation of return. This means that they 
want to move as far as they can in a "north-west" direction in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2. As we saw in Figure 1.2, forming a portfolio of the two 
investments that we considered helps them do this. For example, by 
putting 60% in the first investment and 40% in the second, a portfolio 
with an expected return of 12% and a standard deviation of return equal 
to 14.87% is obtained. This is an improvement over the risk/return trade-
off for the first investment. (The expected return is 2% higher and the 
standard deviation of the return is 1.13% lower.) 
Efficient Frontier 
Let us now bring a third investment into our analysis. The third invest-
ment can be combined with any combination of the first two investments 
to produce new risk/return trade-offs. This enables us to move further in 
the north-west direction. We can then add a fourth investment. This can 
be combined with any combination of the first three investments to 
produce yet more investment opportunities. As we continue this process, 
Figure 1.3 The efficient frontier of risky investments. 
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considering every possible portfolio of the available risky investments in 
Figure 1.1, we obtain what is known as an efficient frontier. This repre-
sents the limit of how far we can move in a north-west direction and is 
illustrated in Figure 1.3. There is no investment that dominates a point on 
the efficient frontier in the sense that it has both a higher expected return 
and a lower standard deviation of return. The shaded area in Figure 1.3 
represents the set of all investments that are possible. For any point in the 
shaded area, we can find a point on the efficient frontier that has a better 
(or equally good) risk/return trade-off. 
In Figure 1.3 we have considered only risky investments. What does the 
efficient frontier of all possible investments look like? To consider this, we 
first note that one available investment is the risk-free investment. Sup-
pose that the risk-free investment yields a return of RF. In Figure 1.4 we 
have denoted the risk-free investment by point F and drawn a tangent 
Figure 1.4 The efficient frontier of all investments. Point I is achieved by 
investing a percentage of available funds in portfolio M and the rest in a 
risk-free investment. Point J is achieved by borrowing - 1 of available 
funds at the risk-free rate and investing everything in portfolio M. 
from point F to the efficient frontier of risky investments. M is the point 
of tangency. As we will now show, the line FM is our new efficient 
frontier. 
Consider what happens when we form an investment I by putting 
(0 < < 1) of the funds we have available for investment in the risky 
portfolio, M, and 1 - n the risk-free investment, F. From equation (1.1) 
the expected return from the investment, E{RI), is given by 
E(RI) = {1- )RF+ E{RM) 
and from equation (1.2) the standard deviation of this return is , 
where is the standard deviation of returns for portfolio M. This 
risk/return combination corresponds to point labeled I in Figure 1.4. 
From the perspective of both expected return and standard deviation of 
return, point I is of the way from F to M. 
All points on the line FM can be obtained by choosing a suitable 
combination of the investment represented by point F and the investment 
represented by point M. The points on this line dominate all the points on 
the previous efficient frontier because they give a better risk/return trade-
off. The straight line FM is therefore the new efficient frontier. 
If we make the simplifying assumption that we can borrow at the risk-
free rate of RF as well as invest at that rate, we can create investments that 
are on the line from F to M but beyond M. Suppose, for example, that we 
want to create the investment represented by the point J in Figure 1.4, 
where the distance of J from F is ( > 1) times the distance of M 
from F. We borrow - 1 of the amount that we have available for 
investment at rate RF and then invest everything (the original funds and 
the borrowed funds) in the investment represented by point M. After 
allowing for the interest paid, the new investment has an expected return, 
E(Rj), given by 
E(Rj) = E(RM) - ( - 1)RF 
and the standard deviation of the return is , This shows that the risk 
and expected return combination corresponds to point J. 
The argument that we have presented shows that, when the risk-free 
investment is considered, the efficient frontier must be a straight line. To 
put this another way, there should be a linear trade-off between the 
expected return and the standard deviation of returns, as indicated in 
Figure 1.4. All investors should choose the same portfolio of risky assets. 
This is the portfolio represented by M. They should then reflect their 
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appetite for risk by combining this risky investment with borrowing or 
lending at the risk-free rate. 
It is a short step from here to argue that the portfolio of risky 
investments represented by M must be the portfolio of all risky invest-
ments. How else could it be possible that all investors hold the portfolio? 
The amount of a particular risky investment in portfolio M must be 
proportional to the amount of that investment available in the economy. 
The investment M is usually referred to as the market portfolio. 
Systematic vs. Nonsystematic Risk 
How do investors decide on the expected returns they require for indi-
vidual investments? Based on the analysis we have presented, the market 
portfolio should play a key role. The expected return required on an 
investment should reflect the extent to which the investment contributes 
to the risks of the market portfolio. 
A common procedure is to use historical data to determine a best-fit 
linear relationship between returns from an investment and returns from 
the market portfolio. This relationship has the form 
R = (1.3) 
where R is the return from the investment, RM is the return from the 
market portfolio, and are constants, and is a random variable equal 
to the regression error. 
Equation (1.3) shows that there are two components to the risk in the 
investment's return: 
1. A component RM, which is a multiple of the return from the 
market portfolio 
2. A component which is unrelated to the return from the market 
portfolio 
The first component is referred to as systematic risk; the second com-
ponent is referred to as nonsystematic risk. 
Consider first the nonsystematic risk. If we assume that the for 
different investments are independent of each other, the nonsystematic risk 
is almost completely diversified away in a large portfolio. An investor 
should not therefore be concerned about nonsystematic risk and should 
not require an extra return above the risk-free rate for bearing non-
systematic risk. 
The systematic risk component is what should matter to an investor. 
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When a large well-diversified portfolio is held, the systematic risk repre-
sented by RM does not disappear. An investor should require an 
expected return to compensate for this systematic risk. 
We know how investors trade off systematic risk and expected return 
from Figure 1.4. When = 0, there is no systematic risk and the expected 
return is RF. When = 1, we have the same systematic risk as point M 
and the expected return should be E{RM). In general, 
E(R) = RF+ [E(RM)-RF] (1.4) 
This is the capital asset pricing model. The excess expected return over the 
risk-free rate required on the investment is times the excess expected 
return on the market portfolio. This relationship is plotted in Figure 1.5. 
Suppose that the risk-free rate is 5% and the return on the market portfolio 
is 10%. An investment with a of 0 should have an expected return of 5%; 
an investment with a of 0.5 should have an expected return of 7.5%; an 
investment with a of 1.0 should have an expected return of 10%; 
and so on. 
The variable is the beta of the investment. It is equal to where 
is the correlation between the return from the investment and the return 
from the market portfolio, is the standard deviation of the return from 
the investment, and is the standard deviation of the return from the 
Figure 1.5 The capital asset pricing model. 
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market portfolio. Beta measures the sensitivity of the return from the 
investment to the return from the market portfolio. We can define the 
beta of any investment portfolio in a similar way to equation (1.3). The 
capital asset pricing model in equation (1.4) should then apply with the 
return R defined as the return from the portfolio. 
In Figure 1.4 the market portfolio represented by M has a beta of 1.0 
and the riskless portfolio represented by F has a beta of zero. The 
portfolios represented by the points I and J have betas equal to and 
respectively. 
Assumptions 
The analysis we have presented makes a number of simplifying assump-
tions. In particular, it assumes: 
1. Investors care only about the expected return and the standard 
deviation of return 
2. The for different investments in equation (1.3) are independent 
3. Investors focus on returns over just one period and the length of this 
period is the same for all investors 
4. Investors can borrow and lend at the same risk-free rate 
5. There are no tax considerations 
6. All investors make the same estimates of expected returns, standard 
deviations of returns, and correlations for available investments 
These assumptions are of course not exactly true. Investors have complex 
sets of risk preferences that involve more than just the first two moments 
of the return distribution. The one-factor model in equation (1.3) assumes 
that the correlation between the returns from two investments arises only 
from their correlations with the market portfolio. This is clearly not true 
for two investments in the same sector of the economy. Investors have 
different time horizons. They cannot borrow and lend at the same rate. 
Taxes do influence the portfolios that investors choose and investors do 
not have homogeneous expectations. (Indeed, if the assumptions of the 
capital asset pricing model held exactly, there would be very little trading.) 
In spite of all this, the capital asset pricing model has proved to be a 
useful tool for portfolio managers. Estimates of the betas of stocks are 
readily available and the expected return on a portfolio estimated by the 
capital asset pricing model is a commonly used benchmark for assessing 
the performance of the portfolio manager. 
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Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
A more general analysis that moves us away from the first two assump-
tions listed above is arbitrage pricing theory. The return from an invest-
ment is assumed to depend on several factors. By exploring ways in which 
investors can form portfolios that eliminate their exposure to the factors, 
arbitrage pricing theory shows that the expected return from an invest-
ment is linearly dependent on the factors. 
The assumption that the for different investments are independent 
in equation (1.3) ensures that there is just one factor driving expected 
returns (and therefore one source of systematic risk) in the capital asset 
pricing model. This is the return from the market portfolio. In arbitrage 
pricing theory there are several factors affecting investment returns. Each 
factor is a separate source of systematic risk. Unsystematic risk is the risk 
that is unrelated to all the factors and can be diversified away. 
1.2 RISK vs. RETURN FOR COMPANIES 
We now move on to consider the trade-offs between risk and return 
made by a company. How should a company decide whether the 
expected return on a new investment project is sufficient compensation 
for its risks? 
The ultimate owners of a company are its shareholders and a com-
pany should be managed in the best interests of its shareholders. It is 
therefore natural to argue that a new project undertaken by the com-
pany should be viewed as an addition to its shareholder's portfolio. The 
company should calculate the beta of the investment project and its 
expected return. If the expected return is greater than that given by the 
capital asset pricing model, it is a good deal for shareholders and the 
investment should be accepted. Otherwise it should be rejected. The 
argument suggests that nonsystematic risks should not be considered 
in the accept/reject decision. 
In practice, companies are concerned about nonsystematic as well as 
systematic risks. For example, most companies insure themselves against 
the risk of their buildings being burned down—even though this risk is 
entirely nonsystematic and can be diversified away by their shareholders. 
They try to avoid taking high risks and often hedge their exposures to 
exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices, and other market vari-
ables. Earnings stability and the survival of the company are important 
managerial objectives. Companies do try and ensure that the expected 
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returns on new ventures are consistent with the risk/return trade-offs of 
their shareholders. But there is an overriding constraint that the risks 
taken should not be allowed to get too large. 
Most investors are also concerned about the overall risk of the com-
panies they invest in. They do not like surprises and prefer to invest in 
companies that show solid growth and meet earnings forecasts. They like 
companies to manage risks carefully and limit the overall amount of 
risk—both systematic and nonsystematic—they are taking. 
The theoretical arguments we presented in Section 1.1 suggest that 
investors should not behave in this way. They should encourage companies 
to make high-risk investments when the trade-off between expected return 
and systematic risk is favorable. Some of the companies in a shareholder's 
portfolio will go bankrupt, but others will do very well. The result should 
be an overall return to the shareholder that is satisfactory. 
Are investors behaving suboptimally? Would their interests be better 
served if companies took more nonsystematic risks because investors are 
in a position to diversify away these risks? There is an important argu-
ment to suggest that this is not necessarily the case. This argument is 
usually referred to as the "bankruptcy costs" argument. It is often used to 
explain why a company should restrict the amount of debt it takes on, but 
it can be extended to apply to all risks. 
Bankruptcy Costs 
In a perfect world, bankruptcy would be a fast affair where the company's 
assets (tangible and intangible) are sold at their fair market value and the 
proceeds distributed to bondholders, shareholders, and other stakeholders 
using well-defined rules. If we lived in such a perfect world, the bankruptcy 
process itself would not destroy value for shareholders. Unfortunately the 
real world is far from perfect. The bankruptcy process leads to what are 
known as bankruptcy costs. 
What is the nature of bankruptcy costs? Once a bankruptcy has been 
announced, customers and suppliers become less inclined to do business 
with the company; assets sometimes have to be sold quickly at prices well 
below those that would be realized in an orderly sale; the value of 
important intangible assets such as the company's brand name and its 
reputation in the market are often destroyed; the company is no longer 
run in the best interests of shareholders; large fees are often paid to 
accountants and lawyers; and so on. Business Snapshot 1.1 is a fictitious 
story, but all too representative of what happens in practice. It illustrates 
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how, when a high-risk decision works out badly, there can be disastrous 
bankruptcy costs. 
We mentioned earlier that corporate survival is an important manager-
ial objective and that shareholders like companies to avoid excessive risks. 
We now understand why this is so. Bankruptcy laws vary widely from 
country to country, but they all have the effect of destroying value as 
lenders and other creditors vie with each other to get paid. This value has 
often been painstakingly built up by the company over many years. It 
makes sense for a company that is operating in the best interests of its 
shareholders to limit the probability of this value destruction occurring. It 
does this by limiting the total risk (systematic and nonsystematic) that 
it takes. 
Business Snapshot 1.1 The Hidden Costs of Bankruptcy 
Several years ago a company had a market capitalization of $2 billion and 
$500 million of debt. The CEO decided to acquire a company in a related 
industry for $1 billion in cash. The cash was raised using a mixture of bank debt 
and bond issues. The price paid for the company was close to its market value 
and therefore presumably reflected the market's assessment of the company's 
expected return and its systematic risk at the time of the acquisition. 
Many of the anticipated synergies used to justify the acquisition were not 
realized. Furthermore the company that was acquired was not profitable. After 
three years the CEO resigned. The new CEO sold the acquisition for $100 mil-
lion (10% of the price paid) and announced the company would focus on its 
original core business. However, by then the company was highly levered. A 
temporary economic downturn made it impossible for the company to service 
its debt and it declared bankruptcy. 
The offices of the company were soon filled with accountants and lawyers 
representing the interests of the various parties (banks, different categories of 
bondholders, equity holders, the company, and the board of directors). 
These people directly or indirectly billed the company about $10 million 
per month in fees. The company lost sales that it would normally have made 
because nobody wanted to do business with a bankrupt company. Key senior 
executives left. The company experienced a dramatic reduction in its market 
share. 
After two years and three reorganization attempts, an agreement was 
reached between the various parties and a new company with a market 
capitalization of $700,000 was incorporated to continue the remaining profit-
able parts of the business. The shares in the new company were entirely owned 
by the banks and the bondholders. The shareholders got nothing. 
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When a major new investment is being contemplated, it is important to 
consider how well it fits in with other risks taken by the company. 
Relatively small investments can often have the effect of reducing the 
overall risks taken by a company. However, a large investment can 
dramatically increase these risks. Many spectacular corporate failures 
(such as the one in Business Snapshot 1.1) can be traced to CEOs who 
made large acquisitions (often highly levered) that did not work out. 
1.3 BANK CAPITAL 
We now switch our attention to banks. Banks face the same types of 
bankruptcy costs as other companies and have an incentive to manage 
their risks (systematic and nonsystematic) prudently so that the prob-
ability of bankruptcy is minimal. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 7, 
governments regulate banks in an attempt to ensure that they do exactly 
this. In this section we take a first look at the nature of the risks faced by a 
bank and discuss the amount of capital banks need. 
Consider a hypothetical bank DLC (Deposits and Loans Corporation). 
DLC is primarily engaged in the traditional banking activities of taking 
deposits and making loans. A summary balance sheet for DLC at the end 
of 2006 is shown in Table 1.3 and a summary income statement for 2006 
is shown in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.3 shows that the bank has $100 billion of assets. Most of the 
assets (80% of the total) are loans made by the bank to private individuals 
and corporations. Cash and marketable securities account for a further 
15% of the assets. The remaining 5% of the assets are fixed assets (i.e., 
buildings, equipment, etc.). A total of 90% of the funding for the assets 
comes from deposits of one sort or another from the bank's customers and 
counterparties. A further 5% is financed by subordinated long-term debt 
Table 1.3 Summary balance sheet for DLC at end of 2006 ($ billions). 
Assets 
Cash 
Marketable securities 
Loans 
Fixed assets 
Total 
5 
10 
80 
5 
100 
Liabilities and net worth 
Deposits 
Subordinated long-term debt 
Equity capital 
Total 
90 
5 
5 
100 
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Table 1.4 Summary income statement for 
DLC in 2006 ($ billions). 
Net interest income 
Loan losses 
Noninterest income 
Noninterest expense 
Pre-tax operating income 
3.00 
(0.80) 
0.90 
(2.50) 
0.60 
(i.e., bonds issued by the bank to investors that rank below deposits in the 
event of a liquidation) and the remaining 5% is financed by the bank's 
shareholders in the form of equity capital. The equity capital consists of 
the original cash investment of the shareholders and earnings retained in 
the bank. 
Consider next the income statement for 2006 shown in Table 1.4. The 
first item on the income statement is net interest income. This is the excess 
of the interest earned over the interest paid and is 3% of assets in our 
example. It is important for the bank to be managed so that net interest 
income remains roughly constant regardless of the level of interest rates. 
We will discuss this in more detail in Section 1.5. 
The next item is loan losses. This is 0.8% of assets for the year in 
question. Even if a bank maintains a tight control over its lending policies, 
this will tend to fluctuate from year to year. In some years default rates in 
the economy are high; in others they are quite low.1 The management and 
quantification of the credit risks it takes is clearly of critical importance to 
a bank. This will be discussed in Chapters 11, 12, and 13. 
The next item, noninterest income, consists of income from all the 
activities of a bank other than lending money. This includes trading 
activities, fees for arranging debt or equity financing for corporations, 
and fees for the many other services the bank provides for its retail and 
corporate clients. In the case of DLC, noninterest income is 0.9% of 
assets. This must be managed carefully. In particular, the market risks 
associated with trading activities must be quantified and controlled. 
Market risk management procedures are discussed in Chapters 3, 8, 9, 
and 10. 
The final item is noninterest expense and is 2.5% of assets in our 
1
 Evidence for this can be found by looking at Moody's statistics on the default rates on 
bonds between 1970 and 2003. This ranged from a low of 0.09% in 1979 to a high of 
3.81% in 2001. 
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example. This consists of all expenses other than interest paid. It includes 
salaries, technology-related costs, and other overheads. As in the case of 
all large businesses, these have a tendency to increase over time unless 
they are managed carefully. Banks must try and avoid large losses from 
litigation, business disruption, employee fraud, etc. The risk associated 
with these types of losses is known as operational risk and will be 
discussed in Chapter 14. 
Capital Adequacy 
Is the equity capital of 5% of assets in Table 1.3 adequate? One way of 
answering this is to consider an extreme scenario and determine whether 
the bank will survive. Suppose that there is a severe recession and as a 
result the bank's loan losses rise to 4% next year. We assume that other 
items on the income statement are unaffected. The result will be a pre-tax 
net operating loss of 2.6% of assets. Assuming a tax rate of 30%, this 
would result in an after-tax loss of about 1.8% of assets. 
In Table 1.3 equity capital is 5% of assets and so an after-tax loss equal 
to 1.8% of assets, although not at all welcome, can be absorbed. It would 
result in a reduction of the equity capital to 3.2% of assets. Even a second 
bad year similar to the first would not totally wipe out the equity. 
Suppose now that the bank has the more aggressive capital structure 
shown in Table 1.5. Everything is the same as Table 1.3 except that equity 
capital is 1% (rather than 5%) of assets and deposits are 94% (rather 
than 90%) of assets. In this case one year where the loan losses are 4% of 
assets would totally wipe out equity capital and the bank would find itself 
in serious financial difficulties. It would no doubt try to raise additional 
equity capital, but it is likely to find this almost impossible in such a weak 
financial position. 
Table 1.5 Alternative balance sheet for DLC at end of 2006 with 
equity only 1 % of assets (billions). 
Assets 
Cash 
Marketable securities 
Loans 
Fixed assets 
Total 
5 
10 
80 
5 
100 
Liabilities and net worth 
Deposits 
Subordinated long-term debt 
Equity capital 
Total 
94 
5 
1 
100 
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It is quite likely that there would be a run on deposits and the bank 
would be forced into liquidation. If all assets could be liquidated for book 
value (a big assumption), the long-term debtholders would likely receive 
about $4.2 billion rather than $5 billion (they would in effect absorb the 
negative equity) and the depositors would be repaid in full. 
Note that equity and subordinated long-term debt are both sources of 
capital. Equity provides the best protection against adverse events. (In 
our example, when the bank has $5 billion of equity capital rather than 
$1 billion, it stays solvent and is unlikely to be liquidated.) Subordinated 
long-term debt holders rank below depositors in the event of a default. 
However, subordinated long-term debt does not provide as good a 
cushion for the bank as equity. As our example shows, it does not 
necessarily prevent the bank's liquidation. 
As we shall see in Chapter 7, bank regulators have been active in 
ensuring that the capital a bank keeps is sufficient to cover the risks it 
takes. Regulators consider the market risks from trading activities as well 
as the credit risks from lending activities. They are moving toward an 
explicit consideration of operational risks. Regulators define different 
types of capital and prescribe levels for them. In our example DLC's 
equity capital is Tier 1 capital; subordinated long-term debt is Tier 2 
capital. 
1.4 APPROACHES TO MANAGING RISKS 
Since a bank's equity capital is typically very low in relation to the assets 
on the balance sheet, a bank must manage its affairs conservatively to 
avoid large fluctuations in its earnings. There are two broad risk manage-
ment strategies open to the bank (or any other organization). One 
approach is to identify risks one by one and handle each one separately. 
This is sometimes referred to as risk decomposition. The other is to reduce 
risks by being well diversified. This is sometimes referred to as risk 
aggregation. In practice, banks use both approaches when they manage 
market and credit risks as we will now explain. 
Market Risks 
Market risks arise primarily from the bank's trading activities. A bank 
has exposure to interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices, commodity 
prices, and the market variables. These risks are in the first instance 
managed by the traders. For example, there is likely to be one trader (or a 
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group of traders) working for a US bank who is responsible for the 
dollar/yen exchange rate risk. At the end of each day the trader is 
required to ensure that risk limits specified by the bank are not exceeded. 
If the end of the day is approached and one or more of the risk limits is 
exceeded, the trader must execute new hedging trades so that the limits 
are adhered to. 
The risk managers working for the bank then aggregate the residual 
market risks from the activities of all traders to determine the total risk 
faced by the bank from movements in market variables. Hopefully the 
bank is well diversified, so that its overall exposure to market movements 
is fairly small. If risks are unacceptably high, the reasons must be 
determined and corrective action taken. 
Credit Risks 
Credit risks are traditionally managed by ensuring that the credit port-
folio is well diversified (risk aggregation). If a bank lends all its available 
funds to a single borrower, then it is totally undiversified and subject to 
huge risks. If the borrowing entity runs into financial difficulties and is 
unable to make its interest and principal payments, the bank will 
become insolvent. 
If the bank adopts a more diversified strategy of lending 0.01% of its 
available funds to each of 10,000 different borrowers, then it is in a 
much safer position. Suppose that in a typical year the probability of 
any one borrower defaulting is 1%. We can expect that close to 100 
borrowers will default in the year and the losses on these borrowers will 
be more than offset by the profits earned on the 99% of loans that 
perform well. 
Diversification reduces nonsystematic risk. It does not eliminate sys-
tematic risk. The bank faces the risk that there will be an economic 
downturn and a resulting increase in the probability of default by 
borrowers. To maximize the benefits of diversification, borrowers should 
be in different geographical regions and different industries. A large 
international bank with different types of borrowers all over the world 
is likely to be much better diversified than a small bank in Texas that 
lends entirely to oil companies. However, there will always be some 
systematic risks that cannot be diversified away. For example, diversifica-
tion does not protect a bank against world economic downturns. 
Since the late 1990s we have seen the emergence of an active market for 
credit derivatives. Credit derivatives allow banks to handle credit risks 
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one by one (risk decomposition) rather than relying solely on risk 
diversification. They also allow banks to buy protection against the 
overall level of defaults in the economy. We discuss credit derivatives in 
Chapter 13. 
1.5 THE MANAGEMENT OF NET INTEREST INCOME 
As mentioned earlier net interest income is the excess of interest received 
over interest paid. It is the role of the asset/liability management function 
to ensure that fluctuations in net interest income are minimal. In this 
section we explain how it does this. 
To illustrate how fluctuations in net interest income could occur, 
consider a simple situation where a bank offers consumers a one-year 
and a five-year deposit rate as well as a one-year and five-year mortgage 
rate. The rates are shown in Table 1.6. We make the simplifying assump-
tion that market participants expect the one-year interest rate for future 
time periods to equal the one-year rates prevailing in the market today. 
Loosely speaking, this means that the market considers interest rate 
increases to be just as likely as interest rate decreases. As a result the rates 
in Table 1.6 are "fair", in that they reflect the market's expectations. 
Investing money for one year and reinvesting for four further one-year 
periods gives the same expected overall return as a single five-year 
investment. Similarly, borrowing money for one year and refinancing each 
year for the next four years leads to the same expected financing costs as a 
single five-year loan. 
Now suppose you have money to deposit and agree with the prevailing 
view that interest rate increases are just as likely as interest rate decreases. 
Would you choose to deposit your money for one year at 3% per annum 
or for five years at 3% per annum? The chances are that you would 
choose one year because this gives you more financial flexibility. It ties up 
your funds for a shorter period of time. 
Table 1.6 Example of rates offered by a bank to 
its customers. 
Maturity 
(years) 
1 
5 
Deposit 
rate 
3% 
3% 
Mortgage 
rate 
6% 
6% 
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Now suppose that you want a mortgage. Again you agree with the 
prevailing view that interest rate increases are just as likely as interest rate 
decreases. Would you choose a one-year mortgage at 6% or a five-year 
mortgage at 6%? The chances are that you would choose a five-year 
mortgage because it fixes your borrowing rate for the next five years and 
subjects you to less refinancing risk. 
When the bank posts the rates shown in Table 1.6, it is likely to find 
that the majority of its depositors opt for one-year maturities and the 
majority of its customers seeking mortgages opt for five-year maturities. 
This creates an asset/liability mismatch for the bank and subjects its net 
interest income to risks. There is no problem if interest rates fall. The 
bank will find itself financing the five-year 6% mortgages with deposits 
that cost less than 3% and net interest income will increase. However, if 
rates rise, the deposits that are financing these 6% mortgages will cost 
more than 3% and net interest income will decline. A 3% rise in interest 
rates would reduce the net interest income to zero. 
It is the job of the asset/liability management group to ensure that the 
maturities of the assets on which interest is earned and the maturities of the 
liabilities on which interest is paid are matched. One way to do this in our 
example is to increase the five-year rate on both deposits and mortgages. 
For example, we could move to the situation in Table 1.7 where the five-
year deposit rate is 4% and the five-year mortgage rate 7%. This would 
make five-year deposits relatively more attractive and one-year mortgages 
relatively more attractive. Some customers who chose one-year deposits 
when the rates were as in Table 1.6 will switch to five-year deposits when 
rates are as in Table 1.7. Some customers who chose five-year mortgages 
when the rates were as in Table 1.6 will choose one-year mortgages. This 
may lead to the maturities of assets and liabilities being matched. If there is 
still an imbalance with depositors tending to choose a one-year maturity 
and borrowers a five-year maturity, five-year deposit and mortgage rates 
could be increased even further. Eventually the imbalance will disappear. 
The net result of all banks behaving in the way we have just described is 
Table 1.7 Five-year rates are increased in an attempt 
to match maturities of assets and liabilities. 
Maturity 
(years) 
1 
5 
Deposit 
rate 
3% 
4% 
Mortgage 
rate 
6% 
7% 
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that long-term rates tend to be higher than those predicted by expected 
future short-term rates. This phenomenon is referred to as liquidity 
preference theory. It leads to long-term rates being higher than short-term 
rates most of the time. Even when the market expects a small decline in 
short-term rates, liquidity preference theory is likely to cause long-term 
rates to be higher than short-term rates. 
Many banks now have sophisticated systems for monitoring the deci-
sions being made by customers so that, when they detect small differences 
between the maturities of the assets and liabilities being chosen, they can 
fine-tune the rates they offer. Sometimes derivatives such as interest rate 
swaps are also used to manage their exposure. The result is that net interest 
income is very stable and does not lead to significant risks. However, as 
indicated in Business Snapshot 1.2, this has not always been the case. 
SUMMARY 
An important general principle in finance is that there is a trade-off 
between risk and return. Higher expected returns can usually be achieved 
only by taking higher risks. Investors should not, in theory, be concerned 
with risks they can diversify away. The extra return they demand should 
be for the amount of nondiversifiable systematic risk they are bearing. 
For companies, investment decisions are more complicated. Compan-
ies are not in general as well diversified as investors and survival is an 
Business Snapshot 1.2 Expensive Failures of Financial Institutions in the US 
Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Savings and Loans (S&Ls) in the 
United States failed to manage interest rate risk well. They tended to take 
short-term deposits and make long-term fixed-rate mortgages. As a result they 
were seriously hurt by interest rate increases in 1966, 1969 70, 1974. and the 
killer in 1979-82. S&Ls were protected by government guarantees. Over 1,700 
failed in the 1980s. A major reason for the failures was their inadequate 
interest rate risk management. The total cost to the US taxpayer of the failures 
has been estimated to be between $100 and $500 billion. 
The largest bank failure in the US, Contintental Illinois, can also be 
attributed to a failure to manage interest rale risks well. During the period 
1980 to 1983 its assets (i.e., loans) with maturities over a year totaled between 
$7 billion and $8 billion, whereas its liabilities (i.e., deposits) with maturities 
over a year were between $1.4 billion and $2.5 billion. Continental failed in 
1984 and was the subject of an expensive government bailout. 
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important and legitimate objective. Both financing and investment 
decisions should be taken so that the possibility of financial distress 
is low. 
This is because financial distress leads to what are known as bank-
ruptcy costs. These costs arise from the nature of the bankruptcy process 
and almost invariably lead to a reduction in shareholder value over and 
above the reduction that took place as a result of the adverse events 
leading to bankruptcy. 
Banks must manage the risks they face carefully. Equity capital is 
typically about 5% of assets and profit before taxes is often less than 
1% of assets. Large trading losses, an economic downturn leading to a 
sharp rise in loan losses, or other unexpected events can lead to an 
erosion of equity capital and put the bank in a precarious position. 
Regulators have become increasingly active in ensuring that the capital 
a bank keeps is commensurate with the risks it takes. 
Two general approaches to risk management are risk decomposition 
and risk aggregation. Risk decomposition involves managing risks one 
by one. Risk aggregation involves relying on the power of diversification 
to reduce risks. Banks use both approaches to manage market risks. 
Credit risks have traditionally been managed using risk aggregation, but 
with the advent of credit derivatives the risk decomposition approach 
can be used. 
A bank's net interest income is the excess of the interest earned over the 
interest paid. There are now well established asset/liability management 
procedures to ensure that this remains roughly constant from year to year. 
These involve adjusting the rates offered to customers to ensure that the 
maturities of assets and liabilities are matched. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
1.1. An investment has probabilities 0.1, 0.2, 0.35, 0.25, and 0.1 of giving 
returns equal to 40%, 30%, 15%, - 5 % and - 1 5 % . What is the expected 
return and the standard deviation of returns? 
1.2. Suppose that there are two investments with the same probability dis-
tribution of returns as in Problem 1.1. The correlation between the 
returns is 0.15. What is the expected return and standard deviation of 
return from a portfolio where money is divided equally between the 
investments. 
1.3. For the two investments considered in Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2, what are 
the alternative risk/return combinations if the correlation is (a) 0.3, (b) 1.0, 
and (c) -1.0. 
1.4. What is the difference between systematic and nonsystematic risk? Which 
is more important to an equity investor? Which can lead to the bankruptcy 
of a corporation? 
1.5. Outline the arguments leading to the conclusion that all investors should 
choose the same portfolio of risky investments. What are the key 
assumptions? 
1.6. The expected return on the market portfolio is 12% and the risk-free rate 
is 6%. What is the expected return on an investment with a beta of (a) 0.2, 
(b) 0.5, and (c) 1.4? 
1.7. "Arbitrage pricing theory is an extension of the capital asset pricing 
model." Explain this statement. 
1.8. "The capital structure decision of a company is a trade-off between 
bankruptcy costs and the tax advantages of debt." Explain this statement. 
1.9. A bank's operational risk is the risk of large losses because of employee 
fraud, natural disasters, litigation, etc. It will be discussed in Chapter 14. Is 
operational risk best handled by risk decomposition or risk aggregation. 
1.10. A bank's profit next year will be normally distributed with a mean of 0.6% 
of assets and a standard deviation of 1.5% of assets. The bank's equity is 
4% of assets. What is the probability that the bank will have a positive 
equity at the end of the year? Ignore taxes. 
1.11. Why do you think that banks are regulated to ensure that they do not take 
too much risk but most other companies (e.g., those in manufacturing and 
retailing) are not? 
1.12. Explain carefully the risks faced by Continental Illinois in the 1980 to 1983 
period based on the data in Business Snapshot 1.2. 
1.13. Explain carefully why interest rate risks contributed to the expensive S&L 
failures in the United States. 
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1.14. Suppose that a bank has $5 billion of one-year loans and $20 billion of 
five-year loans. These are financed by $15 billion of one-year deposits and 
$10 billion of five-year deposits. Explain the impact on the bank's net 
interest income of interest rates increasing by 1 % every year for the next 
three years. 
1.15. List the bankruptcy costs incurred by the company in Business Snap-
shot 1.1. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
1.16. Suppose that one investment has a mean return of 8% and a standard 
deviation of return of 14%. Another investment has a mean return of 12% 
and a standard deviation of return of 20%. The correlation between the 
returns is 0.3. Produce a chart similar to Figure 1.2 showing alternative 
risk/return combinations from the two investments. 
1.17. Which items on a DLC's income statement in Table 1.4 are most likely to 
be affected by (a) credit risk, (b) market risk, and (c) operational risk. 
1.18. A bank estimates that its profit next year is normally distributed with a 
mean of 0.8% of assets and the standard deviation of 2% of assets. How 
much equity (as a percent of assets) does the company need to be (a) 99% 
and (b) 99.9% sure that it will have positive equity at the end of the year. 
Ignore taxes. 
1.19. Suppose that a bank has $10 billion of one-year loans and $30 billion of 
five-year loans. These are financed by $35 billion of one-year deposits and 
$5 billion of five-year deposits. The bank has equity totaling $2 billion and 
its return on equity is currently 12%. Estimate what change in the interest 
rates next year would lead to the bank's return on equity being reduced to 
zero. Assume that the bank is subject to a tax rate of 30%. 
1.20. Explain why long-term rates are higher than short-term rates most of the 
time. Under what circumstances would you expect long-term rates to be 
lower than short-term rates? 
Financial Products 
and How They Are 
Used for Hedging 
Companies trade a variety of financial instruments to manage their risks. 
Some of these instruments are referred to as standard or "plain vanilla" 
products. Most forward contracts, futures contracts, swaps, and options 
fall into this category. Others are designed to meet the particular needs of 
a corporate treasurer. These are referred to as "exotics" or structured 
products. This chapter describes the instruments and how they trade. It 
discusses the circumstances when a company should hedge, how much 
hedging it should do, and what instruments should be used. 
2.1 THE MARKETS 
There are two types of markets in which financial instruments trade. 
These are known as the exchange-traded market and the over-the-counter 
(or OTC) market. 
Exchange-Traded Markets 
Exchanges have been used to trade financial products for many years. 
Some exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) focus on 
the trading of stocks. Others such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 
and the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) are concerned with 
the trading of derivatives such as futures and options. 
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The role of the exchange is to define the contracts that trade and 
organize trading so that market participants can be sure that the trades 
they agree to will be honored. Traditionally individuals have met at the 
exchange and agreed on the prices for trades, often by using an elaborate 
system of hand signals. Exchanges are increasingly moving to electronic 
trading. This involves traders entering their desired trades at a keyboard 
and a computer being used to match buyers and sellers. Not everyone 
agrees that the shift to electronic trading is desirable. Electronic trading is 
less physically demanding than traditional floor trading. However, traders 
do not have the opportunity to attempt to predict short-term market 
trends from the behavior and body language of other traders. 
Sometimes trading is facilitated with market makers. These are indi-
viduals who are always prepared to quote both a bid price (the price at 
which they are prepared to buy) and an offer price (the price at which they 
are prepared to sell). Typically the exchange will specify an upper bound 
for the spread between a market maker's bid and offer prices. 
Over-the-Counter Markets 
The over-the-counter market is an important alternative to exchanges. It 
is a telephone- and computer-linked network of traders who work for 
financial institutions, large corporations, or fund managers. Financial 
institutions often act as market makers for the more commonly traded 
instruments. 
Telephone conversations in the over-the-counter market are usually 
taped. If there is a dispute over what was agreed, the tapes are replayed 
to resolve the issue. Trades in the over-the-counter market are typically 
much larger than trades in the exchange-traded market. A key advantage 
of the over-the-counter market is that the terms of a contract do not have 
to be those specified by an exchange. Market participants are free to 
negotiate any mutually attractive deal. A disadvantage is that there is 
usually some credit risk in an over-the-counter trade (i.e., there is a small 
risk that the contract will not be honored). Exchanges have organized 
themselves to eliminate virtually all credit risk. 
2.2 WHEN TO HEDGE 
Most nonfinancial companies have no particular skills or expertise in 
predicting variables such as interest rates, exchange rates, and commod-
ity prices. It makes sense for them to hedge the risks associated with 
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these variables as they arise. The companies can then focus on their main 
activities. By hedging, they avoid unpleasant surprises such as a foreign 
exchange loss or a sharp rise in the price of a commodity that has to be 
purchased. 
It can be argued that companies need not hedge because the company's 
shareholders can implement their own hedging programs, deciding which 
of the company's risks to keep and which to get rid of. However this 
assumes—unrealistically—that a company's shareholders have as much 
information about the risks faced by the company as the company's 
management. It also ignores the bankruptcy costs arguments in 
Section 1.2. 
Hedging and Competitors 
It is not always correct for a company to choose to hedge. If hedging is 
not the norm in a certain industry, it can be dangerous for one company 
to choose to be different from all others. Competitive pressures within the 
industry may be such that the prices of the goods and services produced 
by the industry fluctuate to reflect raw material costs, interest rates, 
exchange rates, and so on. A company that does not hedge can expect 
its profit margins to be roughly constant. However, a company that does 
hedge can expect its profit margins to fluctuate! 
To illustrate this point, consider two manufacturers of gold jewelry, 
SafeandSure Company and TakeaChance Company. We assume that 
most companies in the industry do not hedge against movements in the 
price of gold and that TakeaChance Company is no exception. However, 
SafeandSure Company has decided to be different from its competitors 
and to use futures contracts to lock in the price it will pay for gold over 
the next 18 months. 
If the price of gold goes up, economic pressures will tend to lead to a 
corresponding increase in the wholesale price of the jewelry, so that 
TakeaChance Company's profit margin is unaffected. By contrast, 
SafeandSure Company's profit margin will increase after the effects of 
the hedge have been taken into account. If the price of gold goes down, 
economic pressures will tend to lead to a corresponding decrease in the 
wholesale price of the jewelry. Again, TakeaChance Company's profit 
margin is unaffected. However, SafeandSure Company's profit margin 
goes down. In extreme conditions, SafeandSure Company's profit margin 
could become negative as a result of the "hedging" carried out! This 
example is summarized in Table 2.1. 
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The example emphasizes the importance of looking at the big picture 
when hedging. All the implications of changes in commodity prices, 
interest rates, and exchange rates on a company's profitability should 
be taken into account in the design of a hedging strategy. 
2.3 THE "PLAIN VANILLA" PRODUCTS 
In this section we review the products that most commonly trade in 
financial markets. We focus on those that involve stocks, currencies, 
commodities, and interest rates. Less traditional products such as credit 
derivatives, weather derivatives, energy derivatives, and insurance deriva-
tives are covered in later chapters. * 
Long and Short Positions in Assets 
The simplest type of trade is the purchase or sale of an asset. Examples of 
such trades are: 
1. The purchase of 100 IBM shares 
2. The sale of 1 million British pounds 
3. The purchase of 1000 ounces of gold 
4. The sale of $1 million worth of bonds issued by General Motors 
The first of these trades would typically be done on an exchange; the 
other three would be done in the over-the-counter market. The trades are 
sometimes referred to as spot contracts because they lead to almost 
immediate "on the spot" delivery of the asset. 
Short Sales 
In some markets it is possible to sell an asset that you do not own with 
the intention of buying it back later. This is referred to as shorting the 
asset. We will illustrate how it works by considering a short sale of shares 
of a stock. 
Change in 
gold price 
Increase 
Decrease 
Effect on price 
of gold jewelry 
Increase 
Decrease 
Effect on profits 
of TakeaChance Co. 
None 
None 
Effect on profits 
of SafeandSure Co. 
Increase 
Decrease 
Table 2.1 Danger in hedging when competitors do not. 
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Suppose an investor instructs a broker to short 500 IBM shares. The 
broker will carry out the instructions by borrowing the shares from 
another client and selling them on an exchange in the usual way. The 
investor can maintain the short position for as long as desired, provided 
there are always shares available for the broker to borrow. At some stage, 
however, the investor will close out the position by purchasing 500 IBM 
shares. These are then replaced in the account of the client from which 
the shares were borrowed. The investor takes a profit if the stock price 
has declined and a loss if it has risen. If, at any time while the contract is 
open, the broker runs out of shares to borrow, the investor is short-
squeezed and is forced to close out the position immediately, even if not 
ready to do so. 
An investor with a short position must pay to the broker any income, 
such as dividends or interest, that would normally be received on the 
securities that have been shorted. The broker will transfer this to the client 
account from which the securities have been borrowed. Consider the 
position of an investor who shorts 500 shares in April when the price 
per share is $120 and closes out the position by buying them back in July 
when the price per share is $100. Suppose that a dividend of $1 per share 
is paid in May. The investor receives 500 x $120 = $60,000 in April when 
the short position is initiated. The dividend leads to a payment by the 
investor of 500 x $1 = $500 in May. The investor also pays 
500 x $100 = $50,000 for shares when the position is closed out in July. 
The net gain is, therefore, 
$60,000 - $500 - $50,000 = $9,500 
Table 2.2 illustrates this example and shows that the cash flows from the 
short sale are the mirror image of the cash flows from purchasing the 
shares in April and selling them in July. 
An investor entering into a short position is required to maintain a 
margin account with the broker. The margin account consists of cash or 
marketable securities deposited by the investor with the broker to guaran-
tee that the investor will not walk away from the short position if the 
share price increases. An initial margin is deposited and, if there are 
adverse movements (i.e., increases) in the price of the asset that is being 
shorted, additional margin may be required. The margin account does 
not represent a cost to the investor. This is because interest is usually paid 
on the balance in margin accounts and, if the interest rate offered is 
unacceptable, marketable securities such as Treasury bills can be used to 
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Table 2.2 Cash flows from short sale and purchase of shares. 
Purchase of Shares 
April: Purchase 500 shares for $120 -$60,000 
May: Receive dividend +$500 
July: Sell 500 shares for $100 per share +$50,000 
Net profit = -$9, 500 
Short Sale of Shares 
April: Borrow 500 shares and sell them for $120 +$60,000 
May: Pay dividend -$500 
July: Buy 500 shares for $100 per share -$50,000 
Replace borrowed shares to close short position 
Net profit = +$9, 500 
meet margin requirements. The proceeds of the sale of the asset belong to 
the investor and normally form part of the initial margin. 
Forward Contracts 
A forward contract is an agreement to buy an asset in the future for a 
certain price. Forward contracts trade in the over-the-counter market. 
One of the parties to a forward contract assumes a long position and 
agrees to buy the underlying asset on a certain specified future date for a 
certain specified price. The other party assumes a short position and 
agrees to sell the asset on the same date for the same price. 
Forward contracts on foreign exchange are very popular. Table 2.3 
provides quotes on the exchange rate between the British pound (GBP) 
and the US dollar (USD) that might be provided by a large international 
Table 2.3 Spot and forward quotes for the 
USD/GBP exchange rate, August 5, 2005 (GBP = 
British pound; USD = US dollar; quote is number 
of USD per GBP). 
Spot 
1-month forward 
3-month forward 
6-month forward 
Bid 
1.7794 
1.7780 
1.7761 
1.7749 
Offer 
1.7798 
1.7785 
1.7766 
1.7755 
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bank on August 5, 2005. The quotes are for the number of USD per GBP. 
The first row indicates that the bank is prepared to buy GBP (also known 
as sterling) in the spot market (i.e., for virtually immediate delivery) at the 
rate of $1.7794 per GBP and sell sterling in the spot market at $1.7798 per 
GBP; the second row indicates that the bank is prepared to buy sterling in 
one month's time at $1.7780 per GBP and sell sterling in one month at 
$1.7785 per GBP; and so on. 
Forward contracts can be used to hedge foreign currency risk. Suppose 
that on August 5, 2005, the treasurer of a US corporation knows that the 
corporation will pay £1 million in six months (on February 5, 2006) and 
wants to hedge against exchange rate moves. The treasurer can agree to 
buy £1 million six months forward at an exchange rate of 1.7755 by 
trading with the bank providing the quotes in Table 2.3. The corporation 
then has a long forward contract on GBP. It has agreed that on February 
5, 2006, it will buy £1 million from the bank for $1.7755 million. The 
bank has a short forward contract on GBP. It has agreed that on 
February 5, 2006, it will sell £1 million for $1.7755 million. Both the 
corporation and the bank have made a binding commitment. 
What are the possible outcomes in the trade we have just described? 
The forward contract obligates the corporation to buy £1 million for 
$1,775,500 and the bank to sell £1 million for this amount. If the spot 
exchange rate rose to, say, 1.8000 at the end of the six months the forward 
contract would be worth +$24,500 (= $1,800,000 - $1,775,500) to the 
corporation and -$24,500 to the bank. It would enable 1 million pounds 
to be purchased at 1.7755 rather than 1.8000. Similarly, if the spot 
exchange rate fell to 1.6000 at the end of the six months, the forward 
contract would have a value of -$175,500 to the corporation and a value 
of +$175,500 to the bank because it would lead to the corporation paying 
$175,500 more than the market price for the sterling. 
In general, the payoff from a long position in a forward contract on one 
unit of an asset is 
ST — K 
where K is the delivery price and ST is the spot price of the asset at 
maturity of the contract. This is because the holder of the contract is 
obligated to buy an asset worth ST for K. Similarly, the payoff from a 
short position in a forward contract on one unit of an asset is 
K — ST 
These payoffs can be positive or negative. They are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Payoffs from forward contracts: (a) long position and (b) short 
position. Delivery price = K; price of asset at contract maturity = ST. 
Because it costs nothing to enter into a forward contract, the payoff from 
the contract is also the trader's total gain or loss from the contract. 
Futures Contracts 
Futures contracts like forward contracts are agreements to buy an asset at 
a future time. Unlike forward contracts, futures are traded on an ex-
change. This means that the contracts that trade are standardized. The 
exchange defines the amount of the asset underlying one contract, when 
delivery can be made, exactly what can be delivered, and so on. Contracts 
are referred to by their delivery month. For example the September 2007 
gold futures is a contract where delivery is made in September 2007. (The 
precise times, delivery locations, etc., are defined by the exchange.) 
One of the attractive features of futures contracts is that it is easy to close 
out a position. If you buy (i.e., take a long position in) a September gold 
futures contract in March you can exit in June by selling (i.e., taking a short 
position in) the same contract. In forward contracts final delivery of the 
underlying asset is usually made. Futures contracts by contrast are usually 
closed out before the delivery month is reached. Business Snapshot 2.1 is 
an amusing story indicating a potential pitfall in closing out contracts. 
Futures contracts are different from forward contracts in that they are 
settled daily. If the futures price moves in your favor during a day, you 
make an immediate gain. If it moves in the opposite direction, you make 
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Business Snapshot 2.1 The Unanticipated Delivery of a Futures Contract 
This story (which may well be apocryphal) was told to the author of this book 
by a senior executive of a financial institution. It concerns a new employee of the 
financial institution who had not previously worked in the financial sector. One 
of the clients of the financial institution regularly entered into a long futures 
contract on live cattle for hedging purposes and issued instructions to close out 
the position on the last day of trading. (Live cattle futures contracts trade on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange and each contract is on 40.000 pounds of cattle.) 
The new employee was given responsibility for handling the account. 
When the time came to close out a contract, the employee noted that the 
client was long one contract and instructed a trader at the exchange to go long 
(not short) one contract. The result of this mistake was that the financial 
institution ended up with a long position in two live cattle futures contracts. 
By the time the mistake was spotted, trading in the contract had ceased. 
The financial institution (not the client) was responsible for the mistake. As 
a result, it started to look into the details of the delivery arrangements for live 
cattle futures contracts something it had never done before. Under the terms 
of the contract, cattle could be delivered by the party with the short position 
to a number of different locations in the United States during the delivery 
month. Because it was long the financial institution could do nothing but wait 
for a party with a short position to issue a notice of intention to deliver to the 
exchange and for the exchange to assign that notice to the financial institution. 
It eventually received a notice from the exchange and found that it would 
receive live cattle at a location 2,000 miles away the following Tuesday. The new 
employee was dispatched to the location to handle things. It turned out that the 
location had a cattle auction every Tuesday. The party with the short position 
that was making delivery bought cattle at the auction and then immediately 
delivered them. Unfortunately, the cattle could not be resold until the next cattle 
auction the following Tuesday. The employee was therefore faced with the 
problem of making arrangements for the cattle to be housed and fed for a 
week. This was a great start to a first job in the financial sector! 
an immediate loss. Consider what happens when you buy one Septem-
ber gold futures contract on the Chicago Board of Trade when the 
futures price is $580 per ounce. The contract is on 100 ounces of gold. 
You must maintain a margin account with your broker. As in the case 
of a short sale, this consists of cash or marketable securities and is to 
ensure that you will honor your commitments under the contract. The 
rules for determining the initial amount that must be deposited in a 
margin account, when it must be topped up, and so on, are set by the 
exchange. 
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Suppose that the initial margin requirement on your gold trade is 
$2000. If, by close of trading on the first day you hold the contract, 
the September gold futures price has dropped from $580 to $578, then 
you lose 2 x 100 or $200. This is because you agreed to buy gold in 
September for $580 and the going price for September gold is now $578. 
The balance in your margin account would be reduced from $2,000 to 
$1,800. If, at close of trading the next day, the September futures price is 
$577, then you lose a further $100 from your margin account. If the 
decline continues, you will at some stage be asked to add cash to your 
margin account. If you do not do so, your broker will close out your 
position. 
In the example we have just considered, the price of gold moved against 
you. If instead it moved in your favor, funds would be added to your 
margin account. The Exchange Clearinghouse is responsible for man-
aging the flow of funds from investors with short positions to investors 
with long positions when the futures price increases and the flow of funds 
in the opposite direction when the futures price declines. 
The relationship between futures or forward prices and spot prices is 
given in Appendix A at the end of the book. 
Swaps 
The first swap contracts were negotiated in the early 1980s. Since then the 
market has seen phenomenal growth. Swaps now occupy a position of 
central importance in the over-the-counter derivatives market. 
A swap is an agreement between two companies to exchange cash flows 
in the future. The agreement defines the dates when the cash flows are to 
be paid and the way in which they are to be calculated. Usually the 
calculation of the cash flows involves the future values of interest rates, 
exchange rates, or other market variables. 
A forward contract can be viewed as a simple example of a swap. 
Suppose it is March 1, 2007, and a company enters into a forward 
contract to buy 100 ounces of gold for $600 per ounce in one year. The 
company can sell the gold in one year as soon as it is received. The 
forward contract is therefore equivalent to a swap where the company 
agrees that on March 1, 2008, it will pay $60,000 and receive 1005, 
where S is the market price of one ounce of gold on that date. 
Whereas a forward contract is equivalent to the exchange of cash flows 
on just one future date, swaps typically lead to cash flow exchanges 
taking place on several future dates. The most common swap is a "plain 
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5% 
Company A Counterparty 
LIBOR 
Figure 2.2 A plain vanilla interest rate swap. 
vanilla" interest rate swap where a fixed rate of interest is exchanged for 
LIBOR.1 Both interest rates are applied to the same notional principal. 
A swap where company A pays a fixed rate of interest of 5% and receives 
LIBOR is shown in Figure 2.2. Suppose that in this contract interest 
rates are reset every six months, the notional principal is $100 million, 
and the swap lasts for three years. Table 2.4 shows the cash flows to 
company A when six-month LIBOR interest rates prove to be those 
shown in the second column of the table. The swap is entered into on 
March 5, 2007. The six-month interest rate on that date is 4.2% per year 
or 2.1 % per six months. As a result, the floating-rate cash flow received 
six months later on September 5, 2007, is 0.021 x 100 or $2.1 million. 
Similarly, the six month interest rate of 4.8% per annum (or 2.4% per six 
months) on September 5, 2007, leads to the floating cash flow received 
six months later (on March 5, 2008) being $2.4 million, and so on. The 
fixed-rate cash flow paid is always $2.5 million (5% of $100 million 
Table 2.4 Cash flows (millions of dollars) to company A in swap 
in Figure 2.2. The swap lasts three years and has a principal of 
$100 million. Date 
Mar. 5, 2007 
Sept. 5, 2007 
Mar. 5, 2008 
Sept. 5, 2008 
Mar. 5, 2009 
Sept. 5, 2009 
Mar. 5, 2010 
6-month 
LIBOR rate 
(%) 
4.20 
4.80 
5.30 
5.50 
5.60 
5.90 
6.40 
Floating 
cash f l o w 
received 
+2.10 
+2.40 
+2.65 
+2.75 
+2.80 
+2.95 
Fixed 
cash flow 
paid 
-2.50 
-2.50 
-2.50 
-2.50 
-2.50 
-2.50 
Net 
cash flow 
-0.40 
-0.10 
+0.15 
+0.25 
+0.30 
+0.45 
1LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered Rate. It is the rate at which a bank offers to 
make large wholesale deposits with another bank and will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
38 Chapter 2 
applied to a six-month period).2 Note that the timing of cash flows 
corresponds to the usual way short-term interest rates such as LIBOR 
work. The interest is observed at the beginning of the period to which it 
applies and paid at the end of the period. 
Plain vanilla interest rate swaps are very popular because they can be 
used for many purposes. For example, the swap in Figure 2.2 could be 
used by company A to transform borrowings at a floating rate of LIBOR 
plus 1% to borrowings at a fixed rate of 6%. (Pay LIBOR plus 1%, 
receive LIBOR, and pay 5% nets out to pay 6%.) It can also be used by 
company A to transform an investment earning a fixed rate of 4.5% to an 
investment earning LIBOR minus 0.5%. (Receive 4.5%, pay 5%, and 
receive LIBOR nets out to receive LIBOR minus 0.5%.) 
Example 2.1 
Suppose a bank has floating-rate deposits and five-year fixed-rate loans. As 
explained in Section 1.5, this exposes the bank to significant risks. If rates rise, 
then the deposits will be rolled over at high rates and the bank's net interest 
income will contract. The bank can hedge its risks by entering into the swap in 
Figure 2.2 (taking the role of Company A). The swap can be viewed as 
transforming the floating-rate deposits to fixed-rate deposits. (Alternatively, 
it can be viewed as transforming fixed-rate loans to floating-rate loans.) 
Many banks are market makers in swaps. Table 2.5 shows quotes for US 
dollar swaps that might be posted by a bank.3 The first row shows that the 
Table 2.5 
Maturity 
(years) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
10 
Swap quotes made by a market maker 
(percent per annum). 
Bid 
6.03 
6.21 
6.35 
6.47 
6.65 
6.83 
Offer 
6.06 
6.24 
6.39 
6.51 
6.68 
6.87 
Swap rate 
6.045 
6.225 
6.370 
6.490 
6.665 
6.850 
2
 Note that we have not taken account of day count conventions, holidays, calendars, 
etc., in Table 2.4. 
3
 The standard swap in the United States is one where fixed payments made every six 
months are exchanged for floating LIBOR payments made every three months. In 
Table 2.4 we assumed that fixed and floating payments are exchanged every six months. 
Business Snapshot 2.2 Procter and Gamble's Bizarre Deal 
A particularly bizarre swap is the so-called "5/30" swap entered into between 
Bankers Trust (BT) and Procter and Gamble (P&G) on November 2, 1993. 
This was a five-year swap with semiannual payments. The notional principal 
was $200 million. BT paid P&G 5.30% per annum. P&G paid BT the average 
30-day CP (commercial paper) rate minus 75 basis points plus a spread. The 
average commercial paper rate was calculated by taking observations on the 
30-day commercial paper rate each day during the preceding accrual period 
and averaging them. 
The spread was zero for the first payment date (May 2, 1994). For the 
remaining nine payment dates, it was 
In this, five-year CMT is the constant maturity Treasury yield (i.e., the yield on 
a five-year Treasury note, as reported by the US Federal Reserve). The 30-year 
TSY price is the midpoint of the bid and offer cash bond prices for the 6.25% 
Treasury bond maturing on August 2023. Note that the spread calculated from 
the formula is a decimal interest rate. It is not measured in basis points. If the 
formula gives 0.1 and the CP rate is 6%, the rate paid by P&G is 15.25%. 
P&G was hoping that the spread would be zero and the deal would enable it 
to exchange fixed-rate funding at 5.30% for funding at 75 basis points less than 
the commercial paper rate. In fact, interest rates rose sharply in early 1994, bond 
prices fell, and the swap proved very, very expensive. (See Problem 2.30.) 
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bank is prepared to enter into a two-year swap where it pays a fixed rate of 
6.03% and receives LIBOR. It is also prepared to enter into a swap where it 
receives 6.06% and pays LIBOR. The bid-offer spread in Table 2.5 is three 
or four basis points. The average of the bid and offer fixed rates is known as 
the swap rate. This is shown in the final column of the table. 
The trading of swaps is facilitated by ISDA, the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association. This organization has developed standard 
contracts that are widely used by market participants. Swaps can be 
designed so that the periodic cash flows depend on the future value of 
any well-defined variable. Swaps dependent on interest rates, exchange 
rates, commodity prices, and equity indices are popular. Sometimes there 
are embedded options in a swap. For example, one side might have the 
option to terminate a swap early or to choose between a number of 
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different ways of calculating cash flows. Occasionally swaps are traded 
with payoffs that are calculated in quite bizarre ways. An example is a 
deal entered into between Procter and Gamble and Bankers Trust in 1993 
(see Business Snapshot 2.2). The details of this transaction are in the 
public domain because it later became the subject of litigation.4 The 
valuation of swaps is discussed in Appendix B at the end of the book. 
Options 
Options are traded both on exchanges and in the over-the-counter 
market. There are two basic types of options. A call option gives the 
holder the right to buy the underlying asset by a certain date for a certain 
price. A put option gives the holder the right to sell the underlying asset 
by a certain date for a certain price. The price in the contract is known as 
the exercise price or strike price; the date in the contract is known as the 
expiration date or maturity. American options can be exercised at any time 
up to the expiration date, but European options can be exercised only on 
the expiration date itself.5 Most of the options that are traded on 
exchanges are American. In the exchange-traded equity option market, 
one contract is usually an agreement to buy or sell 100 shares. European 
options are generally easier to analyze than American options, and some 
of the properties of an American option are frequently deduced from 
those of its European counterpart. 
An at-the-money option is an option where the strike price is close to 
the price of the underlying asset. An out-of-the-money option is a call 
option where the strike price is above the price of the underlying asset or 
a put option where the strike price is below this price. An in-the-money 
option is a call option where the strike price is below the price of the 
underlying asset or a put option where the strike price is above this price. 
It should be emphasized that an option gives the holder the right to do 
something. The holder does not have to exercise this right. By contrast, in 
a forward or futures contract, the holder is obligated to buy or sell the 
underlying asset. Note that, whereas it costs nothing to enter into a 
forward or futures contract, there is a cost to acquiring an option. 
The largest exchange in the world for trading stock options is the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE; www.cboe.com). Table 2.6 
4
 See D.J. Smith, "Aggressive Corporate Finance: A Close Look at the Procter and 
Gamble-Bankers Trust Leveraged Swap." Journal of Derivatives 4, No. 4 (Summer 1997): 
67-79. 
5
 Note that the terms American and European do not refer to the location of the option 
or the exchange. Some options trading on North American exchanges are European. 
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Table 2.6 Prices of options on Intel, May 29, 2003; stock price = $20.83. 
Strike price 
($) 
20.00 
22.50 
Calls 
June 
1.25 
0.20 
July 
1.60 
0.45 
Oct. 
2.40 
1.15 
Puts 
June 
0.45 
1.85 
July 
0.85 
2.20 
Oct. 
1.50 
2.85 
gives the closing prices of some of the American options trading on Intel 
on May 29, 2003. The option strike prices are $20 and $22.50. The 
maturities are June 2003, July 2003, and October 2003. The June options 
have an expiration date of June 21, 2003; the July options have an 
expiration date of July 19, 2003; the October options have an expiration 
date of October 18, 2003. Intel's stock price at the close of trading on 
May 29, 2003, was $20.83. 
Suppose an investor instructs a broker to buy one October call option 
contract on Intel with a strike price of $22.50. The broker will relay these 
instructions to a trader at the CBOE. This trader will then find another 
trader who wants to sell one October call contract on Intel with a strike 
price of $22.50, and a price will be agreed upon. We assume that the price 
is $1.15, as indicated in Table 2.6. This is the price for an option to buy 
one share. In the United States, one stock option contract is a contract to 
buy or sell 100 shares. Therefore the investor must arrange for $115 to be 
remitted to the exchange through the broker. The exchange will then 
arrange for this amount to be passed on to the party on the other side of 
the transaction. 
In our example the investor has obtained at a cost of $115 the right to 
buy 100 Intel shares for $22.50 each. The party on the other side of the 
transaction has received $115 and has agreed to sell 100 Intel shares for 
$22.50 per share if the investor chooses to exercise the option. If the price of 
Intel does not rise above $22.50 before October 18, 2003, the option is not 
exercised and the investor loses $115. But if the Intel share price does well 
and the option is exercised when it is $30, the investor can buy 100 shares at 
$22.50 per share when they are worth $30 per share. This leads to a gain of 
$750, or $635 when the initial cost of the options is taken into account. 
An alternative trade for the investor would be the purchase of one July 
put option contract with a strike price of $20. From Table 2.6 we see that 
this would cost 100 x 0.85 or $85. The investor would obtain at a cost of 
$85 the right to sell 100 Intel shares for $20 per share prior to July 19,2003. 
If the Intel share price stays above $20 the option is not exercised and the 
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Profit ($) 
Figure 2.3 Net profit per share from (a) purchasing a contract consisting of 100 
Intel October call options with a strike price of $22.50 and (b) purchasing a 
contract consisting of 100 Intel July put options with a strike price of $20.00. 
investor loses $85. But if the investor exercises when the stock price is $15, 
the investor makes a gain of $500 by buying 100 Intel shares at $15 and 
selling them for $20. The net profit after the cost of the options is taken into 
account is $415. 
The options trading on the CBOE are American. If we assume for 
simplicity that they are European so that they can be exercised only at 
maturity, the investor's profit as a function of the final stock price for the 
Intel options we have been considering is shown in Figure 2.3. 
There are four types of trades in options markets: 
1. Buying a call 
2. Selling a call 
3. Buying a put 
4. Selling a put 
Buyers are referred to as having long positions; sellers are referred to as 
having short positions. Selling an option is also known as writing the 
option. 
Options trade very actively in the over-the-counter market as well as on 
exchanges. Indeed the over-the-counter market for options is now larger 
than the exchange-traded market. Whereas exchange-traded options tend 
to be American, options trading in the over-the-counter market are 
frequently European. The advantage of the over-the-counter market is 
that maturity dates, strike prices, and contract sizes can be tailored to 
meet the precise needs of a client. They do not have to correspond to 
those specified by the exchange. Option trades in the over-the-counter 
market are usually much larger than those on exchanges. 
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Valuation formulas and numerical procedures for options on stocks, 
stock indices, currencies, and futures are in Appendices C and D at the 
end of this book. 
2.4 USING THE PRODUCTS FOR HEDGING 
Futures and forward contracts provide a hedge for an exposure at one 
particular time. As we saw earlier the treasurer of a US company can use 
the quotes in Table 2.3 to buy sterling forward when it is known that the 
company will have to pay sterling at a certain future time. Similarly, the 
treasurer can use the quotes to sell sterling forward when it is known that 
it will receive sterling at a certain future time. Futures contracts can be 
used in a similar way. When a futures contract is used for hedging the 
plan is usually to close the contract out prior to maturity. As a result the 
hedge performance is reduced somewhat because there is uncertainty 
about the difference between the futures price and the spot price on the 
close-out date. This uncertainty is known as basis risk. 
When forward and futures contracts are used for hedging the objective 
is to lock in the price at which an asset will be bought or sold at a certain 
future time. The hedge ratio is the ratio of the size of the futures or 
forward position to the size of the exposure. Up to now we have assumed 
that a company uses a hedge ratio of 1.0. (For example, if it has a 
$1 million exposure to the USD/GBP exchange rate it takes a $1 million 
forward or futures position.) Sometimes a company may choose to 
partially hedge its risks by using a hedge ratio of less than 1.0. 
Even when a company wants to minimize its risks, it may not be 
optimal for it to use a hedge ratio of 1.0. Suppose that the standard 
deviation of the change in a futures or forward price during the hedging 
period is and the standard deviation of the change in the value of the 
asset being hedged is Suppose further that the correlation between the 
two changes is It can be shown that the optimal hedge ratio is 
(2.1) 
Example 2.2 
An airline expects to purchase 2.4 million gallons of jet fuel in one month's 
time. Because there is no futures contract on jet fuel it decides to use the 
futures contact on heating oil that trades on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange. The correlation between monthly changes in the price of jet fuel 
and monthly changes in heating oil futures price is 0.7. The standard deviation 
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of monthly changes in the heating oil futures price per gallon is 0.024 and the 
standard deviation of the monthly changes in the price of jet oil per gallon is 
0.021. The optimal hedge ratio is therefore 
Each heating oil futures contract is on 42,000 gallons of heating oil. The 
number of contracts the company should buy is therefore 
Example 2.3 
A fund manager wants to hedge a well-diversified investment portfolio worth 
$2.5 million until time T using a forward contracts on the S&P 500. The index 
is currently 1250, so that the portfolio is worth 2000 times the index. Assume 
that F is the current forward rate for a contract maturing at time T. If the 
portfolio has a beta of 1.0, the hedge ratio should be 1.0 (see Section 1.1 for a 
discussion of beta). This means that the forward contract should be structured 
so that the payoff to the fund manager at time T is 
2000(F - ST) 
where ST is the value of the S&P 500 at time T. When = 2, the hedge 
position should be doubled, so that the payoff is 
4000(F - ST) 
In general, the hedge ratio should equal the beta of the well-diversified 
portfolio, so that the payoff from the forward contract is This 
is consistent with equation (2.1) because it is approximately true that 
and = 1. 
As explained earlier, a swap can be regarded as a convenient way of 
bundling forward contracts. It can provide a hedge for cash flows that will 
occur on a regular basis over a period of time. 
Options are a different type of hedging instrument from forwards, 
futures, and swaps. Whereas forward, futures, and swap contracts lock 
in prices for future sales or purchases of an asset, an option provides 
insurance. For example, the call option in Figure 2.3a could be used to 
guarantee that shares of Intel could be purchased for $22.50 or less in 
October; the put option in Figure 2.3b could be used to guarantee that a 
holding of shares in Intel could be sold for at least $20 in July. 
A Practical Issue 
It is important to realize that hedging can result in a decrease or an 
increase in a company's profits relative to the position it would be in with 
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no hedging. Consider a company that decides to use a short futures 
position to hedge the future sale of 1 million barrels of oil. If the price 
of oil goes down, the company loses money on the sale of the oil and the 
futures position leads to an offsetting gain. The treasurer can be con-
gratulated for having had the foresight to put the hedge in place. Clearly, 
the company is better off than it would be with no hedging. Other 
executives in the organization, it is hoped, will appreciate the contribution 
made by the treasurer. 
If the price of oil goes up, the company gains from its sale of the oil, 
and the futures position leads to an offsetting loss. The company is in a 
worse position than it would be with no hedging. Although the hedging 
decision was perfectly logical, the treasurer may in practice have a difficult 
time justifying it. Suppose that the price of oil increases by $3, so that the 
company loses about $3 per barrel on the futures contract. We can 
imagine a conversation such as the following between the treasurer and 
the president: 
PRESIDENT: This is terrible. We've lost $3 million in the futures 
market in the space of three months. How could it 
happen? I want a full explanation. 
TREASURER: The purpose of the futures contracts was to hedge our 
exposure to the price of oil—not to make a profit. Don't 
forget that we made about $3 million from the favorable 
effect of the oil price increases on our business. 
PRESIDENT: What's that got to do with it? That's like saying that we 
do not need to worry when our sales are down in 
California because they are up in New York. 
TREASURER : If the price of oil had gone down.. . 
PRESIDENT : I don't care what would have happened if the price of oil 
had gone down. The fact is that it went up. I really do not 
know what you were doing playing the futures markets 
like this. Our shareholders will expect us to have done 
particularly well this quarter. I'm going to have to 
explain to them that your actions reduced profits by 
$3 million. I'm afraid this is going to mean no bonus 
for you this year. 
TREASURER: That's unfair. I was only... 
PRESIDENT : Unfair! You are lucky not to be fired. You lost $3 million. 
TREASURER : It all depends how you look at i t . . . 
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This shows that, although hedging reduces risk for the company, it can 
increase risk for the treasurer if others do not fully understand what is 
being done. The only real solution to this problem is to ensure that all 
senior executives within the organization fully understand the nature of 
hedging before a hedging program is put in place. One of the reasons why 
treasurers sometimes choose to buy insurance using options rather than 
implementing a more straightforward hedge using forwards, futures, or 
swaps is that options do not lead to the problem we have just mentioned. 
They allow the company to benefit from favorable outcomes while being 
hedged against unfavorable outcomes. (Of course, this is achieved at a 
cost. The company has to pay the option premium.) 
2.5 EXOTIC OPTIONS AND STRUCTURED DEALS 
We met one exotic swap transaction in Business Snapshot 2.2. Many 
different types of exotic options and highly structured deals trade in the 
over-the-counter market. Although exotics are a relatively small part of 
the trading for a financial institution they are important because the profit 
margin on trades in exotics tends to be much higher than on plain vanilla 
options or swaps. Here are a few examples of exotic options: 
Asian Options: Whereas regular options provide a payoff based on the 
final price of the underlying asset at the time of exercise, Asian options 
provide a payoff based on the average of the price of the underlying asset 
over some specified period. An example is an average price call option that 
provides a payoff in one year equal to max(S - K, 0), where S is the 
average asset price during the year and K is the strike price. 
Barrier Options: These options come into existence or disappear when the 
price of the underlying asset reaches a certain barrier. For example, a 
knock-out call option with a strike price of $30 and a barrier of $20 is a 
regular call option that ceases to exist if the asset price falls below $20. 
Basket Options: These are options on a portfolio of assets rather than 
options on a single asset. 
Binary Options: These are options that provide a fixed dollar payoff if 
some criterion is met. An example is an option that provides a payoff in 
one year of $1,000 if a stock price is greater than $20. 
Compound Options: These are options on options. There are four types: a 
call on a call, a call on a put, a put on a call, and a put on a put. An example 
of a compound option is an option to buy an option on a stock currently 
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worth $15. The first option expires in one year and has a strike price of $1. 
The second option expires in three years and has a strike price of $20. 
Lookback Options: These are options that provide a payoff based on the 
maximum or minimum price of the underlying asset over some period. 
An example is an option that provides a payoff in one year equal to 
ST - Smin, where ST is the asset price at the end of the year and Smin is the 
minimum asset price during the year. 
Business Snapshot 2.3 Microsoft's Hedging 
Microsoft actively manages its foreign exchange exposure. In some countries 
(e.g., Europe. Japan, and Australia) it bills in the local currency and converts 
jits net revenue to US dollars monthly. For these currencies there is a clear 
exposure to exchange rate movements. In other countries (e.g., Latin America, 
Eastern Europe. and Southeast Asia) it bills in US dollars. The latter appears 
to avoid any foreign exchange exposure - but it does not. 
Suppose the US dollar strengthens against the currency of a country where 
Microsoft is billing in dollars. People in the country will find it more difficult 
to buy Microsoft products because it takes more of the local currency to buy 
11. As a result Microsoft will probably find it necessary to reduce its US dollar 
prices or face a decline in sales. Microsoft therefore has a foreign exchange 
exposure—both when it bills in US dollars and when it bills in the local 
currency. This emphasizes the point made in Section 2.2 that it is important to 
consider the big picture when hedging. 
Microsoft likes to use options for hedging. Suppose it uses a one-year time 
horizon. Microsoft recognizes that its exposure to. say, the Japanese yen is an 
exposure to the average exchange rate during the year because approximately 
the same amount of yen is converted to US dollars each month. It therefore uses 
Asian options rather than regular options to hedge the exposure. What is more, 
Microsoft's net exposure is to a weighted average of the exchange rates for all 
the countries in which it does business. It therefore uses basket options (i.e., 
options on a weighted average of exchange rates). A contract it likes to negotiate 
with financial institutions is therefore an Asian basket put option. This cost of 
this option is much less than a portfolio of put options, one for each month and 
each exchange rate (see Problem 2.24). But it gives Microsoft exactly the 
protection it requires. 
Microsoft faces other financial risks. For example, it is exposed to interest 
rate risk on its bond portfolio. (When rates rise, the portfolio loses money.) It 
also has two sorts of exposure to equity prices. It is exposed to the equity 
prices of the companies in which it invests. It is also exposed to its own equity 
price because it regularly repurchases its own shares as part of its stock awards 
program. It likes to use sophisticated option strategies to hedge these risks. 
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Why do companies use exotic options and structured products in 
preference to the plain vanilla products we looked at in Section 2.3? 
Sometimes the products are totally inappropriate as risk management 
tools. (This was certainly true in the case of the Procter and Gamble 
swap discussed in Business Snapshot 2.2.) But usually there are sound 
reasons for the contracts entered into by corporate treasurers. For 
example, Microsoft often uses Asian basket options in its risk manage-
ment. As explained in Business Snapshot 2.3 this is the ideal product for 
managing its exposures. 
2.6 DANGERS 
Derivatives are very versatile instruments. They can be used for hedging, 
for speculation, and for arbitrage. (Hedging involves reducing risks; 
speculation involves taking risks; arbitrage involves locking in a profit 
by simultaneously trading in two or more markets.) It is this very 
versatility that can cause problems. Sometimes traders who have a 
mandate to hedge risks or follow an arbitrage strategy become (con-
sciously or unconsciously) speculators. The results can be disastrous. 
One example of this is provided by the activities of Nick Leeson at 
Barings Bank (see Business Snapshot 2.4).6 
To avoid the problems Barings encountered, it is very important for 
both financial and nonfinancial corporations to set up controls to ensure 
that derivatives are being used for their intended purpose. Risk limits 
should be set and the activities of traders monitored daily to ensure that 
the risk limits are adhered to. 
SUMMARY 
There are two types of markets in which financial products trade: the 
exchange-traded market and the over-the-counter market. In this chapter 
we have reviewed spot trades, forward contracts, futures contracts, swaps, 
and options contracts. A forward or futures contract involves an obliga-
tion to buy or sell an asset at a certain time in the future for a certain 
price. A swap is an agreement to exchange cash flows in the future in 
amounts dependent on the values of one or more market variables. There 
are two types of options: calls and puts. A call option gives the holder the 
6
 The movie Rogue Trader provides a good dramatization of the failure of Barings Bank. 
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right to buy an asset by a certain date for a certain price. A put option 
gives the holder the right to sell an asset by a certain date for a certain 
price. Forwards, futures, swaps, and options trade on a wide range of 
different underlying assets. 
Forward, futures, and swap contracts have the effect of locking in the 
prices that will apply to future transactions. Options by contrast provide 
insurance. They ensure that the price applicable to a future transaction 
will not be worse than a certain level. Exotic options and structured 
products are tailored to the particular needs of corporate treasurers. 
For example, as we saw in Business Snapshot 2.3, Asian basket options 
can allow a company such as Microsoft to hedge its net exposure to 
several risks over a period of time. 
It is important to look at the big picture when hedging. For example, 
a company may find that it is increasing rather than reducing its risks if 
it chooses to hedge when none of its competitors does so. The hedge 
ratio is the ratio of the size of the hedge position to the size of the 
exposure. It is not always optimal to use a hedge ratio of 1.0. The 
optimal hedge ratio depends on the variability of futures price, the 
variability of the price of the asset being hedged, and the correlation 
between the two. 
Business Snapshot 2.4 The Barings Bank Disaster 
Derivatives are very versatile instruments. They can be used for hedging, 
speculation, and arbitrage. One of the risks faced by a company that trades 
derivatives is that an employee who has a mandate to hedge or to look for 
arbitrage opportunities may become a speculator. 
Nick Leeson, an employee of Barings Bank in the Singapore office in 1995. 
had a mandate to look for arbitrage opportunities between the Nikkei 225 
futures prices on the Singapore exchange and the Osaka exchange. Over time 
Leeson moved from being an arbitrageur to being a speculator without anyone 
in Barings head office in London fully understanding that he had changed the 
way he was using derivatives. He began to make losses, which he was able to 
hide. He then began to take bigger speculative positions in an attempt to 
recover the losses, but only succeeded in making the losses worse. 
In the end Leeson's total loss was close to 1 billion dollars. As a result. 
Barings a bank that had been in existence for 200 years -was wiped out. 
One of the lessons from the Barings disaster is that it is important to define 
unambiguous risk limits for traders and then carefully monitor their activities 
to make sure that the limits are adhered to. 
50 Chapter 2 
FURTHER READING 
Baz, J., and M. Pascutti. "Alternative Swap Contracts Analysis and Pricing," 
Journal of Derivatives, Winter 1996: 7-21. 
Boyle, P., and F. Boyle, Derivatives: The Tools That Changed Finance. London: 
Risk Books, 2001 
Brown, K. C. and D. J. Smith. Interest Rate and Currency Swaps: A Tutorial. 
Association for Investment Management and Research, 1996. 
Brown, G. W. "Managing Foreign Exchange Risk with Derivatives." Journal of 
Financial Economics, 60 (2001): 401-448. 
Flavell, R. Swaps and Other Instruments. Chichester: Wiley, 2002. 
Geczy, C, B.A. Minton, and C. Schrand. "Why Firms Use Currency 
Derivatives," Journal of Finance, 52, No. 4 (1997): 1323-1354. 
Litzenberger, R. H. "Swaps: Plain and Fanciful," Journal of Finance, 47, No. 3 
(1992): 831-850. 
Miller, M. H. "Financial Innovation: Achievements and Prospects," Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 4 (Winter 1992): 4-11. 
Warwick B., F. J. Jones, and R. J. Teweles. The Futures Game, 3rd edn. New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1998. 
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
2.1. What is the difference between a long forward position and a short 
forward position? 
2.2. Explain the difference between hedging, speculation, and arbitrage. 
2.3. What is the difference between entering into a long forward contract when 
the forward price is $50 and taking a long position in a call option with a 
strike price of $50? 
2.4. Explain carefully the difference between selling a call option and buying a 
put option. 
2.5. An investor enters into a short forward contract to sell 100,000 British 
pounds for US dollars at an exchange rate of 1.5000 US dollars per 
pound. How much does the investor gain or lose if the exchange rate at 
the end of the contract is (a) 1.4900 and (b) 1.5200? 
2.6. A trader enters into a short cotton futures contract when the futures price 
is 50 cents per pound. The contract is for the delivery of 50,000 pounds. 
How much does the trader gain or lose if the cotton price at the end of the 
contract is (a) 48.20 cents per pound and (b) 51.30 cents per pound? 
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2.7. Suppose you write a put contract with a strike price of $40 and an 
expiration date in three months. The current stock price is $41 and the 
contract is on 100 shares. What have you committed yourself to? How 
much could you gain or lose? 
2.8. What is the difference between the over-the-counter market and the 
exchange-traded market? Which of the two markets do the following trade 
in: (a) a forward contract, (b) a futures contract, (c) an option, (d) a swap, 
and (e) an exotic option? 
2.9. You would like to speculate on a rise in the price of a certain stock. The 
current stock price is $29, and a three-month call with a strike of $30 costs 
$2.90. You have $5,800 to invest. Identify two alternative strategies, one 
involving an investment in the stock and the other involving investment in 
the option. What are the potential gains and losses from each? 
2.10. Suppose that you own 5,000 shares worth $25 each. How can put options 
be used to provide you with insurance against a decline in the value of 
your holding over the next four months? 
2.11. When first issued, a stock provides funds for a company. Is the same true 
of a stock option? Discuss. 
2.12. Suppose that a March call option to buy a share for $50 costs $2.50 and is 
held until March. Under what circumstances will the holder of the option 
make a profit? Under what circumstances will the option be exercised? 
2.13. Suppose that a June put option to sell a share for $60 costs $4 and is held 
until June. Under what circumstances will the seller of the option (i.e., the 
party with the short position) make a profit? Under what circumstances 
will the option be exercised? 
2.14. A company knows that it is due to receive a certain amount of a foreign 
currency in four months. What type of option contract is appropriate for 
hedging? 
2.15. A United States company expects to have to pay 1 million Canadian 
dollars in six months. Explain how the exchange rate risk can be hedged 
using (a) a forward contract and (b) an option. 
2.16. In the 1980s, Bankers Trust developed index currency option notes 
(ICONs). These are bonds in which the amount received by the holder 
at maturity varies with a foreign exchange rate. One example was its trade 
with the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan. The ICON specified that if the 
yen/US dollar exchange rate, ST, is greater than 169 yen per dollar at 
maturity (in 1995), the holder of the bond receives $1,000. If it is less than 
169 yen per dollar, the amount received by the holder of the bond is 
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When the exchange rate is below 84.5, nothing is received by the holder at 
maturity. Show that this ICON is a combination of a regular bond and two 
options. 
2.17. Suppose that USD/GBP spot and forward exchange rates are as follows: 
Spot 1.6080 
90-day forward 1.6056 
180-day forward 1.6018 
What opportunities are open to an arbitrageur in the following situations: 
(a) a 180-day European call option to buy £1 for $1.57 costs 2 cents and 
(b) a 90-day European put option to sell £1 for $1.64 costs 2 cents? 
2.18. A company has money invested at 5% for five years. It wishes to use the 
swap quotes in Table 2.5 to convert its investment to a floating-rate 
investment. Explain how it can do this. 
2.19. A company has borrowed money for five years at 7%. Explain how it can 
use the quotes in Table 2.5 to convert this to a floating-rate liability. 
2.20. A company has a has a floating-rate liability that costs LIBOR plus 1%. 
Explain how it can use the quotes in Table 2.5 to convert this to a three-
year fixed-rate liability. 
2.21. A corn farmer argues: "I do not use futures contracts for hedging. My real 
risk is not the price of corn. It is that my whole crop gets wiped out by the 
weather." Discuss this viewpoint. Should the farmer estimate his or her 
expected production of corn and hedge to try to lock in a price for 
expected production? 
2.22. An airline executive has argued: "There is no point in our hedging the 
price of jet fuel. There is just as much chance that we will lose from doing 
this as that we will gain." Discuss the executive's viewpoint. 
2.23. The standard deviation of monthly changes in the spot price of live cattle 
is (in cents per pound) 1.2. The standard deviation of monthly changes in 
the futures price of live cattle for the closest contract is 1.4. The correlation 
between the futures price changes and the spot price changes is 0.7. It is 
now October 15. A beef producer is committed to purchasing 200,000 
pounds of live cattle on November 15. The producer wants to use the 
December live-cattle futures contracts to hedge its risk. Each contract is 
for the delivery of 40,000 pounds of cattle. What strategy should the beef 
producer follow? 
2.24. Why is the cost of an Asian basket put option to Microsoft considerably 
less than the cost of a portfolio of put options, one for each currency and 
each maturity (see Business Snapshot 2.3.)? 
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ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
2.25. The current price of a stock is $94, and three-month European call options 
with a strike price of $95 currently sell for $4.70. An investor who feels 
that the price of the stock will increase is trying to decide between buying 
100 shares and buying 2,000 call options (= 20 contracts). Both strategies 
involve an investment of $9,400. What advice would you give? How high 
does the stock price have to rise for the option strategy to be more 
profitable? 
2.26. A bond issued by Standard Oil worked as follows. The holder received no 
interest. At the bond's maturity the company promised to pay $1,000 plus 
an additional amount based on the price of oil at that time. The additional 
amount was equal to the product of 170 and the excess (if any) of the price 
of a barrel of oil at maturity over $25. The maximum additional amount 
paid was $2,550 (which corresponds to a price of $40 per barrel). Show 
that the bond is a combination of a regular bond, a long position in call 
options on oil with a strike price of $25, and a short position in call 
options on oil with a strike price of $40. 
2.27. The price of gold is currently $500 per ounce. The forward price for 
delivery in one year is $700. An arbitrageur can borrow money at 10% 
per annum. What should the arbitrageur do? Assume that the cost of 
storing gold is zero and that gold provides no income. 
2.28. A company's investments earn LIBOR minus 0.5%. Explain how it can 
use the quotes in Table 2.5 to convert the investments to (a) 3-year, 
(b) 5-year, and (c) 10-year fixed-rate investments. 
2.29. What position is equivalent to a long forward contract to buy an asset at 
K on a. certain date and a long position in a European put option to sell it 
for K on that date. 
2.30. Estimate the interest rate paid by P&G on the 5/30 swap in Business 
Snapshot 2.2 if (a) the CP rate is 6.5% and the Treasury yield curve is flat 
at 6% and (b) the CP rate is 7.5% and the Treasury yield curve is flat at 
7% with semiannual compounding. 
2.31. It is July 16. A company has a portfolio of stocks worth $100 million. The 
beta of the portfolio is 1.2. The company would like to use the CME 
December futures contract on the S&P 500 to change the beta of the 
portfolio to 0.5 during the period July 16 to November 16. The index is 
currently 1,000, and each contract is on $250 times the index, (a) What 
position should the company take? (b) Suppose that the company changes 
its mind and decides to increase the beta of the portfolio from 1.2 to 1.5. 
What position in futures contracts should it take? 
How Traders 
Manage Their 
Exposures 
The trading function within a financial institution is referred to as the front 
office; the part of the financial institution that is concerned with the overall 
level of the risks being taken, capital adequacy, and regulatory compliance 
is referred to as the middle office; the record keeping function is referred to 
as the back office. As explained in Chapter 1, there are two levels within a 
financial institution at which trading risks are managed. First, the front 
office hedges risks by ensuring that exposures to individual market vari-
ables are not too great. Second, the middle office aggregates the exposures 
of all traders to determine whether the total risk is acceptable. In this 
chapter we focus on the hedging activities of the front office. In later 
chapters we will consider how risks are aggregated in the middle office. 
This chapter explains what are termed the "Greek letters", or simply 
the "Greeks". Each of the Greeks measures a different aspect of the risk 
in a trading position. Traders calculate their Greeks at the end of each day 
and are required to take action if the internal risk limits of the financial 
institution they work for are exceeded. Failure to take this action is liable 
to lead to immediate dismissal. 
3.1 DELTA 
Imagine that you are a trader working for a US bank and responsible for 
all trades involving gold. The current price of gold is $500 per ounce. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of gold portfolio. 
Table 3.1 shows a summary of your portfolio (known as your "book"). 
How can you manage your risks? 
The value of your portfolio is currently $117,000. One way of investi-
gating the risks you face is to revalue the portfolio on the assumption that 
there is a small increase in the price of gold from $500 per ounce to 
$500.10 per ounce. Suppose that the new value of the portfolio is 
$116,900. A $0.10 increase in the price of gold decreases the value of 
your portfolio by $100. The sensitivity of the portfolio to the price of 
gold is therefore 
This is referred to as the delta of the portfolio. The portfolio loses value 
at a rate of $1,000 per $1 increase in the price of gold. Similarly, it gains 
value at a rate of $1,000 per $1 decrease in the price of gold. 
In general, the delta of a portfolio with respect to a market variable is 
where is a small change in the value of the variable and is the 
resultant change in the value of the portfolio. Using calculus terminology, 
delta is the partial derivative of the portfolio value with respect to the 
value of the variable: 
In our example the trader can eliminate the delta exposure by buying 
1,000 ounces of gold. This is because the delta of a position in 1,000 ounces 
of gold is 1,000. (The position gains value at the rate of $1,000 per $1 
Position 
Spot gold 
Forward Contracts 
Futures Contracts 
Swaps 
Options 
Exotics 
Total 
Value ($) 
180,000 
-60,000 
2,000 
80,000 
-110,000 
25,000 
117,000 
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increase in the price of gold.) When this trade is combined with the existing 
portfolio, the resultant portfolio has a delta of zero. Such a portfolio is 
referred to as a delta-neutral portfolio. 
Linear Products 
A linear product is a product whose value at any given time is linearly 
dependent on the value of the underlying asset price (see Figure 3.1). 
Forward contracts, futures contracts, and swaps are linear products; 
options are not. 
A linear product can be hedged relatively easily. Consider, for example, 
a US bank that enters into a forward contract with a corporate client 
where it agrees to sell the client 1 million euros at a certain exchange rate 
in one year. Assume that the euro interest rate is 4% with annual 
compounding. This means that the present value of 1 million euros in 
one year is 961,538 euros. The bank can hedge its risk by borrowing 
enough dollars to buy 961,538 euros today and then investing the euros 
for one year at 4%. The bank knows that it will have the 1 million euros it 
needs to deliver in one year and it knows what its costs will be. 
When the bank enters into the opposite transaction and agrees to buy 
1 million euros in one year it must hedge by shorting 961,538 euros. It 
Figure 3.1 A linear product 
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does this by borrowing the euros today at 4% and immediately converting 
them to US dollars. The 1 million euros received in one year are used to 
repay the loan. 
Shorting assets to hedge forward contracts is not always easy. Gold is 
an interesting case in point. Financial institutions often find that they 
enter into very large forward contracts to buy gold from gold producers. 
This means that they need to borrow large quantities of gold to create a 
short position for hedging. As outlined in Business Snapshot 3.1, central 
banks are the source of the borrowed gold. 
Nonlinear Products 
Options and most structured products are nonlinear products. The 
relationship between the value of the product and the value of the 
underlying market variable at any given time is nonlinear. This non-
linearity makes them more difficult to hedge. 
Business Snapshot 3.1 Hedging by Gold Mining Companies 
It is natural for a gold mining company to consider hedging against changes 
in the price of gold. Typically it takes several years to extract all the gold from 
a mine. Once a gold mining company decides to go ahead with production at 
a particular mine, it has a big exposure to the price of gold. Indeed, a mine 
that looks profitable at the outset could become unprofitable if the price of 
gold plunges. 
Gold mining companies are careful to explain their hedging strategies to 
potential shareholders. Some gold mining companies do not hedge. They tend 
to attract shareholders who buy gold stocks because they want to benefit 
when the price of gold increases and are prepared to accept the risk of a loss 
from a decrease in the price of gold. Other companies choose to hedge. They 
estimate the number of ounces they will produce each month for the next few 
years and enter into short futures or forward contracts to lock in the price 
that will be received. 
Suppose you are Goldman Sachs and have just entered into a forward 
contract with a gold mining company where you agree to buy a large amount 
of gold at a fixed price. How do you hedge your risk? The answer is that you 
borrow gold from a central bank and sell it at the current market price. (The 
central banks of many countries hold large amounts of gold.) At the end of 
the life of the forward contract, you buy gold from the gold mining company 
under the terms of the forward contract and use it to repay the central bank. 
The central bank charges a fee (perhaps 1.5% per annum) known as the gold 
lease rate for lending its gold in this way. 
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Asset price 
Figure 3.2 Value of option as a function of stock price. 
Consider as an example a trader who sells 100,000 European call 
options on a non-dividend-Paying stock when 
1. The stock price is $49. 
2. The strike price is $50. 
3. The risk-free interest rate is 5%. 
4. The stock price volatility is 20% per annum. 
5. The time to option maturity is 20 weeks. 
We suppose that the amount received for the options is $300,000 and that 
the trader has no other positions dependent on the stock. 
The value of one option as a function of the underlying stock price is 
shown in Figure 3.2. The delta of one option changes with the stock price 
in the way shown in Figure 3.3.1 At the time of the trade, the value of an 
option to buy one share of the stock is $2.40 and the delta of the option is 
0.522. Because the trader is short 100,000 options, the value of the 
trader's portfolio is -$240,000 and the delta of the portfolio is 
—52,200. The trader can feel pleased that the options have been sold 
for $60,000 more than their theoretical value, but is faced with the 
problem of hedging the risk in the position. 
The portfolio can be made delta neutral immediately after the trade by 
1
 Figures 3.2 and 3.3 were produced with the DerivaGem software, which can be 
downloaded from the author's website. The Black-Scholes (analytic) model is used. 
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Asset price 
Figure 3.3 Delta of option as a function of stock price. 
buying 52,200 shares of the underlying stock. If there is a small decrease 
(increase) in the stock price, the gain (loss) on the option position should 
be offset by the loss (gain) on the shares. For example, if the stock price 
increases from $49 to $49.10, then the value of the options will decrease by 
52,200 x 0.1 = $5,220 while that of the shares will increase by this amount. 
In the case of linear products, once the hedge has been set up, it does 
not need to be changed. This is not the case for nonlinear products. To 
preserve delta neutrality, the hedge has to be adjusted periodically. This is 
known as rebalancing. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide two examples of how rebalancing might 
work in our example. Rebalancing is assumed to be done weekly. As 
mentioned, the initial value of delta for a single option is 0.522 and the 
delta of the portfolio is —52,200. This means that, as soon as the option is 
written, $2,557,800 must be borrowed to buy 52,200 shares at a price of 
$49. The rate of interest is 5%. An interest cost of approximately $2,500 is 
therefore incurred in the first week. 
In Table 3.2 the stock price falls by the end of the first week to $48.12. 
The delta declines to 0.458. A long position in 45,800 shares is now 
required to hedge the option position. A total of 6,400 (i.e., 52,200 -
45,800) shares is therefore sold to maintain the delta neutrality of the 
hedge. The strategy realizes $308,000 in cash, and the cumulative borrow-
ings at the end of Week 1 are reduced to $2,252,300. During the second 
week, the stock price reduces to $47.37 and delta declines again. This 
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Table 3.2 Simulation of delta hedging. Option closes in the money and cost of 
hedging is $263,300. 
Week 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Stock 
price 
49.00 
48.12 
47.37 
50.25 
51.75 
53.12 
53.00 
51.87 
51.38 
53.00 
49.88 
48.50 
49.88 
50.37 
52.13 
51.88 
52.87 
54.87 
54.62 
55.87 
57.25 
Delta 
0.522 
0.458 
0.400 
0.596 
0.693 
0.774 
0.771 
0.706 
0.674 
0.787 
0.550 
0.413 
0.542 
0.591 
0.768 
0.759 
0.865 
0.978 
0.990 
1.000 
1.000 
Shares 
purchased 
52,200 
(6,400) 
(5,800) 
19,600 
9,700 
8,100 
(300) 
(6,500) 
(3,200) 
11,300 
(23,700) 
(13,700) 
12,900 
4,900 
17,700 
(900) 
10,600 
11,300 
1,200 
1,000 
0 
Cost of shares 
purchased 
($000) 
2,557.8 
(308.0) 
(274.7) 
984.9 
502.0 
430.3 
(15.9) 
(337.2) 
(164.4) 
598.9 
(1,182.2) 
(664.4) 
643.5 
246.8 
922.7 
(46.7) 
560.4 
620.0 
65.5 
55.9 
0.0 
Cumulative cash 
outflow 
($000) 
2,557.8 
2,252.3 
1,979.8 
2,966.6 
3,471.5 
3,905.1 
3,893.0 
3,559.5 
3,398.5 
4,000.7 
2,822.3 
2,160.6 
2,806.2 
3,055.7 
3,981.3 
3,938.4 
4,502.6 
5,126.9 
5,197.3 
5,258.2 
5,263.3 
Interest 
cost 
($000) 
2.5 
2.2 
1.9 
2.9 
3.3 
3.8 
3.7 
3.4 
3.3 
3.8 
2.7 
2.1 
2.7 
2.9 
3.8 
3.8 
4.3 
4.9 
5.0 
5.1 
leads to 5,800 shares being sold at the end of the second week. During the 
third week, the stock price increases to over $50 and delta increases. This 
leads to 19,600 shares being purchased at the end of the third week. 
Toward the end of the life of the option, it becomes apparent that the 
option will be exercised and delta approaches 1.0. By Week 20, therefore, 
the hedger owns 100,000 shares. The hedger receives $5 million (i.e., 
100,000 x $50) for these shares when the option is exercised so that 
the total cost of writing the option and hedging it is $263,300. 
Table 3.3 illustrates an alternative sequence of events where the option 
closes out of the money. As it becomes clear that the option will not be 
exercised, delta approaches zero. By Week 20 the hedger therefore has no 
Position in the underlying stock. The total costs incurred are $256,600. 
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Week 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Stock 
price 
49.00 
49.75 
52.00 
50.00 
48.38 
48.25 
48.75 
49.63 
48.25 
48.25 
51.12 
51.50 
49.88 
49.88 
48.75 
47.50 
48.00 
46.25 
48.13 
46.63 
48.12 
Delta 
0.522 
0.568 
0.705 
0.579 
0.459 
0.443 
0.475 
0.540 
0.420 
0.410 
0.658 
0.692 
0.542 
0.538 
0.400 
0.236 
0.261 
0.062 
0.183 
0.007 
0.000 
Shares 
purchased 
52,200 
4,600 
13,700 
(12,600) 
(12,000) 
(1,600) 
3,200 
6,500 
(12,000) 
(1,000) 
24,800 
3,400 
(15,000) 
(400) 
(13,800) 
(16,400) 
2,500 
(19,900) 
12,100 
(17,600) 
(700) 
Cost of shares 
purchased 
($000) 
2,557.8 
228.9 
712.4 
(630.0) 
(580.6) 
(77.2) 
156.0 
322.6 
(579.0) 
(48.2) 
1,267.8 
175.1 
(748.2) 
(20.0) 
(672.7) 
(779.0) 
120.0 
(920.4) 
582.4 
(820.7) 
(33.7) 
Cumulative cash 
outflow 
($000) 
2,557.8 
2,789.2 
3,504.3 
2,877.7 
2,299.9 
2,224.9 
2,383.0 
2,707.9 
2,131.5 
2,085.4 
3,355.2 
3,533.5 
2,788.7 
2,771.4 
2,101.4 
1,324.4 
1,445.7 
526.7 
1,109.6 
290.0 
256.6 
Interest 
cost 
($000) 
2.5 
2.7 
3.4 
2.8 
2.2 
2.1 
2.3 
2.6 
2.1 
2.0 
3.2 
3.4 
2.7 
2.7 
2.0 
1.3 
1.4 
0.5 
1.1 
0.3 
In Tables 3.2 and 3.3 the costs of hedging the option, when discounted 
to the beginning of the period, are close to but not exactly the same as 
the theoretical (Black-Scholes) price of $240,000. If the hedging scheme 
worked perfectly, the cost of hedging would, after discounting, be exactly 
equal to the Black-Scholes price for every simulated stock price path. 
The reason for the variation in the cost of delta hedging is that the hedge 
is rebalanced only once a week. As rebalancing takes place more fre-
quently, the variation in the cost of hedging is reduced. Of course, the 
examples in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are idealized in that they assume the 
model underlying the Black-Scholes formula is exactly correct and there 
are no transaction costs. 
Delta hedging aims to keep the value of the financial institution's 
Table 3.3 Simulation of delta hedging. Option closes out of the money ; 
cost of hedging is $256,600. 
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position as close to unchanged as possible. Initially, the value of the 
written option is $240,000. In the situation depicted in Table 3.2, the value 
of the option can be calculated as $414,500 in Week 9. Thus, the financial 
institution has lost $174,500 (i.e., 414,500 - 240,000) on its short option 
position. Its cash position, as measured by the cumulative cost, is 
$1,442,900 worse in Week 9 than in Week 0. The value of the shares held 
has increased from $2,557,800 to $4,171,100 for a gain of $1,613,300. The 
net effect of all this is that the value of the financial institution's position 
has changed by only $4,100 during the nine-week period. 
Where the Cost Comes From 
The delta-hedging scheme in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in effect creates a long 
position in the option synthetically to neutralize the trader's short option 
position. As the tables illustrate, the scheme tends to involve selling stock 
just after the price has gone down and buying stock just after the price 
has gone up. It might be termed a buy-high, sell-low scheme! The cost of 
$240,000 comes from the average difference between the price paid for the 
stock and the price realized for it. 
Transaction Costs 
Maintaining a delta-neutral position in a single option and the underlying 
asset, in the way that has just been described, is liable to be prohibitively 
expensive because of the transaction costs incurred on trades. Delta 
neutrality is more feasible for a large portfolio of derivatives dependent 
on a single asset. Only one trade in the underlying asset is necessary to 
zero out delta for the whole portfolio. The hedging transactions costs are 
absorbed by the profits on many different trades. 
3.2 GAMMA 
The gamma, , of a portfolio of options on an underlying asset is the rate 
of change of the portfolio's delta with respect to the price of the under-
lying asset. It is the second partial derivative of the portfolio with respect 
to asset price: 
If gamma is small, then delta changes slowly and adjustments to keep a 
Portfolio delta neutral only need to be made relatively infrequently. 
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Figure 3.4 Hedging error introduced by nonlinearity. 
However, if gamma is large in absolute terms, then delta is highly sensitive 
to the price of the underlying asset. It is then quite risky to leave a delta-
neutral portfolio unchanged for any length of time. Figure 3.4 illustrates 
this point. When the stock price moves from S to S', delta hedging 
assumes that the option price moves from C to C', when in fact it moves 
from C to C". The difference between C' and C" leads to a hedging error. 
This error depends on the curvature of the relationship between the option 
price and the stock price. Gamma measures this curvature.2 
Gamma is positive for a long position in an option. The general way in 
which gamma varies with the price of the underlying asset is shown in 
Figure 3.5. Gamma is greatest for options where the stock price is close to 
the strike price, K. 
Making a Portfolio Gamma Neutral 
A linear product has zero gamma and cannot be used to change the gamma 
of a portfolio. What is required is a position in an instrument, such as an 
option, that is not linearly dependent on the underlying asset price. 
Suppose that a delta-neutral portfolio has a gamma equal to and a 
traded option has a gamma equal to If the number of traded options 
added to the portfolio is the gamma of the portfolio is 
Hence, the position in the traded option necessary to make the portfolio 
2
 Indeed, the gamma of an option is sometimes referred to as its curvature by 
practitioners. 
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Figure 3.5 Relationship between gamma of an option and 
price of underlying asset. K is the option's strike price. 
gamma neutral is Including the traded option is likely to 
change the delta of the portfolio, so the position in the underlying asset 
then has to be changed to maintain delta neutrality. Note that the 
portfolio is gamma neutral only for a short period of time. As time 
passes, gamma neutrality can be maintained only if the position in the 
traded option is adjusted so that it is always equal to 
Making a delta-neutral portfolio gamma neutral can be regarded as a 
first correction for the fact that the position in the underlying asset cannot 
be changed continuously when delta hedging is used. Delta neutrality 
provides protection against relatively small stock price moves between 
rebalancing. Gamma neutrality provides protection against larger move-
ments in this stock price between hedge rebalancing. Suppose that a 
portfolio is delta neutral and has a gamma of -3,000. The delta and 
gamma of a particular traded call option are 0.62 and 1.50, respectively. 
The portfolio can be made gamma neutral by including in the portfolio a 
long position of 3,000/1.5 = 2,000 in the call option. However, the delta 
of the portfolio will then change from zero to 2,000 x 0.62 = 1,240. A 
quantity, 1,240, of the underlying asset must therefore be sold to keep it 
delta neutral. 
3.3 VEGA 
Another source of risk in derivatives trading is volatility. The volatility of 
a market variable measures our uncertainty about the future value of the 
variable. (It will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5.) In option 
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valuation models, volatilities are often assumed to be constant, but in 
practice they do change through time. Spot positions, forwards, and 
swaps do not depend on the volatility of the underlying market variable, 
but options and most exotics do. Their values are liable to change 
because of movements in volatility as well as because of changes in the 
asset price and the passage of time. 
The vega, of a portfolio is the rate of change of the value of the 
portfolio with respect to the volatility of the underlying market variable.3 
If vega is high in absolute terms, the portfolio's value is very sensitive to 
small changes in volatility. If vega is low in absolute terms, volatility 
changes have relatively little impact on the value of the portfolio. 
The vega of a portfolio can be changed by adding a position in a traded 
option. If V is the vega of the portfolio and is the vega of a traded 
option, a position of in the traded option makes the portfolio 
instantaneously vega neutral. Unfortunately, a portfolio that is gamma 
neutral will not, in general, be vega neutral, and vice versa. If a hedger 
requires a portfolio to be both gamma and vega neutral, then at least two 
traded derivatives dependent on the underlying asset must usually be 
used. 
Example 3.1 
Consider a portfolio that is delta neutral, with a gamma of —5,000 and a vega 
of —8,000. A traded option has a gamma of 0.5, a vega of 2.0, and a delta of 
0.6. The portfolio could be made vega neutral by including a long position in 
4,000 traded options. This would increase delta to 2,400 and require that 2,400 
units of the asset be sold to maintain delta neutrality. The gamma of the 
portfolio would change from —5,000 to —3,000. 
To make the portfolio gamma and vega neutral, we suppose that there is a 
second traded option with a gamma of 0.8, a vega of 1.2, and a delta of 0.5. If 
w1 and w2 are the quantities of the two traded options included in the 
portfolio, we require that 
-5,000 + 0.5w1 + 0.8w2 = 0 and - 8,000 + 2.0w1 + 1.2w2 = 0 
The solution to these equations is w1 = 400, w2 = 6,000. The portfolio can 
therefore be made gamma and vega neutral by including 400 of the first traded 
option and 6,000 of the second traded option. The delta of the portfolio after 
3
 Vega is the name given to one of the "Greek letters" in option pricing, but it is not one 
of the letters in the Greek alphabet. 
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Figure 3.6 Variation of vega of an option with price of 
underlying asset. K is the option's strike price. 
the addition of the positions in the two traded options is 
400 x 0.6 + 6,000 x 0.5 = 3,240. Hence, 3,240 units of the asset would have 
to be sold to maintain delta neutrality. 
The vega of a long position in an option is positive. The variation of vega 
with the price of the underlying asset is similar to that of gamma and is 
shown in Figure 3.6. Gamma neutrality protects against large changes in 
the price of the underlying asset between hedge rebalancing. Vega neu-
trality protects against variations in volatility. 
The volatilities of short-dated options tend to be more variable than 
the volatilities of long-dated options. The vega of a portfolio is therefore 
often calculated by changing the volatilities of short-dated options by 
more than that of long-dated options. This is discussed in Section 5.10. 
3.4 THETA 
The theta, of a portfolio is the rate of change of the value of the 
portfolio with respect to the passage of time with all else remaining the 
same. Theta is sometimes referred to as the time decay of the portfolio. 
Theta is usually negative for an option.4 This is because as the time to 
maturity decreases, with all else remaining the same, the option tends to 
become less valuable. The general way in which varies with stock price 
for a call option on a stock is shown in Figure 3.7. When the stock price is 
very low, theta is close to zero. For an at-the-money call option, theta is 
4
 An exception to this could be an in-the-money European put option on a non-dividend-
Paying stock or an in-the-money European call option on a currency with a very high 
interest rate. 
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Figure 3.7 Variation of theta of a European call 
option with stock price. 
large and negative. Figure 3.8 shows typical patterns for the variation of 
with the time to maturity for in-the-money, at-the-money, and out-of-
the-money call options. 
Theta is not the same type of Greek letter as delta. There is uncertainty 
about the future stock price, but there is no uncertainty about the passage 
of time. It makes sense to hedge against changes in the price of the 
Figure 3.8 Typical patterns for variation of theta of a European 
call option with time to maturity. 
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underlying asset, but it does not make any sense to hedge against the 
effect of the passage of time on an option portfolio. In spite of this, many 
traders regard theta as a useful descriptive statistic for a portfolio. In a 
delta-neutral portfolio, when theta is large and positive, gamma tends to 
be large and negative, and vice versa. 
3.5 RHO 
The final Greek letter we consider is rho. Rho is the rate of change of a 
portfolio with respect to the level of interest rates. Currency options have 
two rhos, one for the domestic interest rate and one for the foreign interest 
rate. When bonds and interest rate derivatives are part of a portfolio, 
traders usually consider carefully the ways in which the whole term 
structure of interest rates can change. We will discuss this in the next 
chapter. 
3.6 CALCULATING GREEK LETTERS 
The calculation of Greek letters for options is explained in Appendices C 
and D. The DerivaGem software, which can be downloaded from the 
author's website, can be used to calculate Greek letters for both regular 
options and exotics. 
Consider again the European call option considered in Section 3.1. 
The stock price is $49, the strike price is $50, the risk-free rate is 5%, the 
stock price volatility is 20%, and the time to exercise is 20 weeks or 20/ 
52 years. Using the Analytic (European) calculation, we see that the 
option price is $2.40; the delta is 0.522 (per $); the gamma is 0.066 (per $ 
per $); the vega is 0.121 per %; the theta is -0.012 per day; and the rho 
is 0.089 per %. 
These numbers imply the following: 
1. When there is an increase of $0.10 in the stock price with no other 
changes, the option price increases by about 0.522 x 0.1, or $0.0522. 
2. When there is an increase $0.10 in the stock price with no other 
changes, the delta of the option increases by about 0.066 x 0.1, or 
0.0066. 
3. When there is an increase of 0.5% in volatility with no other 
changes, the option price increases by about 0.121 x 0.5, or 0.0605. 
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4. When one day goes by with no changes to the stock price or its 
volatility, the option price decreases by about 0.012. 
5. When interest rates increase by 1% (or 100 basis points) with no 
other changes, the option price increases by 0.089. 
3.7 TAYLOR SERIES EXPANSIONS 
A Taylor series expansion of the change in the portfolio value in a short 
period of time shows the role played by different Greek letters. Consider a 
portfolio dependent on a single market variable, S. If the volatility of the 
underlying asset and interest rates are assumed to be constant, the value 
of the portfolio, is a function of S and time t. The Taylor series 
expansion gives 
(3.1) 
where and are the change in and S, respectively, in a small time 
interval Delta hedging eliminates the first term on the right-hand side. 
The second term, which is theta times is nonstochastic. The third term 
can be made zero by ensuring that the portfolio is gamma neutral as well 
as delta neutral. Arguments from stochastic calculus show that is of 
order This means that the third term on the right-hand side is of 
order Later terms in the Taylor series expansion are of higher order 
than 
For a delta-neutral portfolio, the first term on the right-hand side of 
equation (3.1) is zero, so that 
(3.2) 
when terms of higher order than are ignored. The relationship between 
the change in the portfolio value and the change in the stock price is 
quadratic as shown in Figure 3.9. When gamma is positive, the holder of 
the portfolio gains from large movements in the market variable and loses 
when there is little or no movement. When gamma is negative, the reverse 
is true and a large positive or negative movement in the market variable 
leads to severe losses. 
When the volatility of the underlying asset is uncertain, is a function 
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(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
Figure 3.9 Alternative relationships between and f or a delta-
neutral portfolio, with (a) slightly positive gamma, (b) large positive 
gamma, (c) slightly negative gamma, and (d) large negative gamma. 
of S, and t. Equation (3.1) then becomes 
where is the change in in time In this case, delta hedging 
eliminates the first term on the right-hand side. The second term is 
eliminated by making the portfolio vega neutral. The third term is 
nonstochastic. The fourth term is eliminated by making the portfolio 
gamma neutral. 
Traders often define other "Greek letters" to correspond to higher-
order terms in the Taylor series expansion. For example, is 
sometimes referred to as "gamma of vega". 
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3.8 THE REALITIES OF HEDGING 
In an ideal world traders working for financial institutions would be able 
to rebalance their portfolios very frequently in order to maintain a zero 
delta, a zero gamma, a zero vega, and so on. In practice, this is not 
possible. When managing a large portfolio dependent on a single under-
lying asset, traders usually make delta zero, or close to zero, at least once 
a day by trading the underlying asset. Unfortunately, a zero gamma and a 
zero vega are less easy to achieve because it is difficult to find options or 
Business Snapshot 3.2 Dynamic Hedging in Practice 
In a typical arrangement at a financial institution, the responsibility for a 
portfolio of derivatives dependent on a particular underlying asset is assigned 
to one trader or to a group of traders working together. For example, one 
trader at Goldman Sachs might be assigned responsibility for all derivatives 
dependent on the value of the Australian dollar. A computer system calculates 
the value of the portfolio and Greek letters for the portfolio. Limits are 
defined for each Greek letter and special permission is required if a trader 
wants to exceed a limit at the end of a trading day. 
The delta limit is often expressed as the equivalent maximum position in the 
underlying asset. For example, the delta limit of Goldman Sachs on Microsoft 
might be S10 million. If the Microsoft slock price is S50, this means that the 
absolute value of delta as we have calculated it can be no more that 200,000. 
The vega limit is usually expressed as a maximum dollar exposure per 1% 
change in the volatility. 
As a matter of course, options traders make themselves delta neutral -or 
close to delta neutral at the end of each day. Gamma and vega are mon-
itored, but arc not usually managed on a daily basis. Financial institutions 
often find that their business with clients involves writing options and that as a 
result they accumulate negative gamma and vega. They are then always 
looking out for opportunities to manage their gamma and vega risks by 
buying options at competitive prices. 
There is one aspect of an options portfolio that mitigates problems of 
managing gamma and vega somewhat. Options are often close to the money 
when they are first sold so that they have relatively high gammas and vegas. 
However, after some lime has elapsed, the underlying asset price has often 
changed sufficiently for them to become deep out of the money or deep in the 
money. Their gammas and vegas are then very small and of little consequence. 
The nightmare scenario for an options trader is where written options remain 
very close to the money as the maturity date is approached. 
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other nonlinear derivatives that can be traded in the volume required at 
competitive prices (see the discussion of dynamic hedging in Business 
Snapshot 3.2). 
There are large economies of scale in being an options trader. As noted 
earlier, maintaining delta neutrality for an individual option on an asset 
by trading the asset daily would be prohibitively expensive. But it is 
realistic to do this for a portfolio of several hundred options on the asset. 
This is because the cost of daily rebalancing is covered by the profit on 
many different trades. 
3.9 HEDGING EXOTICS 
Exotic options can often be hedged using the approach we have outlined. 
As explained in Business Snapshot 3.3, delta hedging is sometimes easier 
for exotics and sometimes more difficult. When delta hedging is not 
feasible for a portfolio of exotic options, an alternative approach known 
as static options replication is sometimes used. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.10. Suppose that S denotes the asset price and t denotes time 
With the current (t = 0) value of S being S0. Static options replication 
involves choosing a barrier in {S, t}-space that will eventually be reached 
Business Snapshot 3.3 Is Delta Hedging Easier or More Difficult 
for Exotics? 
We can approach the hedging of exotic options by creating a delta-neutral 
position and rebalancing frequently to maintain delta neutrality. When we do 
this, we find that some exotic options are easier to hedge than plain vanilla 
options and some are more difficult. 
An example of an exotic option that is relatively easy to hedge is an average 
price call option (sec Asian options in Section 2.5). As time passes, we observe 
more of the asset prices that will be used in calculating the final average. This 
means that our uncertainty about the payoff decreases with the passage of 
time. As a result, the option becomes progressively easier to hedge. In the final 
few days, the delta of the option always approaches zero because price move-
ments during this time have very little impact on the payoff. 
By contrast, barrier options (see Section 2.5) are relatively difficult to hedge. 
Consider a knock-out call option on a currency when the exchange rate is 
0.0005 above the barrier. If the barrier is hit. the option is worth nothing. If it is 
not hit. the option may prove to be quite valuable. The delta of the option is 
discontinuous at the barrier, making conventional hedging very difficult. 
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Figure 3.10 Static options replication. A replicating portfolio is 
chosen so that it has the same value as the exotic option portfolio at a 
number of points on a barrier. 
and then finding a portfolio of plain vanilla options that is worth the 
same as the portfolio of exotic options at a number of points on the 
barrier. The portfolio of exotic options is hedged by shorting Once the 
barrier is reached the hedge is unwound. 
The theory underlying static options replication is that if two portfolios 
are worth the same at all {S, t} points on the barrier they must be worth 
the same at all the {S, t} points that can be reached prior to the barrier. In 
practice, values of the original portfolio and the replicating portfolio 
are matched at some, but not all, points on the barrier. The procedure 
therefore relies on the idea that if two portfolios have the same value at a 
reasonably large number of points on the barrier then their values are 
likely to be close at other points on the barrier. 
3.10 SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
In addition to monitoring risks such as delta, gamma, and vega, option 
traders often also carry out a scenario analysis. The analysis involves 
Value of exotic option 
portfolio and portfolio П 
is the same at these points 
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Table 3.4 Profit or loss realized in two weeks under different 
scenarios ($ millions) 
Volatility 
8% 
10% 
12% 
Exchange rate 
0.94 
+102 
+80 
+60 
0.96 
+55 
+40 
+25 
0.98 
+25 
+17 
+9 
1.00 
+6 
+2 
- 2 
1.02 
-10 
- 1 4 
-18 
1.04 
- 3 4 
-38 
-42 
1.06 
-80 
-85 
-90 
calculating the gain or loss on their portfolio over a specified period 
under a variety of different scenarios. The time period chosen is likely to 
depend on the liquidity of the instruments. The scenarios can be either 
chosen by management or generated by a model. 
Consider a trader with a portfolio of options on a particular foreign 
currency. There are two main variables on which the value of the port-
folio depends. These are the exchange rate and the exchange rate volatil-
ity. Suppose that the exchange rate is currently 1.0000 and its volatility is 
10% per annum. The bank could calculate a table such as Table 3.4 
showing the profit or loss experienced during a two-week period under 
different scenarios. This table considers seven different exchange rates 
and three different volatilities. Because a one-standard-deviation move in 
the exchange rate during a two-week period is usually about 0.02, the 
exchange rate moves considered are approximately one, two, and three 
standard deviations. 
In Table 3.4 the greatest loss is in the lower right corner of the table. 
The loss corresponds to the volatility increasing to 12% and the exchange 
rate moving up to 1.06. Usually the greatest loss in a table such as 3.4 
occurs at one of the corners, but this is not always so. For example, as we 
saw in Figure 3.9, when gamma is positive the greatest loss is experienced 
when the underlying market variable stays where it is. 
SUMMARY 
The individual responsible for the trades involving a particular market 
variable monitors a number of Greek letters and ensures that they are 
kept within the limits specified by his or her employer. 
The delta, A, of a portfolio is the rate of change of its value with 
respect to the price of the underlying asset. Delta hedging involves 
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creating a position with zero delta (sometimes referred to as a delta-
neutral position). Since the delta of the underlying asset is 1.0, one way of 
hedging the portfolio is to take a position of —A in the underlying asset. 
For portfolios involving options and more complex derivatives, the 
position taken in the underlying asset has to be changed periodically. 
This is known as rebalancing. 
Once a portfolio has been made delta neutral, the next stage is often to 
look at its gamma. The gamma of a portfolio is the rate of change of its 
delta with respect to the price of the underlying asset. It is a measure of 
the curvature of the relationship between the portfolio and the asset price. 
Another important hedge statistic is vega. This measures the rate of 
change of the value of the portfolio with respect to changes in the 
volatility of the underlying asset. Gamma and vega can be changed by 
trading options on the underlying asset. 
In practice, derivatives traders usually rebalance their portfolios at least 
once a day to maintain delta neutrality. It is usually not feasible to 
maintain gamma and vega neutrality on a regular basis. Typically a 
trader monitors these measures. If they get too large, either corrective 
action is taken or trading is curtailed. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
3.1. The delta of a derivatives portfolio dependent on the S&P 500 index is 
—2,100. The S&P 500 index is currently 1,000. Estimate what happens to 
the value of the portfolio when the index increases to 1,005. 
3.2. The vega of a derivatives portfolio dependent on the USD/GBP exchange 
rate is 200 ($ per %). Estimate the effect on the portfolio of an increase in 
the volatility of the exchange rate from 12% to 14%. 
3.3. The gamma of a delta-neutral portfolio is 30 (per $ per $). Estimate what 
happens to the value of the portfolio when the price of the underlying asset 
(a) suddenly increases by $2 and (b) suddenly decreases by $2. 
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3.4. What does it mean to assert that the delta of a call option is 0.7? How can 
a short position in 1,000 options be made delta neutral when the delta of a 
long position in each option is 0.7? 
3.5. What does it mean to assert that the theta of an option position is -100 
per day? If a trader feels that neither a stock price nor its implied volatility 
will change, what type of option position is appropriate? 
3.6. What is meant by the gamma of an option position? What are the risks in 
the situation where the gamma of a position is large and negative and the 
delta is zero? 
3.7. "The procedure for creating an option position synthetically is the reverse 
of the procedure for hedging the option position." Explain this statement. 
3.8. A company uses delta hedging to hedge a portfolio of long positions in put 
and call options on a currency. Which of the following would lead to the 
most favorable result: (a) a virtually constant spot rate or (b) wild move-
ments in the spot rate? How does your answer change if the portfolio 
contains short option positions? 
3.9. A bank's position in options on the USD/euro exchange rate has a delta of 
30,000 and a gamma of —80,000. Explain how these numbers can be 
interpreted. The exchange rate (dollars per euro) is 0.90. What position 
would you take to make the position delta neutral? After a short period of 
time, the exchange rate moves to 0.93. Estimate the new delta. What 
additional trade is necessary to keep the position delta neutral? Assuming 
the bank did set up a delta-neutral position originally, has it gained or lost 
money from the exchange rate movement? 
3.10. "Static options replication assumes that the volatility of the underlying 
asset will be constant." Explain this statement. 
3.11. Suppose that a trader using the static options replication technique wants 
to match the value of a portfolio of exotic derivatives with the value of a 
portfolio of regular options at 10 points on a boundary. How many 
regular options are likely to be needed? Explain your answer. 
3.12. Why is an Asian option easier to hedge than a regular option? 
3.13. Explain why there are economies of scale in hedging options. 
3.14. Consider a six-month American put option on a foreign currency when the 
exchange rate (domestic currency per foreign currency) is 0.75, the strike 
price is 0.74, the domestic risk-free rate is 5%, the foreign risk-free rate is 
3%, and the exchange rate volatility is 14% per annum. Use the Deriva-
Gem software (binomial tree with 100 steps) to calculate the price, delta, 
gamma, vega, theta, and rho of the option. (The software can be down-
loaded from the author's website.) Verify that delta is correct by changing 
the exchange rate to 0.751 and recomputing the option price. 
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ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
3.15. The gamma and vega of a delta-neutral portfolio are 50 per $ per $ and 25 
per %, respectively. Estimate what happens to the value of the portfolio 
when there is a shock to the market causing the underlying asset price to 
decrease by $3 and its volatility to increase by 4%. 
3.16. Consider a one-year European call option on a stock when the stock price 
is $30, the strike price is $30, the risk-free rate is 5%, and the volatility is 
25% per annum. Use the DerivaGem software to calculate the price, delta, 
gamma, vega, theta, and rho of the option. Verify that delta is correct by 
changing the stock price to $30.1 and recomputing the option price. Verify 
that gamma is correct by recomputing the delta for the situation where the 
stock price is $30.1. Carry out similar calculations to verify that vega, 
theta, and rho are correct. 
3.17. A financial institution has the following portfolio of over-the-counter 
options on sterling: 
Type 
Call 
Call 
Put 
Call 
Position 
-1000 
-500 
-2000 
-500 
Delta of 
option 
0.50 
0.80 
-0.40 
0.70 
Gamma of 
option 
2.2 
0.6 
1.3 
1.8 
Vega of 
option 
1.8 
0.2 
0.7 
1.4 
A traded option is available with a delta of 0.6, a gamma of 1.5, and a vega 
of 0.8. (a) What position in the traded option and in sterling would make 
the portfolio both gamma neutral and delta neutral? (b) What position in 
the traded option and in sterling would make the portfolio both vega 
neutral and delta neutral? 
3.18. Consider again the situation in Problem 3.17. Suppose that a second 
traded option with a delta of 0.1, a gamma of 0.5, and a vega of 0.6 is 
available. How could the portfolio be made delta, gamma, and vega 
neutral? 
3.19. Reproduce Table 3.2. (In Table 3.2 the stock position is rounded to the 
nearest 100 shares.) Calculate the gamma and theta of the position each 
week. Calculate the change in the value of the portfolio each week (before 
the rebalancing at the end of the week) and check whether equation (3.2) is 
approximately satisfied. {Note: DerivaGem produces a value of theta "per 
calendar day". The theta in the formula in Appendix C is "per year".) 
Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is more difficult to manage than the risk arising from 
market variables such as equity prices, exchange rates, and commodity 
prices. One complication is that there are many different interest rates in 
any given currency (Treasury rates, interbank borrowing and lending 
rates, mortgage rates, deposit rates, prime borrowing rates? and so on). 
Although these tend to move together, they are not perfectly correlated. 
Another complication is that, to describe an interest rate, we need more 
than a single number. We need a function describing the variation of the 
rate with maturity. This is known as the interest rate term structure or the 
yield curve. 
Consider, for example, the situation of a US government bond trader. 
The trader's portfolio is likely to consist of many bonds with different 
maturities. The trader has an exposure to movements in the one-year rate, 
the two-year rate, the three-year rate, and so on. The trader's delta 
exposure is therefore more complicated than that of the gold trader in 
Table 3.1. The trader must be concerned with all the different ways in 
which the US Treasury yield curve can change its shape through time. 
This chapter starts with some preliminary material on types of interest 
rates and the way interest rates are measured. It then moves on to consider 
the ways exposures to interest rates can be managed. Duration and 
convexity measures are covered first. For parallel shifts in the yield curve, 
these are analogous to the delta and gamma measures discussed in the 
previous chapter. A number of different approaches to managing the risks 
80 Chapter 4 
of nonparallel shifts are then presented. These include the use of partial 
durations, the calculation of multiple deltas, and the use of principal 
components analysis. 
4.1 MEASURING INTEREST RATES 
A statement by a bank that the interest rate on one-year deposits is 10% 
per annum sounds straightforward and unambiguous. In fact, its precise 
meaning depends on the way the interest rate is measured. 
If the interest rate is measured with annual compounding, the bank's 
statement that the interest rate is 10% means that $100 grows to 
$100 x 1.1 =$110 
at the end of one year. When the interest rate is measured with semi-
annual compounding, it means that we earn 5% every six months, with 
the interest being reinvested. In this case, $100 grows to 
$100 x 1.05 x 1.05 = $110.25 
at the end of one year. When the interest rate is measured with quarterly 
compounding, the bank's statement means that we earn 2.5% every three 
months, with the interest being reinvested. The $100 then grows to 
$100 x 1.0254 = $110.38 
at the end of one year. Table 4.1 shows the effect of increasing the 
compounding frequency further. 
Table 4.1 Effect of the compounding frequency 
on the value of $100 at the end of one year when 
the interest rate is 10% per annum. 
Compounding 
frequency 
Annually (m = 1) 
Semiannually (m = 2) 
Quarterly (m = 4) 
Monthly (m = 12) 
Weekly (m = 52) 
Daily (m = 365) 
Value of $100 
at end of year {$) 
110.00 
110.25 
110.38 
110.47 
110.51 
110.52 
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The compounding frequency defines the units in which an interest rate 
is measured. A rate expressed with one compounding frequency can be 
converted into an equivalent rate with a different compounding fre-
quency. For example, from Table 4.1 we see that 10.25% with annual 
compounding is equivalent to 10% with semiannual compounding. We 
can think of the difference between one compounding frequency and 
another to be analogous to the difference between kilometers and miles. 
They are two different units of measurement. 
To generalize our results, suppose that an amount A is invested for 
n years at an interest rate of R per annum. If the interest is compounded 
once per annum, the terminal value of the investment is 
If the interest is compounded m times per annum, the terminal value of 
the investment is 
(4.1) 
When m = 1, the rate is sometimes referred to as the equivalent annual 
interest rate. 
Continuous Compounding 
The limit as the compounding frequency m tends to infinity is known as 
continuous compounding.1 With continuous compounding, it can be 
shown that an amount A invested for n years at rate R grows to 
(4.2) 
where e = 2.71828. The function ex is built into most calculators, so the 
computation of the expression in equation (4.2) presents no problems. In 
the example in Table 4.1, A = 100, n = 1, and R — 0.1, so that the value 
to which A grows in one year with continuous compounding is 
100e0.1 = $110.52 
This is (to two decimal places) the same as the value with daily com-
pounding. For most practical purposes, continuous compounding can be 
thought of as being equivalent to daily compounding. Compounding a 
sum of money at a continuously compounded rate R for n years involves 
1
 Actuaries sometimes refer to a continuously compounded rate as the force of interest. 
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multiplying it by Discounting it at a continuously compounded rate 
R for n years involves multiplying by 
Suppose that Rc is a rate of interest with continuous compounding and 
Rm is the equivalent rate with compounding m times per annum. From 
the results in equations (4.1) and (4.2), we must have 
(4.3) 
and 
(4.4) 
These equations can be used to convert a rate with a compounding 
frequency of m times per annum to a continuously compounded rate 
and vice versa. The function ln is the natural logarithm function and is 
built into most calculators. This function is defined so that, if y = ln x, 
then x = ey. 
Example 4.1 
Consider an interest rate that is quoted as 10% per annum with semiannual 
compounding. From equation (4.3) with m = 2 and Rm =0.1, the equivalent 
rate with continuous compounding is 
or 9.758% per annum. 
Example 4.2 
Suppose that a lender quotes the interest rate on loans as 8% per annum with 
continuous compounding and that interest is actually paid quarterly. From 
equation (4.4) with m = 4 and Rc = 0.08, the equivalent rate with quarterly 
compounding is 
4(e0.08/4-1) = 0.0808 
or 8.08% per annum. This means that on a $1,000 loan, interest payments of 
$20.20 would be required each quarter: 
or 
This means that 
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4.2 ZERO RATES AND FORWARD RATES 
The n-year zero-coupon interest rate is the rate of interest earned on an 
investment that starts today and lasts for n years. All the interest and 
principal is realized at the end of n years. There are no intermediate 
payments. The n-year zero-coupon interest rate is sometimes also referred 
to as the n-year spot rate, the n-year zero rate, or just the n-year zero. The 
zero rate as a function of maturity is referred to as the zero curve. Suppose 
a five-year zero rate with continuous compounding is 5% per annum. 
This means that $100, if invested for five years, grows to 
100 x e0.05x5 = 128.40 
A forward rate is the future zero rate implied by today's zero rates. 
Consider the zero rates shown in Table 4.2. The forward rate for the 
period between six months and one year is 6.6%. This is because 5% for 
the first six months combined with 6.6% for the next six months gives an 
average of 5.8% for one year. Similarly, the forward rate for the period 
between 12 months and 18 months is 7.6% because this rate when 
combined with 5.8% for the first 12 months gives an average of 6.4% 
for 18 months. In general, the forward rate F for the period between 
times T1 and T2 is 
(4.5) 
where R1 is the zero rate for maturity of T1 and R2 is the zero rate for 
maturity T2. This formula is exactly correct when rates are measured with 
continuous compounding and approximately correct for other com-
pounding frequencies. The results from using this formula on the rates 
in Table 4.2 are given in Table 4.3. For example, substituting T1 = 1.5, 
Table 4.2 Zero rates. 
Maturity 
(years) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
Zero rate 
(% cont. comp.) 
5.0 
5.8 
6.4 
6.8 
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Table 4.3 Forward rates for zero rates 
in Table 4.2. 
Period 
(years) 
0.5 to 1.0 
1.0 to 1.5 
1.5 to 2.0 
Forward rate 
{% cont. comp.) 
6.6 
7.6 
8.0 
T2 = 2.0, R1 = 0.064, and R2 = 0.068, we get F = 0.08, showing that the 
forward rate for the period between 18 months and 24 months is 8.0%. 
Investors who think that future interest rates will be markedly different 
from forward rates have no difficulty in finding trades that reflect their 
beliefs (see Business Snapshot 4.1). 
Bond Pricing 
Most bonds provide coupons periodically. The bond's principal (also 
known as its par value or face value) is received at the end of its life. 
The theoretical price of a bond can be calculated as the present value of 
all the cash flows that will be received by the owner of the bond. The most 
accurate approach is to use a different zero rate for each cash flow. To 
illustrate this, consider the situation where zero rates are as shown in 
Table 4.2. Suppose that a two-year bond with a principal of $100 provides 
coupons at the rate of 6% per annum semiannually. To calculate the 
present value of the first coupon of $3, we discount it at 5.0% for six 
months; to calculate the present value of the second coupon of $3, we 
discount it at 5.8% for one year; and so on. The theoretical price of the 
bond is therefore 
or $98.39. 
Bond Yields 
A bond's yield is the discount rate that, when applied to all the bond's 
cash flows, equates the bond price to its market price. Suppose that the 
theoretical price of the bond we have been considering, $98.39, is also its 
market value (i.e., the market's price of the bond is in exact agreement 
with the data in Table 4.2). If y is the yield on the bond, expressed with 
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continuous compounding, we must have 
This equation can be solved using Excel's Solver or in some other way to 
give y = 6.76%. 
4.3 TREASURY RATES 
Treasury rates are the rates an investor earns on Treasury bills and 
Treasury bonds. These are the instruments used by a government to 
borrow in its own currency. Japanese Treasury rates are the rates at which 
the Japanese government borrows in yen; US Treasury rates are the rates 
at which the US government borrows in US dollars; and so on. It is 
Usually assumed that there is no chance that a government will default on 
Business Snapshot 4.1 Orange County's Yield Curve Plays 
Consider an investor who can borrow or lend at the rates shown in Table 4.2. 
Suppose the investor thinks that the six-month interest rates will not change 
much over the next three years. The investor can borrow six-month funds and 
Invest for two years. The six-month borrowings can be rolled over at the end of 
.6, 12. and 18 months. If interest rates do stay about the same, this strategy will 
yield a profit of about 1.8% per year because interest will be received at 6.8% 
and paid at 5%. This type of trading strategy is known as a yield curve play. 
T|he investor is speculating that rates in the future will be quite different from 
the forward rates shown in Table 4.3. 
Robert Citron, the Treasurer at Orange County, used yield curve plays 
similar to the one we have just described very successfully in 1992 and 1993. 
The profit from Mr. Citron's trades became an important contributor to 
Orange County's budget and he was re-elected. (No-one listened to his 
opponent in the election, who said his trading strategy was too risky.) 
In 1994 Mr. Citron expanded his yield curve plays. He invested 
Heavily in inverse floaters. These pay a rate of interest equal to a fixed 
rate of interest minus a floating rate. He also leveraged his position by 
Borrowing at short-term interest rates. If short-term interest rates had 
remained the same or declined, he would have continued to do well. As 
it happened, interest rates rose sharply during 1994. On December 1, 
19$94, Orange County announced that its investment portfolio had lost 
$1.5 billion and several days later it filed for bankruptcy protection. 
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an obligation denominated in its own currency.2 Treasury rates are there-
fore totally risk-free rates in the sense that an investor who buys a 
Treasury bill or Treasury bond is certain that interest and principal 
payments will be made as promised. 
Determining Treasury Zero Rates 
One way of determining Treasury zero rates such as those in Table 4.2 is 
to observe the yields on "strips". These are zero-coupon bonds that are 
synthetically created by traders when they sell the coupons on a Treasury 
bond separately from the principal. 
Another way of determining Treasury zero rates is from regular Treas-
ury bills and bonds. The most popular approach is known as the boot-
strap method. This involves working from short maturities to successively 
longer maturities and matching prices. Suppose that Table 4.2 gives the 
Treasury rates determined so far and that a 2.5-year bond providing a 
coupon of 8% sells for $102 per $100 of principal. We would determine 
the 2.5-year zero rate as the rate R which, when used in conjunction with 
the rates in Table 4.2, gives the correct price for this bond. This involves 
solving 
which gives R = 7.05%. The complete set of zero rates is shown in 
Table 4.4. The zero curve is usually assumed to be linear between the 
points that are determined by the bootstrap method. (In our example, the 
2.25-year zero rate would be 6.925%.) It is also assumed to be constant 
Table 4.4 Rates in Table 4.2 after 2.5-year rate 
has been determined using the bootstrap method. 
2
 The reason for this is that the government can always meet its obligation by printing 
more money. 
Maturity 
(years) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
Zero rate 
(% cont. comp.) 
5.00 
5.80 
6.40 
6.80 
7.05 
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Figure 4.1 Zero curve for data in Table 4.4. 
prior to the first point and beyond the last point. The zero curve for our 
example is shown in Figure 4.1. 
4.4 LIBOR AND SWAP RATES 
LIBOR is short for London Interbank Offered Rate. A LIBOR quote by a 
particular bank is the rate of interest at which the bank is prepared to 
make a large wholesale deposit with another bank.3 Large banks and 
other financial institutions quote 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, and 
12-month LIBOR in all major currencies, where 1-month LIBOR is the 
rate at which one-month deposits are offered, 3-month LIBOR is the rate 
at which three-month deposits are offered, and so on. A deposit with a 
bank can be regarded as a loan to that bank. A bank must therefore 
satisfy certain creditworthiness criteria to qualify for receiving LIBOR 
deposits. Typically, it must have an AA credit rating.4 
Zero rate (%) 
Maturity (years) 
3 
Banks also quote LIBID, the London Interbank Bid Rate. The is the rate at which a 
bank is prepared to accept deposits from another bank. The LIBOR quote is slightly 
higher than the LIBID quote. 
The best credit rating given to a company by the rating agency S&P is AAA. The 
second best is AA. The corresponding ratings from the rival rating agency Moody's are 
Aaa and Aa, respectively. More details on ratings are in Chapter 11. 
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LIBOR rates are therefore the 1-month to 12-month borrowing rates 
for banks (and other companies) that have AA credit ratings. How can 
the LIBOR yield curve be extended beyond one year? There are two ways 
of doing this: 
1. Create a yield curve to represent the rates at which AA-rated 
companies can borrow for periods of time longer than one year. 
2. Create a yield curve to represent the future short-term borrowing 
rates for AA-rated companies. 
It is important to understand the difference. Suppose that the yield curve 
is 4% for all maturities. If the yield curve is created in the first way, this 
means that AA-rated companies can today lock in an interest rate of 4% 
regardless of how long they want to borrow. If the yield curve is created in 
the second way, then the forward interest rate that the market assigns to 
the short-term borrowing rates of AA-rated companies at future times is 
4%. When the yield curve is created in the first way, it gives the forward 
short-term borrowing rate for a company that is AA-rated today. When it 
is created in the second way, it gives the forward short-term borrowing 
rate for a company that will be AA at the beginning of the period covered 
by the forward contract. 
In practice, the LIBOR yield curve is extended using the second 
approach. The LIBOR yield curve is sometimes also called the swap yield 
curve or the LIBOR/swap yield curve. The LIBOR/swap zero rates out to 
one year are known directly from quoted LIBOR deposit rates. Swap rates 
(see Table 2.5) allow the yield curve to be extended beyond one year using 
an approach similar to the bootstrap method described for Treasuries in 
the previous section.5 To understand why this is so, consider a bank that 
1. Lends a certain principal for six months to an AA borrower and 
relends it for successive six month periods to other AA borrowers, 
and 
2. Enters into a swap to exchange the LIBOR for the five-year swap 
rate 
These transactions show that the effective interest rate earned from the 
series of short-term loans to AA borrowers is equivalent to the swap rate. 
This means that the swap yield curve and the LIBOR yield curve (defined 
using the second approach above) are the same. 
5
 Eurodollar futures, which are contracts on the future value of LIBOR, can also be used 
to extend the LIBOR yield curve. 
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The Risk-Free Rate 
The risk-free rate is important in the pricing of financial contracts. The 
usual practice among financial institutions is to assume that the LIBOR/ 
swap yield curve provides the risk-free rate. Treasury rates are regarded as 
too low to be used as risk-free rates because: 
1. Treasury bills and Treasury bonds must be purchased by financial 
institutions to fulfill a variety of regulatory requirements. This 
increases demand for these Treasury instruments driving their prices 
up and their yields down. 
2. The amount of capital a bank is required to hold to support an 
investment in Treasury bills and bonds is substantially smaller than 
the capital required to support a similar investment in other very 
low-risk instruments. 
3. In the United States, Treasury instruments are given a favorable tax 
treatment compared with most other fixed-income investments 
because they are not taxed at the state level. 
As we have seen, the credit risk in the LIBOR/swap yield curve corres-
ponds to the credit risk in a series of short-term loans to AA-rated 
borrowers. It is therefore not totally risk free. There is a small chance 
that an AA borrower will default during the life of a short-term loan. But 
the LIBOR/swap yield curve is close to risk free and is widely used by 
traders as a proxy for the risk-free yield curve. There is some evidence that 
a true risk-free yield curve, uninfluenced by the factors affecting Treasury 
rates that we have just mentioned, is about 10 basis points (= 0.1%) below 
the LIBOR/swap yield curve.6 By contrast, Treasury rates are about 
50 basis points (0.5%) below LIBOR/swap rates on average. 
4.5 DURATION 
Duration is a widely used measure of a portfolio's exposure to yield curve 
movements. As its name implies, the duration of an instrument is a 
measure of how long, on average, the holder of the instrument has to 
wait before receiving cash payments. A zero-coupon bond that lasts n 
years has a duration of n years. However, a coupon-bearing bond lasting 
6
 See J. Hull, M. Predescu, and A. White, "The Relationship Between Credit Default 
Swap Spreads, Bond Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements," Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 28 (November 2004), 2789-2811. 
90 Chapter 4 
n years has a duration of less than n years, because the holder receives 
some of the cash payments prior to year n. 
Suppose that a bond provides the holder with cash flows at time 
for i = 1 , . . . , n. The price B and yield y (continuously compounded) are 
related by 
The duration D of the bond is defined as 
The term in parentheses is the ratio of the present value of the cash flow at 
time to the bond price. The bond price is the present value of all 
payments. The duration is therefore a weighted average of the times when 
payments are made, with the weight applied to time being equal to the 
proportion of the bond's total present value provided by the cash flow at 
time . The sum of the weights is 1.0. 
When a small change in the yield is considered, it is approximately 
true that 
(4.9) 
From equation (4.6), this becomes 
(4.10) 
(Note that there is an inverse relationship between B and y. When bond 
yields increase, bond prices decrease; and when bond yields decrease, 
bond prices increase.) From equations (4.7) and (4.10), we obtain the key 
duration relationship 
(4.11) 
This can be written as 
(4.12) 
This can be written as 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
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Table 4.5 Calculation of duration. 
Equation (4.12) is an approximate relationship between percentage 
changes in a bond price and changes in its yield. The equation is easy 
to use and is the reason why duration, first suggested by Macaulay in 
1938, has become such a popular measure. 
Consider a three-year 10% coupon bond with a face value of $100. 
Suppose that the yield on the bond is 12% per annum with continuous 
compounding. This means that y = 0.12. Coupon payments of $5 are 
made every six months. Table 4.5 shows the calculations necessary to 
determine the bond's duration. The present values of the bond's cash 
flows, using the yield as the discount rate, are shown in column 3. (For 
example, the present value of the first cash flow is 5e-0.12x0.5 — 4.709.) 
The sum of the numbers in column 3 gives the bond's price as 94.213. The 
weights are calculated by dividing the numbers in column 3 by 94.213. 
The sum of the numbers in column 5 gives the duration as 2.653 years. 
Small changes in interest rates are often measured in basis points. A 
basis point is 0.01% per annum. The following example investigates the 
accuracy of the duration relationship in equation (4.11). 
Example 4.5 
For the bond in Table 4.5, the bond price B is 94.213 and the duration D is 
2.653, so that equation (4.11) gives 
or 
When the yield on the bond increases by 10 basis points (=0.1%), 
= +0.001. The duration relationship predicts that 
Time 
(years) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
Total 
Cash flow 
($) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
105 
130 
Present value 
($) 
4.709 
4.435 
4.176 
3.933 
3.704 
73.256 
94.213 
Weight 
0.050 
0.047 
0.044 
0.042 
0.039 
0.778 
1.000 
Time x Weight 
0.025 
0.047 
0.066 
0.083 
0.098 
2.333 
2.653 
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so that the bond price goes down to 94.213 — 0.250 = 93.963. How accurate is 
this? When the bond yield increases by 10 basis points to 12.1%, the bond 
price is 
which is (to three decimal places) the same as that predicted by the duration 
relationship. 
Modified Duration 
The preceding analysis is based on the assumption that y is expressed with 
continuous compounding. If y is expressed with annual compounding, it 
can be shown that the approximate relationship in equation (4.11) 
becomes 
More generally, if y is expressed with a compounding frequency of m 
times per year, then 
A variable D* defined by 
is sometimes referred to as the bond's modified duration. It allows the 
duration relationship to be simplified to 
when y is expressed with a compounding frequency of m times per year. 
The following example investigates the accuracy of the modified duration 
relationship. 
Example 4.6 
The bond in Table 4.5 has a price of 94.213 and a duration of 2.653. The yield, 
expressed with semiannual compounding is 12.3673%. The modified duration 
D* is 
From equation (4.13), we have 
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or 
When the yield (semiannually compounded) increases by 10 basis points 
(=0.1%), =+0.001. The duration relationship predicts that we expect 
to be —235.39 x 0.001 = —0.235, so that the bond price goes down to 
94.213 - 0.235 = 93.978. How accurate is this? When the bond yield (semi-
annually compounded) increases by 10 basis points to 12.4673% (or to 
12.0941% with continuous compounding), an exact calculation similar to that 
in the previous example shows that the bond price becomes 93.978. This shows 
that the modified duration calculation is accurate for small yield changes. 
4.6 CONVEXITY 
The duration relationship measures exposure to small changes in yields. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, which shows the relationship between the 
percentage change in value and change in yield for bonds having the same 
duration. The gradients of the two curves are the same at the origin. This 
means that both portfolios change in value by the same percentage for 
small yield changes, as predicted by equation (4.12). For large yield 
Figure 4.2 Two portfolios with the same duration. 
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changes, the portfolios behave differently. Portfolio X has more curvature 
in its relationship with yields than Portfolio Y. A factor known as 
convexity measures this curvature and can be used to improve the 
relationship in equation (4.12). 
A measure of convexity for a bond is 
where y is the bond's yield. This is the weighted average of the square of 
the time to the receipt of cash flows. From Taylor series expansions, a 
more accurate expression than equation (4.9) is 
This leads to 
Example 4.7 
Consider again the bond in Table 4.5: the bond price B is 94.213 and the 
duration D is 2.653. The convexity is 
0.05 x 0.52 + 0.047 x 1.02 + 0.044 x 1.52 + 0.042 x 2.02 
+ 0.039 x 2.52 + 0.779 x 3.02 = 7.570 
The convexity relationship in equation (4.14) is therefore 
Consider a 2% change in the bond yield from 12% to 14%. The duration 
relationship predicts that the dollar change in the value of the bond will be 
—94.213 x 2.653 x 0.02 = —4.999. The convexity relationship predicts that it 
will be 
-94.213 x 2.653 x 0.02 + 0.5 x 94.213 x 7.570 x 0.022 = -4.856 
The actual change in the value of the bond is —4.859. This shows that the 
convexity relationship gives much more accurate results than duration for a 
large change in the bond yield. 
4.7 APPLICATION TO PORTFOLIOS 
The duration concept can be used for any portfolio of assets dependent 
on interest rates. Suppose that P is the value of the portfolio. We make a 
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small parallel shift in the zero-coupon yield curve and observe the change 
in P. Duration is defined as 
where is size of the parallel shift. Equation (4.12) becomes 
Suppose the portfolio consists of a number of assets. The ith asset is 
worth Xi and has a duration Di (i = 1 , . . . , n). Define as the change 
in the value of Xi arising from the yield curve shift It follows that 
so that the duration of the portfolio is 
given by 
The duration of the ith asset is 
Hence, 
This shows that the duration D of a portfolio is the weighted average of 
the durations of the individual assets comprising the portfolio with the 
weight assigned to an asset being proportional to the value of the asset. 
The convexity can be generalized in the same way as the duration. For 
an interest-rate-dependent portfolio with value P, we define the convexity 
as 1/P times the second partial derivative of the value of the portfolio 
with respect to a parallel shift in the zero-coupon yield curve. Equation 
(4.14) is correct with B replaced by P: 
(4.16) 
The relationship between the convexity of a portfolio and the convexity of 
the assets comprising the portfolio is similar to that for duration: the 
convexity of the portfolio is the weighted average of the convexities of the 
assets with the weights being proportional to the value of the assets. 
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The convexity of a bond portfolio tends to be greatest when the 
portfolio provides payments evenly over a long period of time. It is least 
when the payments are concentrated around one particular point in time. 
Portfolio Immunization 
A portfolio consisting of long and short positions in interest-rate-
dependent assets can be protected against relatively small parallel shifts 
in the yield curve by ensuring that its duration is zero. It can be 
protected against relatively large parallel shifts in the yield curve by 
ensuring that its duration and convexity are both zero or close to zero. 
In this respect duration and convexity are analogous to the delta and 
gamma Greek letters we encountered in Chapter 3. 
4.8 NONPARALLEL YIELD CURVE SHIFTS 
Unfortunately, the basic duration relationship in equation (4.15) only 
quantifies exposure to parallel yield curve shifts. The duration plus 
convexity relationship in equation (4.16) allows the shift to be relatively 
large, but it is still a parallel shift. 
Some researchers have attempted to extend duration measures so that 
nonparallel shifts can be considered. Reitano suggests a partial duration 
measure where just one point on the zero-coupon yield curve is shifted 
and all other points remain the same.7 Suppose that the zero curve is as 
shown in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.3. Shifting the five-year point involves 
changing the zero curve as indicated in Figure 4.4. In general, the partial 
duration of the portfolio for the ith point on the zero curve is 
where is the size of the small change made to the ith point on the yield 
curve and is the resultant change in the portfolio value. The sum of 
all the partial duration measures equals the usual duration measure. 
Suppose that the partial durations for a particular portfolio are as 
shown in Table 4.7. The total duration of the portfolio is only 0.2. This 
means that the portfolio is relatively insensitive to parallel shifts in the 
yield curve. However, the durations for short maturities are positive while 
7
 See R. Reitano, "Non-Parallel Yield Curve Shifts and Immunization," Journal of 
Portfolio Management, Spring 1992, 36-43. 
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Table 4.6 Zero-coupon yield curve (rates continuously compounded). 
Maturity (years) 
Rate (%) 
1 
4.0 
2 
4.5 
3 
4.8 
4 
5.0 
5 
5.1 
7 
5.2 
10 
5.3 
Figure 4.3 The zero-coupon yield curve in Table 4.6. 
Figure 4.4 Change in zero-coupon yield curve when one point is shifted. 
Table 4.7 Partial durations for a portfolio. 
Maturity (years) 
Duration 
1 
2.0 
2 
1.6 
3 
0.6 
4 
0.2 
5 
-0.5 
7 
-1.8 
10 
-1.9 
Total 
0.2 
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Figure 4.5 A rotation of the yield curve. 
those for long maturities are negative. This means that the portfolio loses 
(gains) in value when short rates rise (fall). It gains (loses) in value when 
long rates rise (fall). 
We are now in a position to go one step further and calculate the 
impact of nonparallel shifts. We can define any type of shift we want. 
Suppose that, in the case of the yield curve shown in Figure 4.3, we define 
a rotation where the changes to the 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year, 5-year, 
7-year, and 10-year points are — 3e, —2e, —e, 0, e, 3e, and 6e for some 
small e. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5. From the partial durations in 
Table 4.7, the percentage change in the value of the portfolio arising from 
the rotation is 
2.0 x (-3e) + 1.6 x (-2e) + 0.6 x (-e) + 0.2 x 0 
- 0.5 x e - 1.8 x 3e - 1.9 x 6e = -27.1e 
This shows that a portfolio that gives rise to the partial durations in Table 
4.7 is much more heavily exposed to a rotation of the yield curve than to a 
parallel shift. 
4.9 INTEREST RATE DELTAS 
We now move on to consider how the Greek letters discussed in Chapter 3 
can be calculated for interest rates. One possibility is to define the delta of 
a portfolio as the change in value for a one-basis-point parallel shift in 
the zero curve. This is sometimes termed a DV01. It is the same as the 
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Table 4.8 Deltas for portfolio in Table 4.7. Value of Portfolio is $1 million. 
The dollar impact of a one-basis-point shift in points on the zero curve is shown. 
Maturity (years) 
Delta 
1 
200 
2 
160 
3 
60 
4 
20 
5 
-50 
7 
-180 
10 
-190 
Total 
20 
duration of the portfolio multiplied by the value of the portfolio multi-
plied by 0.0001. 
In practice, analysts like to calculate several deltas to reflect their 
exposures to all the different ways in which the yield curve can move. 
There are a number of different ways this can be done. One approach 
corresponds to the partial duration approach that we outlined in the 
previous section. It involves computing the impact of a one-basis-point 
change similar to the one illustrated in Figure 4.4 for each point on the 
zero-coupon yield curve. This delta is the partial duration calculated in 
Table 4.7 multiplied by the value of the portfolio multiplied by 0.0001. 
The sum of the deltas for all the points on the yield curve equals the 
DV01. Suppose that the portfolio in Table 4.7 is worth $1 million. The 
deltas are shown in Table 4.8. 
A variation on this approach is to divide the yield curve into a number 
of segments or "buckets" and calculate for each bucket the impact of 
changing all the zero rates corresponding to the bucket by one basis 
point while keeping all other zero rates unchanged. This approach is 
often used in asset-liability management (see Section 1.5) and is referred 
to as GAP management. Figure 4.6 shows the type of change that would 
Figure 4.6 Change considered to yield curve when bucketing approach is used. 
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be considered for the segment of the zero curve between 2.0 and 3.0 years 
in Figure 4.3. Again, the sum of the deltas for all the segments equals 
the DV01. 
Calculating Deltas to Facilitate Hedging 
One of the problems with the delta measures that we have considered so 
far is that they are not designed to make hedging easy. Consider the deltas 
in Table 4.8. If we plan to hedge our portfolio with zero-coupon bonds, 
we can calculate the position in a one-year zero-coupon bond to zero out 
the $200 per basis point exposure to the one-year rate, the position in a 
two-year zero-coupon bond to zero out the exposure to the two-year rate, 
and so on. But, if other instruments are used, a much more complicated 
analysis is necessary. 
In practice, traders tend to use positions in the instruments that have 
been used to construct the zero curve to hedge their exposure. For 
example, a government bond trader is likely to take positions in the 
actively traded government bonds that were used to construct the Treas-
ury zero curve when hedging. A trader of instruments dependent on the 
LIBOR/swap yield curve is likely to take positions in LIBOR deposits, 
Eurodollar futures, and swaps when hedging. 
To facilitate hedging, traders therefore often calculate the impact of 
small changes in the quotes for each of the instruments used to construct 
the zero curve. Consider a trader responsible for interest rate caps and 
swap options. Suppose that the trader's exposure to a one-basis-point 
change in a Eurodollar futures quote is $500. Each Eurodollar futures 
contract changes in value by $25 for a one-basis-point change in the 
Eurodollar futures quote. It follows that the trader's exposure can be 
hedged with 20 contracts. Suppose that the exposure to a one-basis-point 
change in the five-year swap rate is $4,000 and that a five-year swap with a 
notional principal of $ 1 million changes in value by $400 for a one-basis-
point change in the five-year swap rate. The exposure can be hedged by 
trading swaps with a notional principal of $10 million. 
4.10 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
The approaches we have just outlined can lead to analysts calculating 
10 to 15 different deltas for every zero curve. This seems like overkill 
because the variables being considered are quite highly correlated with 
each other. For example, when the yield on a five-year bond moves up by 
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Table 4 .9 Factor loadings for US Treasury data. 
3m 
6m 
12m 
2y 
3y 
4y 
5y 
7y 
10y 
30y 
PC1 
0.21 
0.26 
0.32 
0.35 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.34 
0.31 
0.25 
PC2 
-0.57 
-0.49 
-0.32 
-0.10 
0.02 
0.14 
0.17 
0.27 
0.30 
0.33 
PC3 
0.50 
0.23 
-0.37 
-0.38 
-0.30 
-0.12 
-0.04 
0.15 
0.28 
0.46 
PC4 
0.47 
-0.37 
-0.58 
0.17 
0.27 
0.25 
0.14 
0.01 
-0.10 
-0.34 
PC5 
-0.39 
0.70 
-0.52 
0.04 
0.07 
0.16 
0.08 
0.00 
-0.06 
-0.18 
PC6 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.23 
0.59 
0.24 
-0.63 
-0.10 
-0.12 
0.01 
0.33 
PC7 
0.01 
-0.04 
-0.04 
0.56 
-0.79 
0.15 
0.09 
0.13 
0.03 
-0.09 
PC8 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
0.12 
0.00 
0.55 
-0.26 
-0.54 
-0.23 
0.52 
PC9 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.12 
-0.09 
-0.14 
0.71 
0.00 
-0.63 
0.26 
PC10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.05 
-0.00 
-0.08 
0.48 
-0.68 
0.52 
-0.13 
a few basis points, most of the time the yield on a ten-year bond does the 
same. Arguably a trader should not be worried when a portfolio has a 
large positive exposure to the five-year rate and a similar large negative 
exposure to the ten-year rate. 
One approach to handling the risk arising from groups of highly 
correlated market variables is principal components analysis. This takes 
historical data on movements in the market variables and attempts to 
define a set of components or factors that explain the movements. 
The approach is best illustrated with an example. The market variables 
we will consider are ten US Treasury rates with maturities between three 
months and 30 years. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show results produced by Frye 
for these market variables using 1,543 daily observations between 1989 
and 1995.8 The first column in Table 4.9 shows the maturities of the rates 
that were considered. The remaining ten columns in the table show the 
ten factors (or principal components) describing the rate moves. The first 
factor, shown in the column labeled PC1, corresponds to a roughly 
parallel shift in the yield curve. When we have one unit of that factor, 
Table 4.10 Standard deviation of factor scores (basis points). 
8
 See J. Frye, "Principals of Risk: Finding VAR through Factor-Based Interest Rate 
Scenarios." In VAR: Understanding and Applying Value at Risk, Risk Publications, 
London, 1997, pp. 275-288. 
PCI 
17.49 
PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 
6.05 3.10 2.17 1.97 1.69 1.27 1.24 0.80 
PC10 
0.79 
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the three-month rate increases by 0.21 basis points, the six-month rate 
increases by 0.26 basis points, and so on. The second factor is shown in 
the column labeled PC2. It corresponds to a "twist" or change of slope of 
the yield curve. Rates between three months and two years move in one 
direction; rates between three years and 30 years move in the other 
direction. The third factor corresponds to a "bowing" of the yield curve. 
Rates at the short end and long end of the yield curve move in one 
direction; rates in the middle move in the other direction. The interest rate 
move for a particular factor is known as factor loading. In our example, 
the first factor's loading for the three-month rate is 0.21.9 
As there are ten rates and ten factors, the interest rate changes observed 
on any given day can always be expressed as a linear sum of the factors by 
solving a set of ten simultaneous equations. The quantity of a particular 
factor in the interest rate changes on a particular day is known as the 
factor score for that day. 
The importance of a factor is measured by the standard deviation of its 
factor score. The standard deviations of the factor scores in our example 
are shown in Table 4.10 and the factors are listed in order of their 
importance. The numbers in Table 4.10 are measured in basis points. A 
quantity of the first factor equal to one standard deviation, therefore, 
corresponds to the three-month rate moving by 0.21 x 17.49 = 3.67 basis 
points, the six-month rate moving by 0.26 x 17.49 = 4.55 basis points, 
and so on. 
The technical details of how the factors are determined are not covered 
here. It is sufficient for us to note that the factors are chosen so that the 
factor scores are uncorrelated. For instance, in our example, the first 
factor score (amount of parallel shift) is uncorrelated with the second 
factor score (amount of twist) across the 1,543 days. The variances of the 
factor scores (i.e., the squares of the standard deviations) have the 
property that they add up to the total variance of the data. From 
Table 4.10, the total variance of the original data (i.e., sum of the 
variance of the observations on the three-month rate, the variance of 
the observations on the six-month rate, and so on) is 
17.492 + 6.052 + 3.102 + ... + 0.792 = 367.9 
From this, it can be seen that the first factor accounts for 
17.492/367.9 = 83.1% of the variance in the original data; the first two 
factors account for (17.492 + 6.052)/367.9 = 93.1% of the variance in the 
9
 The factor loadings have the property that the sum of their squares for each factor is 1.0. 
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Figure 4.7 The three most important factors driving yield curve movements. 
data; the third factor accounts for a further 2.6% of the variance. This 
shows that most of the risk in interest rate moves is accounted for by the 
first two or three factors. It suggests that we can relate the risks in a 
portfolio of interest-rate-dependent instruments to movements in these 
factors instead of considering all ten interest rates. The three most 
important factors from Table 4.9 are plotted in Figure 4.7.10 
Using Principal Components Analysis to Calculate Deltas 
To illustrate how a principal components analysis can provide an alter-
native way of calculating deltas, suppose we have a portfolio with the 
exposures to interest rate moves shown in Table 4.11. A one-basis-point 
change in the one-year rate causes the portfolio value to increase by 
$10 million; a one-basis-point change in the two-year rate causes it to 
increase by $4 million; and so on. We use the first two factors to model 
rate moves. (As mentioned earlier, this captures over 90% of the un-
certainty in rate moves.) Using the data in Table 4.9, our delta exposure to 
the first factor (measured in millions of dollars per factor-score basis 
10
 Results similar to those described here, with respect to the nature of the factors and 
the amount of the total risk they account for, are obtained when a principal components 
analysis is used to explain the movements in almost any yield curve in any country. 
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be considered for the segment of the zero curve between 2.0 and 3.0 years 
in Figure 4.3. Again, the sum of the deltas for all the segments equals 
the DV01. 
Calculating Deltas to Facilitate Hedging 
One of the problems with the delta measures that we have considered so 
far is that they are not designed to make hedging easy. Consider the deltas 
in Table 4.8. If we plan to hedge our portfolio with zero-coupon bonds, 
we can calculate the position in a one-year zero-coupon bond to zero out 
the $200 per basis point exposure to the one-year rate, the position in a 
two-year zero-coupon bond to zero out the exposure to the two-year rate, 
and so on. But, if other instruments are used, a much more complicated 
analysis is necessary. 
In practice, traders tend to use positions in the instruments that have 
been used to construct the zero curve to hedge their exposure. For 
example, a government bond trader is likely to take positions in the 
actively traded government bonds that were used to construct the Treas-
ury zero curve when hedging. A trader of instruments dependent on the 
LIBOR/swap yield curve is likely to take positions in LIBOR deposits, 
Eurodollar futures, and swaps when hedging. 
To facilitate hedging, traders therefore often calculate the impact of 
small changes in the quotes for each of the instruments used to construct 
the zero curve. Consider a trader responsible for interest rate caps and 
swap options. Suppose that the trader's exposure to a one-basis-point 
change in a Eurodollar futures quote is $500. Each Eurodollar futures 
contract changes in value by $25 for a one-basis-point change in the 
Eurodollar futures quote. It follows that the trader's exposure can be 
hedged with 20 contracts. Suppose that the exposure to a one-basis-point 
change in the five-year swap rate is $4,000 and that a five-year swap with a 
notional principal of $1 million changes in value by $400 for a one-basis-
point change in the five-year swap rate. The exposure can be hedged by 
trading swaps with a notional principal of $10 million. 
4.10 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
The approaches we have just outlined can lead to analysts calculating 
10 to 15 different deltas for every zero curve. This seems like overkill 
because the variables being considered are quite highly correlated with 
each other. For example, when the yield on a five-year bond moves up by 
Interest Rate Risk 101 
Table 4.9 Factor loadings for US Treasury data. 
3m 
6m 
12m 
2y 
3y 
4y 
5y 
7y 
l0y 
30y 
PC1 
0.21 
0.26 
0.32 
0.35 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.34 
0.31 
0.25 
PC2 
-0.57 
-0.49 
-0.32 
-0.10 
0.02 
0.14 
0.17 
0.27 
0.30 
0.33 
PC3 
0.50 
0.23 
-0.37 
-0.38 
-0.30 
-0.12 
-0.04 
0.15 
0.28 
0.46 
PC4 
0.47 
-0.37 
-0.58 
0.17 
0.27 
0.25 
0.14 
0.01 
-0.10 
-0.34 
PC5 
-0.39 
0.70 
-0.52 
0.04 
0.07 
0.16 
0.08 
0.00 
-0.06 
-0.18 
PC6 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.23 
0.59 
0.24 
-0.63 
-0.10 
-0.12 
0.01 
0.33 
PC7 
0.01 
-0.04 
-0.04 
0.56 
-0.79 
0.15 
0.09 
0.13 
0.03 
-0.09 
PC8 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
0.12 
0.00 
0.55 
-0.26 
-0.54 
-0.23 
0.52 
PC9 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.12 
-0.09 
-0.14 
0.71 
0.00 
-0.63 
0.26 
PC10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.05 
-0.00 
-0.08 
0.48 
-0.68 
0.52 
-0.13 
a few basis points, most of the time the yield on a ten-year bond does the 
same. Arguably a trader should not be worried when a portfolio has a 
large positive exposure to the five-year rate and a similar large negative 
exposure to the ten-year rate. 
One approach to handling the risk arising from groups of highly 
correlated market variables is principal components analysis. This takes 
historical data on movements in the market variables and attempts to 
define a set of components or factors that explain the movements. 
The approach is best illustrated with an example. The market variables 
we will consider are ten US Treasury rates with maturities between three 
months and 30 years. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show results produced by Frye 
for these market variables using 1,543 daily observations between 1989 
and 1995.8 The first column in Table 4.9 shows the maturities of the rates 
that were considered. The remaining ten columns in the table show the 
ten factors (or principal components) describing the rate moves. The first 
factor, shown in the column labeled PC1, corresponds to a roughly 
Parallel shift in the yield curve. When we have one unit of that factor, 
Table 4.10 Standard deviation of factor scores (basis points). 
8
 See J. Frye, "Principals of Risk: Finding VAR through Factor-Based Interest Rate 
Scenarios." In VAR: Understanding and Applying Value at Risk, Risk Publications, 
London, 1997, pp. 275-288. 
PC1 
17.49 
PC2 
6.05 
PC3 
3.10 
PC4 
2.17 
PC5 
1.97 
PC6 
1.69 
PC7 
1.27 
PC8 
1.24 
PC9 
0.80 
PC10 
0.79 
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the three-month rate increases by 0.21 basis points, the six-month rate 
increases by 0.26 basis points, and so on. The second factor is shown in 
the column labeled PC2. It corresponds to a "twist" or change of slope of 
the yield curve. Rates between three months and two years move in one 
direction; rates between three years and 30 years move in the other 
direction. The third factor corresponds to a "bowing" of the yield curve. 
Rates at the short end and long end of the yield curve move in one 
direction; rates in the middle move in the other direction. The interest rate 
move for a particular factor is known as factor loading. In our example, 
the first factor's loading for the three-month rate is 0.21.9 
As there are ten rates and ten factors, the interest rate changes observed 
on any given day can always be expressed as a linear sum of the factors by 
solving a set of ten simultaneous equations. The quantity of a particular 
factor in the interest rate changes on a particular day is known as the 
factor score for that day. 
The importance of a factor is measured by the standard deviation of its 
factor score. The standard deviations of the factor scores in our example 
are shown in Table 4.10 and the factors are listed in order of their 
importance. The numbers in Table 4.10 are measured in basis points. A 
quantity of the first factor equal to one standard deviation, therefore, 
corresponds to the three-month rate moving by 0.21 x 17.49 = 3.67 basis 
points, the six-month rate moving by 0.26 x 17.49 = 4.55 basis points, 
and so on. 
The technical details of how the factors are determined are not covered 
here. It is sufficient for us to note that the factors are chosen so that the 
factor scores are uncorrelated. For instance, in our example, the first 
factor score (amount of parallel shift) is uncorrelated with the second 
factor score (amount of twist) across the 1,543 days. The variances of the 
factor scores (i.e., the squares of the standard deviations) have the 
property that they add up to the total variance of the data. From 
Table 4.10, the total variance of the original data (i.e., sum of the 
variance of the observations on the three-month rate, the variance of 
the observations on the six-month rate, and so on) is 
17.492 + 6.052 + 3.102 + • • • + 0.792 = 367.9 
From this, it can be seen that the first factor accounts for 
17.492/367.9 = 83.1% of the variance in the original data; the first two 
factors account for (17.492 + 6.052)/367.9 = 93.1% of the variance in the 
9
 The factor loadings have the property that the sum of their squares for each factor is 1.0. 
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Figure 4.7 The three most important factors driving yield curve movements. 
data; the third factor accounts for a further 2.6% of the variance. This 
shows that most of the risk in interest rate moves is accounted for by the 
first two or three factors. It suggests that we can relate the risks in a 
portfolio of interest-rate-dependent instruments to movements in these 
factors instead of considering all ten interest rates. The three most 
important factors from Table 4.9 are plotted in Figure 4.7.10 
Using Principal Components Analysis to Calculate Deltas 
To illustrate how a principal components analysis can provide an alter-
native way of calculating deltas, suppose we have a portfolio with the 
exposures to interest rate moves shown in Table 4.11. A one-basis-point 
change in the one-year rate causes the portfolio value to increase by 
$10 million; a one-basis-point change in the two-year rate causes it to 
increase by $4 million; and so on. We use the first two factors to model 
rate moves. (As mentioned earlier, this captures over 90% of the un-
certainty in rate moves.) Using the data in Table 4.9, our delta exposure to 
the first factor (measured in millions of dollars per factor-score basis 
10
 Results similar to those described here, with respect to the nature of the factors and 
the amount of the total risk they account for, are obtained when a principal components 
analysis is used to explain the movements in almost any yield curve in any country. 
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Table 4.11 Change in portfolio value for a 
one-basis-point rate move ($ millions). 
1-year 
rate 
+ 10 
2-year 
rate 
+4 
3-year 
rate 
- 8 
4-year 
rate 
-1 
5-year 
rate 
+2 
point) is 
10 x 0.32 + 4 x 0.35 - 8 x 0.36 - 7 x 0.36 + 2 x 0.36 = -0.08 
and our delta exposure to the second factor is 
10 x (-0.32) + 4 x (-0.10) - 8 x 0.02 - 7 x 0.14 + 2 x 0.17 = -4.40 
The approach being used here is similar to the approach described in 
Section 4.8 where partial durations are used to estimate the impact of 
nonparallel shifts. The advantage of using a principal components ana-
lysis is that it tells you which are the most appropriate shifts to consider. 
It also provides information on the relative importance of different shifts. 
In the example we have considered, our exposure to the second shift is 
about 50 times greater than our exposure to the first shift. However, the 
first shift is about three times as important in terms of the extent to which 
it occurs. (We base this last statement on the standard deviation of factor 
scores reported in Table 4.10.) 
4.11 GAMMA AND VEGA 
When several delta measures are calculated, there are many possible 
gamma measures. Suppose that ten instruments are used to compute 
the zero curve and that we measure deltas with respect to changes in 
the quotes for each of these. Gamma is a second partial derivative of the 
form , where P is the portfolio value. We have ten choices for 
xi and ten choices for xj and a total of 55 different gamma measures. This 
may be "information overload". One approach is to ignore cross-gammas 
and focus on the ten partial derivatives where i = j. Another is to 
calculate a single gamma measure as the second partial derivative of 
the value of the portfolio with respect to a parallel shift in the zero curve. 
A further possibility is to calculate gammas with respect to the first two 
factors in a principal components analysis. , 
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The vega of a portfolio of interest rate derivatives measures its 
exposure to volatility changes. Different volatilities are used to price 
different interest rate derivatives. One approach is to make the same 
small change to all volatilities and calculate the effect on the value of the 
portfolio. Another is to carry out a principal components analysis to 
calculate factors that reflect the patterns of volatility changes across 
different instruments that tend to occur in practice. Vega measures can 
be calculated for the first two or three factors. 
SUMMARY 
The compounding frequency used for an interest rate defines the units in 
which it is measured. The difference between an annually compounded 
rate and a quarterly compounded rate is analogous to the difference 
between a distance measured in miles and a distance measured in kilo-
meters. Analysts frequently use continuous compounding when analyzing 
derivatives. 
Many different types of interest rates are quoted in financial markets 
and calculated by analysts. The n-year zero rate or n-year spot rate is the 
rate applicable to an investment lasting for n years when all of the return 
is realized at the end. Forward rates are the rates applicable to future 
periods of time implied by today's zero rates. 
A zero-coupon yield curve shows the zero rate as a function of 
maturity. Two important zero-coupon yield curves for risk managers 
are the Treasury zero curve and the LIBOR/swap zero curve. The method 
most commonly used to calculate zero curves is known as the bootstrap 
method. It involves starting with short-term instruments and moving to 
progressively longer-term instruments making sure that the zero rates 
calculated at each stage are consistent with the prices of the instruments. 
An important concept in interest rate markets is duration. Duration 
measures the sensitivity of the value of a portfolio to a small parallel shift 
m the zero-coupon yield curve. An approximate relationship is 
where P is the value of the portfolio, D is the duration of the portfolio, y 
is the size of a small parallel shift in the zero curve, and P is the resultant 
effect on the value of the portfolio. A more precise relationship is 
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where C is the convexity of the portfolio. This relationship is accurate for 
relatively large parallel shifts in the yield curve but does not quantify the 
exposure to nonparallel shifts. 
To quantify exposure to all the different ways the yield curve can 
change through time, several duration or delta measures are necessary. 
There are a number of ways these can be defined. A principal components 
analysis can be a useful alternative to calculating multiple deltas. It shows 
that the yield curve shifts that occur in practice are to a large extent a 
linear sum of two or three standard shifts. If a portfolio manager is 
hedged against these standard shifts, he or she is therefore also well 
hedged against the shifts that occur in practice. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
4.1. A bank quotes you an interest rate of 14% per annum with quarterly 
compounding. What is the equivalent rate with (a) continuous compound-
ing and (b) annual compounding? 
4.2. An investor receives $1,100 in one year in return for an investment of 
$1,000 now. Calculate the percentage return per annum with (a) annual 
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compounding, (b) semiannual compounding, (c) monthly compounding, 
and (d) continuous compounding. 
4.3. A deposit account pays 12% per annum with continuous compounding, 
but interest is actually paid quarterly. How much interest will be paid each 
quarter on a $10,000 deposit? 
4.4. What rate of interest with continuous compounding is equivalent to 15% 
per annum with monthly compounding? 
4.5. Suppose that zero interest rates with continuous compounding are as 
follows: 
Maturity 
{years) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Rate 
(% per annum) 
2.0 
3.0 
3.7 
4.2 
4.5 
Calculate forward interest rates for the second, third, fourth, and fifth 
years. 
4.6. Suppose that zero interest rates with continuous compounding are as 
follows: 
Maturity 
(months) 
3 
6 
9 
12 
15 
18 
Rate 
(% per annum) 
8.0 
8.2 
8.4 
8.5 
8.6 
8.7 
Calculate forward interest rates for the second, third, fourth, fifth, and 
sixth quarters. 
4.7. The term structure of interest rates is upward sloping. Put the following in 
order of magnitude: (a) the five-year zero rate, (b) the yield on a five-year 
coupon-bearing bond, and (c) the forward rate corresponding to the 
period between 5 and 5.25 years in the future. What is the answer to this 
question when the term structure of interest rates is downward sloping? 
4.8. The six-month and one-year zero rates are both 10% per annum. For a 
bond that has a life of 18 months and pays a coupon of 8% per annum 
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(with semiannual payments and one having just been made), the yield is 
10.4% per annum. What is the bond's price? What is the 18-month zero 
rate? All rates are quoted with semiannual compounding. 
4.9. Suppose that 6-month, 12-month, 18-month, 24-month, and 30-month 
zero rates are 4%, 4.2%, 4.4%, 4.6%, and 4.8% per annum, respectively, 
with continuous compounding. Estimate the cash price of a bond with a 
face value of 100 that will mature in 30 months and pays a coupon of 4% 
per annum semiannually. 
4.10. A three-year bond provides a coupon of 8% semiannually and has a cash 
price of 104. What is the bond's yield? 
4.11. Why are US Treasury rates significantly lower than other rates that are 
close to risk free? 
4.12. What does duration tell you about the sensitivity of a bond portfolio to 
interest rates. What are the limitations of the duration measure? 
4.13. A five-year bond with a yield of 11% (continuously compounded) pays an 
8% coupon at the end of each year. (a) What is the bond's price? (b) What 
is the bond's duration? (c) Use the duration to calculate the effect on the 
bond's price of a 0.2% decrease in its yield. (d) Recalculate the bond's 
price on the basis of a 10.8% per annum yield and verify that the result is 
in agreement with your answer to (c). 
4.14. Repeat Problem 4.13 on the assumption that the yield is compounded 
annually. Use modified durations. 
4.15. A six-year bond with a continuously compounded yield of 4% provides a 
5% coupon at the end of each year. Use duration and convexity to 
estimate the effect of a 1% increase in the yield on the price of the bond. 
How accurate is the estimate? 
4.16. Explain three ways in which a vector of deltas can be calculated to manage 
nonparallel yield curve shifts. 
4.17. Estimate the delta of the portfolio in Table 4.8 with respect to the first two 
factors in Table 4.9. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
4.18. An interest rate is quoted as 5% per annum with semiannual compound-
ing. What is the equivalent rate with (a) annual compounding, (b) monthly 
compounding, and (c) continuous compounding. 
4.19. Portfolio A consists of a 1-year zero-coupon bond with a face value of 
$2,000 and a 10-year zero-coupon bond with a face value of $6,000. 
Portfolio B consists of a 5.95-year zero-coupon bond with a face value 
of $5,000. The current yield on all bonds is 10% per annum (continuously 
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compounded). (a) Show that both portfolios have the same duration. (b) 
Show that the percentage changes in the values of the two portfolios for a 
0.1% per annum increase in yields are the same. (c) What are the 
percentage changes in the values of the two portfolios for a 5% per annum 
increase in yields? 
4.20. What are the convexities of the portfolios in Problem 4.19? To what extent 
does (a) duration and (b) convexity explain the difference between the 
percentage changes calculated in part (c) of Problem 4.19? 
4.21. When the partial durations are as in Table 4.7 estimate the effect of a shift 
in the yield curve where the 10-year rate stays the same, the 1-year rate 
moves up by 9e and the movements in intermediate rates are calculated by 
interpolation between 9e and 0. How could your answer be calculated 
from the results for a rotation presented in Section 4.8? 
4.22. Suppose that the change in a portfolio value for a 1-basis-point shift in the 
3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year, and 5-year rates are (in 
$million) +5, —3, — 1, +2, +5, +7, and +8, respectively. Estimate the delta 
of the portfolio with respect to the first three factors in Table 4.9. Quantify 
the relative importance of the three factors for this portfolio. 
C H A P T E R Volatility 
Hedging schemes such as those described in the last two chapters elim-
inate much of the risks from trading activities. This is because traders are 
required to ensure that Greek letters such as delta, gamma, and vega are 
within certain limits. But trading portfolios are not totally free of risk. At 
any given time, a financial institution still has a residual exposure to 
changes in hundreds or even thousands of market variables such as 
interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices, and commodity prices. The 
volatility of a market variable measures uncertainty about the future 
value of the variable. It is important for risk managers to monitor the 
volatilities of market variables in order to assess potential losses. This 
chapter describes the procedures they use to carry out the monitoring. 
We begin by defining volatility and then explain how volatility can be 
implied from option prices or estimated from historical data. The com-
mon assumption that percentage returns from market variables are 
normally distributed is examined and we present the power law as an 
alternative. After that we move on to consider models with imposing 
names such as exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), auto-
regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), and generalized auto-
regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH). The distinctive 
feature of these models is that they recognize that volatility is not 
constant: during some periods it may be relatively low, whereas during 
others it may be relatively high. The models attempt to keep track of the 
variations in the volatility through time. 
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5.1 DEFINITION OF VOLATILITY 
The volatility of a variable is defined as the standard deviation of the 
return provided by the variable per unit of time when the return is 
expressed using continuous compounding. When volatility is used for 
option pricing, the unit of time is usually one year, so that volatility is the 
standard deviation of the continuously compounded return per year. 
However, when volatility is used for risk management, the unit of time 
is usually one day, so that volatility is the standard deviation of the 
continuously compounded return per day. 
In general, is equal to the standard deviation of , where 
is the value of the market variable at time T and is its value today. 
The expression equals the total return (not the return per unit 
time) earned in time T expressed with continuous compounding. If is 
per day, T is measured in days; if is per year, T is measured in years. 
When T is small, the continuously compounded return of a market 
variable is close to the percentage change. It follows that, for small T, 
is approximately equal to the standard deviation of the percentage 
change in the market variable in time T. Suppose, for example, that a 
stock price is $50 and its volatility is 30% per year. The standard 
deviation of the percentage change in the stock price in one week is 
approximately 
30 = 4.16% 
A one-standard-deviation move in the stock price in one week is therefore 
50 0.0416, or $2.08. 
When the time horizons considered are short, our uncertainty about a 
future stock price, as measured by its standard deviation, increases (at least 
approximately) with the square root of how far ahead we are looking. For 
example, the standard deviation of the stock price in four weeks is 
approximately twice the standard deviation in one week. This corresponds 
to the adage "uncertainty increases with the square root of time". 
Variance Rate 
Risk managers often focus on the variance rate rather than the volatility-
The variance rate is defined as the square of the volatility. The variance 
rate per year is the variance of the continuously compounded return in 
one year; the variance rate per day is the variance of the continuously 
compounded return in one day. Whereas the standard deviation of the 
return in time T increases with the square root of time, the variance of 
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this return increases linearly with time. If we wanted to be pedantic, we 
could say that it is correct to talk about the variance rate per day but that 
volatility is "per square root of day". 
Trading Days vs. Calendar Days 
When volatilities are calculated and used, an issue that crops up is 
whether time should be measured in calendar days or trading days. As 
shown in Business Snapshot 5.1, research shows that volatility is much 
higher when the exchange is open for trading than when it is closed. As a 
result, when estimating volatility from historical data, analysts tend to 
Business Snapshot 5.1 What Causes Volatility? 
It is natural to assume that the volatility of a stock price is caused by new 
information reaching the market. This information causes people to revise their 
opinions on the value of the stock. The price of the stock changes and volatility 
results. However, this view of what causes volatility is not supported by 
research. With several years of daily stock price data, researchers can calculate: 
1. The variance of stock price returns between the close of trading on one 
day and the close of trading on the next day when there are no 
intervening nontrading days 
2. The variance of the stock price returns between the close of trading on 
Friday and the close of trading on Monday 
The second variance is the variance of returns over a three-day period. The 
first is a variance over a one-day period. We might reasonably expect the 
second variance to be three times as great as the first variance. Fama (1965), 
French (1980), and French and Roll (1986) show that this is not the case. 
These three research studies estimate the second variance to be 22%, 19%, and 
10.7% higher than the first variance, respectively. 
At this stage you might be tempted to argue that these results are explained 
by more news reaching the market when the market is open for trading. But 
research by Roll (1984) does not support this explanation. Roll looked at the 
prices of orange juice futures. By far the most important news for orange juice 
futures prices is news about the weather and news about the weather is equally 
likely to arrive at any time. When Roll did a similar analysis to that just 
described for stocks, he found that the second (Friday-to-Monday) variance is 
only 1.54 times the first variance. 
The only reasonable conclusion from all this is that volatility is to a large 
extent caused by trading itself. (Traders usually have no difficulty accepting 
this conclusion!) 
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ignore days when the exchange is closed. The usual assumption is that 
there are 252 days per year. 
Define as the volatility per year of a certain asset, while is the 
equivalent volatility per day of the asset. The standard deviation of the 
continuously compounded return on the asset in one year is either or 
. It follows that 
with the result that the daily volatility is about 6% of annual volatility. 
5.2 IMPLIED VOLATILITIES 
As shown in Appendix C at the end of this book, the one parameter in 
option pricing formulas that cannot be directly observed is the volatility 
of the asset price. This allows traders to imply a volatility from option 
prices. 
To illustrate how implied volatilities are calculated, suppose that the 
market price of a three-month European call option on a non-dividend-
paying stock is $1.875 when the stock price is $21, the strike price is $20 
and the risk-free rate is 10%. The implied volatility is the value of 
volatility that, when substituted into the Black-Scholes option pricing 
formula, gives an option price of $1.875. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to invert the Black-Scholes formula so that volatility is expressed as a 
function of the option price and other variables. However, an iterative 
search procedure can be used to find the implied volatility . For example, 
we can start by trying =0.20. This gives a value for the option price 
equal to $1.76, which is less than the market price of $1.875. Since the 
option price is an increasing function of , a higher value of is required. 
We can next try =0.3 . This gives a value for the option price equal to 
$2.10, which is too high and means that must lie between 0.20 and 0.30. 
Next, we try a value of 0.25 for . This also proves to be too high, 
showing that the implied volatility lies between 0.20 and 0.25. Proceeding 
in this way, we can halve the range of values for at each iteration and 
calculate its correct value to any required accuracy.1 In this example, the 
1
 This method is presented for illustration. Other more powerful search procedures are 
used to calculate implied volatilities in practice. 
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implied volatility is 0.235, or 23.5% per annum. A similar procedure can 
be used in conjunction with binomial trees to find implied volatilities for 
American options. 
Implied volatilities are used extensively by traders, as we will explain in 
Chapter 15. However, risk management is largely based on historical 
volatilities. The rest of this chapter will be concerned with developing 
procedures for using historical data to monitor volatility. 
5.3 ESTIMATING VOLATILITY FROM HISTORICAL 
DATA 
When the volatility of a variable is estimated using historical data, it is 
usually observed at fixed intervals of time (e.g., every day, week, or month). 
Define: 
n + 1: Number of observations 
Si: Value of variable at end of ith interval, where i = 0, 1 , . . . , n 
: Length of time interval 
and let 
for i = 1,2, ...,n. 
The usual estimate s of the standard deviation of the ui is given by 
where is the mean of the ui. 
As explained in Section 5.1, the standard deviation of the ui is 
where is the volatility of the variable. The variable s is, therefore, an 
estimate of . It follows that itself can be estimated as , where 
The standard error of this estimate can be shown to be approximately 
or 
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. If T is measured in years, the volatility calculated is a volatility per 
year; if is measured in days, the volatility that is calculated is a daily 
volatility. 
Example 5.1 
Table 5.1 shows a possible sequence of stock prices during 21 consecutive 
trading days. In this case, 
or 1.216%. To calculate a daily volatility, we set = 1 and obtain a volatility 
of 1.216%. To calculate a volatility per year, we set = 1/252 and the data 
Table 5.1 Computation of volatility. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
20.00 
20.10 
19.90 
20.00 
20.50 
20.25 
20.90 
20.90 
20.90 
20.75 
20.75 
21.00 
21.10 
20.90 
20.90 
21.25 
21.40 
21.40 
21.25 
21.75 
22.00 
1.00500 
0.99005 
1.00503 
1.02500 
0.98780 
1.03210 
1.00000 
1.00000 
0.99282 
1.00000 
1.01205 
1.00476 
0.99052 
1.00000 
1.01675 
1.00706 
1.00000 
0.99299 
1.02353 
1.01149 
0.00499 
-0.01000 
0.00501 
0.02469 
-0.01227 
0.03159 
0.00000 
0.00000 
-0.00720 
0.00000 
0.01198 
0.00475 
-0.00952 
0.00000 
0.01661 
0.00703 
0.00000 
-0.00703 
0.02326 
0.01143 
and the estimate of the standard deviation of the daily return is 
and 
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give an estimate for the volatility per annum of 0.01216 =0.193, or 
19.3%. The standard error of the daily volatility estimate is 
or 0.19% per day. The standard error of the volatility per year is 
or 3.1% per annum. 
5.4 ARE DAILY PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN 
FINANCIAL VARIABLES NORMAL? 
The Black-Scholes model and its extensions (see Appendix C) make the 
assumption that asset prices change continuously and have constant 
volatility. This means that the return in a short period of time always 
has a normal distribution with a standard deviation of . Suppose 
that the volatility of an exchange rate is estimated as 12% per year. This 
corresponds to 12/ , or 0.756%, per day. Assuming normally dis-
tributed returns, we see from the tables at the end of this book that the 
probability of the value of the foreign currency changing by more than 
one standard deviation (i.e., by more than 0.756%) in one day is 31.73%; 
the probability that the exchange rate will change by more than two 
standard deviations (i.e., by more than 1.512%) is 4.55%; the probability 
that it will change by more than three standard deviations (i.e., by more 
than 2.268%) is 0.27%; and so on.2 
In practice, exchange rates, as well as most other market variables, tend 
to have heavier tails than the normal distribution. Table 5.2 illustrates this 
by examining the daily movements in 12 different exchange rates over a 
ten-year period.3 The first step in the production of this table is to 
calculate the standard deviation of daily percentage changes in each 
exchange rate. The next stage is to note how often the actual percentage 
changes exceeded one standard deviation, two standard deviations, and 
so on. These numbers are then compared with the corresponding num-
bers for the normal distribution. 
2
 We are making a small approximation here that the one-day continuously compounded 
return is the same as the one-week return with daily compounding. 
. This table is taken from J. C. Hull and A. White, "Value at Risk When Daily Changes 
in Market Variables Are Not Normally Distributed." Journal of Derivatives, 5, No. 3 
(Spring 1998): 9-19. 
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Daily percentage changes exceed three standard deviations on 1.34% of 
the days. The normal model for returns predicts that this should happen 
on only 0.27% of days. Daily percentage changes exceed four, five, and 
six standard deviations on 0.29%, 0.08%, and 0.03% of days, respec-
tively. The normal model predicts that we should hardly ever observe this 
happening. The table, therefore, provides evidence to support the exis-
tence of heavy tails. Business Snapshot 5.2 shows how you could have 
made money if you had done the analysis in Table 5.2 in 1985! 
Table 5.2 Percentage of days when absolute size of daily 
exchange rate moves is greater than 1, 2 , . . . , 6 standard deviations. 
(SD = standard deviation of daily percentage change.) 
>1 SD 
>2 SD 
>3 SD 
>4 SD 
>5 SD 
>6 SD 
Real world 
(%) 
25.04 
5.27 
1.34 
0.29 
0.08 
0.03 
Normal model 
(%) 
31.73 
4.55 
0.27 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Business Snapshot 5.2 Making Money from Foreign Currency Options 
Suppose that most market participants think that exchange rates are log-
normally distributed. They will be comfortable using the same volatility to 
value all options on a particular exchange rate. You have just done the 
analysis in Table 5.2 and know that the lognormal assumption is not a good 
one for exchange rates. What should you do? 
The answer is that you should buy deep-out-of-the-money call and put 
options on a variety of different currencies—and wait. These options will be 
relatively inexpensive and more of them will close in the money than the 
lognormal model predicts. The present value of your payoffs will on average 
be much greater than the cost of the options. 
In the mid-1980s a few traders knew about the heavy tails of foreign 
exchange probability distributions. Everyone else thought that the lognormal 
assumption of Black-Scholes was reasonable. The few traders who were well 
informed followed the strategy we have described—and made lots of money. 
By the late 1980s everyone realized that out-of-the money options should have 
a higher implied volatility than at-the-money options and the trading oppor-
tunities disappeared. 
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of normal distribution with a 
heavy-tailed distribution. The two distributions have the 
same mean and standard deviation. 
Figure 5.1 compares a typical heavy-tailed distribution (such as the one 
for foreign exchange) with a normal distribution that has the same mean 
and standard deviation.4 The heavy-tailed distribution is more peaked 
than the normal distribution. In Figure 5.1, we can distinguish three parts 
of the distribution: the middle, the tails, the intermediate parts (between 
the middle and the tails). When we move from the normal distribution to 
the heavy-tailed distribution, probability mass shifts from the intermediate 
parts of the distribution to both the tails and the middle. If we are 
considering the percentage change in a market variable, the heavy-tailed 
distribution has the property that small and large changes in the variable 
are more likely than they would be if a normal distribution were assumed. 
Intermediate changes are less likely. 
An Alternative to Normal Distributions: The Power Law 
The power law asserts that, for many variables that are encountered in 
practice, it is approximately true that the value v of the variable has the 
Property that, when x is large, 
(5.1) 
where K and are constants. This equation has been found to be 
4
 Kurtosis measures the size of a distribution's tails. A leptokurtic distribution has heavier 
tails than the normal distribution. A Platykurtic distribution has less heavy tails than the 
normal distribution. A distribution with tails of the same size as the normal distribution is 
termed mesokurtic. 
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approximately true for variables as diverse as the income of individuals, 
the size of cities, and the number of visits to a website. Suppose that = 3 
and we observe that the probability that is 0.05. In this case 
K = 50 and we can estimate that the probability that is 0.00625; 
the probability that is 0.0019; and so on. 
Equation (5.1) implies that 
We can therefore do a quick test of whether it holds by plotting 
against . We do this for our exchange rate data in 
Figure 5.2. The logarithm of the probability of the exchange rate increasing 
by more than x standard deviations is approximately linearly dependent on 
for x > 3 showing that the power law holds. The parameter is about 
5.5. When producing Figure 5.2, we assume that the distribution of 
exchange rate changes in Table 5.2 is symmetrical, so that the probability 
of a change greater than one standard deviation is 0.5 25.04 = 12.52%, 
greater than two standard deviations is 0.5 5.27 = 2.635%, and so on. 
We will examine the power law more formally and explain better 
Figure 5.2 Log-log plot for exchange rate increases: x is number of 
standard deviations; v is the exchange rate increase. 
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procedures for estimating the parameters when we consider extreme value 
theory in Chapter 9. We will also explain how it can be used in the 
assessment of operational risk in Chapter 14. 
5.5 MONITORING DAILY VOLATILITY 
Risk managers cannot assume that asset prices are well behaved with a 
constant volatility. It is important for them to monitor volatility daily. 
Define as the volatility of a market variable on day n, as estimated at 
the end of day n — 1. The variance rate is . Suppose that the value of 
the market variable at the end of day i is Si. As in Section 5.3, we define 
the variable as the continuously compounded return during day i 
(between the end of day i — 1 and the end of day i), so that 
One approach to estimating is to set it equal to the historical volatility as 
calculated in Section 5.3. When m days of observations on the are used, 
this approach gives 
(5.2) 
where is the mean of the : 
For risk management purposes, the formula in equation (5.2) is usually 
changed in a number of ways: 
1. is defined as the percentage change in the market variable 
between the end of day i — 1 and the end of day i so that 
(5.3) 
This makes very little difference to the values of ui that are computed. 
2. is assumed to be zero. The justification for this is that the expected 
change in a variable in one day is very small when compared with 
the standard deviation of changes. 
3. m — 1 is replaced by m. This moves us from an unbiased estimate of 
volatility to a maximum-likelihood estimate (see Section 5.9). 
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These three changes allow the formula for the variance rate to be 
simplified to 
(5.4) 
where is given by equation (5.3). 
Weighting Schemes 
Equation (5.4) gives equal weight to all . Our objec-
tive is to estimate the current level of volatility, . It therefore makes 
sense to give more weight to recent data. A model that does this is 
(5.5) 
The variable is the amount of weight given to the observation days 
ago. The 's are positive. If we choose them so that when 
less weight is given to older observations. The weights must sum to unity, 
so that 
An extension of the idea in equation (5.5) is to assume that there is a 
long-run average variance rate and that this should be given some weight. 
This leads to the model that takes the form 
(5.6) 
where is the long-run variance rate and is the weight assigned to 
Since the weights must sum to unity, we have 
This is known as an ARCH(m) model. It was first suggested by Engle. 
The estimate of the variance is based on a long-run average variance 
and m observations. The older an observation, the less weight it is given. 
5
 See R. Engle, "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the 
Variance of UK Inflation," Econometrica, 50 (1982), 987-1008. Robert Engle won the 
Nobel prize for economics in 2003 for his work on ARCH models. 
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Defining , we can write the model in equation (5.6) as 
In the next two sections we discuss two important approaches to mon-
itoring volatility using the ideas in equations (5.5) and (5.6). 
5.6 THE EXPONENTIALLY WEIGHTED MOVING 
AVERAGE MODEL 
The exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) model is a parti-
cular case of the model in equation (5.5) where the weights decrease 
exponentially as we move back through time. Specifically, , 
where is a constant between 0 and 1. 
It turns out that this weighting scheme leads to a particularly simple 
formula for updating volatility estimates. The formula is 
The estimate of the volatility for day n (made at the end of day n — 1) 
is calculated from (the estimate of the volatility for day n — 1 that 
was made at the end of day n — 2) and (the most recent daily 
percentage change). 
To understand why equation (5.8) corresponds to weights that decrease 
exponentially, we substitute for to get 
or 
Substituting in a similar way for gives 
Continuing in this way, we see that 
For a large m, the term is sufficiently small to be ignored, so that 
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equation (5.8) is the same as equation (5.5) with . The 
weights for the u's decline at rate as we move back through time. Each 
weight is times the previous weight. 
Example 5.2 
Suppose that is 0.90, the volatility estimated for a market variable for day 
n — 1 is 1 % per day, and during day n — 1 the market variable increased by 
2%. This means that = 0.012 = 0.0001 and = 0.022 = 0.0004. Equa-
tion (5.8) gives 
= 0.9 0.0001+0.1 0.0004 = 0.00013 
The estimate of the volatility for day n is therefore , or 1.14%, per 
day. Note that the expected value of is , or 0.0001. In this example, 
the realized value of is greater than the expected value, and as a result 
our volatility estimate increases. If the realized value of had been less 
than its expected value, our estimate of the volatility would have decreased. 
The EWMA approach has the attractive feature that relatively little data 
need to be stored. At any given time, we need to remember only the 
current estimate of the variance rate and the most recent observation on 
the value of the market variable. When we get a new observation on the 
value of the market variable, we calculate a new daily percentage change 
and use equation (5.8) to update our estimate of the variance rate. The 
old estimate of the variance rate and the old value of the market variable 
can then be discarded. 
The EWMA approach is designed to track changes in the volatility. 
Suppose there is a big move in the market variable on day n — 1, so that 
is large. From equation (5.8), this causes our estimate of the current 
volatility to move upward. The value of governs how responsive the 
estimate of the daily volatility is to the most recent daily percentage change. 
A low value of leads to a great deal of weight being given to the when 
is calculated. In this case, the estimates produced for the volatility on 
successive days are themselves highly volatile. A high value of (i.e., a 
value close to 1.0) produces estimates of the daily volatility that respond 
relatively slowly to new information given by the daily percentage change. 
The RiskMetrics database, which was originally created by J. P. Morgan 
and made publicly available in 1994, uses the EWMA model with = 0.94 
for updating daily volatility estimates. The company found that, across a 
range of different market variables, this value of gives forecasts of the 
variance rate that come closest to the realized variance rate.6 The realized 
6
 See J. P. Morgan, RiskMetrics Monitor, Fourth Quarter, 1995. We will explain an 
alternative (maximum-likelihood) approach to estimating parameters later in the chapter. 
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variance rate on a particular day was calculated as an equally weighted 
average of the on the subsequent 25 days (see Problem 5.20). 
5.7 THE GARCH(1,1) MODEL 
We now move on to discuss what is known as the GARCH(1,1) model, 
proposed by Bollerslev in 1986.7 The difference between the GARCH(1,1) 
model and the EWMA model is analogous to the difference between 
equation (5.5) and equation (5.6). In GARCH(1,1), is calculated from 
a long-run average variance rate, , as well as from and . The 
equation for GARCH(1,1) is 
(5.9) 
where is the weight assigned to , is the weight assigned to , and 
is the weight assigned to . Since the weights must sum to one, we 
have 
The EWMA model is a particular case of GARCH(1,1) where , 
, and 
The "(1,1)" in GARCH(1,1) indicates that is based on the most 
recent observation of and the most recent estimate of the variance rate. 
The more general GARCH(p,q) model calculates from the most recent 
observations on and the most recent estimates of the variance rate.8 
GARCH(1, 1) is by far the most popular of the GARCH models. 
Setting , we can also write the GARCH(1,1) model as 
(5.10) 
This is the form of the model that is usually used for the purposes of 
7
 See T. Bollerslev. "Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity," 
Journal of Econometrics, 31 (1986), 307-327. 
8
 Other GARCH models have been proposed that incorporate asymmetric news. These 
models are designed so that depends on the sign of . Arguably, these models are 
more appropriate than GARCH(1,1) for equities. This is because the volatility of an 
equity's price tends to be inversely related to the price, so that a negative should 
have a bigger effect on than the same positive . For a discussion of models for 
handling asymmetric news, see D. Nelson, "Conditional Heteroscedasticity and Asset 
Returns; A New Approach," Econometrica, 59 (1990), 347-370 and R. F. Engle and 
V. Ng, "Measuring and Testing the Impact of News on Volatility," Journal of Finance, 48 
(1993), 1749-1778. 
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estimating the parameters. Once and have been estimated, we can 
calculate as The long-term variance VL can then be calcu-
lated as For a stable GARCH(1,1) process, we require < 1. 
Otherwise the weight applied to the long-term variance is negative. 
Example 5.3 
Suppose that a GARCH(1,1) model is estimated from daily data as 
This corresponds to =0.13, =0.86, and =0.000002. Since = 
1- it follows that = 0.01, and, since we have VL = 0.0002. 
In other words, the long-run average variance per day implied by the model is 
0.0002. This corresponds to a volatility of = 0.014, or 1.4%, per day. 
Suppose that the estimate of the volatility on day n - 1 is 1.6% per day, so 
that = 0.0162 = 0.000256, and that on day n - 1 the market variable 
decreased by 1%, so that = 0.012 = 0.0001. Then 
= 0.000002 + 0.13 x 0.0001 + 0.86 x 0.000256 = 0.00023516 
The new estimate of the volatility is therefore = 0.0153, or 1.53%, 
per day. 
The Weights 
Substituting for in equation (5.10), we obtain 
or 
Substituting for we get 
Continuing in this way, we see that the weight applied to is 
The weights decline exponentially at rate The parameter can be 
interpreted as a "decay rate". It is similar to in the EWMA model. It 
defines the relative importance of the u's in determining the current 
variance rate. For example, if = 0.9, then is only 90% as import-
ant as is 81% as important as and so on. The 
GARCH(1,1) model is the same as the EWMA model except that, in 
addition to assigning weights that decline exponentially to past it also 
assigns some weight to the long-run average volatility. 
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5.8 CHOOSING BETWEEN THE MODELS 
In practice, variance rates do tend to be pulled back to a long-run average 
level. This is known as mean reversion. The GARCH(1,1) model incorpor-
ates mean reversion whereas the EWMA model does not. GARCH(1,1) is 
therefore theoretically more appealing than the EWMA model. 
In the next section, we shall discuss how best-fit parameters and 
in GARCH(1,1) can be estimated. When the parameter is zero, the 
GARCH(1,1) reduces to EWMA. In circumstances where the best-fit 
value of turns out to be negative, the GARCH(1,1) model is not stable 
and it makes sense to switch to the EWMA model. 
5.9 MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD METHODS 
It is now appropriate to discuss how the parameters in the models we have 
been considering are estimated from historical data. The approach used is 
known as the maximum-likelihood method. It involves choosing values for 
the parameters that maximize the chance (or likelihood) of the data 
occurring. 
To illustrate the method, we start with a very simple example. Suppose 
that we sample ten stocks at random on a certain day and find that the 
price of one of them declined on that day and the prices of the other nine 
either remained the same or increased. What is our best estimate of the 
probability of a price decline? The natural answer is 0.1. Let us see if this 
is the result given by the maximum-likelihood method. 
Suppose that the probability of a price decline is p. The probability 
that one particular stock declines in price and the other nine do not is 
p(l - p)9. (There is a probability p that it will decline and 1 — p that each 
of the other nine will not.) Using the maximum-likelihood approach, the 
best estimate of p is the one that maximizes p(1 — p)9. Differentiating this 
expression with respect to p and setting the result equal to zero, we find 
that p = 0.1 maximizes the expression. This shows that the maximum-
likelihood estimate of p is 0.1, as expected. 
Estimating a Constant Variance 
As our next example of maximum-likelihood methods, we consider the 
problem of estimating the variance of a variable X from m observations 
on X when the underlying distribution is normal with mean zero. We 
assume that the observations are u1, u2, . . . , um and that the mean of the 
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underlying distribution is zero. Denote the variance by The likelihood 
of being observed is the probability density function for X when 
X = This is 
The likelihood of m observations occurring in the order in which they are 
observed is 
Using the maximum-likelihood method, the best estimate of is the value 
that maximizes this expression. 
Maximizing an expression is equivalent to maximizing the logarithm of 
the expression. Taking logarithms of the expression in equation (5.11) 
and ignoring constant multiplicative factors, it can be seen that we wish to 
maximize 
or 
Estimating GARCH(1,1) Parameters 
We now consider how the maximum-likelihood method can be used to 
estimate the parameters when GARCH(1,1) or some other volatility 
updating scheme is used. Define as the estimated variance for 
day i. We assume that the probability distribution of conditional on the 
variance is normal. A similar analysis to the one just given shows the best 
The unbiased estimator has m replaced by m — 1. 
Differentiating this expression with respect to and setting the resultant 
equation to zero, we see that the maximum-likelihood estimator of is9 
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Taking logarithms, we see that this is equivalent to maximizing 
This is the same as the expression in equation (5.12), except that is 
replaced by We search iteratively to find the parameters in the model 
that maximize the expression in equation (5.13). 
The spreadsheet in Table 5.3 indicates how the calculations could be 
organized for the GARCH(1,1) model. The table analyzes data on the 
Japanese yen exchange rate between January 6, 1988, and August 15, 
1997. The numbers in the table are based on trial estimates of the three 
GARCH(1,1) parameters: and The first column in the table 
records the date. The second counts the days. The third shows the 
exchange rate at the end of day i. The fourth shows the proportional 
change in the exchange rate between the end of day i - 1 and the end of 
Table 5.3 Estimation of parameters in GARCH(1,1) model. 
Date 
06-Jan-88 
07-Jan-88 
08-Jan-88 
ll-Jan-88 
12-Jan-88 
13-Jan-88 
13-Aug-97 
14-Aug-97 
15-Aug-97 
Day i 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2421 
2422 
2423 
Si 
0.007728 
0.007779 
0.007746 
0.007816 
0.007837 
0.007924 
0.008643 
0.008493 
0.008495 
ui 
0.006599 
-0.004242 
0.009037 
0.002687 
0.011101 
0.003374 
-0.017309 
0.000144 
0.00004355 
0.00004198 
0.00004455 
0.00004220 
0.00007626 
0.00007092 
0.00008417 
9.6283 
8.1329 
9.8568 
7.1529 
9.3321 
5.3294 
9.3824 
22,063.5763 
Trial estimates of GARCH parameters 
0.00000176 0.0626 0.8976 
parameters are the ones that maximize 
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day i. This is The fifth column shows the estimate of 
the variance rate for day i made at the end of day i — 1. On day 
three, we start things off by setting the variance equal to On sub-
sequent days equation (5.10) is used. The sixth column tabulates the 
likelihood measure, The values in the fifth and sixth 
columns are based on the current trial estimates of and We are 
interested in choosing and to maximize the sum of the numbers in 
the sixth column. This involves an iterative search procedure.10 
In our example, the optimal values of the parameters turn out to be 
= 0.00000176, =0.0626, =0.8976 
and the maximum value of the function in equation (5.13) is 22,063.5763. 
The numbers shown in Table 5.3 were calculated on the final iteration of 
the search for the optimal and 
The long-term variance rate, VL, in our example is 
The long-term volatility is or 0.665%, per day. 
Figure 5.3 shows the way in which the GARCH(1,1) volatility for the 
Japanese yen changed over the ten-year period covered by the data. Most 
of the time, the volatility was between 0.4% and 0.8% per day, but 
volatilities over 1% were experienced during some periods. 
An alternative and more robust approach to estimating parameters in 
GARCH(1,1) is known as variance targeting.11 This involves setting the 
long-run average variance rate, VL, equal to the sample variance calcu-
lated from the data (or to some other value that is believed to be 
reasonable.) The value of then equals and only two 
parameters have to be estimated. For the data in Table 5.3 the sample 
variance is 0.00004341, which gives a daily volatility of 0.659%. Setting 
VL equal to the sample variance, we find that the values of that 
maximize the objective function in equation (5.13) are 0.0607 and 0.8990, 
respectively. The value of the objective function is 22,063.5274, only 
10
 As discussed later, a general purpose algorithm such as Solver in Microsoft's Excel 
can be used. Alternatively, a special purpose algorithm, such as Levenberg-Marquardt, 
can be used. See, for example, W. H. Press, B.P. Flannery, S.A. Teukolsky, and 
W. T. Vetterling. Numerical Recipes in C: The Art of Scientific Computing, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. 
11
 See R. Engle and J. Mezrich, "GARCH for Groups," Risk, August 1996, 36-40. 
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Figure 5.3 Daily volatility of the yen/USD exchange rate, 1988-97. 
marginally below the value of 22,063.5763 obtained using the earlier 
procedure. 
When the EWMA model is used, the estimation procedure is relatively 
simple. We set = 0 , = 1 — , and and only one parameter has 
to be estimated. In the data in Table 5.3, the value of that maximizes the 
objective function in equation (5.13) is 0.9686 and the value of the 
objective function is 21,995.8377. 
Both GARCH(1,1) and the EWMA method can be implemented by 
using the Solver routine in Excel to search for the values of the para-
meters that maximize the likelihood function. The routine works well 
provided that we structure our spreadsheet so that the parameters we are 
[searching for have roughly equal values. For example, in GARCH(1,1) 
we could let cells Al, A2, and A3 contain x 105, and 0.1 We could 
then set Bl = Al/100,000, B2 = A2, and B3 = 10 * A3. We could use 
Bl, B2, and B3 to calculate the likelihood function and then ask Solver to 
(calculate the values of Al , A2, and A3 that maximize the likelihood 
function. 
How Good Is the Model? 
The assumption underlying a GARCH model is that volatility changes 
with the passage of time. During some periods volatility is relatively high; 
[during others it is relatively low. To put this another way, when is high, 
Volatility 
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Table 5.4 Autocorrelations before and after the 
use of a GARCH model. 
Time lag 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Autocorrelation 
for 
0.072 
0.041 
0.057 
0.107 
0.075 
0.066 
0.019 
0.085 
0.054 
0.030 
0.038 
0.038 '„ 
0.057 
0.040 
0.007 
Autocorrelation 
for 
0.004 
-0.005 
0.008 
0.003 
0.016 
0.008 
-0.033 
0.012 
0.010 
-0.023 
-0.004 
-0.021 
-0.001 
0.002 
-0.028 
there is a tendency for to be high; when is low, there is a 
tendency for to be low. We can test how true this is by 
examining the autocorrelation structure of the 
Let us assume that the do exhibit autocorrelation. If a GARCH 
model is working well, it should remove the autocorrelation. We can test 
whether it has done this by considering the autocorrelation structure for 
the variables If these show very little autocorrelation, our model 
foi has succeeded in explaining autocorrelations in the 
Table 5.4 shows results for the yen/USD exchange rate data referred to 
earlier. The first column shows the lags considered when the autocorrela-
tion is calculated. The second column shows autocorrelations for the 
third column shows autocorrelations for The table shows that 
the autocorrelations are positive for for all lags between 1 and 15. In 
the case of some of the autocorrelations are positive and some are 
negative. They tend to be smaller in magnitude than the autocorrelations 
for 
The GARCH model appears to have done a good job in explaining the 
12
 For a series the autocorrelation with a lag of k is the coefficient of correlation 
between and 
Volatility 133 
data. For a more scientific test, we can use what is known as the Ljung-
Box statistic.13 If a certain series has m observations the Ljung-Box 
statistic is 
where is the autocorrelation for a lag of k, K is the number of lags 
considered, and 
For K = 15, zero autocorrelation can be rejected with 95% confidence 
when the Ljung-Box statistic is greater than 25. 
From Table 5.4, the Ljung-Box statistic for the series is about 123. 
This is strong evidence of autocorrelation. For the series the Ljung-
Box statistic is 8.2, suggesting that the autocorrelation has been largely 
removed by the GARCH model. 
5.10 USING GARCH(1,1) TO FORECAST FUTURE 
VOLATILITY 
The variance rate estimated at the end of day n — 1 for day n, when 
GARCH(l,l) is used, is 
so that 
On day n + t in the future, we have 
The expected value of Hence, 
where E denotes expected value. Using this equation repeatedly yields 
13
 See G. M. Ljung and G. E. P. Box, "On a Measure of Lack of Fit in Time Series 
Models," Biometrica, 65 (1978), 297-303. 
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Figure 5.4 Expected path for the variance rate when (a) current variance rate is 
above long-term variance rate and (b) current variance rate is below long-term 
variance rate. 
or 
This equation forecasts the volatility on day n +t using the information 
available at the end of day n — 1. In the EWMA model, = 1 and 
equation (5.14) shows that the expected future variance rate equals the 
current variance rate. When < 1, the final term in the equation 
becomes progressively smaller as t increases. Figure 5.4 shows the 
expected path followed by the variance rate for situations where the 
current variance rate is different from VL. As mentioned earlier, the 
variance rate exhibits mean reversion with a reversion level of VL and a 
reversion rate of Our forecast of the future variance rate tends 
toward VL as we look further and further ahead. This analysis empha-
sizes the point that we must have < 1 for a stable GARCH(1,1) 
process. When > 1, the weight given to the long-term average 
variance is negative and the process is "mean fleeing" rather than "mean 
reverting". 
In the yen/USD exchange rate example considered earlier, 
= 0.9602 and VL = 0.00004422. Suppose that our estimate of the 
current variance rate per day is 0.00006. (This corresponds to a volatility 
of 0.77% per day.) In ten days the expected variance rate is 
0.00004422 + 0.960210(0.00006 - 0.00004422) = 0.00005473 
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The expected volatility per day is 0.74%, still well above the long-term 
volatility of 0.665% per day. However, the expected variance rate in 100 
days is 
0.00004422 + 0.9602100(0.00006 - 0.00004422) = 0.00004449 
and the expected volatility per day is 0.667%, very close the long-term 
volatility. 
Volatility Term Structures 
Suppose it is day n. Define 
so that equation (5.14) becomes 
Here V(t) is an estimate of the instantaneous variance rate in t days. The 
average variance rate per day between today and time T is 
The longer the life of the option, the closer this is to VL. Define as 
the volatility per annum that should be used to price a 7-day option 
under GARCH(1,1). Assuming 252 days per year, is 252 times the 
average variance rate per day, so that 
(5.15) 
As we discuss in Chapter 15, the market prices of different options on the 
same asset are often used to calculate a volatility term structure. This is the 
relationship between the implied volatilities of the options and their 
maturities. Equation (5.15) can be used to estimate a volatility term 
structure based on the GARCH(1,1) model. The estimated volatility term 
structure is not usually the same as the actual volatility term structure. 
However, as we will show, it is often used to predict the way that the 
actual volatility term structure will respond to volatility changes. 
When the current volatility is above the long-term volatility, the 
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GARCH(1,1) model estimates a downward-sloping volatility term struc-
ture. When the current volatility is below the long-term volatility, it 
estimates an upward-sloping volatility term structure. In the case of the 
yen/USD exchange rate a = ln(l/0.9602) = 0.0406 and VL = 0.00004422. 
Suppose that the current variance rate per day, V(0) is estimated as 
0.00006 per day. It follows from equation (5.15) that 
where T is measured in days. Table 5.5 shows the volatility per year for 
different values of T. 
Impact of Volatility Changes 
Equation (5.15) can be written as 
When changes by changes by 
Table 5.6 shows the effect of a volatility change on options of varying 
maturities for our yen/USD exchange rate example. We assume as before 
that V(0) = 0.00006, so that =12.30%. The table considers a 
100-basis-point change in the instantaneous volatility from 12.30% per 
year to 13.30% per year. This means that = 0.01, or 1%. 
Many financial institutions use analyses such as this when determining 
the exposure of their books to volatility changes. Rather than consider an 
across-the-board increase of 1% in implied volatilities when calculating 
vega, they relate the size of the volatility increase that is considered to the 
maturity of the option. Based on Table 5.6, a 0.84% volatility increase 
Table 5.5 Yen/USD volatility term structure predicted from GARCH(1, 1). 
Option life (days): 
Option volatility (% per annum): 
10 
12.00 
30 
11.59 
50 
11.33 
100 
11.00 
500 
10.65 
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Table 5.6 Impact of 1% change in the instantaneous volatility predicted from 
GARCH(1,1). 
would be considered for a 10-day option, a 0.61% increase for a 30-day 
option, a 0.46% increase for a 50-day option, and so on. 
SUMMARY 
In option pricing we define the volatility of a variable as the standard 
deviation of its continuously compounded return per year. Volatilities are 
either estimated from historical data or implied from option prices. In 
risk management the daily volatility of a market variable is defined as the 
standard deviation of the percentage daily change in the market variable. 
The daily variance rate is the square of the daily volatility. Volatility tends 
to be much higher on trading days than on nontrading days. As a result 
nontrading days are ignored in volatility calculations. It is tempting to 
assume that daily changes in market variables are normally distributed. 
In fact, this is far from true. Most market variables have distributions for 
percentage daily changes with much heavier tails than the normal dis-
tribution. The power law has been found to be a good description of the 
tails of many distributions that are encountered in practice, and is often 
used for the tails of the distributions of percentage changes in many 
market variables. 
Most popular option pricing models, such as Black-Scholes, assume 
that the volatility of the underlying asset is constant. This assumption is 
far from perfect. In practice, the volatility of an asset, like its price, is a 
stochastic variable. However, unlike the asset price, it is not directly 
observable. This chapter has discussed schemes for attempting to keep 
track of the current level of volatility. 
We define ui, as the percentage change in a market variable between the 
end of day i — 1 and the end of day i. The variance rate of the market 
variable (i.e., the square of its volatility) is calculated as a weighted 
average of the The key feature of the schemes that have been discussed 
here is that they do not give equal weight to the observations on the 
The more recent an observation, the greater the weight assigned to it. In 
the EWMA model and the GARCH(1,1) model, the weights assigned to 
Option life (days): 
Increase in volatility (%): 
10 
0.84 
30 
0.61 
50 
0.46 
100 
0.27 
500 
0.06 
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observations decrease exponentially as the observations become older. 
The GARCH(1,1) model differs from the EWMA model in that some 
weight is also assigned to the long-run average variance rate. Both the 
EWMA and GARCH(1,1) models have structures that enable forecasts 
of the future level of variance rate to be produced relatively easily. 
Maximum-likelihood methods are usually used to estimate parameters 
in GARCH(1,1) and similar models from historical data. These methods 
involve using an iterative procedure to determine the parameter values 
that maximize the chance or likelihood that the historical data will occur. 
Once its parameters have been determined, a model can be judged by how 
well it removes autocorrelation from the 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
5.1. The volatility of a stock price is 30% per annum. What is the standard 
deviation of the percentage price change in one week? 
5.2. The volatility of an asset is 25% per annum. What is the standard 
deviation of the percentage price change in one trading day. Assuming a 
normal distribution, estimate 95% confidence limits for the percentage 
price change in one day. 
5.3. Why do traders assume 252 rather than 365 days in a year when using 
volatilities? 
5.4. What is implied volatility? How can it be calculated? In practice, different 
options on the same asset have different implied volatilities. What conclu-
sions do you draw from this? 
5.5. Suppose that observations on an exchange rate at the end of the last 
11 days have been 0.7000, 0.7010, 0.7070, 0.6999, 0.6970, 0.7003, 0.6951, 
0.6953, 0.6934, 0.6923, 0.6922. Estimate the daily volatility using both the 
approach in Section 5.3 and the simplified approach in equation (5.4). 
5.6. The number of visitors to a website follows the power law given in 
equation (5.1) with = 2. Suppose that 1 % of sites get 500 or more visitors 
per day. What percentage of sites get (a) 1000 and (b) 2000 or more visitors 
per day. 
5.7. Explain the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) model for 
estimating volatility from historical data. 
5.8. What is the difference between the exponentially weighted moving average 
model and the GARCH(1,1) model for updating volatilities? 
5.9. The most recent estimate of the daily volatility of an asset is 1.5% and the 
price of the asset at the close of trading yesterday was $30.00. The 
parameter in the EWMA model is 0.94. Suppose that the price of the 
asset at the close of trading today is $30.50. How will this cause the 
volatility to be updated by the EWMA model? 
5.l0. A company uses an EWMA model for forecasting volatility. It decides to 
change the parameter from 0.95 to 0.85. Explain the likely impact on the 
forecasts. 
5.l1. Assume that S&P 500 at close of trading yesterday was 1,040 and the daily 
volatility of the index was estimated as 1% per day at that time. The 
parameters in a GARCH(1,1) model are =0.000002, =0.06, and 
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= 0.92. If the level of the index at close of trading today is 1,060, what is 
the new volatility estimate? 
5.12. The most recent estimate of the daily volatility of the USD/GBP exchange 
rate is 0.6% and the exchange rate at 4 p.m. yesterday was 1.5000. The 
parameter in the EWMA model is 0.9. Suppose that the exchange rate at 
4 p.m. today proves to be 1.4950. How would the estimate of the daily 
volatility be updated? 
5.13. A company uses the GARCH(1,1) model for updating volatility. The 
three parameters are and Describe the impact of making a small 
increase in each of the parameters while keeping the others fixed. 
5.14. The parameters of a GARCH(1,1) model are estimated as = 0.000004, 
= 0.05, and = 0.92. What is the long-run average volatility and what is 
the equation describing the way that the variance rate reverts to its long-
run average? If the current volatility is 20% per year, what is the expected 
volatility in 20 days? 
5.15. Suppose that the daily volatility of the FTSE 100 stock index (measured in 
GBP) is 1.8% and the daily volatility of the USD/GBP exchange rate is 
0.9%. Suppose further that the correlation between the FTSE 100 and the 
USD/GBP exchange rate is 0.4. What is the volatility of the FTSE 100 
when it is translated to US dollars? Assume that the USD/GBP exchange 
rate is expressed as the number of US dollars per pound sterling. (Hint: 
When Z = XY, the percentage daily change in Z is approximately equal to 
the percentage daily change in X plus the percentage daily change in Y.) 
5.16. Suppose that GARCH(1,1) parameters have been estimated as 
= 0.000003, =0.04, and =0.94. The current daily volatility is 
estimated to be 1%. Estimate the daily volatility in 30 days. 
5.17. Suppose that GARCH(1,1) parameters have been estimated as 
= 0.000002, =0.04, and =0.94. The current daily volatility is 
estimated to be 1.3%. Estimate the volatility per annum that should be 
used to price a 20-day option. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
5.18. Suppose that observations on a stock price (in US dollars) at the end of 
each of 15 consecutive weeks are as follows: 
30.2, 32.0, 31.1, 30.1, 30.2, 30.3, 30.6, 33.0, 32.9, 33.0, 33.5, 33.5, 33.7, 33.5, 33.2 
Estimate the stock price volatility. What is the standard error of your 
estimate? 
5.19. Suppose that the price of gold at close of trading yesterday was $300 and 
its volatility was estimated as 1.3% per day. The price at the close of 
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trading today is $298. Update the volatility estimate using (a) the EWMA 
model with = 0.94 and (b) the GARCH(1,1) model with =0.000002, 
= 0.04, and = 0.94. 
5.20. An Excel spreadsheet containing over 900 days of daily data on a number 
of different exchange rates and stock indices can be downloaded from the 
author's website: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull. Choose one 
exchange rate and one stock index. Estimate the value of in the EWMA 
model that minimizes the value of 
where is the variance forecast made at the end of day i — 1 and is the 
variance calculated from data between day i and day i + 25. Use the Solver 
tool in Excel. To start the EWMA calculations, set the variance forecast at 
the end of the first day equal to the square of the return on that day. 
5.21. Suppose that the parameters in a GARCH(1,1) model are =0.03, 
= 0.95, and = 0.000002. (a) What is the long-run average volatility? 
(b) If the current volatility is 1.5% per day, what is your estimate of the 
volatility in 20, 40, and 60 days? (c) What volatility should be used to price 
20-, 40-, and 60-day options? (d) Suppose that there is an event that 
increases the current volatility by 0.5% to 2% per day. Estimate the effect 
on the volatility in 20, 40, and 60 days. (e) Estimate by how much the 
event increases the volatilities used to price 20-, 40-, and 60-day options. 
5.22. An Excel spreadsheet containing over 900 days of daily data on a number 
of different exchange rates and stock indices can be downloaded from the 
author's website: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull. Use the data 
and maximum-likelihood methods to estimate for the TSE and S&P 
indices the best-fit parameters in an EWMA model and a GARCH(1,1) 
model for the variance rate. 
Correlations 
and Copulas 
Suppose a company has an exposure to two different market variables. In 
the case of each variable it gains $10 million if there is a one-standard-
deviation increase and loses $10 million if there is a one-standard-
deviation decrease. If changes in the two variables have a high positive 
correlation, the company's total exposure is very high; if they have a 
correlation of zero, the exposure is less, but still quite large; if they have a 
high negative correlation, the exposure is quite low because a loss on one 
of the variables is likely to be offset by a gain on the other. This example 
shows that it is important for a risk manager to estimate correlations 
between the changes in market variables as well as their volatilities when 
assessing risk exposures. 
This chapter explains how correlations can be monitored in a similar 
way to volatilities. It also covers what are known as copulas. These are 
tools that provide a way of defining a correlation structure between two 
or more variables, regardless of the shapes of their probability distribu-
tions. Copulas will prove to be important in a number of future 
chapters. For example, a knowledge of copulas enables some of the 
formulas underlying the Basel II capital requirements to be understood 
(Chapter 7). Copulas are also useful in modeling default correlation for 
the purposes of valuing credit derivatives (Chapter 13) and in the 
calculation of economic capital (Chapter 16). The final section of this 
chapter explains how copulas can be used to model defaults on port-
folios of loans. 
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6.1 DEFINITION OF CORRELATION 
The coefficient of correlation, between two variables V\ and V2 is 
defined as 
where E(•) denotes expected value and SD(•) denotes standard deviation. 
If there is no correlation between the variables, then E{V1V2)= 
E(V1)E(V2) and = 0. If V1 = V2, then the numerator and the denomin-
ator in the expression for are both equal to the variance of V1. As we 
would expect, = 1 in this case. 
The Covariance between V1 and V2 is defined as 
cov(V1, V2) = E{V1 V2) - E(V1)E(V2) (6.2) 
so that the correlation can be written 
Although it is easier to develop intuition about the meaning of a correl-
ation than a Covariance, it is covariances that will prove to be the 
fundamental variables of our analysis. An analogy here is that variance 
rates were the fundamental variables for the EWMA and GARCH 
methods in Chapter 5, even though volatilities are easier to understand. 
Correlation vs. Dependence 
Two variables are defined as statistically independent if knowledge about 
one of them does not affect the probability distribution for the other. 
Formally, V1 and V2 and independent if 
f(V2|V1=x) = f(V2) 
for all x, where f ( • ) denotes the probability density function. 
If the coefficient of correlation between two variables is zero, does this 
mean that there is no dependence between the variables? The answer is 
no. We can illustrate this with a simple example. Suppose that there are 
three equally likely values for V1.: - 1 , 0 , and +1 . If V1 = — 1 or V1 = +1, 
then V2 = 1. If V 1=0, then V2 = 0. In this case there is clearly a 
dependence between V1 and V2. If we observe the value of V1 we know 
the value of V2. Also, a knowledge of the value of V2 will cause us to 
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(c) 
Figure 6.1 Examples of ways in which V2 can depend on V1. 
change our probability distribution for V1. However, the coefficient of 
correlation between V1 and V2 is zero. 
This example emphasizes the point that the coefficient of correlation 
measures one particular type of dependence between two variables. This 
is linear dependence. There are many other ways in which two variables 
can be related. We can characterize the nature of the dependence between 
V1 and V2 by plotting E(V2) against V1. Three examples are shown in 
Figure 6.1. Figure 6.1a shows linear dependence where the expected value 
of V2 depends linearly on V1. Figure 6.1b shows a V-shaped relationship 
between the expected value of V2 and V1. (This is similar to the example 
we have just considered; a symmetrical V-shaped relationship, however 
strong, leads to zero coefficient of correlation.) Figure 6.1c shows a type 
of dependence that is often seen when V1 and V2 are percentage changes 
in financial variables. For the values of V1 normally encountered, there is 
very little relation between V1 and V2. However, extreme values of V1 tend 
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to lead to extreme values of V2. To quote one commentator: "During a 
crisis the correlations all go to one." 
A similar weighting scheme for variances gives an estimate for the 
variance rate on day n for variable X as 
and for variable Y as 
6.2 MONITORING CORRELATION 
Chapter 5 explained how EWMA and GARCH methods can be devel-
oped to monitor the variance rate of a variable. Similar approaches can 
be used to monitor the Covariance rate between two variables. The 
variance rate per day of a variable is the variance of daily returns. 
Similarly the Covariance rate per day between two variables is defined 
as the Covariance between the daily returns of the variables. 
Suppose that and are the values of two variables X and Y at the 
end of day i. The returns on the variables on day i are 
The Covariance rate between X and Y on day n is, from equation (6.2), 
covn = E(xnyn) - E(xn)E(yn) 
In Section 5.5 we explained that risk managers assume that expected daily 
returns are zero when the variance rate per day is calculated. They do the 
same when calculating the Covariance rate per day. This means that the 
Covariance rate per day between X and Y on day n is simply 
Using equal weighting for the last m observations on and 
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The correlation estimate on day n is 
Using EWMA 
Most risk managers would agree that observations from far back in the 
past should not have as much weight as recent observations. In Chapter 5 
we discussed the use of the EWMA model for variances. We saw that it 
leads to weights that decline exponentially as we move back through time. 
A similar weighting scheme can be used for covariances. The formula for 
updating a Covariance estimate in the EWMA model is, similarly to 
equation (5.8), 
A similar analysis to that presented for the EWMA volatility model shows 
that the weight given to declines as i increases (i.e., as we move 
back through time). The lower the value of the greater the weight that 
is given to recent observations. 
Example 6.1 
Suppose that = 0.95 and that the estimate of the correlation between two 
variables X and Y on day n — 1 is 0.6. Suppose further that the estimate of the 
volatilities for X and Y on day n — 1 are 1% and 2%, respectively. From the 
relationship between correlation and Covariance, the estimate of the Covar-
iance rate between X and Y on day n — 1 is 
0.6 x 0.01 x 0.02 = 0.00012 
Suppose that the percentage changes in X and Y on day n — 1 are 0.5% and 
2.5%, respectively. The variance rates and Covariance rate for day n would be 
updated as follows: 
= 0.95 x 0.012 + 0.05 x 0.0052 = 0.00009625 
= 0.95 x 0.022 + 0.05 x 0.0252 = 0.00041125 
= 0.95 x 0.00012 + 0.05 x 0.005 x 0.025 = 0.00012025 
The new volatility of X is = 0.981 % and the new volatility of Y 
is = 2.028%. The new correlation between X and Y is 
148 Chapter 6 
Using GARCH 
GARCH models can also be used for updating Covariance rate estimates 
and forecasting the future level of Covariance rates. For example, the 
GARCH(1,1) model for updating a Covariance rate between X and Y is 
This formula, like its counterpart in equation (5.10) for updating 
variances, gives some weight to a long-run average Covariance, some 
to the most recent Covariance estimate, and some to the most recent 
observation on Covariance (which is ). The long-term average 
Covariance rate is Formulas similar to those in 
equations (5.14) and (5.15) can be developed for forecasting future 
Covariance rates and calculating the average Covariance rate during the 
life of an option. 
Consistency Condition for Covariances 
Once variance and Covariance rates have been calculated for a set of 
market variables, a variance-covariance matrix can be constructed. When 
i j, the (i, j)th element of this matrix shows the Covariance rate 
between the variables i and j; when i = j, it shows the variance rate of 
variable i. 
Not all variance-covariance matrices are internally consistent. The 
condition for an N x N variance-covariance matrix to be internally 
consistent is 
for all N x 1 vectors where is the transpose of w. A matrix that 
satisfies this property is known as Positive-semidefinite. 
To understand why the condition in equation (6.4) must hold, suppose 
that is The expression is the variance rate of 
where is the value of variable i. As such, it 
cannot be negative. 
To ensure that a Positive-semidefinite matrix is produced, variances and 
covariances should be calculated consistently. For example, if variance 
rates are calculated by giving equal weight to the last m data items, the 
same should be done for Covariance rates. If variance rates are updated 
using an EWMA model with = 0.94, the same should be done for 
Covariance rates. Multivariate GARCH models, where variance rates 
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and Covariance rates for a set of variables are updated in a consistent way, 
can also be developed.1 
An example of a variance-covariance matrix that is not internally 
consistent is 
The variance of each variable is 1.0 and so the covariances are also 
coefficients of correlation in this case. The first variable is highly correlated 
with the third variable, and the second variable is also highly correlated 
with the third variable. However, there is no correlation at all between the 
first and second variables. This seems strange. When we set equal to 
(1,1,-1), we find that the condition in equation (6.4) is not satisfied, 
proving that the matrix is not Positive-semidefinite.2 
Variance-covariance matrices that are calculated in a consistent way 
from observations on the underlying variables are always Positive-semi-
definite. For example, if we have 500 days of data on three different 
variables and use it to calculate a variance-covariance matrix using 
EWMA with = 0.94, it will be Positive-semidefinite. If we make a small 
change to the matrix (e.g., for the purposes of doing a sensitivity 
analysis), it is likely that the matrix will remain Positive-semidefinite. 
However, if we do the same thing for observations on 1000 variables, 
we have to be much more careful. The 1000 x 1000 matrix that we 
calculate from the 500 days of data is Positive-semidefinite, but if we 
make an arbitrary small change to the matrix it is quite likely that it will 
no longer be Positive-semidefinite. 
6.3 MULTIVARIATE NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
Multivariate normal distributions are well understood and relatively easy 
to deal with. As we will explain in the next section, they can be useful 
1
 See R. Engle and J. Mezrich, "GARCH for Groups," Risk, August 1996, 36-40, for a 
discussion of alternative approaches. 
2
 It can be shown that the condition for a 3 x 3 matrix of correlations to be internally 
consistent is 
where is the coefficient of correlation between variables i and j. 
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tools for specifying the correlation structure between variables—even 
when the distributions of the variables are not normal. 
We start by considering a bivariate normal distribution, where there are 
only two variables, V1 and V2. Suppose that we know V1 has some 
value Conditional on this, the value of V2 is normal with mean 
and standard deviation 
Here and are the unconditional means of V1 and V2; and are 
their unconditional standard deviations; and is the coefficient of cor-
relation between V1 and V2. Note that the expected value of V2 condi-
tional on V1 is linearly dependent on the value of V1. This corresponds to 
Figure 6.1a. Also the standard deviation of V2 conditional on the value of 
V1 is the same for all values of V1. 
Generating Random Samples from Normal Distributions 
Most programming languages have routines for sampling a random 
number between 0 and 1 and many have routines for sampling from a 
normal distribution.3 If no routine for sampling from a standardized 
normal distribution is readily available, an approximate random sample 
can be calculated as 
where the Ri (1 i 12) are independent random numbers between 0 
and 1, and is the required sample. This approximation is satisfactory for 
most purposes. 
When two correlated samples and from bivariate distributions are 
required, an appropriate procedure is as follows. Independent samples z1 
and z2 from a univariate standardized normal distribution are obtained as 
just described. The required samples and are then calculated as 
follows: 
where is the coefficient of correlation. 
3
 In Excel the instruction =NORMSINV(RAND()) gives a random sample from a 
normal distribution. 
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Consider next the situation where we require n correlated samples from 
normal distributions and the coefficient of correlation between sample i 
and sample j is We first sample n independent variables (1 i n) 
from univariate standardized normal distributions. The required samples 
are (1 i n), where 
and the are parameters chosen to give the correct variances and 
correlations for the 
For 1 j < i, we have 
and, for all j < i, 
The first sample, , is set equal to z\. These equations for the can be 
solved so that is calculated from z1 and z2, is calculated from z1, z2 and 
z3, and so on. The procedure is known as the Cholesky decomposition. 
If we find ourselves trying to take the square root of a negative number 
when using the Cholesky decomposition, the variance-covariance matrix 
assumed for the variables is not internally consistent. As explained in 
Section 6.2, this is equivalent to saying that the matrix is not Positive-
semidefinite. 
Factor Models 
Sometimes the correlations between normally distributed variables are 
defined using a factor model. Suppose that U1,U2,... ,UN have standard 
normal distributions (i.e., normal distributions with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1). In a one-factor model each Ui has a component dependent on 
a common factor F and a component that is uncorrelated with the other 
variables. Formally, 
where F and the Zi have a standard normal distributions and ai is a 
constant between —1 and +1. The Zi are uncorrelated with each other 
and uncorrelated with F. In this model all the correlation between Ui and 
Vj arises from their dependence on the common factor F. The coefficient 
of correlation between Ui and Uj is 
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The advantage of a one-factor model is that it imposes some structure 
on the correlations. Without assuming a factor model the number of 
correlations that have to be estimated for the N variables is N(N — l)/2. 
With the one-factor model we need only estimate N parameters: 
An example of a one-factor model from the world of 
investments is the capital asset pricing model, where the return on a stock 
has a component dependent on the return from the market and an 
idiosyncratic (nonsystematic) component that is independent of the return 
on other stocks (see Section 1.1). 
The one-factor model can be extended to a two-, three-, or M-factor 
model. In the M-factor model, 
The factors F1, F2,..., FM have uncorrelated standard normal distribu-
tions and the Zi are uncorrelated both with each other and with the F's. 
In this case the correlation between Ui and Uj is 
6.4 COPULAS 
Consider two correlated variables V\ and V2.The marginal distribution of 
V1 (sometimes also referred to as the unconditional distribution) is its 
distribution assuming we know nothing about V2; similarly, the marginal 
distribution of V2 is its distribution assuming we know nothing about V1. 
Suppose we have estimated the marginal distributions of V1 and V2. How 
can we make an assumption about the correlation structure between the 
two variables to define their joint distribution? 
If the marginal distributions of V1 and V2 are normal, an assumption 
that is convenient and easy to work with is that the joint distribution of 
the variables is bivariate normal.4 Similar assumptions are possible for 
some other marginal distributions. But often there is no natural way of 
defining a correlation structure between two marginal distributions. This 
is where copulas come in. 
4
 Although this is a convenient assumption it is not the only one that can be made. There 
are many other ways in which two normally distributed variables can be dependent on 
each other. See, for example, Problem 6.11. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 6.2 Triangular distributions for (a) V1 and (b) V2. 
As an example of the application of copulas, suppose that the marginal 
distributions of V1 and V2 are the triangular probability density functions 
shown in Figure 6.2. Both variables have values between 0 and 1. The 
density function for V1 peaks at 0.2, and the density function for V2 peaks 
at 0.5. For both density functions, the maximum height is 2.0. To use what 
is known as a Gaussian copula, we map V1 and V2 into new variables U1 and 
U2 that have standard normal distributions. (A standard normal distribu-
tion is a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.) The 
mapping is effected on a percentile-to-percentile basis. The 1-percentile 
point of the V1 distribution is mapped to the 1-percentile point of the U1 
distribution; the 10-percentile point of the V1 distribution is mapped to the 
10-percentile point of the U1 distribution; and so on. The variable V2 is 
mapped into U2 in a similar way. Table 6.1 shows how values of V1 are 
Table 6.1 Mapping of V1, which has the triangular 
distribution in Figure 6.2a, to U1, which has a standard 
normal distribution. 
V1 value 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
Percentile 
of distribution 
5.00 
20.00 
38.75 
55.00 
68.75 
80.00 
88.75 
95.00 
98.75 
U1 value 
-1.64 
-0.84 
-0.29 
0.13 
0.49 
0.84 
1.21 
1.64 
2.24 
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Table 6.2 Mapping of V2, which has the triangular 
distribution in Figure 6.2b, to U2, which has a standard 
normal distribution. 
V2 value 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
Percentile 
of distribution 
2.00 
8.00 
18.00 
32.00 
50.00 
68.00 
82.00 
92.00 
98.00 
U2 value 
-2.05 
-1.41 
-0.92 
-0.47 
0.00 
0.47 
0.92 
1.41 
2.05 
mapped into values of U1 and Table 6.2 how values of V2 are mapped into 
values of U2. Consider the V1 =0 .1 calculation in Table 6.1. The cumula-
tive probability that V1 is less than 0.1 is (by calculating areas of triangles) 
0.5 x 0.1 x 1 = 0.05, or 5%. The value 0.1 for V1 therefore gets mapped to 
the 5-percentile point of the standard normal distribution. This is —1.64.5 
The variables U1 and U2 have normal distributions. We assume that 
they are jointly bivariate normal. This in turn implies a joint distribution 
and a correlation structure between V1 and V2. The essence of copulas is 
therefore that, instead of defining a correlation structure between V1 and 
V2 directly, we do so indirectly. We map V1 and V2 into other variables 
which have "well-behaved" distributions and for which it is easy to define 
a correlation structure. 
The way in which a copula defines a joint distribution is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3. Let us assume that the correlation between U1 and U2 is 0.5. 
The joint cumulative probability distribution between V1 and V2 is shown 
in Table 6.3. To illustrate the calculations, consider the first one where we 
are calculating the probability that V1 < 0.1 and V2 < 0.1. From Tables 6.1 
and 6.2, this is the same as the probability that U1 < —1.64 and 
U2 < -2.05. From the cumulative bivariate normal distribution, this is 
0.006 when = 0.5.6 (The probability would be only 0.02 x 0.05 = 0.001 
if =0 . ) 
5
 It can be calculated using Excel: NORMSINV(0.05) = -1.64. 
6
 An Excel function for calculating the cumulative bivariate normal distribution can be 
found on the author's website: www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull. 
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One-to-one 
mappings 
Correlation assumption 
Figure 6.3 The way in which a copula model defines a joint distribution. 
Table 6.3 Cumulative joint probability distribution for V1 and V2 in a 
Gaussian copula model. Correlation parameter =0.5. Table shows the joint 
probability that V1 and V2 are less than the specified values. 
V1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
0.1 
0.006 
0.013 
0.017 
0.019 
0.019 
0.020 
0.020 
0.020 
0.020 
0.2 
0.017 
0.043 
0.061 
0.071 
0.076 
0.078 
0.079 
0.080 
0.080 
0.3 
0.028 
0.081 
0.124 
0.149 
0.164 
0.173 
0.177 
0.179 
0.180 
0.4 
0.037 
0.120 
0.197 
0.248 
0.281 
0.301 
0.312 
0.318 
0.320 
V2 
0.5 
0.044 
0.156 
0.273 
0.358 
0.417 
0.456 
0.481 
0.494 
0.499 
0.6 
0.048 
0.181 
0.331 
0.449 
0.537 
0.600 
0.642 
0.667 
0.678 
0.7 
0.049 
0.193 
0.364 
0.505 
0.616 
0.701 
0.760 
0.798 
0.816 
0.8 
0.050 
0.198 
0.381 
0.535 
0.663 
0.763 
0.837 
0.887 
0.913 
0.9 
0.050 
0.200 
0.387 
0.548 
0.683 
0.793 
0.877 
0.936 
0.970 
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The correlation between U1 and U2 is referred to as the copula correl-
ation. This is not, in general, the same as the correlation between V1 and 
V2. Since U1 and U2 are bivariate normal, the conditional mean of U2 is 
linearly dependent on U1 and the conditional standard deviation of U2 is 
constant (as discussed in Section 6.3). However, a similar result does not 
in general apply to V1 and V2. 
Expressing the Approach Algebraically 
For a more formal description of the Gaussian copula approach, suppose 
that F1 and F2 are the cumulative marginal probability distributions of V1 
and V2. We map V1 = v1 to U1 = u1 and V2 = v2 to U2 = u2, where 
and N is the cumulative normal distribution function. This means that 
and 
The variables U1 and U2 are then assumed to be bivariate normal. The 
key property of a copula model is that it preserves the marginal distribu-
tions of V1 and V2 (however unusual these may be) while defining a 
correlation structure between them. 
Other Copulas 
The Gaussian copula is just one copula that can be used to define a 
correlation structure between V1 and V2. There are many other copulas 
leading to many other correlation structures. One that is sometimes used 
is the Student t-copula. This works in the same way as the Gaussian 
copula except that the variables U1 and U2 are assumed to have a 
bivariate Student t-distribution. To sample from a bivariate Student 
t-distribution with f degrees of freedom and correlation we proceed 
as follows: 
1. Sample from the inverse chi-square distribution to get a value (In 
Excel, the CHIINV function can be used. The first argument is 
RAND() and the second is f.) 
2. Sample from a bivariate normal distribution with correlation as 
described in Section 6.3. 
3. Multiply the normally distributed samples by 
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Figure 6.4 shows plots of 5000 random samples from a bivariate normal, 
while Figure 6.5 does the same for the bivariate Student t. The correlation 
parameter is 0.5 and the number of degrees of freedom for the Student t 
is 4. Define a "tail value" of a distribution as a value in the left or right 
1 % tail of the distribution. There is a tail value for the normal distribu-
tion when the variable is greater than 2.33 or less than —2.33. Similarly 
there is a tail value in the t-distribution when the value of the variable is 
greater than 3.75 or less than -3.75. Vertical and horizontal lines in the 
figures indicate when tail values occur. The figures illustrate that it is more 
common for both variables to have tail values in the bivariate t-distribu-
tion than in the bivariate normal distribution. To put this another way, 
the tail correlation is higher in a bivariate t-distribution that in a bivariate 
normal distribution. We made the point earlier that correlations between 
market variables tend to increase in extreme market conditions so that 
Figure 6.1c is sometimes a better description of the correlation structure 
between two variables than Figure 6.1a. This has led some researchers to 
argue that the Student t-copula provides a better description of the joint 
behavior of market variables than the Gaussian copula. 
Figure 6.4 5000 random samples from a bivariate normal distribution. 
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Figure 6.5 5000 random samples from a bivariate Student t-distribution. 
Multivariate Copulas 
Copulas can be used to define a correlation structure between more than 
two variables. The simplest example of this is the multivariate Gaussian 
copula. Suppose that there are N variables, V1 V2,..., VN, and that we 
know the marginal distribution of each variable. For each i (1 i N), we 
transform Vi into Ui where Ui has a standard normal distribution (the 
transformation is effected on a percentile-to-percentile basis as above). We 
then assume that the Ui have a multivariate normal distribution. 
A Factor Copula Model 
In multivariate copula models, analysts often assume a factor model for 
the correlation structure between the Ui. When there is only one factor, 
equation (6.6) gives 
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where F and the Zi have standard normal distributions. The Zi are 
uncorrelated with each other and uncorrelated with F. Other factor copula 
models are obtained by choosing F and the Zi to have other zero-mean 
unit-variance distributions. For example, if Zi is normal and F has a 
Student t-distribution, we obtain a multivariate Student t-distribution 
for Ui. These distributional choices affect the nature of the dependence 
between the variables. 
6.5 APPLICATION TO LOAN PORTFOLIOS 
We now present an application of the one-factor Gaussian copula that 
will prove useful in understanding the Basel II capital requirements in 
Chapter 7. Consider a portfolio of N companies. Define Ti (1 i N) as 
the time when company i defaults. (We assume that all companies will 
default eventually—but that the default time may be a long time, perhaps 
even hundreds of years, in the future.) Denote the cumulative probability 
distribution of 7} by Qi. 
In order to define a correlation structure between the Ti using the one-
factor Gaussian copula model, we map, for each i, Ti to a variable Ui that 
has a standard normal distribution on a percentile-to-percentile basis. We 
assume the factor model in equation (6.8) for the correlation structure 
between the Ui: 
where the variables F and Zi have independent standard normal distribu-
tions. The mappings between the Ui and Ti imply 
when 
From equation (6.9), the probability that Ui < U conditional on the 
factor value F is 
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7
 See O. Vasicek "Probability of Loss on a Loan Portfolio," Working Paper KMV, 1987. 
Vasicek's results were published in Risk in December 2002 under the title "Loan Portfolio 
Value". 
This is also when equation (6.10) is satisfied. Hence, 
To simplify matters, we suppose that the distribution Qi of time to 
default is the same for all i and equal to Q. We also assume that the 
copula correlation between any two names is the same and equals Since 
the copula correlation between companies i and j is this means that 
the for all i. Equation (6.11) becomes 
For a large portfolio of loans, this equation provides a good estimate of 
the proportion of loans in the portfolio that default by time T. We will 
refer to this as the default rate. 
As F decreases, the default rate increases. How bad can the default rate 
become? Because F has a standard normal distribution, the probability 
that F will be less than There is therefore a probability of Y 
that the default rate will be greater than 
Define V(T, X) as the default rate that will not be exceeded with 
probability X, so that we are X% certain that the default rate will not 
exceed V(T, X). The value of V(T, X) is determined by substituting 
Y = 1 — X into the above expression: 
This result was first developed by Vasicek in 1987.7 
Example 6.2 
Suppose that a bank has lent a total of $100 million to its retail clients. The 
one-year probability of default on every loan is 2% and the amount recovered 
in the event of a default averages 60%. The copula correlation parameter is 
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estimated as 0.1. In this case, 
showing that we are 99.9% certain that the default rate will not be worse than 
12.8%. Losses when this worst-case loss rate occur are 100 x 0.128 x (1 — 0.6), 
or $5.13 million. 
SUMMARY 
The measure usually considered by a risk manager to describe the relation-
ship between two variables is the Covariance rate. The daily Covariance rate 
is the correlation between the daily returns on the variables multiplied by 
the product of their daily volatilities. The methods for monitoring a 
Covariance rate are similar to those described in Chapter 5 for monitoring 
a variance rate. Either EWMA or GARCH models can be used. In 
practice, risk managers need to keep track of a variance-covariance matrix 
for all the variables to which they are exposed. 
The marginal distribution of a variable is the unconditional distribution 
of the variable. Very often an analyst is in a situation where he or she has 
estimated the marginal distributions of a set of variables and wants to 
make an assumption about their correlation structure. If the marginal 
distributions of the variables happen to be normal, it is natural to assume 
that the variables have a multivariate normal distribution. In other situa-
tions copulas are used. The marginal distributions are transformed on a 
percentile-to-percentile basis to normal distributions (or to some other 
distribution for which there is a multivariate counterpart). The correlation 
structure between the variables of interest is then defined indirectly from an 
assumed correlation structure between the transformed variables. 
When many variables are involved, analysts often use a factor model. 
This is a way of reducing the number of correlation estimates that have to 
be made. The correlation between any two variables is assumed to derive 
solely from their correlations with the factors. The default correlation 
between different companies can be modeled using a factor-based Gaus-
sian copula model of their times to default. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
6.1. If you know the correlation between two variables, what extra information 
do you need to calculate the Covariance? 
6.2. What is the difference between correlation and dependence? Suppose that 
y = x2 and x is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
What is the correlation between x and y? 
6.3. What is a factor model? Why are factor models useful when defining a 
correlation structure between large numbers of variables? 
6.4. What is meant by a Positive-semidefinite matrix? What are the implica-
tions of a correlation matrix not being Positive-semidefinite? 
6.5. Suppose that the current daily volatilities of asset A and asset B are 1.6% 
and 2.5%, respectively. The prices of the assets at close of trading yester-
day were $20 and $40 and the estimate of the coefficient of correlation 
between the returns on the two assets made at that time was 0.25. The 
parameter used in the EWMA model is 0.95. (a) Calculate the current 
estimate of the Covariance between the assets. (b) On the assumption that 
the prices of the assets at close of trading today are $20.50 and $40.50, 
update the correlation estimate. 
6.6. Suppose that the current daily volatilities of asset X and asset Y are 1.0% 
and 1.2%, respectively. The prices of the assets at close of trading yester-
day were $30 and $50 and the estimate of the coefficient of correlation 
between the returns on the two assets made at this time was 0.50. 
Correlations and volatilities are updated using a GARCH(1,1) model. 
The estimates of the model's parameters are = 0.04 and = 0.94. For 
the correlation, = 0.000001, and, for the volatilities, = 0.000003. If 
the prices of the two assets at close of trading today are $31 and $51, how 
is the correlation estimate updated? 
6.7. Suppose that in Problem 5.15 the correlation between the S&P 500 Index 
(measured in dollars) and the FTSE 100 Index (measured in sterling) is 
0.7, the correlation between the S&P 500 Index (measured in dollars) and 
the USD/GBP exchange rate is 0.3, and the daily volatility of the S&P 500 
Index is 1.6%. What is the correlation between the S&P 500 Index 
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(measured in dollars) and the FTSE 100 Index when it is translated to 
dollars? (Hint: For three variables X, Y, and Z, the Covariance between 
X + Y and Z equals the Covariance between X and Z plus the Covariance 
between Y and Z.) 
6.8. Suppose that two variables V1 and V2 have uniform distributions where all 
values between 0 and 1 are equally likely. Use a Gaussian copula to define 
the correlation structure between V1 and V2 with a copula correlation of 
0.3. Produce a table similar to Table 6.3 considering values of 0.25, 0.5, 
and 0.75 for V1 and V2. (A spreadsheet for calculating the cumulative 
bivariate normal distribution can be found on the author's website: 
www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull.) 
6.9. Assume that you have independent random samples z1, z2, and z3 from a 
standard normal distribution and want to convert them to samples e1, e2, 
and e3 from a trivariate normal distribution using the Cholesky decom-
position. Derive three formulas expressing e1, e2, and e3 in terms of z1, z2, 
and z3 and the three correlations that are needed to define the trivariate 
normal distribution. 
6.10. Explain what is meant by tail dependence. How can you vary tail 
dependence by the choice of copula? 
6.11. Suppose that the marginal distributions of V1 and V2 are standard normal 
distributions but that a Student t-copula with four degrees of freedom and 
a correlation parameter of 0.5 is used to define the correlation between the 
variables. How would you construct a chart showing samples from the 
joint distribution? 
6.12. In Table 6.3 what is the probability density function of V2 conditional on 
V\ < 0.1. Compare it with the unconditional distribution of V2. 
6.13. What is the median of the distribution of V2 when V1 equals 0.2 in the 
example in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
6.14. Suppose that a bank has made a large number of loans of a certain type. 
The total amount lent is $500 million. The one-year probability of default 
on each loan is 1.5% and the loss when a default occurs is 70% of the 
amount owed. The bank uses a Gaussian copula for time to default. The 
copula correlation parameter is 0.2. Estimate the loss on the portfolio that 
is not expected to be exceeded with a probability of 99.5%. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
6-15. Suppose that the price of gold at close of trading yesterday was $300 and 
its volatility was estimated as 1.3% per day. The price of gold at the close 
of trading today is $298. Suppose further that the price of silver at the 
close of trading yesterday was $8, its volatility was estimated as 1.5% per 
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day, and its correlation with gold was estimated as 0.8. The price of silver 
at the close of trading today is unchanged at $8. Update the volatility of 
gold and silver and the correlation between gold and silver using (a) the 
EWMA model with =0.94, and (b) the GARCH(1,1) model with 
= 0.000002, = 0.04, and = 0.94. In practice, is the parameter 
likely to be the same for gold and silver? 
6.16. The probability density function for an exponential distribution is 
where x is the value of the variable and A. is a parameter. The cumulative 
probability distribution is Suppose that two variables V1 and V2 
have exponential distributions with of 1.0 and 2.0, respectively. Use a 
Gaussian copula to define the correlation structure between V1 and V2 with 
a copula correlation of —0.2. Produce a table similar to Table 6.3 using 
values of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5 for V1 and V2. (A spreadsheet for 
calculating the cumulative bivariate normal distribution can be found on 
the author's website: www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull. 
6.17. Create an Excel spreadsheet to produce a chart similar to Figure 6.5 
showing samples from a bivariate Student t-distribution with four degrees 
of freedom where the correlation is 0.5. Next suppose that the marginal 
distributions of V1 and V2 are Student t with four degrees of freedom but 
that a Gaussian copula with a copula correlation parameter of 0.5 is used 
to define the correlation between the two variables. Construct a chart 
showing samples from the joint distribution. Compare the two charts you 
have produced. 
6.18. Suppose that a bank has made a large number loans of a certain type. The 
one-year probability of default on each loan is 1.2%. The bank uses a 
Gaussian copula for time to default. It is interested in estimating a 
"99.97% worst case" for the percentage of loans that default on the 
portfolio. Show how this varies with the copula correlation. 
Bank Regulation 
and Basel II 
An important objective of governments is to provide a stable economic 
environment for private individuals and businesses. One way they do this 
is by providing a reliable banking system where bank failures are rare and 
depositors are protected. Shortly after the disastrous crash of 1929, the 
United States took a number of steps to increase confidence in the 
banking system and protect depositors. It created the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to provide safeguards to depositors in the 
event of a failure by a bank. It also passed the famous Glass-Steagall Act 
that prevented deposit-taking commercial banks from engaging in invest-
ment banking activities. 
Deposit insurance continues to exist in the United States and many 
other countries today. However, many of the provisions of the Glass-
Steagall Act in the United States have now been repealed. There has been 
a trend worldwide toward the development of progressively more compli-
cated rules on the capital that banks are required to keep. This is because, 
as shown in Section 1.3, the ability of a bank to absorb unexpected losses 
is critically dependent on the amount of equity and other forms of capital 
held. In this chapter we review the evolution of the regulation of bank 
capital from the 1980s and explain the new Basel II capital requirements, 
which are scheduled to be implemented starting in 2007. 
It is widely accepted that the capital a financial institution requires 
should cover the difference between expected losses over some time horizon 
and "worst-case losses" over the same time horizon. The worst-case loss is 
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Figure 7.1 The loss probability density function and the capital 
required by a financial institution. 
the loss that is not expected to be exceeded with some high degree of 
confidence. The high degree of confidence might be 99% or 99.9%. The 
idea here is that expected losses are usually covered by the way a financial 
institution prices its products. For example, the interest charged by a bank 
is designed to recover expected loan losses. Capital is a cushion to protect 
the bank from an extremely unfavorable outcome. This is illustrated in 
Figure 7.1. 
Banks compete in some financial markets with securities firms and 
insurance companies. These types of financial institutions are often 
subject to different regulations from banks. In the United States securities 
firms are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
and insurance companies are regulated at the state level with national 
guidelines being set by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC). However, the regulators of all financial institutions face 
similar problems. Bank regulators want to protect depositors and ensure 
a stable financial system; insurance regulators want to protect policy-
holders from defaults by insurance companies and ensure that the public 
has confidence in the insurance industry; securities regulators want to 
protect the clients of brokers from defaults and ensure that markets 
operate smoothly. In some instances the three types of regulators find 
themselves specifying capital for the same financial instruments. If they 
do not do this in the same way, there is liable to be what is known as 
regulatory arbitrage, with risks being shifted to those financial institutions 
that are required to carry least capital for the financial instruments. 
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There have been some signs of convergence in the regulation of 
financial institutions. Insurance regulators and securities regulators are 
adopting similar approaches to bank regulators in prescribing minimum 
levels for capital. In the European Union the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD) legislation will require the regulatory capital for secur-
ities firms to be calculated in a similar way to that for banks. Another 
initiative by the European Union, Solvency II, is likely to lead to the 
capital for insurance companies in Europe being calculated in a broadly 
similar way to that for banks. 
Bank regulators are in many ways taking the lead in developing a 
methodology for setting capital requirements for financial institutions. 
The regulation of banks is based on international standards, whereas the 
regulation of other types of financial institutions varies more from 
country to country. For this reason the regulation of banks will be the 
main focus of this chapter. 
7.1 REASONS FOR REGULATING BANK CAPITAL 
It is tempting to argue as follows: "Bank regulation is unnecessary. Even 
if there were no regulations, banks would manage their risks prudently 
and would strive to keep a level of capital that is commensurate with the 
risks they are taking." Unfortunately, history does not altogether support 
this view. There is little doubt that regulation has played an important 
role in increasing bank capital, making banks more aware of the risks 
they are taking. 
If markets operated totally without government intervention, banks 
that took risks by keeping low levels of equity capital would find it 
difficult to attract deposits and might experience a "run on deposits", 
where large numbers of depositors try to withdraw funds at the same 
time. As mentioned earlier, most governments do provide some form of 
deposit insurance because they want depositors to have confidence that 
their money is safe. However, the existence of deposit insurance has the 
effect of encouraging banks to reduce equity capital (thereby increasing 
expected return on equity) because they no longer have to worry about 
depositors losing confidence.1 From the government's perspective there is 
therefore a risk that the existence of deposit insurance leads to more bank 
.
 1
 This is an example of what insurance companies term moral hazard. The existence of an 
insurance contract changes the behavior of the insured party. We will discuss moral 
hazard further in Chapter 14. 
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failures and an increase in the cost of deposit insurance programs. As a 
result governments have found it necessary to combine deposit insurance 
with regulations on the capital banks must hold. In addition, govern-
ments are concerned about what is termed systemic risk. This is discussed 
in Business Snapshot 7.1. 
7.2 PRE-1988 
Prior to 1988 bank regulators in different countries tended to regulate 
bank capital by setting minimum levels for the ratio of capital to total 
assets. However, definitions of capital and the ratios considered accept-
able varied from country to country. Some countries enforced their 
regulations more diligently than others. Banks were competing globally 
and a bank operating in a country where capital regulations were slack 
was considered to have a competitive edge over one operating in a country 
with tighter more strictly enforced capital regulations. In addition the 
huge exposures of the major international banks to less developed 
countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina and the accounting 
games sometimes used to manage those exposures were starting to raise 
questions about the adequacy of capital levels. 
Another problem was that the types of transactions entered into by 
banks were becoming more complicated. The over-the-counter derivatives 
market for products such as interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and 
foreign exchange options was growing fast. These contracts increase the 
credit risks being taken by a bank. Consider, for example, an interest rate 
swap. If the counterparty in an interest rate swap transaction defaults 
Business Snapshot 7.1 Systemic Risk 
Systemic risk is the risk that a default by one financial institution will create a 
"ripple effect" that leads to defaults by other financial institutions and 
threatens the stability of the financial system. The financial system has survived 
defaults such as Drexel in 1990 and Barings in 1995 very well, but regulators 
continue to be concerned. There are huge numbers of over-the-counter trans-
actions between banks. If Bank A fails, Bank B may take a huge loss on the 
transactions it has with Bank A. This in turn could lead to Bank B failing, 
Bank C that has many outstanding transactions with both Bank A and Bank 
B might then take a large loss and experience severe financial difficulties, and 
so on. 
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when the swap has a positive value to the bank and a negative value to the 
counterparty, the bank loses money. Many of these newer transactions 
were "off balance sheet". This means that they had no effect on the level of 
assets reported by a bank. As a result, they had no effect on the amount of 
capital the bank was required to keep. It became apparent to regulators 
that total assets was no longer a good indicator of the total risks being 
taken. A more sophisticated approach than that of setting minimum levels 
for the ratio of capital to total balance sheet assets was needed. 
These problems led supervisory authorities for Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States to form the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. They met regularly in Basel, 
Switzerland, under the patronage of the Bank for International Settle-
ments. The first major result of these meetings was a document entitled 
"International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Stand-
ards". This was referred to as "The 1988 BIS Accord" or just "The 
Accord". More recently it has come to be known as Basel I. 
7.3 THE 1988 BIS ACCORD 
The 1988 BIS Accord was the first attempt to set international risk-based 
standards for capital adequacy. It has been subject to much criticism as 
being too simple and somewhat arbitrary. In fact, the Accord was a huge 
achievement. It was signed by all 12 members of the Basel Committee and 
paved the way for significant increases in the resources banks devote to 
measuring, understanding, and managing risks. 
The BIS Accord defined two minimum standards for meeting acceptable 
capital adequacy requirements. The first standard was similar to that 
existing prior to 1988 and required banks to have an assets-to-capital 
multiple of at most 20. The second standard introduced what became 
known as the Cooke ratio. For most banks there was no problem in 
satisfying the capital multiple rule. The Cooke ratio was the key regulatory 
requirement. 
The Cooke Ratio 
In calculating the Cooke ratio both On-balance-sheet and off-balance-
sheet items are considered. They are used to calculate what is known as 
the bank's total risk-weighted assets (also sometimes referred to as the 
risk-weighted amount). It is a measure of the bank's total credit exposure. 
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Table 7.1 Risk weights for On-balance-sheet items. 
Risk weight Asset category 
(%) 
0 Cash, gold bullion, claims on OECD governments 
such as Treasury bonds or insured residential 
mortgages 
20 Claims on OECD banks and OECD public sector 
entities such as securities issued by US 
government agencies or claims on municipalities 
50 Uninsured residential mortgage loans 
100 All other claims, such as corporate bonds and 
less-developed country debt, claims on non-
OECD banks, real estate, premises, plant, and 
equipment 
Consider first On-balance-sheet items. Each On-balance-sheet item is 
assigned a risk weight reflecting its risk. A sample of the risk weights 
specified in the Accord are shown in Table 7.1. Cash and securities issued 
by OECD governments are considered to have virtually zero risk and 
have a risk weight of zero. Loans to corporations have a risk weight of 
100%. Loans to OECD banks and government agencies have a risk 
weight of 20%. Uninsured residential mortgages have a risk weight of 
50%. The total risk-weighted assets for N On-balance-sheet items equals 
where Li is the principal amount of the ith item and is its risk weight. 
Example 7.1 
The assets of a bank consist of $100 million of corporate loans, $10 million of 
OECD government bonds, and $50 million of residential mortgages. The total 
of risk-weighted assets is 
1.0 x 100 + 0.0 x 10 + 0.5 x 50 = 125 
or $125 million. 
Off-balance-sheet items are expressed as a credit equivalent amount-
Loosely speaking, the credit equivalent amount is the loan principal that 
is considered to have the same credit risk. For nonderivative instruments 
the credit equivalent amount is calculated by applying a conversion factor 
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to the principal amount of the instrument. Instruments that from a credit 
perspective are considered to be similar to loans, such as bankers' 
acceptances, have a conversion factor of 100%. Others, such as note 
issuance facilities (where a bank agrees that a company can issue short-
term paper on pre-agreed terms in the future), have lower conversion 
factors. 
For an over-the-counter derivative, such as an interest rate swap or a 
forward contract, the credit equivalent amount is calculated as 
where V is the current value of the derivative, a is an add-on factor, 
and L is the principal amount. The first term in equation (7.1) is the 
current exposure. The add-on factor is an allowance for the possibility 
of the exposure increasing in the future. The add-on factors are shown 
in Table 7.2. 
Example 7.2 
A bank has entered into a $100 million interest rate swap with a remaining life 
of 4 years. The current value of the swap is $2.0 million. In this case the add-
on amount is 0.5% of the principal, so that the credit equivalent amount is 
$2.0 million plus $0.5 million, or $2.5 million. 
The credit equivalent amount for an off-balance-sheet item is multiplied 
by the risk weight for the counterparty in order to calculate the risk-
weighted assets. The risk weights for off-balance-sheet items are similar to 
those in Table 7.1 except that the risk weight for a corporation is 0.5 
rather than 1.0 when off-balance-sheet items are considered. 
Example 7.3 
Consider again the bank in Example 7.2. If the interest rate swap is with a 
corporation, the risk-weighted assets are 2.5 x 0.5, or $1.25 million. If it is 
with an OECD bank, the risk-weighted assets are 2.5 x 0.2, or $0.5 million. 
Table 7.2 Add-on factors (as a percentage of principal) for derivatives. 
Remaining 
maturity 
(years) 
< 1 
1 to 5 
> 5 
Interest 
rate 
0.0 
0.5 
1 . 5 
Exchange rate 
and gold 
1.0 
5.0 
7.5 
Equity 
6.0 
8.0 
10.0 
Precious metals 
except gold 
7.0 
7.0 
8.0 
Other 
commodities 
10.0 
12.0 
15.0 
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Putting all this together, the total risk-weighted assets for a bank with 
N On-balance-sheet items and M off-balance-sheet items is 
Here, Li is the principal of the ith On-balance-sheet item and is its risk 
weight for the counterparty; is the credit equivalent amount for the 
jth off-balance-sheet item and is the risk weight for the counterparty. 
Capital Requirement 
The Accord required banks to keep capital equal to at least 8% of the 
risk-weighted assets. The capital had two components: 
1. Tier 1 Capital. This consists of items such as equity, noncumulative 
perpetual preferred stock2 less goodwill. 
2. Tier 2 Capital. This is sometimes referred to as Supplementary 
Capital. It includes instruments such as cumulative perpetual preferred 
stock,3 certain types of 99-year debenture issues, and subordinated debt 
with an original life of more than five years. 
At least 50% of the required capital (i.e., 4% of the risk-weighted assets) 
must be in Tier 1. The Basel Committee updated its definition of 
instruments that are eligible for Tier 1 capital in a 1998 press release. 
7.4 THE G-30 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In 1993 a working group consisting of end users, dealers, academics, 
accountants, and lawyers involved in derivatives published a report that 
contained 20 risk management recommendations for dealers and end 
users of derivatives and four recommendations for legislators, regulators, 
and supervisors. The report was based on a detailed survey of 80 dealers 
and 72 end users worldwide. The survey involved both questionnaires and 
in-depth interviews. The report is not a regulatory document, but it has 
been very influential in the development of risk management practices. 
2
 Noncumulative perpetual preferred stock is preferred stock lasting forever where there 
is a predetermined dividend rate. Unpaid dividends do not cumulate (i.e., the dividends 
for one year are not carried forward to the next year). 
3
 In cumulative preferred stock unpaid dividends cumulate. Any backlog of dividends 
must be paid before dividends are paid on the common stock. 
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A brief summary of the important recommendations is as follows: 
1. A company's policies on risk management should be clearly 
defined and approved by senior management, ideally at the board 
of directors level. Managers at all levels should enforce the policies. 
2. Derivatives positions should be marked to market at least once 
a day. 
3. Derivatives dealers should measure market risk using a consistent 
measure such as value at risk. (This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 8.) Limits to the market risks that are taken should be set. 
4. Derivatives dealers should carry out stress tests to determine 
potential losses under extreme market conditions. 
5. The risk management function should be set up so that it is 
independent from the trading operation. 
6. Credit exposures arising from derivatives trading should be assessed 
based on the current replacement value of existing positions and 
potential future replacement costs. 
7. Credit exposures to a counterparty should be aggregated in a way 
that reflects enforceable netting agreements. (We talk about netting 
in the next section.) 
8. The individuals responsible for setting credit limits should be 
independent of those involved in trading. 
9. Dealers and end users should assess carefully both the costs and 
benefits of credit risk mitigation techniques such as Collateraliza-
tion and downgrade triggers. In particular, they should assess their 
own capacity and that of their counterparties to meet the cash flow 
requirement of downgrade triggers. (Credit mitigation techniques 
are discussed in Chapter 12.) 
10. Only individuals with the appropriate skills and experience should 
be allowed to have responsibility for trading derivatives, super-
vising the trading, carrying out back-office functions in relation to 
the trading, etc. 
11. There should be adequate systems in place for data capture, 
processing, settlement, and management reporting. 
12. Dealers and end users should account for the derivatives trans-
actions used to manage risks so as to achieve a consistency of 
income recognition treatment between those instruments and the 
risks being managed. 
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7.5 NETTING 
The word netting refers to a clause in over-the-counter contracts which 
states that if a counterparty defaults on one contract it has with a 
financial institution then it must default on all outstanding contracts with 
that financial institution. 
Netting can have the effect of substantially reducing credit risk. 
Consider a bank that has three swap contracts outstanding with a 
particular counterparty. The contracts are worth +$24 million, 
—$17 million, and +$8 million to the bank. Suppose that the counter-
party experiences financial difficulties and defaults on its outstanding 
obligations. To the counterparty, the three contracts have values of 
—$24 million, +$17 million, and —$8 million, respectively. Without 
netting, the counterparty would default on the first contract, keep the 
second contract, and default on the third contract. The loss to the bank 
would be $32 (= 24 + 8) million. With netting, the counterparty is 
required to default on the second contract as well. The loss to bank is 
then $15 (= 24 - 17 + 8) million.4 
Suppose that a financial institution has a portfolio of N derivative 
contracts outstanding with a particular counterparty and that the current 
value of the ith contract is Vi. Without netting, the financial institution's 
exposure in the event of a default today is 
With netting, it is 
Without netting, the exposure is the payoff from a portfolio of options; 
with netting, the exposure is the payoff from an option on a portfolio. 
The 1988 Accord does not take netting into account in setting capital 
requirements. From equation (7.1) the credit equivalent amount for a 
portfolio of derivatives with a counterparty under the Accord is 
4
 Note that if the second contract had been worth —$40 million to the bank then the 
counterparty is better off if it chooses not to default on its contracts with the bank. 
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where ai is the add-on factor for the ith transaction and Li is the principal 
for the ith transaction. 
By 1995 netting had been successfully tested in the courts in many 
jurisdictions. As a result, the 1988 Accord was modified to allow banks to 
reduce their credit equivalent totals when enforceable bilateral netting 
agreements were in place. The first step was to calculate the net replace-
ment ratio, NRR. This is the ratio of the current exposure with netting to 
the current exposure without netting: 
The credit equivalent amount was modified to 
Example 7.4 
Consider the example in Table 7.3 which shows a portfolio of three derivatives 
contracts that a bank has with a particular counterparty. The third column 
shows the current marked-to-market values of the transactions and the fourth 
column shows the add-on amount calculated from Table 7.2. The current 
exposure with netting is —60 + 70 + 55 = 65. The current exposure without 
netting is 0 + 70 + 55 = 125. The net replacement ratio is given by 
The total of the add-on amounts, is 5 + 75 + 30=110. The 
credit equivalent amount, when netting agreements are in place is 
65 + (0.4 + 0.6 x 0.52) x 110 = 143.32. Without netting agreements, the 
credit equivalent amount is 125 + 110 = 235. Suppose that the counter-
Party is an OECD bank so that the risk weight is 0.2. This means that 
the risk-weighted assets with netting is 0.2 x 143.32 = 28.66. Without 
netting, it is 0.2 x 235 = 47. 
Table 7.3 Portfolio of derivatives with a particular counterparty. 
Transaction 
3-year interest rate swap 
6-year foreign exchange forward 
9-month option on a stock 
Principal, 
Li 
1000 
1000 
500 
Current value, 
Vi 
-60 
70 
55 
Table 7.2 add-on 
amount, ai Li 
5 
75 
30 
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7.6 THE 1996 AMENDMENT 
In 1995 the Basel Committee issued a consultative proposal to amend 
the 1988 Accord. This became known as the "1996 Amendment". It 
was implemented in 1998 and was then sometimes referred to as 
"BIS 98". 
The 1996 Amendment requires financial institutions to hold capital to 
cover their exposure to market risks as well as credit risks. The Amend-
ment distinguishes between a bank's trading book and its banking book. 
The banking book consists primarily of loans and is not usually marked 
to market for managerial and accounting purposes. The trading book 
consists of the myriad of different instruments that are traded by the bank 
(stocks, bonds, swaps, forward contract, exotic derivatives, etc.). The 
trading book is normally marked to market daily. 
Under the 1996 Amendment, the credit risk capital charge in the 1988 
Accord continued to apply to all On-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet 
items in the trading and banking book, except positions in the trading 
book that consisted of (a) debt and equity traded securities and 
(b) positions in commodities and foreign exchange. In addition there 
was a market risk capital charge for all items in the trading book whether 
they were on balance sheet or off balance sheet.5 
The 1996 Amendment outlined a standardized approach for measuring 
the capital charge for market risk. The standardized approach assigned 
capital separately to each of debt securities, equity securities, foreign 
exchange risk, commodities risk, and options. No account was taken of 
correlations between different types of instruments. The more sophisticated 
banks with well-established risk management functions were allowed to 
use an "internal model-based approach" for setting market risk capital. 
This involved calculating a value-at-risk measure and converting it into a 
capital requirement using a formula specified in the 1996 amendment. (We 
discuss value at risk and the alternative approaches companies use to 
calculate it in Chapters 8, 9, and 10). Most large banks preferred to use 
the internal model-based approach because it better reflected the benefits 
of diversification and led to lower capital requirements. 
The value-at-risk measure used by regulators for market risk is the loss 
on the trading book that can be expected to occur over a 10-day period 
1% of the time. Suppose that the value at risk is $1 million. This means 
5
 Certain nontrading book positions that are used to hedge positions in the trading book 
can be included in the calculation of the market risk capital charge. 
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that the bank is 99% confident that there will not be a loss greater than 
$1 million over the next 10 days. 
The market risk capital requirement for banks when they use the 
internal model-based approach is calculated at any given time as 
k * VaR + SRC (7.3) 
where k is a multiplicative factor, and SRC is a specific risk charge. The 
value at risk, VaR, is the greater of the previous day's value at risk and 
the average value at risk over the last 60 days. The minimum value for k 
is 3. Higher values may be chosen by regulators for a particular bank if 
tests reveal inadequacies in the bank's value-at-risk model. 
The specific risk charge, SRC, is a capital charge for the idiosyncratic 
risks related to individual companies. One security that gives rise to 
idiosyncratic risk is a corporate bond. There are two components to the 
risk of this security: interest rate risk and credit risk. The interest rate risk 
is captured by the bank's market value-at-risk measure; the credit risk is 
specific risk.6 The 1996 Amendment proposed standard methods for 
assessing a specific risk capital charge, but allowed banks to use internal 
models for arriving at a capital charge for specific risk similarly to the 
way they calculate a capital charge for market risks. We discuss specific 
risk and its calculation further in Chapter 12. 
The total capital a bank was required to keep after the implementation 
of the 1996 Amendment was (for banks adopting the internal model-based 
approach) the sum of (a) credit risk capital equal to 8% of the risk-
weighted assets (RWA), as given by equation (7.2) and (b) market risk 
capital as given by equation (7.3). For convenience, an RWA for market 
risk capital is defined as 12.5 multiplied by the amount given in 
equation (7.3). This means that the total capital required for credit and 
market risk is given by 
Total capital = 0.08 x (Credit risk RWA + Market risk RWA) (7.4) 
A bank has more flexibility in the type of capital it uses for market risk. It 
can use Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital. It can also use what is termed Tier 3 
capital. This consists of short-term subordinated debt with an original 
maturity of at least two years that is unsecured and fully paid up. 
For most banks the majority of the capital is for credit risk rather than 
6
 As mentioned earlier, the 1988 credit capital charge did not apply to debt securities in 
the trading book under the 1996 Amendment. 
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market risk. In a typical situation 70% of required capital might be for 
credit risk and 30% for market risk. 
7.7 BASEL II 
The 1988 Basel Accord led to significant increases in the capital held by 
banks over the following ten years. It deserves a great deal of credit for 
improving the stability of the global banking system. However, it does 
have significant weaknesses. Under the 1988 Basel Accord, all loans by a 
bank to a corporation have a risk weight of 100% and require the same 
amount of capital. A loan to a corporation with a AAA credit rating is 
treated in the same way as one to a corporation with a B credit rating.7 
Furthermore, in Basel I, there was no model of default correlation. 
In June 1999 the Basel Committee proposed new rules that have 
become known as Basel II. These were revised in January 2001 and April 
2003. A number of quantitative impact studies (QISs) were carried out to 
test the application of the new rules and the amount of capital that will be 
required. A final set of rules agreed to by all members of the Basel 
Committee was published in June 2004. This was updated in November 
2005. Implementation of the rules is expected to begin in 2007 after a 
further QIS.8 
The Basel II capital requirements apply to "internationally active" 
banks. In the United States there are many small regional banks and 
the US regulatory authorities have decided that Basel II will not apply to 
them. (These banks will be regulated under what is termed Basel IA, 
which is similar to Basel I.) It is likely that some of the larger regional 
banks will voluntarily implement Basel II—perhaps to signal to their 
shareholders that they manage risks in a sophisticated way. In Europe all 
banks, large or small, will be regulated under Basel II. In addition, the 
European Union requires the Basel II rules to be applied to securities 
companies as well as banks. Basel II is based on three "pillars": 
1. Minimum capital requirements 
2. Supervisory review 
3. Market discipline 
7
 Credit ratings are discussed in Chapter 11. 
8
 One point to note about the QIS studies is that they do not take account of changes 
banks may choose to make to their portfolios to minimize their capital requirements once 
Basel II is implemented. 
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In Pillar 1, the minimum capital requirement for credit risk in the bank-
ing book is calculated in a new way that reflects the credit ratings of 
counterparties. The capital requirement for market risk remains un-
changed from the 1996 Amendment and there is a new capital charge 
for operational risk. The general requirement in Basel I that banks hold a 
total capital equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets remains unchanged. A 
risk-weighted asset for operational risk is defined as 12.5 times the 
calculated operational risk capital and equation (7.4) becomes 
Total capital = 0.08 x 
(Credit risk RWA + Market risk RWA + Operational risk RWA) (7.5) 
Pillar 2, which is concerned with the supervisory review process, allows 
regulators in different countries some discretion in how rules are applied 
(so that they can take account of local conditions) but seeks to achieve 
overall consistency in the application of the rules. It places more 
emphasis on early intervention when problems arise. Supervisors are 
required to do far more than just ensure that the minimum capital 
required under Basel II is held. Part of their role is to encourage banks 
to develop and use better risk management techniques and to evaluate 
these techniques. They should evaluate risks that are not covered by 
Pillar 1 and enter into an active dialogue with banks when deficiencies 
are identified. 
The third pillar, market discipline, will require banks to disclose more 
information about the way they allocate capital and the risks they take. 
The idea here is that banks will be subjected to added pressure to make 
sound risk management decisions if shareholders and potential share-
holders have more information about those decisions. 
7.8 CREDIT RISK CAPITAL UNDER BASEL II 
For credit risk, banks will have three choices under Basel II: 
1. The standardized approach 
2. The foundation internal ratings based (IRB) approach 
3. The advanced IRB approach 
The overall structure of the calculations is similar to that under Basel I. 
For an On-balance-sheet item a risk weight is applied to the principal 
to calculate risk-weighted assets reflecting the creditworthiness of the 
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counterparty. For off-balance-sheet items the risk weight is applied to a 
credit equivalent amount. This is calculated using either credit conversion 
factors or add-on amounts. The adjustments for netting are similar to 
those in Basel I (see Section 7.5). 
The Standardized Approach 
The standardized approach is to be used by banks that are not suffi-
ciently sophisticated (in the eyes of the regulators) to use the internal 
ratings approaches. (In the United States, Basel II will apply only to the 
largest banks and US regulators have decided that these banks must use 
the IRB approach.) Some of the rules for determining risk weights are 
summarized in Table 7.4. Comparing Table 7.4 with Table 7.1, we see 
that the OECD status of a bank or a country is no longer important 
under Basel II. The risk weight for a country (sovereign) exposure ranges 
from 0% to 150% and the risk weight for an exposure to another bank 
or a corporation ranges from 20% to 150%. In Table 7.1 OECD banks 
were implicitly assumed to be lesser credit risks than corporations. An 
OECD bank attracted a risk weight of 20%, while a corporation 
attracted a risk weight of 100%. Table 7.4 treats banks and corporation 
much more equitably. An interesting observation from Table 7.4 for a 
country, corporation, or bank that wants to borrow money is that it may 
be better to have no credit rating at all than a very poor credit rating! 
Supervisors are allowed to apply lower risk weights (20% rather than 
50%, 50% rather than 100%, and 100% rather than 150%) when 
exposures are to a bank's country of incorporation or that country's 
central bank. 
Table 7.4 Risk weights (as a percentage of principal) for exposures to 
country, banks, and corporations under Basel II's standardized approach as 
a function of their ratings. 
Country* 
Banks** 
Corporations 
AAA 
to 
AA-
0 
20 
20 
A+ 
to 
A-
20 
50 
50 
BBB+ 
to 
BBB-
50 
50 
100 
BB+ 
to 
BB-
100 
100 
100 
B+ 
to 
B-
100 
100 
150 
Below 
B-
150 
150 
150 
Unrated 
100 
50 
100 
* Includes exposures to central banks of the country. 
** National supervisors have options as outlined in the text. 
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For claims on banks, the rules are somewhat complicated. Instead of 
using the risk weights in Table 7.4, national supervisors can choose to 
base capital requirements on the rating of the country in which the bank 
is incorporated. The risk weight assigned to the bank will be 20% if the 
country of incorporation has a rating between AAA and A A - , 50% if it 
is between A+ and A - , 100% if it is between BBB+ and B - , 150% if it 
is below B-, and 100% if it is unrated. Another complication is that, if 
national supervisors elect to use the rules in Table 7.4, then they can 
choose to treat claims with a maturity less than three months more 
favorably, so that the risk weights are 20% if the rating is between AAA+ 
and BBB-, 50% if it is between BB+ and B - , 150% if it is below B - , 
and 20% if it is unrated. 
The standard rule for retail lending is that a risk weight of 75% be 
applied. (This compares with 100% in the 1988 Accord.) When claims 
are secured by a residential mortgage, the risk weight is 35%. (This 
compares with 50% in the 1988 Accord.) Owing to poor historical loss 
experience, the risk weight for claims secured by commercial real estate 
is 100%. 
Example 7.5 
Suppose that the assets of a bank consist of $100 million of loans to corpora-
tions rated A, $10 million of government bonds rated AAA, and $50 million of 
residential mortgages. Under the Basel II standardized approach, the total 
risk-weighted assets is 
0.5 x 100 + 0.0 x 10 + 0.35 x 50 = 67.5 
or $67.5 million. This compares with $125 million under Basel I (see 
Example 7.1). 
Adjustments for Collateral 
There are two ways banks can adjust risk weights for collateral. The first 
is termed the simple approach and is similar to an approach used in 
Basel I. The second is termed the comprehensive approach. Banks have 
a choice as to which approach is used in the banking book, but they must 
use the comprehensive approach to calculate capital for counterparty 
credit risk in the trading book. 
Under the simple approach, the risk weight of the counterparty is 
replaced by the risk weight of the collateral for the part of the exposure 
covered by the collateral. (The exposure is calculated after netting.) For 
any exposure not covered by the collateral, the risk weight of the counter-
party is used. The minimum level for the risk weight applied to the 
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collateral is 20%.9 A requirement is that the collateral must be revalued at 
least every six months and must be pledged for at least the life of the 
exposure. 
Under the comprehensive approach, banks adjust the size of their 
exposure upward to allow for possible increases and adjust the value of 
the collateral downward to allow for possible decreases in the value of the 
collateral.10 (The adjustments depend on the volatility of the exposure and 
the loan.) A new exposure equal to the excess of the adjusted exposure 
over the adjusted value of the collateral is calculated and the counter-
party's risk weight is applied to this exposure. The adjustments applied to 
the exposure and the collateral can be calculated using rules specified in 
Basel II or, with regulatory approval, using a bank's internal models. 
Where netting arrangements apply, exposures and collateral are separately 
netted and the adjustments made are weighted averages. 
Example 7.6 
Suppose that an $80 million exposure to a particular counterparty is secured 
by collateral worth $70 million. The collateral consists of bonds issued by an 
A-rated company. The counterparty has a rating of B+. The risk weight for 
the counterparty is 150% and the risk weight for the collateral is 50%. The 
risk-weighted assets applicable to the exposure using the simple approach is 
therefore 
0.5 x 70+1.50 x 10 = 50 
or $50 million. 
Consider next the comprehensive approach. Assume that the adjustment to 
exposure to allow for possible future increases in the exposure is +10% and 
the adjustment to the collateral to allow for possible future decreases in its 
value is —15%. The new exposure is 
1.1x80-0.85x70 = 28.5 
or $28.5 million and a risk weight of 150% is applied to this exposure to give 
risk-adjusted assets equal to $42.75 million. 
The IRB Approach 
The model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach is the 
one-factor Gaussian copula model of time to default that we discussed in 
Section 6.5. 
9
 An exception is when the collateral consists of cash or government securities with the 
currency of the collateral being the same as the currency of the exposure. 
10
 An adjustment to the exposure is not likely to be necessary on a loan, but is likely to be 
necessary on an over-the-counter derivative. The adjustment is in addition to the add on 
factor. 
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Table 7.5 Dependence of WCDR on PD and 
= 0.0 
= 0.2 
= 0.4 
= 0.6 
= 0.8 
PD = 0.1% 
0.1% 
2.8% 
7.1% 
13.5% 
23.3% 
PD = 0.5% 
0.5% 
9.1% 
21.1% 
38.7% 
66.3% 
P D = 1% 
1.0% 
14.6% 
31.6% 
54.2% 
83.6% 
P D = 1.5% 
1.5% 
18.9% 
39.0% 
63.8% 
90.8% 
PD = 2.0% 
2.0% 
22.6% 
44.9% 
70.5% 
94.4% 
Consider a large portfolio of N loans. Define: 
WCDR: The worst-case default rate during the next year that we are 
99.9% certain will not be exceeded 
PD: The probability of default for each loan in one year 
EAD: The exposure at default on each loan (in dollars) 
LGD: The loss given default. This is the proportion of the exposure 
that is lost in the event of a default 
Suppose that the copula correlation between each pair of obligors is 11 
Equation (6.12) shows that 
It follows that there is a 99.9% chance that the loss on the portfolio will 
be less than N times 
EAD x LGD x WCDR 
It can be shown that, as a good approximation, this result can be 
extended to the case where the loans have different sizes and different 
default probabilities. In a general portfolio of loans, there is a 
99.9% chance that the total loss will be less than the sum of 
EAD x LGD x WCDR for the individual loans.12 This result is the 
theoretical underpinning of the IRB approach. 
Table 7.5 shows how WCDR depends on PD and When the 
correlation is zero, WCDR = PD because in that case there is no 
default correlation and the default rate in all years is the same. As 
increases, WCDR increases. 
11
 Note that the Basel Committee publications use R, not to denote the copula 
correlation. 
12
 The WCDR for an individual loan is calculated by substituting the PD and 
Parameter for the loan into equation (7.6). 
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Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures 
In the case of corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures, Basel II assumes 
a relationship between the correlation parameter and the probability of 
default PD in equation (7.6) based on empirical research.13 The formula is 
Because exp(—50) is a very small number, this formula is to all intents 
and purposes 
As PD increases, decreases. The reason for this inverse relationship is as 
follows. As a company becomes less creditworthy, its PD increases and its 
probability of default becomes more idiosyncratic and less affected by 
overall market conditions. 
Combining equation (7.7) with equation (7.6), we obtain the relation-
ship between WCDR and PD in Table 7.6. We find that WCDR is, as we 
would expect, an increasing function of PD. However, it does not increase 
as fast as it would if were assumed to be independent of PD. 
The formula for the capital required is 
EAD x LGD x (WCDR - PD) x MA (7.8) 
The first three terms in this expression can be understood from our earlier 
discussion. We use WCDR — PD instead of WCDR because we are 
interested in providing capital for the excess of the 99.9% worst-case loss 
over the expected loss. The variable MA is the maturity adjustment and is 
defined as 
Table 7.6 Relationship between WCDR and PD for 
corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures. 
13
 See J. Lopez, "The Empirical Relationship Between Average asset Correlation, Firm 
Probability of Default and Asset Size," Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13, 2 (2004), 
265-283. 
PD: 
WCDR: 
0.1% 
3.4% 
0.5% 
9.8% 
1.0% 
14.0% 
1.5% 
16.9% 
2.0% 
19.0% 
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where 
b = [0.11852 - 0.05478 x ln(PD)]2 
and M is the maturity of the exposure. 
The maturity adjustment is designed to allow for the fact that, if an 
instrument lasts longer than one year, there is a one-year credit exposure 
arising from a possible decline in the creditworthiness of the counterparty 
as well as from a possible default by the counterparty. (Note that when 
M = 1 the MA is 1.0 and has no effect.) As mentioned earlier, the risk-
weighted assets (RWA) are calculated as 12.5 times the capital required 
RWA = 12.5 x EAD x LGD x (WCDR - PD) x MA 
so that the capital is 8% of RWA. 
Under the foundation IRB approach, banks supply PD, while LGD, 
EAD, and M are supervisory values set by the Basel Committee. PD is 
largely determined by a bank's own estimate of the creditworthiness of 
the counterparty. It is subject to a floor of 0.03% for bank and corporate 
exposures. LGD is set at 45% for senior claims and 75% for subordin-
ated claims. When there is eligible collateral, in order to correspond to the 
comprehensive approach that we described earlier, LGD is reduced by the 
ratio of the adjusted value of the collateral to the adjusted value of the 
exposure, both calculated using the comprehensive approach. The EAD is 
calculated in a manner similar to the credit equivalent amount in Basel I 
and includes the impact of netting. M is set at 2.5 in most circumstances. 
Under the advanced IRB approach, banks supply their own estimates 
of the PD, LGD, EAD, and M for corporate, sovereign, and bank 
exposures. The PD can be reduced by credit mitigants such as credit 
triggers. (As in the case of the foundation IRB approach, it is subject to a 
floor of 0.03% for bank and corporate exposures.) The two main factors 
influencing the LGD are the seniority of the debt and the collateral. In 
calculating EAD, banks can with regulatory approval use their own 
estimates of credit conversion factors. 
The capital given by equation (7.8) is intended to be sufficient to cover 
unexpected losses over a one-year period that we are 99% sure will not be 
exceeded. Losses from the one-year "average" probability of default, PD, 
should be covered by a bank in the way it prices its products. The WCDR 
is the probability of default that occurs once every thousand years. The 
Basel Committee reserves the right to apply a scaling factor (less than or 
greater than 1.0) to the result of the calculations in equation (7.8) if it 
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finds that the aggregate capital requirements are too high or low. At the 
time of writing, this factor is estimated at 1.06. 
Example 7.7 
Suppose that the assets of a bank consist of $100 million of loans to A-rated 
corporations. The PD for the corporations is estimated as 0.1% and LGD is 
60%. The average maturity is 2.5 years for the corporate loans. This means 
that 
b = [0.11852 - 0.05478 x ln(0.00l)]2 = 0.247 
so that 
From Table 7.6, the WCDR is 3.4%. Under the Basel II IRB approach, the 
risk-weighted assets for the corporate loans are 
12.5 x 100 x 0.6 x (0.034 - 0.001) x 1.59 = 39.3 
or $39.3 million. This compares with $100 million under Basel I and $50 mil-
lion under the standardized approach of Basel II. (See Examples 7.1 and 7.5, 
where a $100 million corporate loan is part of the portfolio.) 
Retail Exposures 
The model underlying the calculation of capital for retail exposures is 
similar to that underlying the calculation of corporate, sovereign, and 
banking exposures. However, the foundation IRB and advanced IRB 
approaches are merged and all banks using the IRB approach provide 
their own estimates of PD, EAD, and LGD. There is no maturity 
adjustment. The capital requirement is therefore 
EAD x LGD x (WCDR - PD) 
and the risk-weighted assets are 
12.5 x EAD x LGD x (WCDR - PD) 
WCDR is calculated as in equation (7.6). For residential mortgages, is 
set equal to 0.15 in this equation. For qualifying revolving exposures, is 
set equal to 0.04. For all other retail exposures, a relationship between 
and PD is specified for the calculation of WCDR. This is 
Because exp(—35) is a very small number, this formula is to all intents 
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Table 7.7 Relationship between WCDR and PD for 
retail exposures. 
PD: 
WCDR: 
0.1% 
2.1% 
0.5% 
6.3% 
1.0% 
9.1% 
1.5% 
11.0% 
2.0% 
12.3% 
and purposes 
Comparing equation (7.10) with equation (7.7), we see that correlations 
are assumed to be much lower for retail exposures. Table 7.7 is the table 
corresponding to Table 7.6 for retail exposures. 
Example 7.8 
Suppose that the assets of a bank consist of $50 million of residential 
mortgages where the PD is 0.005 and the LGD is 20%. In this case, 
= 0.15 and 
The risk-weighted assets are 
12.5 x 50 x 0.2 x (0.067 - 0.005) = 7.8 
or $7.8 million. This compares with $25 million under Basel I and $17.5 mil-
lion under the standardized approach of Basel II. (See Examples 7.1 and 7.5, 
where $50 million of residential mortgages is part of the portfolio.) 
Guarantees and Credit Derivatives 
The approach traditionally taken by the Basel Committee for handling 
guarantees is the credit substitution approach. Suppose that an AA-rated 
company guarantees a loan to a BBB-rated company. For the purposes of 
calculating capital, the credit rating of the guarantor is substituted for the 
credit rating of the borrower, so that capital is calculated as though the 
loan had been made to the AA-rated company. This overstates the credit 
risk because, for the lender to lose money, both the guarantor and the 
borrower have to default (with the guarantor defaulting before the 
borrower). The Basel Committee has addressed this issue. In July 2005 it 
Published a document concerned with the treatment of double defaults 
under Basel II.14 As an alternative to using the credit substitution 
14 
See 'The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double 
Defaults," July 2005, available on www.bis.org. 
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approach, the capital requirement can be calculated as the capital that 
would be required without the guarantee but multiplied by 
0.15 + 160 x PDg, where PDg is the one-year probability of default by 
the guarantor. Credit default swaps, which we talk about in Chapter 13, 
provide a type of insurance against default and are handled similarly to 
guarantees for regulatory purposes. 
7.9 OPERATIONAL RISK UNDER BASEL II 
In addition to improving the way banks calculate credit risk capital, 
Basel II will require banks to keep capital for operational risk. It seems 
that regulators are introducing a capital charge for operational risk for 
three reasons. The first is that in an increasingly complex environment 
banks face many risks arising from the possibilities of human and com-
puter error.15 The second is that regulators want banks to pay more 
attention to their internal systems to avoid catastrophes like that at Barings 
Bank. The third is that the effect of the Basel II credit risk calculation will 
be to reduce the capital requirements for most banks and regulators want 
another capital charge to bring the total capital back to roughly where it 
was before. The regulators are currently offering three approaches: 
1. The basic indicator approach 
2. The standardized approach 
3. The advanced measurement approach 
Which of these is used depends on the sophistication of the bank. The 
simplest approach is the basic indicator approach. This sets the opera-
tional risk capital equal to the bank's average annual gross income over 
the last three years multiplied by 0.15.16 The standardized approach is 
similar to the basic indicator approach except that a different factor is 
applied to the gross income from different business lines. In the advanced 
measurement approach the bank uses its own internal models to calculate 
the operational risk loss that it is 99.9% certain will not be exceeded in 
one year. One advantage of the advanced measurement approach is that it 
15
 All errors are ultimately human errors. In the case of a "computer error", someone at 
a some stage made a mistake programming the computer. 
16
 Gross income is defined as net interest income plus noninterest income. Net interest 
income is the excess of income earned on loans over interest paid on deposits and other 
instruments that are used to fund the loans. Years where gross income is negative are not 
included in the calculations. 
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allows banks to recognize the risk-mitigating impact of insurance, subject 
to certain conditions. We discuss the calculation of operational risk 
further in Chapter 14. 
There is no question that the calculations in Pillar 1 of Basel II are a 
huge step forward over those in Basel I. In order to comply with Basel II, 
banks are finding that they have to become much more sophisticated in 
the way they handle credit risk and operational risk. Whether there will be 
further major changes to the way capital requirements are calculated for 
banks remains to be seen. Business Snapshot 7.2 speculates on what may 
be the major changes in Basel III. 
7.10 SUPERVISORY REVIEW 
Pillar 2 of Basel II is concerned with the supervisory review process. Four 
key principles of supervisory review are specified: 
1. Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for 
maintaining their capital levels. 
2. Supervisors should review and evaluate banks' internal capital 
adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to 
Business Snapshot 7.2 Basel III? 
Basel II does not allow a bank to use its own credit risk diversification 
calculations when setting capital requirements for credit risk within the bank-
ing book. Equation (7.6) with prescribed values of p must be used. In theory a 
bank with $1 billion of lending to BBB-rated companies in a single industry is 
liable to be asked to keep the same capital as a bank that has $1 billion of 
lending to a much more diverse group of BBB-rated corporations. As banks 
develop better credit value-at-risk models, we may see a Basel III standard 
where the capital requirement in the banking book is based on a bank's own 
model of the aggregate credit risks it is taking. 
The total required capital under Basel II is the sum of the capital for credit 
risk, market risk, and operational risk. This implicitly assumes that the risks 
are perfectly correlated. For example, it assumes that the 99.9% worst-case 
loss for credit risk occurs at the same time as the 99.9% worst-case loss for 
operational risk. Possibly, the calculations in Basel III (if it ever comes to pass) 
will allow banks to assume less than perfect correlation between losses from 
different types of risk when determining regulatory capital requirements. 
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monitor and ensure compliance with regulatory capital ratios. 
Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are 
not satisfied with the result of this process. 
3. Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum 
regulatory capital and should have the ability to require banks to 
hold capital in excess of this minimum. 
4. Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent 
capital from falling below the minimum levels required to support 
the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid 
remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored. 
The Basel Committee suggests that regulators pay particular attention to 
interest rate risk in the banking book, credit risk, and operational risk. 
Key issues in credit risk are stress tests used, default definitions used, 
credit risk concentration, and the risks associated with the use of col-
lateral, guarantees, and credit derivatives. 
The Basel Committee also stresses that there should be transparency 
and accountability in the procedures used by bank supervisors. This is 
particularly important when a supervisor exercises discretion in the pro-
cedures used or sets capital requirements above the minimum specified in 
Basel II. 
7.11 MARKET DISCIPLINE 
Pillar 3 of Basel II is concerned with market discipline. The Basel 
Committee wants to encourage banks to increase disclosure to the market 
of their risk assessment procedures and capital adequacy. The extent to 
which regulators can force banks to increase disclosure varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, banks are unlikely to ignore direc-
tives on this from their supervisors, given the potential of supervisors to 
make their life difficult. Also, in some instances, banks will have to 
increase their disclosure in order to be allowed to use particular meth-
odologies for calculating capital. 
Regulatory disclosures are likely to be different in form from account-
ing disclosures and need not be made in annual reports. It is largely left 
to the bank to choose disclosures that are material and relevant. Among 
the items that banks should disclose are: 
1. The entities in the banking group to which Basel II is applied and 
adjustments made for entities to which it is not applied 
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2. The terms and conditions of the main features of all capital 
instruments 
3. A list of the instruments constituting Tier 1 capital and the amount 
of capital provided by each item 
4. The total amount of Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital 
5. Capital requirements for credit, market, and operational risk 
6. Other general information on the risks to which a bank is exposed 
and the assessment methods used by the bank for different 
categories of risk 
7. The structure of the risk management function and how it operates 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of capital requirements for banks 
throughout the world. The way in which regulators calculate the mini-
mum capital a bank is required to hold has changed dramatically since 
the 1980s. Prior to 1988, regulators determined capital requirements by 
specifying minimum ratios for capital to assets or maximum ratios for 
assets to capital. In the late 1980s, both bank supervisors and the banks 
themselves agreed that changes were necessary. Off-balance-sheet deriva-
tives trading was increasing fast. In addition, banks were competing 
globally and it was considered important to create a level playing field 
by making regulations uniform throughout the world. 
The 1988 Basel Accord assigned capital for credit risk both on and off 
the balance sheet. This involved calculating a risk-weighted asset for each 
item. The risk-weighted asset for an On-balance-sheet loan was calculated 
by multiplying the principal by a risk weight for the counterparty. In the 
case of derivatives such as swaps, banks were first required to calculate a 
credit equivalent amount. The risk-weighted asset was obtained by multi-
Plying the credit equivalent amount by a risk weight for the counterparty. 
Banks were required to keep capital equal to 8% of the total risk-weighted 
assets. In 1995 the capital requirements for credit risk were modified to 
incorporate netting. 
In 1996, the Accord was modified to include a capital charge for market 
risk. Sophisticated banks could base the capital charge on a value-at-risk 
calculation. In 1999, the Basel Committee proposed significant changes, 
which are expected to be implemented in 2007. The capital for market risk 
is unchanged. Credit risk capital will be calculated in a more sophisticated 
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way that will reflect either (a) credit ratings from agencies such as Moody's 
or S&P or (b) a bank's own internal estimates of default probabilities. In 
addition, there will be a capital requirement for operational risk. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
7.1. "When a steel company goes bankrupt, other companies in the same 
industry benefit because they have one less competitor. But when a bank 
goes bankrupt, other banks do not necessarily benefit." Explain this 
statement. 
7.2. "The existence of deposit insurance makes it particularly important for 
there to be regulations on the amount of capital banks hold." Explain this 
statement. 
7.3. As explained in Section 2.3 an interest rate swap involves the exchange of a 
fixed rate of interest for a floating rate of interest with both being applied to 
the same principal. The principals are not exchanged. What is the nature of 
the credit risk for a bank when it enters into a five-year interest rate swap 
with a notional principal of $100 million? Assume the swap is worth zero 
initially. 
7.4. In a currency swap, interest on a principal in one currency is exchanged for 
interest on a principal in another currency. The principals in the two 
currencies are exchanged at the end of the life of the swap. Why is the 
credit risk on a currency swap greater than that on an interest rate swap? 
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7.5. An interest rate swap currently has a negative value to a financial 
institution. Is the financial institution exposed to credit risk on the trans-
action? Explain your answer. 
7.6. Estimate the capital required under Basel I for a bank that has the following 
transactions with a corporation (assume no netting): (a) a 9-year interest 
rate swap with a notional principal of $250 million and a current market 
value of — $2 million; (b) a 4-year interest rate swap with a notional 
principal of $100 million and a current value of $3.5 million; and (c) a 
6-month derivative on a commodity with a principal of $50 million that is 
currently worth $1 million. 
7.7. What is the capital required in Problem 7.6 under Basel I assuming that 
the 1995 netting amendment applies? 
7.8. All the contracts a bank has with a corporate client are loans to the client. 
What is the value to the bank of netting provisions in the loan agreement? 
7.9. Explain why the final stage in the Basel II calculations for credit risk, 
market risk, and operational risk is to multiply by 12.5. 
7.10. What is the difference between the trading book and the banking book for 
a bank? A bank currently has a loan of $10 million dollars to a corporate 
client. At the end of the life of the loan the client would like to sell debt 
securities to the bank instead of borrowing. How does this change affect 
the nature of the bank's regulatory capital calculations? 
7.11. Under Basel I, banks do not like lending to highly creditworthy companies 
and prefer to help them issue debt securities. Why is this? Do you expect 
the banks' attitude to this type of lending to change under Basel II? 
7.12. What is regulatory arbitrage? 
7.13. Equation (7.8) gives the formula for the capital required under Basel II. 
It involves four terms being multiplied together. Explain each of these 
terms. 
7.14. Explain the difference between the simple and the comprehensive 
approach for adjusting for collateral. 
7.15. Explain the difference between the standardized approach, the IRB 
approach, and the advanced IRB approach for calculating credit risk 
capital under Basel II. 
7.16. Explain the difference between the basic indicator approach, the stand-
ardized approach, and the advanced measurement approach for calculat-
ing operational risk capital under Basel II. 
7.17. Suppose that the assets of a bank consist of $200 of retail loans (not 
mortgages). The PD is 1% and the LGD is 70%. What is the risk-
weighted assets under the Basel II IRB approach? How much Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital is required. 
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ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
7.18. Why is there an add-on amount in Basel I for derivatives transactions? 
"Basel I could be improved if the add-on amount for a derivatives trans-
action depended on the value of the transaction." How would you argue 
this viewpoint? 
7.19. Estimate the capital required under Basel I for a bank that has the following 
transactions with another bank (assume no netting): (a) a 2-year forward 
contract on a foreign currency, currently worth $2 million, to buy foreign 
currency worth $50 million; (b) a long position in a 6-month option on the 
S&P 500 with a principal of $20 million and a current value of $4 million; 
and (c) a 2-year swap involving oil with a principal of $30 million and a 
current swap value of -$5 million. What difference does it make if the 
netting amendment applies? 
7.20. A bank has the following transaction with an AA-rated corporation: 
(a) a 2-year interest rate swap with a principal of $100 million worth 
$3 million; (b) a 9-month foreign exchange forward contract with a 
principal of $150 million worth -$5 million; and (c) a 6-month long 
option on gold with a principal of $50 worth $7 million. What is the 
capital requirement under Basel I if there is no netting? What difference 
does it make if the netting amendment applies? What is the capital 
required under Basel II when the standardized approach is used? 
7.21. Suppose that the assets of a bank consist of $500 million of loans to 
BBB-rated corporations. The PD for the corporations is estimated as 
0.3%. The average maturity is 3 years and the LGD is 60%. What is the 
risk-weighted assets for credit risk under the Basel II advanced IRB 
approach? How much Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital is required. How does this 
compare with the capital required under the Basel II standardized approach 
and under Basel I? 
The VaR Measure 
In Chapter 3 we examined measures such as delta, gamma, and vega for 
describing different aspects of the risk in a portfolio of derivatives. A 
financial institution usually calculates each of these measures each day for 
every market variable to which it is exposed. Often there are hundreds, or 
even thousands, of these market variables. A delta-gamma-vega analysis 
therefore leads to a huge number of different risk measures being 
produced each day. These risk measures provide valuable information 
for a trader who is responsible for managing the part of the financial 
institution's portfolio that is dependent on a particular market variable. 
However, they do not provide a way of measuring the total risk to which 
the financial institution is exposed. 
Value at risk (VaR) is an attempt to provide a single number that 
summarizes the total risk in a portfolio of financial assets. It was 
pioneered by J.P. Morgan (see Business Snapshot 8.1), and it has become 
widely used by corporate treasurers and fund managers as well as by 
financial institutions. As we saw in Chapter 7, the VaR measure is used 
by the Basel Committee in setting capital requirements for banks 
throughout the world. 
In this chapter we explain the VaR measure and discuss its strengths 
and weaknesses. We also cover back testing and stress testing. In the next 
two chapters we will explain the two main approaches for estimating VaR 
for market risk. In Chapter 12 we will consider how VaR can be estimated 
for credit risk. 
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8.1 DEFINITION OF VaR 
When using the value-at-risk measure, we are interested in making a 
statement of the following form: 
We are X percent certain that we will not lose more than V dollars in the 
next N days. 
Business Snapshot 8.1 Historical Perspectives on VaR 
J.P. Morgan is credited with helping to make VaR a widely accepted measure. 
The Chairman, Dennis Weatherstone, was dissatisfied with the long risk 
reports he received every day. These contained a huge amount of detail on 
the Greek letters for different exposures, but very little that was really useful to 
top management. He asked for something simpler that focused on the bank's 
total exposure over the next 24 hours measured across the bank's entire trading 
portfolio. At first his subordinates said this was impossible, but eventually 
they adapted the Markowitz portfolio theory (see Section 1.1) to develop a 
VaR report. This became known as the 4:15 report because it was placed on 
the chairman's desk at 4:15 p.m. every day after the close of trading. 
Producing the report entailed a huge amount of work involving the collec-
tion of data daily on the positions held by the bank around the world, the 
handling of different time zones, the estimation of correlations and volatilities, 
and the development of computer systems. The work was completed in about 
1990. The main benefit of the new system was that senior management had a 
better understanding of the risks being taken by the bank and were better able 
to allocate capital within the bank. Other banks had been working on similar 
approaches for aggregating risks and by 1993 VaR was established as an 
important risk measure. 
Banks usually keep the details about the models they develop internally a 
secret. However, in 1994 J.P. Morgan made a simplified version of their own 
system, which they called RiskMetrics, available on the internet. RiskMetrics 
included variances and covariances for a very large number of different market 
variables. This attracted a lot of attention and led to debates about the pros and 
cons of different VaR models. Software firms started offering their own VaR 
models, some of which used the RiskMetrics database. After that, VaR was 
rapidly adopted as a standard by financial institutions and some nonfinancial 
institutions. The BIS Amendment, which was based on VaR (see Section 7.6), 
was announced in 1996 and implemented in 1998. Later the RiskMetrics group 
within J.P. Morgan was spun off as a separate company. This company 
developed CreditMetrics for handling credit risks in 1997 and Corporate-
Metrics for handling the risks faced by nonfinancial corporations in 1999. 
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The variable V is the VaR of the portfolio. It is a function of two 
parameters: the time horizon (N days) and the confidence level (X%). It 
is the loss level over N days that we are X% certain will not be exceeded. 
VaR is the loss corresponding to the (100 — X)th percentile of the 
distribution of the change in the value of the portfolio over the next 
N days. (Gains are positive changes; losses are negative changes.) For 
example, when N = 5 and X = 97, VaR is the third percentile of the 
distribution of changes in the value of the portfolio over the next five 
days. In Figure 8.1, VaR is illustrated for the situation where the change 
in the value of the portfolio is approximately normally distributed. 
Figure 8.1 shows the distribution of the portfolio's daily gain, with 
losses being counted as negative gains. As mentioned, VaR is the 
(100 — X)th percentile of this distribution. Instead, we can calculate the 
distribution of the portfolio's daily loss, with a gain being counted as a 
negative loss. VaR is the Xth percentile of this distribution. 
As discussed in Section 7.6, the 1996 BIS Amendment calculates 
capital for the trading book using the VaR measure with N = 10 and 
X = 99. This means that it focuses on the revaluation loss over a 10-day 
period that is expected to be exceeded only 1 % of the time. The capital it 
requires the bank to hold is k times this VaR measure (with an adjustment 
for what are termed specific risks.) The multiplier k is chosen on a bank-
by-bank basis by the regulators and must be at least 3.0. For a bank with 
excellent well-tested VaR estimation procedures, it is likely that k will be 
set equal to the minimum value of 3.0. For other banks it may be higher. 
As we will discuss in Section 8.6, when tests show a bank's VaR model 
would not have performed well during the last 250 days, k may be as high 
as 4.0. 
Figure 8.1 Calculation of VaR from the probability distribution of the change 
in the portfolio value; confidence level is X%. 
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8.2 VaR vs. EXPECTED SHORTFALL 
VaR is an attractive measure because it is easy to understand. In essence, 
it asks the simple question: "How bad can things get?" This is the 
question all senior managers want answered. They are very comfortable 
with the idea of compressing all the Greek letters for all the market 
variables underlying a portfolio into a single number. VaR is also 
relatively easy to back test, as we shall see later in this chapter. 
However, when VaR is used in an attempt to limit the risks taken by a 
trader, it can lead to undesirable results. Suppose that a bank tells a 
trader that the one-day 99% VaR of the trader's portfolio must be kept at 
less than $10 million. The trader can construct a portfolio where there is 
a 99% chance that the daily loss is less than $10 million and a 1% chance 
that it is $500 million. The trader is satisfying the risk limits imposed by 
the bank but is clearly taking unacceptable risks. 
This behavior by a trader is not as unlikely as it sounds. Many traders 
like taking high risks in the hope of realizing high returns. If they can find 
ways of taking high risks without violating risk limits, they will do so. To 
quote one trader the author has talked to: "I have never met a risk control 
system that I cannot trade around." The problem we are talking about is 
summarized by Figures 8.1 and 8.2. The figures show the probability 
distribution for the gain or loss on a portfolio during N days. Both 
portfolios have the same VaR, but the portfolio in Figure 8.2 is much 
riskier than that in Figure 8.1 because expected losses are much larger. 
Expected Shortfall 
A measure that produces better incentives for traders than VaR is expected 
shortfall. This is also sometimes referred to as conditional VaR or tail loss. 
Figure 8.2 Alternative situation to Figure 8.1; VaR is the same, but the 
potential loss is larger. 
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Whereas VaR asks how bad can things get, expected shortfall asks: "If 
things do get bad, what is the expected loss?" Expected shortfall, like VaR, 
is a function of two parameters: N (the time horizon in days) and X (the 
percent confidence level). It is the expected loss during an N-day period 
conditional on the loss being greater than the Xth percentile of the loss 
distribution.1 For example, with X = 99 and N = 10, the expected short-
fall is the average amount we lose over a ten-day period assuming that the 
loss is greater than the 99th percentile of the loss distribution. 
As we show in the next section, expected shortfall has better properties 
than VaR in that it encourages diversification. One disadvantage is that it 
does not have the simplicity of VaR and, as a result, is slightly more 
difficult to understand. Another is that it is more difficult to back test. 
VaR has become the most popular measure of risk among both regulators 
and risk managers in spite of its weaknesses. Therefore, in most of our 
discussions in this chapter and the next two, we will focus on how VaR can 
be measured and used. Many of the points we make apply equally to 
expected shortfall and other risk measures. 
8.3 PROPERTIES OF RISK MEASURES 
A risk measure used for specifying capital requirements can be thought of 
as the amount of cash (or capital) that must be added to a position to make 
its risk acceptable to regulators. Artzner et al. have proposed a number of 
properties that such a risk measure should have.2 These are: 
1. Monotonicity: If a portfolio has lower returns than another portfolio 
for every state of the world, its risk measure should be greater. 
2. Translation invariance: If we add an amount of cash K to a portfolio, 
its risk measure should go down by K. 
3. Homogeneity: Changing the size of a portfolio by a factor while 
keeping the relative amounts of different items in the portfolio the same 
should result in the risk measure being multiplied by 
4. Subadditivity: The risk measure for two portfolios after they have been 
merged should be no greater than the sum of their risk measures before 
they were merged. 
1
 As mentioned earlier, gains are calculated as negative losses, and so all outcomes are 
considered when a loss distribution is constructed. 
See P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber, and D. Heath, "Coherent Measures of Risk," 
Mathematical Finance, 9 (1999): 203-228. 
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The first three conditions are straightforward, given that the risk measure 
is the amount of cash needed to be added to the portfolio to make its risk 
acceptable. The fourth condition states that diversification helps reduce 
risks. When we aggregate two risks, the total of the risk measures 
corresponding to the risks should either decrease or stay the same. VaR 
satisfies the first three conditions. However, it does not always satisfy the 
fourth one, as is illustrated by the following example. 
Example 8.1 
Consider two $10 million one-year loans each of which has a 1.25% chance of 
defaulting. If a default occurs on one of the loans, the recovery of the loan 
principal is uncertain, with all recoveries between 0% and 100% being equally 
likely. If the loan does not default, a profit of $0.2 million is made. To simplify 
matters, we suppose that if one loan defaults then it is certain that the other 
loan will not default.3 
For a single loan, the one-year 99% VaR is $2 million. This is because there 
is a 1.25% chance of a loss occurring, and conditional on a loss there is an 
80% chance that the loss is greater than $2 million. The unconditional 
probability that the loss is greater than $2 million is therefore 80% of 
1.25%, or 1%. 
Consider next the portfolio of two loans. Each loan defaults 1.25% of the 
time and they never default together. There is therefore a 2.5% probability 
that a default will occur. The VaR in this case turns out to be $5.8 million. 
This is because there is a 2.5% chance of one of the loans defaulting, and 
conditional on this event there is an 40% chance that the loss on the loan that 
defaults is greater than $6 million. The unconditional probability that the loss 
on the defaulting loan is greater than $6 million is therefore 40% of 2.5%, or 
1%. A profit of $0.2 million is made on the other loan showing that the one-
year 99%VaR is $5.8 million. 
The total VaR of the loans considered separately is 2 + 2 = 4 million. The 
total VaR after they have been combined in the portfolio is $1.8 million 
greater at $5.8 million. This is in spite of the fact that there are very attractive 
diversification benefits from combining the loans in a single portfolio. 
Coherent Risk Measures 
Risk measures satisfying all four conditions are referred to as coherent-
Example 8.1 illustrates that VaR is not coherent. It can be shown that the 
expected shortfall measure we discussed earlier is coherent. The following 
3
 This is to simplify the calculations. If the loans default independently of each other, so 
that two defaults can occur, the numbers are slightly different and the VaR of the 
portfolio is still greater than the sum of the VaRs of the individual loans. 
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example illustrates this by calculating expected shortfalls for the situation 
in Example 8.1. 
Example 8.2 
Consider again the situation in Example 8.1. We showed that the VaR for a 
single loan is $2 million. The expected shortfall from a single loan when the 
time horizon is one year and the confidence level is 99% is therefore the 
expected loss on the loan conditional on a loss greater than $2 million. Given 
that losses are uniformly distributed between zero and $10 million, this is 
halfway between $2 million and $10 million, or $6 million. 
The VaR for a portfolio consisting of the two loans was calculated in 
Example 8.1 as $5.8 million. The expected shortfall from the portfolio is 
therefore the expected loss on the portfolio conditional on the loss being 
greater than $5.8 million. When a loan defaults, the other (by assumption) 
does not and outcomes are uniformly distributed between a gain of $0.2 mil-
lion and a loss of $9.8 million. The expected loss given that we are in the part 
of the distribution between $5.8 million and $9.8 million is $7.8 million. This 
is therefore the expected shortfall of the portfolio. 
Because 6 + 6 > 7.8, the expected shortfall does satisfy the Subadditivity 
condition. 
A risk measure can be characterized by the weights it assigns to quantiles 
of the loss distribution.4 VaR gives a 100% weighting to the Xth quantile 
and zero to other quantiles. Expected shortfall gives equal weight to all 
quantiles greater than the Xth quantile and zero weight to all quantiles 
below the Xth quantile. We can define what is known as a spectral risk 
measure by making other assumptions about the weights assigned to 
quantiles. A general result is that a spectral risk measure is coherent 
(i.e., it satisfies the Subadditivity condition) if the weight assigned to the 
qth quantile of the loss distribution is a nondecreasing function of q. 
Expected shortfall satisfies this condition. However, VaR does not, 
because the weights assigned to quantiles greater than X are less than 
the weight assigned to the Xth quantile. Some researchers have proposed 
measures where the weights assigned to the qth quantile of the loss 
distribution increase relatively fast with q. One idea is to make the weight 
assigned to the qth quantile proportional to where is a 
constant. This is referred to as the exponential spectral risk measure. 
Figure 8.3 shows the weights assigned to loss quantiles for expected 
shortfall and for the exponential spectral risk measure when has two 
different values. 
4
 Quantiles are also referred to as percentiles or fractiles. 
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Figure 8.3 Weights as a function of quantiles for (a) expected shortfall 
when X — 90%, (b) exponential spectral risk measure with =0.15, and 
(c) exponential spectral risk measure with = 0.05. 
8.4 CHOICE OF PARAMETERS FOR VaR 
We now return to a consideration of VaR. The user must choose two 
parameters: the time horizon and the confidence level. As mentioned in 
Chapter 7, the Basel Committee has chosen a time horizon of ten days 
and a confidence level of 99% for market risks in the trading book. It has 
also chosen a time horizon of one year and a confidence level of 99.9% 
for credit risks under the internal-ratings-based approach and for opera-
tional risk under the advanced measurement approach. Other parameter 
values are chosen in different situations. For example, Microsoft in its 
financial statements says that it calculates VaR with a 97.5% confidence 
level and a 20-day time horizon. 
A common, though questionable, assumption is that the change in the 
portfolio value over the time horizon is normally distributed. The mean 
change in the portfolio value is usually assumed to be zero. These assump-
tions are convenient because they lead to a simple formula for VaR: 
where X is the confidence level, is the standard deviation of the port-
folio change over the time horizon, and is the inverse cumulative 
normal distribution (which can be calculated using NORMSINV in 
Excel). This equation shows that, regardless of the time horizon, VaR 
for a particular confidence level is proportional to 
(8.1) 
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Example 8.3 
Suppose that the change in the value of a portfolio over a ten-day time horizon 
is normal with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of $20 million. The ten-
day 99% VaR is 
or $46.5 million. 
The Time Horizon 
An appropriate choice for the time horizon depends on the application. 
The trading desks of banks calculate the profit and loss daily. Their 
positions are usually fairly liquid and actively managed. For internal 
use, it therefore makes sense to calculate a VaR over a time horizon of 
one trading day. If VaR is unacceptable, the portfolio can be adjusted 
fairly quickly. Also, a VaR with a longer time horizon might not be 
meaningful because of changes in the composition of the portfolio. 
For an investment portfolio held by a pension fund, a time horizon of 
one month is often chosen. This is because the portfolio is traded less 
actively and some of the instruments in the portfolio are less liquid. Also 
the performance of pension fund portfolios is often monitored monthly. 
Whatever the application, when market risks are being considered 
analysts almost invariably start by calculating VaR for a time horizon 
of one day. The usual assumption is 
This formula is exactly true when the changes in the value of the portfolio 
on successive days have independent identical normal distributions with 
mean zero. In other cases it is an approximation. The formula follows 
from equation (8.1) and the following results: 
1. The standard deviation of the sum on N independent identically 
distributions is times the standard deviation of each distribution 
2. The sum of independent normal distributions is normal 
Regulatory Capital 
As mentioned earlier, the regulatory capital for market risk in the trading 
book is based on the ten-day 99% VaR. Regulators explicitly state that 
the ten-day 99% VaR can be calculated using equation (8.2) as times 
the one-day 99% VaR. This means that when the capital requirement for 
a bank is specified as three times the ten-day 99 % VaR it is to all intents 
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and purposes 3 x =9.49 times the one-day 99% VaR. In the next 
two chapters we will focus entirely on the calculation of one-day VaR for 
market risks. 
Impact of Autocorrelation 
In practice, the changes in the value of a portfolio from one day to the next 
are not always totally independent. Define as the change in the value 
of a portfolio on day i. A simple assumption is first-order autocorrelation 
where the correlation between and is for all i. Suppose that the 
variance of is for all i. Using the usual formula for the variance of 
the sum of two variables, the variance of is 
The correlation between and is This leads to the following 
formula for the variance of (see Problem 8.12): 
(8.3) 
Table 8.1 shows the impact of autocorrelation on the N-day VaR that is 
calculated from the one-day VaR. It assumes that the distribution of daily 
changes in the portfolio are identical normals with mean zero. Note that 
the ratio of the N-day VaR to the one-day VaR does not depend on the 
daily standard deviation or on the confidence level. This follows from 
the result in equation (8.1) and the property of equation (8.3) that the 
N-day standard deviation is proportional to the one-day standard devia-
tion. Comparing the = 0 row in Table 8.1 with the other rows shows that 
the existence of autocorrelation results in the VaR estimates calculated 
from equation (8.1) being a little low. 
Table 8.1 Ratio of TV-day VaR to one-day VaR for different values of N when 
there is first-order correlation; distribution of change in portfolio value each day 
is assumed to have the same normal distribution with mean zero; is the 
autocorrelation parameter. 
= 0 
= 0.05 
= 0.1 
= 0.2 
N = 1 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
N = 2 
1.41 
1.45 
1.48 
1.55 
N=5 
2.24 
2.33 
2.42 
2.62 
N = 10 
3.16 
3.31 
3.46 
3.79 
N = 50 
7.07 
7.43 
7.80 
8.62 
N = 250 
15.81 
16.62 
17.47 
19.35 
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Example 8.4 
Suppose that the standard deviation of daily changes in the portfolio value is 
$3 million and the first-order autocorrelation of daily changes is 0.1. From 
equation (8.3), the variance of the change in the portfolio value over five days is 
32[5 + 2 x 4 x 0 . 1 + 2 x 3 x 0.12 + 2 x 2 x 0.13 + 2 x 1 x 0.14] = 52.7778 
The standard deviation of the change in the value of the portfolio over five days 
is or 7.265. The five-day 95% VaR is therefore 
or $11.95 million. Note that the ratio of the five-
day standard deviation of portfolio changes to the one-day standard deviation 
is 7.265/3 = 2.42. Since VaRs are proportional to standard deviations under 
the assumptions we are making, this is the number in Table 8.1 for = 0.1 and 
N = 5. 
Confidence Level 
The confidence level chosen for VaR is likely to depend on a number of 
factors. Suppose a bank wants to maintain an AA credit rating and 
calculates that companies with this credit rating have a 0.03% chance 
of defaulting over a one-year period. It might choose to use a 99.97% 
confidence level in conjunction with a one-year time horizon for internal 
risk management purposes. (It might also communicate the analysis to 
rating agencies as evidence that it deserves its AA rating.) 
The confidence level that is actually used for the first VaR calculation is 
often much less than the one that is eventually reported. This is because it 
is very difficult to estimate a VaR directly when the confidence level is 
very high. If daily portfolio changes are assumed to be normally dis-
tributed with zero mean, we can use equation (8.1) to convert a VaR 
calculated with one confidence level to a VaR with another confidence 
level. Suppose that is the standard deviation of the change in the 
portfolio value over a certain time horizon and that the expected change 
in the portfolio value is zero. Denote VaR for a confidence level of X by 
VaR(X). From equation (8.1), we have 
for all confidence levels X. It follows that 
Unfortunately this formula is critically dependent on the shape of the 
tails of the loss distribution being normal. When they are not normal, the 
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formula may be quite a bad approximation. Extreme value theory, which 
is covered in Chapter 9, provides an alternative way of extrapolating tails 
of loss distributions. 
Equation (8.4) assumes that the two VaR measures have the same time 
horizon. If we want to change the time horizon, we can use equation (8.4) 
in conjunction with equation (8.2) or (8.3). 
Example 8.5 
Suppose that the one-day VaR with a confidence level of 95% is $1.5 million. 
Using the assumption that the distribution of portfolio value changes is 
normal with mean zero, the one-day 99% VaR is 
or $2.12 million. If we assume daily changes are independent, the ten-day 
99% VaR is times this or $6.71 million and the 250-day VaR is 
times this, or $33.54 million. 
8.5 MARGINAL VaR, INCREMENTAL VaR, AND 
COMPONENT VaR 
Analysts often calculate additional measures in order to understand VaR. 
Consider a portfolio with a number of components where the investment 
in the ith component is The marginal VaR is the sensitivity of VaR to 
the amount invested in the ith component. It is 
For an investment portfolio, marginal VaR is closely related to the capital 
asset pricing model's beta (see Section 1.1). If an asset's beta is high, its 
marginal VaR will tend to be high; if its beta is low, the marginal VaR 
tends to be low. In some circumstances marginal VaR is negative, 
indicating that increasing the weighting of a particular asset reduces the 
risk of the portfolio. 
Incremental VaR is the incremental effect on VaR of a new trade or the 
incremental effect of closing out an existing trade. It asks the question: 
"What is the difference between VaR with and without the trade." It is of 
particular interest to traders who are wondering what the effect of a new 
trade will be on their regulatory capital. If a component is small in 
relation to the size of a portfolio, it may be reasonable to assume that 
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the marginal VaR remains constant as is reduced all the way to zero. 
This leads to the following approximate formula for the incremental VaR 
of the ith component: 
The component VaR for the ith component of the portfolio is the part 
of the VaR of the portfolio that can be attributed to this component. 
Component VaRs should have the following properties: 
1. The ith component VaR for a large portfolio should be approxi-
mately equal to the incremental VaR for that component. 
2. The sum of all the component VaRs should equal the portfolio 
VaR. 
Owing to nonlinearities in the calculation of VaR, we cannot satisfy the 
first condition exactly if we also want to satisfy the second condition. A 
result known as Euler's theorem can be used to calculate component 
VaRs. This is5 
where N is the number of components. We can therefore set 
where Ci is the component VaR for the ith component. From the Euler's 
theorem result, these satisfy the second condition specified above: 
Also, as indicated by equation (8.5), they satisfy the first condition. 
Interestingly, the definition of Ci in equation (8.6) is equivalent to the 
alternative definition that Ci is the expected loss on the ith position, 
conditional on the loss on the portfolio equaling the VaR level. 
Marginal, incremental, and component expected shortfall can be de-
fined analogously to marginal, incremental, and component VaR. Euler's 
The condition that we need for Euler's theorem is that when each of the xi is multiplied 
by A. the portfolio VaR is multiplied by This condition is known as linear homogeneity 
and is clearly satisfied. 
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theorem applies, so component expected shortfall can be defined by 
equation (8.6) with VaR replaced by expected shortfall. 
8.6 BACK TESTING 
Whatever the method used for calculating VaR, an important reality 
check is back testing. It involves testing how well the VaR estimates 
would have performed in the past. Suppose that we have developed a 
procedure for calculating a one-day 99% VaR. Back testing involves 
looking at how often the loss in a day exceeded the one-day 99% VaR 
calculated using the procedure for that day. Days when the actual change 
exceeds VaR are referred to as exceptions. If exceptions happen on about 
1 % of the days, we can feel reasonably comfortable with the method-
ology for calculating VaR. If they happen on, say, 7% of days, the 
methodology is suspect and it is likely that VaR is underestimated. From 
a regulatory perspective, the capital calculated using the VaR estimation 
procedure is then too low. On the other hand, if exceptions happen on, 
say 0.3% of days it is likely that the procedure is overestimating VaR and 
the capital calculated is too high. 
One issue in back testing VaR is whether we take account of changes 
made in the portfolio during the time period considered. There are two 
possibilities. The first is to compare VaR with the hypothetical change in 
the portfolio value calculated on the assumption that the composition of 
the portfolio remains unchanged during the time period. The other is to 
compare VaR to the actual change in the value of the portfolio during the 
time period. VaR itself is invariably calculated on the assumption that the 
portfolio will remain unchanged during the time period, and so the first 
comparison based on hypothetical changes is more logical. However, it is 
actual changes in the portfolio value that we are ultimately interested in. 
In practice, risk managers usually compare VaR to both hypothetical 
portfolio changes and actual portfolio changes. (In fact, regulators insist 
on seeing the results of back testing using actual as well as hypothetical 
changes.) The actual changes are adjusted for items unrelated to the 
market risk—such as fee income and profits from trades carried out at 
prices different from the mid-market price. 
Suppose that the time horizon is one day and the confidence limit is 
X%. If the VaR model used is accurate, the probability of the VaR 
being exceeded on any given day is p = 1 - X. Suppose that we look at 
a total of n days and we observe that the VaR limit is exceeded on m of 
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the days where m/n > p. Should we reject the model for producing 
values of VaR that are too low? Expressed formally, we can consider 
two alternative hypotheses: 
1. The probability of an exception on any given day is p. 
2. The probability of an exception on any given day is greater than p. 
From the properties of the binomial distribution, the probability of the 
VaR limit being exceeded on m or more days is 
This can be calculated using the BINOMDIST function in Excel. An 
often-used confidence level in statistical tests is 5%. If the probability of 
the VaR limit being exceeded on m or more days is less than 5%, we reject 
the first hypothesis that the probability of an exception is p. If this 
probability of the VaR limit being exceeded on m or more days is greater 
than 5%, then the hypothesis is not rejected. 
Example 8.6 
Suppose that we back test a VaR model using 600 days of data. The VaR 
confidence level is 99% and we observe nine exceptions. The expected number 
of exceptions is six. Should we reject the model? The probability of nine or 
more exceptions can be calculated in Excel as 
1 - BINOMDIST(8, 600, 0.01, TRUE) 
It is 0.152. At a 5% confidence level, we should not therefore reject the model. 
However, if the number of exceptions had been 12, we would have calculated 
the probability of 12 or more exceptions as 0.019 and rejected the model. The 
model is rejected when the number of exceptions is 11 or more. (The prob-
ability of 10 or more exceptions is greater than 5%, but the probability of 11 
or more is less than 5%.) 
When the number of exceptions, m, is lower than the expected number of 
exceptions, we can similarly test whether the true probability of an 
exception is 1%. (In this case, our alternative hypothesis is that the true 
probability of an exception is less than 1%.) The probability of m or less 
exceptions is 
and this is compared with the 5% threshold. 
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Example 8.7 
Suppose again that we back test a VaR model using 600 days of data when the 
VaR confidence level is 99% and we observe one exception, well below the 
expected number of six. Should we reject the model? The probability of one or 
zero exceptions can be calculated in Excel as 
BINOMDIST(l, 600, 0.01, TRUE) 
It is 0.017. At a 5% confidence level, we should therefore reject the model. 
However, if the number of exceptions had been two or more, we would not 
have rejected the model. 
The tests we have considered so far have been one-tailed tests. In 
Example 8.6 we assumed that the true probability of an exception was 
either 1% or greater than 1%. In Example 8.7 we assumed that it was 1% 
or less than 1 %. Kupiec has proposed a relatively powerful two-tailed test.6 
If the probability of an exception under the VaR model is p and m 
exceptions are observed in n trials, then 
should have a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. Values 
of the statistic are high for either very low or very high numbers of 
exceptions. There is a probability of 5% that the value of a chi-square 
variable with one degree of freedom will be greater than 3.84. It follows 
that we should reject the model whenever the expression in equation (8.7) 
is greater than 3.84. 
Example 8.8 
Suppose that as in the previous two examples we back test a VaR model using 
600 days of data when the VaR confidence level is 99%. The value of the 
statistic in equation (8.7) is greater that 3.84 when the number of exceptions, m, 
is one or less and when the number of exceptions is 12 or more. We therefore 
accept the VaR model when 2 m 11, and reject it otherwise. 
Generally speaking the difficulty of back testing a VaR model increases as 
the VaR confidence level increases. This is an argument in favor of not 
using very high confidence levels for VaR. 
Basel Committee Rules 
The 1986 BIS Amendment (see Section 7.6) requires VaR models to be 
back tested. Banks should use both actual and hypothetical changes in 
6
 See P. Kupiec, "Techniques for Verifying the Accuracy of Risk Management Models, 
Journal of Derivatives, 3 (1995), 73-84. 
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the daily profit and loss to test a one-day VaR model that has a 
confidence level of 99%. If the number of exceptions during the previous 
250 days is less than 5, the regulatory multiplier for VaR is set at its 
minimum value of 3. If the number of exceptions are 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 
values of the multiplier equal to 3.4, 3.5, 3.65, 3.75, and 3.85, respectively, 
are specified. The bank supervisor has some discretion as to whether the 
higher multipliers are used. The penalty will normally apply when the 
reason for the exceptions is identified as a deficiency in the VaR model 
being used. If changes in positions during the day result in exceptions, the 
higher multiplier should be considered. When the only reason that is 
identified is bad luck, no guidance is provided for the supervisor. In 
circumstances where the number of exceptions is 10 or more the Basel 
Amendment requires the multiplier to be set at 4. The statistical tests we 
have presented can be used to determine the confidence limits the Basel 
Committee is implicitly using for its decision to accept or reject a model 
(see Problem 8.13). 
Bunching 
A separate issue from the number of exceptions is bunching. If daily 
portfolio changes are independent, exceptions should be spread evenly 
through the period used for back testing. In practice, they are often 
bunched together, suggesting that losses on successive days are not 
independent. One approach for testing for bunching is to use the test 
for autocorrelation in Section 5.9. Another approach is to use the 
following test statistic suggested by Christofferson7 
where is the number of observations in which we go from a day where 
we are in state i to a day where we are in state j. This statistic is chi-square 
with one degree of freedom if there is no bunching. State 0 is a day where 
there is no exception while state 1 is a day where there is an exception. 
Also, 
7
 See P. F. Christofferson, "Evaluating Interval Forecasts," International Economic 
Review, 39 (1998), 841-862. 
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8.7 STRESS TESTING 
In addition to requiring that a model for market risk be back tested, the 
Basel Committee requires market risk VaR calculations be accompanied 
by a "rigorous and comprehensive" stress-testing program. Stress testing 
involves estimating how the portfolio would have performed under extreme 
market moves. These extreme market moves typically have a very low 
(virtually zero) probability under most VaR models—but they do happen! 
Stress testing is a way of taking into account extreme events that are 
virtually impossible according to the probability distributions assumed 
for market variables, but do occur from time to time. A five-standard-
deviation daily move in a market variable is one such extreme event. 
Under the assumption of a normal distribution, it happens about once 
every 7,000 years, but, in practice, it is not uncommon to see a five-
standard-deviation daily move once or twice every ten years. 
Some stress tests focus on particular market variables. Examples of 
stress tests that have been recommended include: 
1. Shifting a yield curve by 100 basis points 
2. Changing implied volatilities for an asset by 20% of current values 
3. Changing an equity index by 10% 
4. Changing an exchange rate for a major currency by 6% or changing 
the exchange rate for a minor currency by 20% 
Stress tests more often involve making changes to several market vari-
ables. A common practice is to use historical scenarios. For example, to 
test the impact of an extreme movement in US equity prices, a company 
might set the percentage changes in all market variables equal to those on 
October 19, 1987 (when the S&P 500 moved by 22.3 standard deviations). 
If this is considered too extreme, the company might choose January 8, 
1988 (when the S&P 500 moved by 6.8 standard deviations). To test the 
effect of extreme movements in UK interest rates, the company might set 
the percentage changes in all market variables equal to those on April 10, 
1992 (when ten-year bond yields moved by 8.7 standard deviations). 
The scenarios used in stress testing are also sometimes generated by 
senior management. One technique sometimes used is to ask senior 
management to meet periodically and "brainstorm" to develop extreme 
scenarios that might occur given the current economic environment and 
global uncertainties. Whatever the procedure used to generate the stress 
tests, there should be a "buy in" to the idea of stress testing by senior 
The VaR Measure 213 
management and it should be senior management that reviews the results 
of stress tests. 
If movements in only a few variables are specified in a stress test, one 
approach is to set changes in all other variables to zero. Another 
approach is to regress the nonstressed variables on the variables that 
are being stressed to obtain forecasts for them, conditional on the 
changes being made to the stressed variables. These forecasts can be 
incorporated into the stress test. This is known as conditional stress testing 
and is discussed by Kupiec.8 
SUMMARY 
A value-at-risk (VaR) calculation is aimed at making a statement of the 
form: "We are X percent certain that we will not lose more than V dollars 
in the next N days." The variable V is the VaR, X% is the confidence 
level, and N days is the time horizon. It has become a very popular risk 
measure. An alternative measure that has rather better theoretical proper-
ties is expected shortfall. This is the expected loss conditional on the loss 
being greater than the VaR level. 
When changes in a portfolio value are normally distributed, a VaR 
estimate with one confidence level can be used to calculate a VaR level 
with another confidence level. Also, if one-day changes have independent 
normal distributions, an N-day VaR equals the one-day VaR multiplied 
by When the independence assumption is relaxed other somewhat 
more complicated formulas can be used to go from the one-day VaR to 
the N-day VaR. 
The marginal VaR with respect to the ith position is the partial 
derivative of VaR with respect to the size of the position. The incremental 
VaR with respect to a particular position is the incremental effect of that 
position on VaR. There is a formula that can be used for dividing VaR 
into components that correspond to the positions taken. The component 
VaRs sum to VaR and each component is, for a large portfolio of 
relatively small positions, approximately equal to the corresponding 
incremental VaR. 
Back testing is an important part of a VaR system. It examines how 
well the VaR model would have performed in the past. There are two 
ways in which back testing may indicate weaknesses in a VaR model. One 
8
 P. Kupiec, "Stress Testing in a Value at Risk Framework," Journal of Derivatives, 6 
(1999), 7-24. 
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is in the percentage of exceptions, that is, the percentage of times the 
actual loss exceeds VaR. The other is in the extent to which exceptions are 
bunched. There are statistical tests to determine whether a VaR model 
should be rejected because of the percentage of exceptions or the amount 
of bunching. Regulators have rules for increasing the VaR multiplier 
when market risk capital is calculated if they consider the results from 
back testing over 250 days to be unsatisfactory. 
Stress testing is an important complement to VaR calculations. It 
considers scenarios that either have occurred in the past or are considered 
possibilities for the future. Typically, the scenarios have a very low 
probability of occurring under the models used for calculating VaR. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
8.1. What is the difference between expected shortfall and VaR? What is the 
theoretical advantage of expected shortfall over VaR? 
8.2. What is a spectral risk measure? What conditions must be satisfied by a 
spectral risk measure for the Subadditivity condition in Section 8.3 to be 
satisfied? 
8.3. A fund manager announces that the fund's 1-month 95% VaR is 6% of 
the size of the portfolio being managed. You have an investment of 
$100,000 in the fund. How do you interpret the portfolio manager's 
announcement? 
8.4. A fund manager announces that the fund's one-month 95% expected 
shortfall is 6% of the size of the portfolio being managed. You have an 
investment of $100,000 in the fund. How do you interpret the portfolio 
manager's announcement? 
8.5. Suppose that each of two investments has a 0.9% chance of a loss of 
$10 million, a 99.1% of a loss of $1 million, and zero probability of a gain. 
The investments are independent of each other. (a) What is the VaR for 
one of the investments when the confidence level is 99%? (b) What is the 
expected shortfall for one of the investments when the confidence level is 
99%? (c) What is the VaR for a portfolio consisting of the two investments 
when the confidence level is 99%? (d) What is the expected shortfall for a 
portfolio consisting of the two investments when the confidence level is 
99%? (e) Show that in this example VaR does not satisfy the Subadditivity 
condition whereas expected shortfall does. 
8.6. Suppose that the change in the value of a portfolio over a 1-day time 
period is normal with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
$2 million, What is (a) the 1-day 97.5% VaR, (b) the 5-day 97.5% VaR, 
and (c) the 5-day 99% VaR? 
8.7. What difference does it make to your answers to (b) and (c) of Problem 8.6 
if there is first-order daily autocorrelation with correlation parameter 
equal to 0.16? 
8.8. Explain carefully the differences between marginal VaR, incremental VaR, 
and component VaR for a portfolio consisting of a number of assets. 
8.9. Suppose that we back test a VaR model using 1,000 days of data. The VaR 
confidence level is 99% and we observe 17 exceptions. Should we reject the 
model at the 5% confidence level? Use a one-tailed test. 
8.10. Explain what is meant by bunching. 
8.11. Describe two ways extreme scenarios can be developed for stress testing. 
8.12. Prove equation (8.3). 
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8.13. The back-testing rules of the Basel Committee can lead to questions about 
a VaR model when there are 5 or more exceptions in 250 trials. What is the 
chance of this if the VaR methodology is perfectly accurate? 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
8.14. Suppose that each of two investments has a 4% chance of a loss of 
$10 million, a 2% chance of a loss of $1 million, and a 94% chance of 
a profit of $1 million. They are independent of each other. (a) What is the 
VaR for one of the investments when the confidence level is 95%? (b) What 
is the expected shortfall when the confidence level is 95%? (c) What is the 
VaR for a portfolio consisting of the two investments when the confidence 
level is 95%? (d) What is the expected shortfall for a portfolio consisting of 
the two investments when the confidence level is 95%? (e) Show that, in 
this example, VaR does not satisfy the Subadditivity condition whereas 
expected shortfall does. 
8.15. Suppose that daily changes for a portfolio have first-order correlation with 
correlation parameter 0.12. The 10-day VaR, calculated by multiplying the 
1-day VaR by is $2 million. What is a better estimate of the VaR that 
takes account of autocorrelation? 
8.16. The probability that the loss from a portfolio will be greater than 
$10 million in 1 month is estimated to be 5%. (a) What is the 1-month 
99% VaR assuming the change in value of the portfolio is normally 
distributed. (b) What is the 1-month 99% VaR assuming that the power 
law described in Section 5.4 applies with = 3. 
8.17. Suppose that we back test a VaR model using 1,000 days of data. The VaR 
confidence level is 99% and we observe 15 exceptions. Should we reject the 
model at the 5% confidence level. Use Kupiec's two-tailed test. 
In this chapter and the next we cover the two main approaches for 
calculating VaR for market risk. The approach we consider in this 
chapter is known as historical simulation. This involves using historical 
day-to-day changes in the values of market variables in a direct way to 
estimate the probability distribution of the change in the value of the 
current portfolio between today and tomorrow. 
After describing the mechanics of the historical simulation approach, 
we explain how to calculate the standard error of the VaR estimate and 
how to modify the procedure to take into account the latest information 
about volatility. We also describe how extreme value theory can be used 
in conjuction with a historical simulation to improve VaR estimates and 
to deal with situations where the VaR confidence level is very high. 
9.1 THE METHODOLOGY 
Historical simulation involves using past data as a guide to what will 
happen in the future. Suppose that we want to calculate VaR for a 
Portfolio using a one-day time horizon, a 99% confidence level, and 
500 days of data. (The time horizon and confidence level are those 
typically used for a market risk VaR calculation; 500 is a popular choice 
for the number of days of data used.) The first step is to identify the 
market variables affecting the portfolio. These will typically be exchange 
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rates, equity prices, interest rates, and so on. We then collect data on the 
movements in these market variables over the most recent 500 days. This 
provides us with 500 alternative scenarios for what can happen between 
today and tomorrow. Denote the first day for which we have data as 
Day 0, the second day as Day 1, and so on. Scenario 1 is where the 
percentage changes in the values of all variables are the same as they were 
between Day 0 and Day 1; Scenario 2 is where they are the same as 
between Day 1 and Day 2; and so on. For each scenario we calculate the 
dollar change in the value of the portfolio between today and tomorrow. 
This defines a probability distribution for daily changes in the value of 
our portfolio. The first percentile of the distribution can be estimated as 
the fifth worst outcome.1 The estimate of VaR is the loss when we are at 
this first percentile point. We are 99% certain that we would not have 
taken a loss greater than our VaR estimate if the changes in market 
variables are a random sample from the last 500 days. 
The historical simulation methodology is illustrated in Tables 9.1 
and 9.2. Table 9.1 shows observations on market variables over the last 
500 days. The observations are taken at some particular point in time 
during the day (usually the close of trading). There are assumed to be a 
total of 1,000 market variables. 
Table 9.2 shows the values of the market variables tomorrow if their 
percentage changes between today and tomorrow are the same as they 
Table 9.1 Data for VaR historical simulation calculation. 
Day 
0 
1 
2 
3 
498 
499 
500 
Market 
variable 1 
20.33 
20.78 
21.44 
20.97 
25.72 
25.75 
25.85 
Market 
variable 2 
0.1132 
0.1159 
0.1162 
0.1184 
0.1312 
0.1323 
0.1343 
Market 
variable 1,000 
65.37 
64.91 
65.02 
64.90 
62.22 
61.99 
62.10 
1
 There are alternatives here. A case could be made for using the fifth worst outcome or 
the sixth worst outcome, or an average of the two, as the first percentile of the 
distribution when there are 500 outcomes. In Excel's PERCENTILE function, when there 
are n observations and k is an integer, the k/(n — 1) percentile is the observation ranked 
k + 1. Other percentiles are calculated using linear interpolation. 
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Table 9.2 Scenarios generated for tomorrow (Day 501) using data in Table 9.1. 
Value of portfolio on Day 500 is $23.50 million 
Scenario 
number 
1 
2 
3 
499 
500 
Market 
variable 1 
26.42 
26.67 
25.28 
25.88 
25.95 
Market 
variable 2 .. 
0.1375 •• 
0.1346 •• 
0.1368 
0.1354 
0.1363 
Market 
,. variable 1,000 
61.66 
62.21 
61.99 
61.87 
62.21 
Portfolio 
value 
($ millions) 
23.71 
23.12 
22.94 
23.63 
22.87 
Change 
in value 
($ millions) 
0.21 
-0.38 
-0.56 
0.13 
-0.63 
were between Day i — 1 and Day i for 1 i 500. The first row in 
Table 9.2 shows the values of market variables tomorrow assuming their 
percentage changes between today and tomorrow are the same as they 
were between Day 0 and Day 1; the second row shows the values of 
market variables tomorrow assuming their percentage changes are the 
same as those between Day 1 and Day 2; and so on. The 500 rows in 
Table 9.2 are the 500 scenarios considered. 
Define vi as the value of a market variable on Day i and suppose that 
today is Day n. The ith scenario assumes that the value of the market 
variable tomorrow will be 
In our example, n = 500. For the first variable, the value today, is 
25.85. In addition, = 20.33 and = 20.78. It follows that the value of 
the first market variable in the first scenario is 
The penultimate column of Table 9.2 shows the value of the portfolio 
tomorrow for each of the 500 scenarios. We suppose the value of the 
Portfolio today is $23.50 million. This leads to the numbers in the final 
column for the change in the value between today and tomorrow for all 
the different scenarios. For Scenario 1 the change in value is +$210,000; 
for Scenario 2 it is -$380,000; and so on. 
We are interested in the one-percentile point of the distribution of 
changes in the portfolio value. As indicated earlier, because there are a 
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total of 500 scenarios in Table 9.2, we can estimate this as the fifth worst 
number in the final column of the table. Alternatively, we can use extreme 
value theory, which will be described later in the chapter. As mentioned in 
Section 8.4, the ten-day VaR for a 99% confidence level is usually 
calculated as times the one-day VaR. 
Each day the VaR estimate in our example would be updated using the 
most recent 500 days of data. Consider, for example, what happens on 
Day 501. We find out new values for all the market variables and are able 
to calculate a new value for our portfolio.2 We then go through the 
procedure we have outlined to calculate a new VaR. We use data on 
the market variables from Day 1 to Day 501. (This gives us the required 
500 observations on percentage changes in market variables; the Day 0 
values of the market variables are no longer used.) Similarly, on Day 502, 
we use data from Day 2 to Day 502 to determine VaR, and so on. 
9.2 ACCURACY 
The historical simulation approach estimates the distribution of portfolio 
changes based on a finite number of observations of what happened in 
the past. As a result, the estimates of quantiles of the distribution are not 
perfectly accurate. 
Kendall and Stuart describe how to calculate a confidence interval for 
the quantile of a probability distribution when it is estimated from sample 
data.3 Suppose that the q-quantile of the distribution is estimated as x. 
The standard error of the estimate is 
where n is the number of observations and f(x) is the probability density 
function of the loss evaluated at x. The latter can be estimated by fitting 
the empirical data to a standard distribution. 
Example 9.1 
Suppose we are interested in estimating the 0.01 quantile (= 1 percentile) of a 
loss distribution from 500 observations so that n = 500 and q — 0.01. We can 
estimate f{x) by approximating the actual empirical distribution with a 
2
 Note that the portfolio's composition may have changed between Day 500 and Day 501. 
3
 See M.G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 1: 
Distribution Theory, 4th edn. London: Griffin, 1972. 
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If the estimate of the 0.01 quantile using historical simulation is $25 million, 
a 95% confidence interval is from 25 — 1.96 x 1.67 to 25 + 1.96 x 1.67, that 
is, from $21.7 million to $28.3 million. 
As Example 9.1 illustrates, the standard error of a VaR estimated using 
historical simulation tends to be quite high. It increases as the VaR 
confidence level is increased. For example, if in Example 9.1 the VaR 
confidence level had been 95% instead of 99%, the standard error would 
be $0.95 million instead of $1.67 million. The standard error declines as 
the sample size is increased—but only as the square root of the sample 
size. If we quadrupled the sample size in Example 9.1 from 500 to 2,000 
(i.e., from approximately two to approximately eight years of data), the 
standard error halves from $1.67 million to about $0.83 million. 
Additionally, we should bear in mind that historical simulation assumes 
that the joint distribution of daily changes in market variables is stationary 
through time. This is unlikely to be exactly true and creates additional 
uncertainty about the value of VaR. 
9.3 EXTENSIONS 
In this section we cover a number of extensions of the basic historical 
simulation methodology that we discussed in Section 9.1. 
Weighting of Observations 
The basic historical simulation approach assumes that each day in the past 
is given equal weight. More formally, if we have observations for n day-to-
day changes, each of them is given a weighting of \/n. Boudoukh et al. 
suggest that more recent observations should be given more weight 
because they are more reflective of current volatilities and current macro-
economic variables.4 The natural weighting scheme to use is one where 
4
 See J. Boudoukh, M. Richardson, and R. Whitelaw, "The Best of Both Worlds: A 
Hybrid Approach to Calculating Value at Risk," Risk, 11 (May 1998), 64-67. 
standard distribution. Suppose that the approximate empirical distribution is 
normal with mean zero and standard deviation $10 million. Using Excel, the 
0.01 quantile is NORMINV(0.01,0, 10), or 23.26. The value of f(x) is 
NORMDIST(23.26, 0, 10, FALSE), or 0.0027. The standard error of the 
estimate that is made is 
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weights decline exponentially. We used this in Section 5.6 when developing 
the exponentially weighted moving average model for monitoring vari-
ance. Suppose that we are now at the end of day n. The weight assigned to 
the change in the portfolio value between day n — i and day n — i + 1 is 
times that assigned to the change between day n — i + 1 and day n — i + 2. 
In order for the weights to add up to 1, the weight given to the change 
between day n — i and n — i + 1 is 
where n is the number of days. As this weighting scheme 
approaches the basic historical simulation approach, where all observa-
tions are given a weight of \/n (see Problem 9.2). 
VaR is calculated by ranking the observations from the worst outcome 
to the best. Starting at the worst outcome, weights are summed until the 
required quantile of the distribution is reached. For example, if we are 
calculating VaR with a 99% confidence level, we continue summing 
weights until the sum just exceeds 0.01. We have then reached the 99% 
VaR level. The best value of can be obtained by experimenting to see 
which value back tests best. One disadvantage of the exponential weight-
ing approach relative to the basic historical simulation approach is that the 
effective sample size is reduced. However, we can compensate for this by 
using a larger value of n. Indeed it is not really necessary to discard old 
days as we move forward in time because they are given very little weight. 
Incorporating Volatility Updating 
Hull and White suggest a way of incorporating volatility updating into the 
historical simulation approach.5 A volatility updating scheme, such as 
EWMA or GARCH(1,1) (both of which were described in Chapter 5) is 
used in parallel with the historical simulation approach for all market 
variables. Suppose that the daily volatility for a particular market vari-
able estimated at the end of day i — 1 is This is an estimate of the daily 
volatility between the end of day i — 1 and the end of day i. Suppose it is 
now day n. The current estimate of the volatility of the market variable is 
This applies to the time period between today and tomorrow, which 
is the time period over which we are calculating VaR. 
Suppose that is twice This means that we estimate the daily 
5
 See J. Hull and A. White, "Incorporating Volatility Updating into the Historical 
Simulation Method for Value-at-Risk," Journal of Risk, 1, No. 1 (Fall 1998), 5-19. 
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volatility of this particular market variable to be twice as great today as on 
day i — 1. This means that we expect to see changes between today and 
tomorrow that are twice as big as changes between day i — 1 and day i. 
When carrying out the historical simulation and creating a sample of what 
could happen between today and tomorrow based on what happened 
between day i — 1 and day i, it therefore makes sense to multiply the latter 
by 2. In general, when this approach is used, the expression in equa-
tion (9.1) for the value of a market variable under the ith scenario becomes 
Each market variable is handled in the same way. This approach takes 
account of volatility changes in a natural and intuitive way and produces 
VaR estimates that incorporate more current information. The VaR 
estimates can be greater than any of the historical losses that would have 
occurred for our current portfolio on the days we consider. Hull and White 
produce evidence using exchange rates and stock indices to show that this 
approach is superior to traditional historical simulation and to the expo-
nential weighting scheme described earlier. More complicated models can 
be developed where observations are adjusted for the latest information on 
correlations as well as for the latest information on volatilities. 
Bootstrap Method 
The bootstrap method is another variation on the basic historical simula-
tion approach. It involves creating a set of changes in the portfolio value 
based on historical movements in market variables in the usual way. We 
then sample with replacement from these changes to create many new 
similar data sets. We calculate the VaR for each of the new data sets. Our 
95% confidence interval for VaR is the range between the 2.5 and the 
97.5 percentile point of the distribution of the VaRs calculated from the 
data sets. 
Suppose, for example, that we have 500 days of data. We could sample 
with replacement 500,000 times from the data to obtain 1,000 different 
sets of 500 days of data. We calculate the VaR for each set. We then rank 
the VaRs. Suppose that the 25th largest VaR is $5.3 million and the 475th 
largest VaR is $8.9 million. The 95% confidence limit for VaR is 
$5-3 million to $8.9 million. Usually the 95% confidence range calculated 
for VaR using the bootstrap method is less than that calculated using the 
Procedure in Section 9.2. 
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9.4 EXTREME VALUE THEORY 
In Section 5.4 we introduced the power law and explained that it can be 
used to estimate the tails of a wide range of distributions. We now provide 
the theoretical underpinnings for the power law and present more sophis-
ticated estimation procedures than those used in Section 5.4. The term 
used to describe the science of estimating the tails of a distribution is 
extreme value theory. In this section we show how extreme value theory 
can be used to improve VaR estimates and to deal with situations where 
the VaR confidence level is very high. It provides a way of smoothing and 
extrapolating the tails of an empirical distribution. 
The Key Result 
A key result in extreme value theory was proved by Gnedenko in 1943.6 
This concerns the properties of the tails of a wide range of different 
probability distributions. 
Suppose that F(x) is the cumulative distribution function for a variable 
x and that u is a value of x in the right-hand tail of the distribution. The 
probability that x lies between u and u + y (y > 0) is F(u + y) — F(u). 
The probability that x is greater than u is 1 — F(u). Define Fu(y) as the 
probability that x lies between u and u + y conditional on x > u. This is 
The variable Fu(y) defines the right tail of the probability distribution. It 
is the cumulative probability distribution for the amount by which x 
exceeds u given that it does exceed u. 
Gnedenko's result states that, for a wide class of distributions F(x), the 
distribution of Fu(y) converges to a generalized Pareto distribution as the 
threshold u is increased. The generalized Pareto distribution is 
The distribution has two parameters that have to be estimated from the 
data. These are and The parameter is the shape parameter and 
6
 See D.V. Gnedenko, "Sur la distribution limite du terme d'une serie aleatoire," Ann-
Math., 44 (1943), 423-453. 
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determines the heaviness of the tail of the distribution. The parameter is 
a scale parameter. 
When the underlying variable x has a normal distribution, = 0.7 As 
the tails of the distribution become heavier, the value of increases. For 
most financial data, is positive and in the range 0.1 to 0.4.8 
Estimating and 
The parameters and can be estimated using maximum-likelihood 
methods (see Section 5.9 for a discussion of these methods). The 
probability density function of the cumulative distribution in 
equation (9.3) is calculated by differentiating with respect to y. It is 
We first choose a value for u. This could be a value close to the 95 percentile 
point of the empirical distribution. We then rank the observations on x 
from the highest to the lowest and focus our attention on those observa-
tions for which x > u. Suppose there are nu such observations and they are 
xi (1 i nu). The likelihood function (assuming that 0) is 
Maximizing this function is the same as maximizing its logarithm: 
Standard numerical procedures can be used to find the values of and 
that maximize this expression. 
7 
When = 0, the generalized Pareto distribution becomes 
One of the properties of the distribution in equation (9.3) is that the kth moment E(xk) 
x is infinite for For a normal distribution, all moments are finite. When 
= 0.25, only the first three moments are finite; when = 0.5, only the first moment is 
finite; and so on. 
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Estimating the Tail of the Distribution 
The probability that x > u + y conditional that x > u is The 
probability that x > u is 1 — F(u). The unconditional probability that 
x > u + y is therefore 
If n is the total number of observations, an estimate of 1 — F{u) calcu-
lated from the empirical data is nu/n. The unconditional probability that 
x > u + y is therefore 
This means that our estimator of the tail of the cumulative probability 
distribution of x when x is large is 
Equivalence to the Power Law 
If we set equation (9.5) reduces to 
so that the probability of the variable being greater than x is 
where 
and This shows that equation (9.5) is consistent with the power 
law introduced in Section 5.4. 
The Left Tail 
The analysis so far has assumed that we are interested in the right tail of 
the probability distribution. If we are interested in the left tail, we can use 
the methodology just presented on the variable —x. 
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Calculation of VaR 
To calculate VaR with a confidence level of q it is necessary to solve the 
equation 
From equation (9.5), we have 
so that 
9.5 APPLICATION 
We now illustrate the results in the previous section using data for daily 
returns on the S&P 500 between July 11, 1988, and July 10, 1998. During 
this period the total number of observations, n, on the daily return were 
2,256 and the observations ranged from —6.87% to +5.12%. We consider 
the left tail of the distribution of returns. This means that in the equations 
given above the variable x is the negative of the daily return on the 
S&P 500. We choose a value for u equal to 0.02. There were a total of 
28 returns less than —2%. This means than nu = 28. The returns and the 
x-values are shown in the first two columns of Table 9.3. The third 
column shows the value of 
for particular values of and (The test values of and in Table 9.3 
are = 0.2 and = 0.01.) The sum of the numbers in the third column is 
the log-likelihood function in equation (9.4). Once we have set up the 
spreadsheet, we search for the best-fit values of and that maximize the 
tog-likelihood function.9 It turns out that these are 
= 0.3232, = 0.0055 
and maximum log-likelihood is 108.48. 
9
 The Solver routine in Excel works well provided that the spreadsheet is set up so that 
the values being searched for are similar in magnitude. In this example, we could set up 
the spreadsheet to search for and 
Daily return 
-0.068667 
-0.061172 
-0.036586 
-0.034445 
-0.031596 
-0.030827 
-0.029979 
-0.029654 
-0.029084 
-0.027283 
-0.025859 
-0.025364 
-0.024675 
-0.024000 
-0.023485 
-0.023397 
-0.023234 
-0.022675 
-0.022542 
-0.022343 
-0.022249 
-0.022020 
-0.021813 
-0.021025 
-0.020843 
-0.020625 
-0.020546 
-0.020243 
xi 
0.068667 
0.061172 
0.036586 
0.034445 
0.031596 
0.030827 
0.029979 
0.029654 
0.029084 
0.027283 
0.025859 
0.025364 
0.024675 
0.024000 
0.023485 
0.023397 
0.023234 
0.022675 
0.022542 
0.022343 
0.022249 
0.022020 
0.021813 
0.021025 
0.020843 
0.020625 
0.020546 
0.020243 
0.5268 
1.0008 
2.8864 
3.0825 
3.3537 
3.4291 
3.5133 
3.5460 
3.6035 
3.7893 
3.9403 
3.9937 
4.0689 
4.1434 
4.2009 
4.2108 
4.2291 
4.2925 
4.3076 
4.3304 
4.3412 
4.3676 
4.3915 
4.4835 
4.5049 
4.5306 
4.5400 
4.5761 
106.1842 
Trial estimatesof EVT parameters 
0.2 0.01 
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Table 9.3 Estimation of extreme value theory parameters. 
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Suppose that we wish to estimate the probability that x will be less than 
0.04. From equation (9.5), this is 
This means that we estimate the probability that the daily return will be 
less than - 4 % to be 1 - 0.9989 = 0.0011. (This is more accurate than an 
estimate obtained by counting observations.) The probability that x will 
be less than 0.06 is similarly 0.9997. This means that we estimate the 
probability that the daily return will be less than - 6 % to be 
1 - 0.9997 = 0.0003. 
From equation (9.6) the value of the one-day 99% VaR for a portfolio 
where $1 million is invested in the S&P 500 is $1 million times 
or $21,200. More generally, our estimate of the one-day 99% VaR for a 
portfolio invested in the S&P 500 is 2.12% of the portfolio value. 
Choice of u 
A natural question is how the results depend on the choice of u. In our 
example the values of and do depend on u, but the estimates of F(x) 
remain roughly the same. For example, if we choose u = 0.015, the best-
fit values of and are 0.264 and 0.0046, respectively. The estimate for 
F(x) when x = 0.04 and x = 0.06 are 0.9989 and 0.9997 (much the same 
as before). The estimate of VaR also does not change too much provided 
that the confidence level is not too high. The one-day 99% VaR for an 
investment in the S&P 500 when u = 0.015 is 2.13% (compared with 
2.12% when u = 0.02) of the value of the portfolio. 
SUMMARY 
Historical simulation is a very popular approach for estimating VaR. It 
involves creating a database consisting of the daily movements in all 
market variables over a period of time. The first simulation trial assumes 
that the percentage change in each market variable is the same as that 
on the first day covered by the database; the second simulation trial 
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assumes that the percentage changes are the same as those on the second 
day; and so on. The change in the portfolio value, is calculated for 
each simulation trial, and VaR is calculated as the appropriate percentile 
of the probability distribution of The procedure assumes that the 
future will in some sense be like the past. The standard error for a VaR 
that is estimated using historical simulation tends to be quite high. The 
higher the VaR confidence level required, the higher the standard error. 
There are a number of extensions of the basic historical simulation 
approach. The weights given to observations can be allowed to decrease 
exponentially as we look further and further into the past. Volatility 
updating schemes can be used to take account of differences between the 
volatilities of market variables today and their volatilities at different times 
during the period covered by the historical data. 
Extreme value theory is a way of smoothing the tails of the probability 
distribution of portfolio daily changes calculated using historical simula-
tion. It leads to estimates of VaR that reflect the whole shape of the tail of 
the distribution, not just the positions of a few losses in the tails. Extreme 
value theory can also be used to estimate VaR when the VaR confidence 
level is very high. For example, even if we have only 500 days of data, it 
could be used to come up an estimate of VaR for a VaR confidence level 
of 99.9%. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
9.1. What assumptions are being made when VaR is calculated using the 
historical simulation approach and 500 days of data. 
9.2. Show that when approaches 1, the weighting scheme in Section 9.3 
approaches the basic historical simulation approach. 
9.3. Calculate the 1-day 99% VaR on February 10, 2006, for a £100 million 
portfolio invested in the FTSE 100 Index. Use the previous 1,000 days of 
data (available on the author's website) and historical simulation. 
9.4. Repeat Problem 9.3 using the exponential weighting scheme in Section 9.3 
with = 0.99. 
9.5. Repeat Problem 9.3 using the volatility updating scheme discussed in 
Section 9.3. Use EWMA with = 0.94 to update volatilities. Assume that 
the volatility is initially equal to the standard deviation of daily returns 
calculated from the whole sample. 
9.6. How does extreme value theory modify your answer to Problem 9.3. Try 
values of u equal to 0.005, 0.01, and 0.015. 
9.7. Suppose we estimate the 1-day 95% VaR from 1,000 observations as 
$5 million. By fitting a standard distribution to the observations, the 
probability density function of the loss distribution at the 95% point is 
estimated to be 0.01 when losses are measured in millions. What is the 
standard error of the VaR estimate? 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
9.8. Values for the NASDAQ composite index during the 1,500 days preceding 
March 10, 2006, can be downloaded from the author's website. Calculate 
the 1-day 99% VaR on March 10, 2006, for a $10 million portfolio invested 
in the index using (a) the basic historical simulation approach, (b) the 
exponential weighting scheme in Section 9.3 with = 0.995, (c) the volatility 
updating scheme in Section 9.3 with = 0.94 (assume that the volatility is 
initially equal to the standard deviation of daily returns calculated from the 
whole sample), (d) extreme value theory with u = 0.03, (e) a model where 
daily returns are assumed to be normally distributed (use both an approach 
where observations are given equal weights and the EWMA approach with 
= 0.94 to estimate the standard deviation of daily returns). Discuss the 
reasons for the differences between the results you get. 
9.9. Suppose that a 1-day 97.5% VaR is estimated as $13 million from 2,000 
observations. The observation on the 1-day changes are approximately 
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normal with mean 0 and standard deviation $6 million. Estimate a 99% 
confidence interval for the VaR estimate. 
Market Risk VaR: 
Model-Building 
Approach 
The main alternative to the historical simulation approach for estimating 
VaR for market risk is what is known as the model-building approach or 
the Variance-covariance approach. In this approach, we assume a model 
for the joint distribution of changes in market variables and use histor-
ical data to estimate the model parameters. 
The model-building approach is based on ideas pioneered by Harry 
Markowitz. We used these ideas for assessing the risk-return trade-offs 
in portfolios of stocks in Section 1.1. They can also be used to calculate 
VaR. Estimates of the current levels of the variances and covariances of 
market variables are made using the approaches described in Chapters 5 
and 6. If the probability distributions of the daily percentage changes in 
market variables are assumed to be normal and the dollar change in the 
value of the portfolio is assumed to be linearly dependent on percentage 
changes in market variables, VaR can be obtained very quickly. 
In this chapter we explain the model-building approach and show how 
it can be used for portfolios consisting of stocks, bonds, forward con-
tracts, and interest rate swaps. We discuss attempts to extend it to 
situations where the portfolio is not linearly dependent on the market 
Variables and to situations where the distributions of daily percentage 
changes in market variables are not normal. Finally, we evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of both the model-building approach and the 
historical simulation approach. 
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10.1 THE BASIC METHODOLOGY 
In option pricing, volatility is normally measured as "volatility per year". 
When using the model-building approach to calculate VaR, we usually 
measure the volatility of an asset as "volatility per day". As explained in 
Section 5.1, the relationship between the volatility per day and the volatility 
per year is 
where is the volatility per year and is the corresponding volatility 
per day. This equation shows that the daily volatility is about 6% of 
annual volatility. 
As also pointed out in Chapter 5, is approximately equal to the 
standard deviation of the percentage change in the asset price in one day. 
For the purposes of calculating VaR, we assume exact equality. We define 
the daily volatility of an asset price (or any other variable) as equal to the 
standard deviation of the percentage change in one day. 
Single-Asset Case 
We now consider how VaR is calculated using the model-building 
approach in a very simple situation where the portfolio consists of a 
position in a single stock. The portfolio we consider is one consisting of 
$10 million in shares of Microsoft. We suppose that the time horizon is 
ten days and the VaR confidence level is 99%, so that we are interested in 
the loss level over ten days that we are 99% confident will not be 
exceeded. Initially, we consider a one-day time horizon. 
We assume that the volatility of Microsoft is 2% per day (correspond-
ing to about 32% per year). Because the size of the position is $10 million, 
the standard deviation of daily changes in the value of the position is 2% 
of $10 million, or $200,000. 
It is customary in the model-building approach to assume that the 
expected change in a market variable over the time period considered is 
zero. This is not exactly true, but it is a reasonable assumption. The 
expected change in the price of a market variable over a short time period 
is generally small when compared to the standard deviation of the 
change. Suppose, for example, that Microsoft has an expected return of 
20% per annum. Over a one-day period, the expected return is 0.20/252, 
or about 0.08%, whereas the standard deviation of the return is 2%. Over 
a ten-day period, the expected return is 0.08 x 10, or about 0.8%' 
whereas the standard deviation of the return is or about 6.3%. 
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So far, we have established that the change in the value of the 
portfolio of Microsoft shares over a one-day period has a standard 
deviation of $200,000 and (at least approximately) a mean of zero. We 
assume that the change is normally distributed.1 Since N(—2.33) = 0.01, 
this means that there is a 1% probability that a normally distributed 
variable will decrease in value by more than 2.33 standard deviations. 
Equivalently, it means that we are 99% certain that a normally dis-
tributed variable will not decrease in value by more than 2.33 standard 
deviations. The one-day 99% VaR for our portfolio consisting of a 
$10 million position in Microsoft is therefore 
2.33 x 200,000 = $466,000 
Assuming that the changes in Microsoft's stock price on successive days 
are independent, the N-day VaR is calculated as times the one-day 
VaR. The ten-day 99% VaR for Microsoft is therefore 
Consider next a portfolio consisting of a $5 million position in AT&T, 
and suppose the daily volatility of AT&T is 1% (approximately 16% per 
year). A similar calculation to that for Microsoft shows that the standard 
deviation of the change in the value of the portfolio in one day is 
5,000,000 x 0.01 = 50,000 
Assuming that the change is normally distributed, the one-day 99% VaR is 
50,000x2.33 = $116,500 
and the ten-day 99% VaR is 
Two-Asset Case 
Now consider a portfolio consisting of both $10 million of Microsoft 
shares and $5 million of AT&T shares. We suppose that the returns on 
the two shares have a bivariate normal distribution with a correlation 
of 0.3. A standard result in statistics tells us that, if two variables X and Y 
have standard deviations equal to and with the coefficient of 
1
 We could assume that the price of Microsoft is lognormal tomorrow. Since one day is 
such a short period of time, this is almost indistinguishable from the assumption we do 
make—that the change in the stock price between today and tomorrow is normal. 
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correlation between them being equal to the standard deviation of 
X + Y is given by 
To apply this result, we set X equal to the change in the value of the 
position in Microsoft over a one-day period and Y equal to the change in 
the value of the position in AT&T over a one-day period, so that 
The standard deviation of the change in the value of the portfolio 
consisting of both stocks over a one-day period is therefore 
The mean change is assumed to be zero. The change is normally dis-
tributed. So the one-day 99% VaR is therefore 
220,227 x 2.33 = $513,129 
The ten-day 99% VaR is times this or $1,622,657. 
The Benefits of Diversification 
In the example we have just considered: 
1. The ten-day 99% VaR for the portfolio of Microsoft shares is 
$1,473,621. 
2. The ten-day 99% VaR for the portfolio of AT&T shares is $368,405. 
3. The ten-day 99% VaR for the portfolio of both Microsoft and 
AT&T shares is $1,622,657. 
The amount 
(1,473,621 + 368,405) - 1,622,657 = $219,369 
represents the benefits of diversification. If Microsoft and AT&T were 
perfectly correlated, the VaR for the portfolio of both Microsoft and 
AT&T would equal the VaR for the Microsoft portfolio plus the VaR for 
the AT&T portfolio. Less than perfect correlation leads to some of the 
risk being "diversified away".2 
2
 VaR reflects the benefits of diversification when the distribution of the portfolio-value 
changes is normal. As we saw in Section 8.3, VaR does not always reflect the benefits of 
diversification. The VaR of two portfolios can be greater than the sum of their separate 
V a R s . 
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10.2 THE LINEAR MODEL 
The examples we have just considered are simple illustrations of the use 
of the linear model for calculating VaR. Suppose that we have a port-
folio worth P consisting of n assets with an amount being invested in 
asset i (1 i n). Define as the return on asset i in one day. The 
dollar change in the value of our investment in asset i in one day is 
and 
where is the dollar change in the value of the whole portfolio in 
one day. 
In the example considered in the previous section, $10 million was 
invested in the first asset (Microsoft) and $5 million was invested in the 
second asset (AT&T) so that (in millions of dollars) =10 , = 5 , 
and 
If we assume that the in equation (10.1) are multivariate normal, 
is normally distributed. To calculate VaR, we therefore need to 
calculate only the mean and standard deviation of We assume, as 
discussed in the previous section, that the expected value of each is 
zero. This implies that the mean of is zero. 
To calculate the standard deviation of we define as the daily 
volatility of the ith asset and as the coefficient of correlation between 
returns on asset i and asset j . 3 This means that is the standard 
deviation of and is the coefficient of correlation between 
and The variance of which we will denote by is given by 
This equation can also be written as 
3
 The are sometimes calculated using a factor model (see Section 6.3). 
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The standard deviation of the change over N days is and the 99% 
VaR for an N-day time horizon is 
In the example considered in the previous section, = 0.02, =0.01, 
and = 0.3. As already noted, = 10 and = 5, so that 
= 102 x 0.022 + 52 x 0.012 + 2 x 10 x 5 x 0.3 x 0.02 x 0.01 = 0.0485 
and = 0.220. This is the standard deviation of the change in the 
portfolio value per day (in millions of dollars). The ten-day 99% VaR 
is 2.33 x 0.220 x = $1,623 million. This agrees with the calculation 
in the previous section. 
10.3 HANDLING INTEREST RATES 
It is not possible to define a separate market variable for every single 
bond price or interest rate to which a company is exposed. Some 
simplifications are necessary when the model-building approach is used. 
One possibility is to assume that only parallel shifts in the yield curve 
occur. It is then necessary to define only one market variable: the size of 
the parallel shift. The changes in the value of bond portfolio can then be 
calculated using the approximate duration relationship in equation (4.15): 
where P is the value of the portfolio, is the change in P in one day, D is 
the modified duration of the portfolio, and is the parallel shift in one 
day. This approach gives a linear relationship between and but it 
does not usually give enough accuracy because the relationship is not 
exact and does not take account of nonparallel shifts in the yield curve. 
The procedure usually followed is to choose as market variables the 
prices of zero-coupon bonds with standard maturities: 1 month, 3 months, 
6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, 7 years, 10 years, and 30 years. For the 
purposes of calculating VaR, the cash flows from instruments in the 
portfolio are mapped into cash flows occurring on the standard maturity 
dates. 
Consider a $1 million position in a Treasury bond lasting 0.8 years 
that pays a coupon of 10% semiannually. A coupon is paid in 0.3 years 
and 0.8 years and the principal is paid in 0.8 years. This bond is 
therefore in the first instance regarded as a $50,000 position in 0.3-year 
zero-coupon bond plus a $1,050,000 position in a 0.8-year zero-coupon 
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bond. The position in the 0.3-year bond is then replaced by an equiva-
lent position in 3-month and 6-month zero-coupon bonds and the 
position in the 0.8-year bond is replaced by an equivalent position in 
6-month and 1-year zero-coupon bonds. The result is that the position 
in the 0.8-year coupon-bearing bond is for VaR purposes regarded as a 
position in zero-coupon bonds having maturities of 3 months, 6 months, 
and 1 year. This procedure is known as cash-flow mapping. 
Illustration of Cash-Flow Mapping 
We now illustrate how cash-flow mapping works by continuing with the 
example we have just introduced. It should be emphasized that the pro-
cedure we use is just one of several that have been proposed. 
Consider first the $1,050,000 that will be received in 0.8 years. We 
suppose that zero rates, daily bond price volatilities, and correlations 
between bond returns are as shown in Table 10.1. The first stage is to 
interpolate between the 6-month rate of 6.0% and the 1-year rate of 7.0% 
to obtain a 0.8-year rate of 6.6% (annual compounding is assumed for all 
rates). The present value of the $1,050,000 cash flow to be received in 
0.8 years is 
We also interpolate between the 0.1 % volatility for the 6-month bond 
and the 0.2% volatility for the 1-year bond to get a 0.16% volatility for 
the 0.8-year bond. 
Maturity 
Zero rate 
(% with ann. comp.): 
Bond price volatility 
(% per day): 
Correlation between 
daily returns 
3-month bond 
6-month bond 
1-year bond 
3-month 
bond 
5.50 
0.06 
3-month 
bond 
1.0 
0.9 
0.6 
6-month 
bond 
6.00 
0.10 
6-month 
bond 
0.9 
1.0 
0.7 
1-year 
bond 
7.00 
0.20 
1-year 
bond 
0.6 
0.7 
1.0 
Table 10.1 Data to illustrate cash-flow mapping procedure. 
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Suppose we allocate of the present value to the 6-month bond and 
of the present value to the 1-year bond. Using equation (10.2) and 
matching variances, we obtain 
This is a quadratic equation that can be solved in the usual way to give 
= 0.320337. This means that 32.0337% of the value should be allocated 
to a 6-month zero-coupon bond and 67.9663% of the value should be 
allocated to a 1-year zero-coupon bond. The 0.8-year bond worth $997,662 
is therefore replaced by a 6-month bond worth 
997,662 x 0.320337 = $319,589 
and a 1-year bond worth 
997,662 x 0.679663 = $678,074 
This cash-flow-mapping scheme has the advantage that it preserves both 
the value and the variance of the cash flow. Also, it can be shown that the 
weights assigned to the two adjacent zero-coupon bonds are always 
positive. 
For the $50,000 cash flow received at time 0.3 years, we can carry out 
similar calculations (see Problem 10.7). It turns out that the present value 
of the cash flow is $49,189. This can be mapped to a position worth 
$37,397 in a 3-month bond and a position worth $11,793 in a 6-month 
bond. 
The results of the calculations are summarized in Table 10.2. The 
0.8-year coupon-bearing bond is mapped to a position worth $37,397 
in a 3-month bond, a position worth $331,382 in a 6-month bond, and a 
position worth $678,074 in a 1-year bond. Using the volatilities and 
correlations in Table 10.1, equation (10.2) gives the variance of the 
Table 10.2 The cash-flow-mapping result. 
Position in 3-month bond ($): 
Position in 6-month bond ($): 
Position in 1-year bond ($): 
$50,000 
received 
in 0.3 years 
37,397 
11,793 
$1,050,000 
received 
in 0.8 years 
319,589 
678,074 
Total 
37,397 
331,382 
678,074 
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change in the price of the 0.8-year bond with n = 3, = 37,397, 
= 331,382, =678,074; =0.0006, =0.001 and =0.002; 
and =0.9, =0.6 , = 0.7. This variance is 2,628,518. The stand-
ard deviation of the change in the price of the bond is therefore 
= 1,621.3. Because we are assuming that the bond is the only 
instrument in the portfolio, the ten-day 99% VaR is 
or about $11,950. 
Principal Components Analysis 
As we explained in Section 4.10, a principal components analysis (PCA) 
can be used to reduce the number of deltas that are calculated for 
movements in a zero-coupon yield curve. A PCA can also be used (in 
conjunction with cash-flow mapping) to handle interest rates when VaR 
is calculated using the model-building approach. For any given port-
folio, we can convert a set of delta exposures, such as those given in -
Table 4.11, into a delta exposure to the first PCA factor, a delta 
exposure to the second PCA factor, and so on. This is done in 
Section 4.10. In the example in Table 4.11 the exposure to the first 
factor is calculated as —0.08 and the exposure to the second factor is 
calculated as —4.40. (The first two factors capture over 90% of the 
variation in interest rates.) Suppose that f1 and f2 are the factor scores. 
The change in the portfolio value is approximately 
The factor scores in a PCA are uncorrelated. From Table 4.10 their 
standard deviations of the first two factors are 17.49 and 6.05. The 
standard deviation of is therefore 
The one-day 99% VaR is therefore 26.66 x 2.33 = 62.12. Note that the 
Portfolio we are considering has very little exposure to the first factor and 
significant exposure to the second factor. Using only one factor would 
significantly understate VaR (see Problem 10.9). The duration-based 
method for handling interest rates would also significantly understate 
VaR as it considers only parallel shifts in the yield curve. 
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10.4 APPLICATIONS OF THE LINEAR MODEL 
The simplest application of the linear model is to a portfolio with no 
derivatives consisting of positions in stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, and 
commodities. In this case the change in the value of the portfolio is 
linearly dependent on the percentage changes in the prices of the assets 
comprising the portfolio. Note that, for the purposes of VaR calculations, 
all asset prices are measured in the domestic currency. The market 
variables considered by a large bank in the United States are therefore 
likely to include the value of the Nikkei 225 Index measured in dollars, the 
price of a ten-year sterling zero-coupon bond measured in dollars, and 
so on. 
Examples of derivatives that can be handled by the linear model are 
forward contracts on foreign exchange and interest rate swaps. Suppose a 
forward foreign exchange contract matures at time T. It can be regarded as 
the exchange of a foreign zero-coupon bond maturing at time T for a 
domestic zero-coupon bond maturing at time T. Therefore, for the pur-
poses of calculating VaR, the forward contract is treated as a long position 
in the foreign bond combined with a short position in the domestic bond. 
(As just mentioned, the foreign bond is valued in the domestic currency.) 
Each bond can be handled using a cash-flow-mapping procedure so that it 
is a linear combination of bonds with standard maturities. 
Consider next an interest rate swap. This can be regarded as the 
exchange of a floating-rate bond for a fixed-rate bond. The fixed-rate 
bond is a regular coupon-bearing bond (see Appendix B). The floating-
rate bond is worth par just after the next payment date. It can be regarded 
as a zero-coupon bond with a maturity date equal to the next payment 
date. The interest rate swap therefore reduces to a portfolio of long and 
short positions in bonds and can be handled using a cash-flow-mapping 
procedure. 
10.5 THE LINEAR MODEL AND OPTIONS 
We now consider how the linear model can be used when there are 
options. Consider first a portfolio consisting of options on a single stock 
whose current price is S. Suppose that the delta of the position (calculated 
in the way described in Chapter 3) is 4 Because is the rate of change of 
4
 In Chapter 3 we denote the delta and gamma of a portfolio by and In this section 
and the next, we use the lower case Greek letters and to avoid overworking 
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the value of the portfolio with S, it is approximately true that 
or 
(10.3) 
where is the dollar change in the stock price in one day and is, as 
usual, the dollar change in the portfolio in one day. We define as the 
return on the stock in one day, so that 
It follows that an approximate relationship between and is 
When we have a position in several underlying market variables that 
includes options, we can derive an approximate linear relationship be-
tween and the similarly. This relationship is 
(10.4) 
where is the value of the ith market variable and is the delta of the 
portfolio with respect to the ith. market variable. This is equation (10.1): 
(10.5) 
with Equation (10.5) can therefore be used to calculate the 
standard deviation of 
Example 10.1 
A portfolio consists of options on Microsoft and AT&T. The options on 
Microsoft have a delta of 1,000, and the options on AT&T have a delta of 
20,000. The Microsoft share price is $120, and the AT&T share price is $30. 
From equation (10.4), it is approximately true that 
or 
where and are the returns from Microsoft and AT&T in one day 
(10.3) 
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and is the resultant change in the value of the portfolio. (The portfolio is 
assumed to be equivalent to an investment of $120,000 in Microsoft and 
$600,000 in AT&T.) Assuming that the daily volatility of Microsoft is 2% 
and the daily volatility of AT&T is 1 % and the correlation between the daily 
changes is 0.3, the standard deviation of (in thousands of dollars) is 
Because N(-1.65) = 0.05, the five-day 95% VaR is 
1.65 x x 7,099 = $26,193 
Weakness of the Model 
When a portfolio includes options, the linear model is an approximation. 
It does not take account of the gamma of the portfolio. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, delta is defined as the rate of change of the portfolio value 
with respect to an underlying market variable and gamma is defined as 
the rate of change of the delta with respect to the market variable. 
Gamma measures the curvature of the relationship between the portfolio 
value and an underlying market variable. 
Figure 10.1 shows the impact of a nonzero gamma on the probability 
distribution of the value of the portfolio. When gamma is positive, the 
probability distribution tends to be positively skewed; when gamma is 
negative, it tends to be negatively skewed. Figures 10.2 and 10.3 illustrate 
the reason for this result. Figure 10.2 shows the relationship between the 
value of a long call option and the price of the underlying asset. A long 
call is an example of an option position with positive gamma. The figure 
shows that, when the probability distribution for the price of the under-
lying asset at the end of one day is normal, the probability distribution 
Figure 10.1 Probability distribution for value of portfolio: (a) positive gamma; 
(b) negative gamma. 
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Figure 10.2 Translation of normal probability distribution for an asset 
into probability distribution for value of a long call on that asset. 
for the option price is positively skewed. Figure 10.3 shows the relation-
ship between the value of a short call position and the price of the 
underlying asset. A short call position has a negative gamma. In this 
case, we see that a normal distribution for the price of the underlying 
asset at the end of one day gets mapped into a negatively skewed 
distribution for the value of the option position.5 
The VaR for a portfolio is critically dependent on the left tail of the 
probability distribution of the portfolio value. For example, when the 
confidence level used is 99%, the VaR is the value in the left tail below 
which only 1% of the distribution resides. As indicated in Figures 10.1a 
and 10.2, a positive gamma portfolio tends to have a less heavy left tail 
than the normal distribution. If we assume the distribution is normal, 
we will tend to calculate a VaR that is too high. Similarly, as indicated 
in Figures 10.1b and 10.3, a negative gamma portfolio tends to have a 
heavier left tail than the normal distribution. If we assume the distribu-
taon is normal, we will tend to calculate a VaR that is too low. 
5
 The normal distribution is a good approximation to the lognormal distribution for 
short time periods. 
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Figure 10.3 Translation of normal probability distribution for an asset 
into probability distribution for value of a short call on that asset. 
10.6 THE QUADRATIC MODEL 
For a more accurate estimate of VaR than that given by the linear model, 
we can use both delta and gamma measures to relate to the 
Consider a portfolio dependent on a single asset whose price is S. 
Suppose and are the delta and gamma of the portfolio. As indicated 
in Chapter 3, a Taylor Series expansion gives 
as an improvement over the approximation in equation (10.3).6 Setting 
reduces this to 
6
 A fuller Taylor series expansion suggests the approximation 
when terms of higher order than At are ignored. In practice, the term is so small 
that it is usually ignored. 
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In this case, we have 
where is the daily volatility of the variable. 
For a portfolio with n underlying market variables, with each instru-
ment in the portfolio being dependent on only one of the market 
variables, equation (10.6) becomes 
where is the value of the ith market variable, and and are the delta 
and gamma of the portfolio with respect to the ith market variable. When 
some of the individual instruments in the portfolio are dependent on 
more than one market variable, this equation takes the more general form 
where is a "cross gamma", defined as 
Equation (10.7) is not as easy to work with as equation (10.5), but it can 
be used to calculate moments for 
Cornish-Fisher Expansion 
A result in statistics known as the Cornish-Fisher expansion can be used 
to estimate quantiles of a probability distribution from its moments. We 
illustrate this by showing how the first three moments can be used to 
Produce a VaR estimate that takes account of the Skewness of the 
Probability distribution. Define and as the mean and standard 
deviation of so that 
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The skewness of the probability distribution of is defined as 
Using the first three moments of the Cornish-Fisher expansion 
estimates the q-quantile of the distribution of as 
where 
and zq is q-quantile of the standard normal distribution. 
Example 10.2 
Suppose that for a certain portfolio we calculate = —0.2, = 2.2, and 
= —0.4, and we are interested in the 0.01 quantile (q = 0.01). In this case, 
zq = —2.33. If we assume that the probability distribution of is normal, 
then the 0.01 quantile is 
-0 .2-2 .33x2.2 = -5.326 
In other words, we are 99% certain that 
When we use the Cornish-Fisher expansion to adjust for skewness and set 
q = 0.01, we obtain 
so that the 0.01 quantile of the distribution is 
-0.2 - 2.625 x 2.2 = -5.976 
Taking account of Skewness, therefore, changes the VaR from 5.326 to 5.976. 
10.7 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
As an alternative to the approaches described so far, we can implement 
the model-building approach using Monte Carlo simulation to generate 
the probability distribution for Suppose we wish to calculate a one-
day VaR for a portfolio. The procedure is as follows: 
1. Value the portfolio today in the usual way using the current values 
of market variables. 
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2. Sample once from the multivariate normal probability distribution 
of the 7 
3. Use the sampled values of the to determine the value of each 
market variable at the end of one day. 
4. Revalue the portfolio at the end of the day in the usual way. 
5. Subtract the value calculated in Step 1 from the value in Step 4 to 
determine a sample 
6. Repeat Steps 2 to 5 many times to build up a probability 
distribution for 
The VaR is calculated as the appropriate percentile of the probability 
distribution of Suppose, for example, that we calculate 5,000 differ-
ent sample values of in the way just described. The one-day 99% VaR 
is the 50th worst outcome; the one-day 95% VaR is the 250th worst 
outcome; and so on.8 The N-day VaR is usually assumed to be the one-
day VaR multiplied by 
The drawback of Monte Carlo simulation is that it tends to be 
computationally slow because a company's complete portfolio (which 
might consist of hundreds of thousands of different instruments) has to 
be revalued many times.10 One way of speeding things up is to assume 
that equation (10.7) describes the relationship between and the 
We can then jump straight from Step 2 to Step 5 in the Monte Carlo 
simulation and avoid the need for a complete revaluation of the portfolio. 
This is sometimes referred to as the partial simulation approach. 
10.8 USING DISTRIBUTIONS THAT ARE NOT NORMAL 
When Monte Carlo simulation is used, there are ways of extending the 
model-building approach so that market variables are no longer assumed 
to be normal. One possibility is to assume that the variables have a 
multivariate t-distribution. As indicated in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, this has 
7
 One way of doing so is given in Chapter 6. 
8
 As in the case of historical simulation, extreme value theory can be used to "smooth the 
tails", so that better estimates of extreme percentiles are obtained. 
9
 This is only approximately true when the portfolio includes options, but it is the 
assumption that is made in practice for most VaR calculation methods. 
10
 An approach for limiting the number of portfolio revaluations is proposed in 
F. Jamshidian and Y. Zhu, "Scenario Simulation Model: Theory and Methodology," 
Finance and Stochastics, 1 (1997), 43-67. 
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the effect of giving a higher value to the probability that extreme values 
for several variables occur simultaneously. 
We can assume any set of distributions for the in conjunction with 
a copula model.11 Suppose, for example, that we use a Gaussian copula 
model. As explained in Chapter 6, this means that, when the changes 
in market variables are transformed on a percentile-to-percentile basis to 
normally distributed variables ui the ui are multivariate normal. We can 
follow the five steps given earlier except that Step 2 is changed and a step 
is inserted between Steps 2 and 3 as follows: 
2. Sample once from the multivariate probability distribution for 
the ui. 
2a. Transform each ui to on a percentile-to-percentile basis. 
If a bank has already implemented the Monte Carlo simulation approach 
for calculating VaR assuming percentage changes in market variables are 
normal, it should be relatively easy to modify calculations to implement 
the approach we describe here. Just before the portfolio is valued it is 
necessary to insert a line or two of code into the computer program to do 
the transformation in Step 2a. The marginal distributions of the can 
be calculated by fitting a more general distribution than the normal 
distribution to empirical data. 
10.9 MODEL BUILDING vs. HISTORICAL SIMULATION 
In the last chapter and this one, we have discussed two methods for 
estimating VaR: the historical simulation approach and the model-build-
ing approach. The advantages of the model-building approach are that 
results can be produced very quickly and it can easily be used in 
conjunction with volatility and correlation updating schemes such as 
those described in Chapters 5 and 6. As mentioned in Section 9.3, 
volatility updating can be incorporated into the historical simulation 
approach—but in a rather more artificial way. The main disadvantage 
of the model-building approach is that (at least in the simplest version of 
the approach) it assumes that the market variables have a multivariate 
normal distribution. In practice, daily changes in market variables often 
have distributions that are quite different from normal (see, for example, 
Table 5.2). A user of the model-building approach is hoping that some 
See J. Hull and A. White, "Value at Risk When Daily Changes Are Not Normally 
Distributed," Journal of Derivatives, 5, No. 3 (Spring 1998), 9-19. 
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form of the central limit theorem of statistics applies to the portfolio, so 
that the probability distribution of daily gains/losses on the portfolio is 
normally distributed—even though the gains/losses on the component 
parts of the portfolio are not normally distributed. 
The historical simulation approach has the advantage that historical 
data determines the joint probability distribution of the market variables. 
It is also easier to handle interest rates in a historical simulation because 
on each trial a complete zero-coupon yield curve for both today and 
tomorrow can be calculated. The somewhat messy cash-flow-mapping 
procedure described in Section 10.3 is avoided. The main disadvantage 
of historical simulation is that it is computationally much slower than the 
model-building approach. It is sometimes necessary to use an approxima-
tion such as equation (10.7) when using the historical simulation ap-
proach. This is because a full revaluation for each of the 500 different 
scenarios is not possible.12 
The model-building approach is often used for investment portfolios. 
(It is after all closely related to the popular Markowitz mean-variance 
method of portfolio analysis.) It is less commonly used for calculating the 
VaR for the trading operations of a financial institution. This is because, 
as explained in Chapter 3, financial institutions like to maintain their 
deltas with respect to market variables close to zero. Neither the linear 
model nor the quadratic model work well when deltas are low and 
portfolios are nonlinear. 
SUMMARY 
Whereas historical simulation lets the data determine the joint probability 
distribution of daily percentage changes in market variables, the model-
building approach assumes a particular form for this distribution. The 
most common assumption is that percentage changes in the variables have 
a multivariate normal distribution. For situations where the change in the 
value of the portfolio is linearly dependent on percentage changes in the 
market variables, VaR can be calculated exactly in a straightforward way. 
In other situations approximations are necessary. One approach is to use a 
quadratic approximation for the change in the value of the portfolio as a 
12
 This is particularly likely to be the case if Monte Carlo simulation is the numerical 
Procedure used by the financial institution to value a deal. Monte Carlo simulations 
within historical simulations lead to extremely time-consuming computations. 
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function of percentage changes in the market variables. Another (much 
slower) approach is to use Monte Carlo simulation. 
The model-building approach is frequently used for investment port-
folios. It is less popular for the trading portfolios of financial institutions 
because it does not work well when deltas are low. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
10.1. Consider a position consisting of a $100,000 investment in asset A and a 
$100,000 investment in asset B. Assume that the daily volatilities of both 
assets are 1 % and that the coefficient of correlation between their returns 
is 0.3. What is the 5-day 99% VaR for the portfolio? 
10.2. Describe three ways of handling interest-rate-dependent instruments 
when the model building approach is used to calculate VaR. 
10.3. Explain how an interest rate swap is mapped into a portfolio of zero-
coupon bonds with standard maturities for the purposes of a VaR 
calculation. 
10.4. A financial institution owns a portfolio of options on the USD/GBP 
exchange rate. The delta of the portfolio is 56.0. The current exchange 
rate is 1.5000. Derive an approximate linear relationship between the 
change in the portfolio value and the percentage change in the exchange 
rate. If the daily volatility of the exchange rate is 0.7%, estimate the ten-
day 99% VaR. 
10.5. Suppose you know that the gamma of the portfolio in Problem 10.4 is 16.2. 
How does this change your estimate of the relationship between the change 
in the portfolio value and the percentage change in the exchange rate? 
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10.6. Suppose that the 5-year rate is 6%, the seven year rate is 7% (both 
expressed with annual compounding), the daily volatility of a 5-year zero-
coupon bond is 0.5%, and the daily volatility of a 7-year zero-coupon 
bond is 0.58%. The correlation between daily returns on the two bonds is 
0.6. Map a cash flow of $1,000 received at time 6.5 years into a position 
in a 5-year bond and a position in a 7-year bond. What cash flows in 5 
and 7 years are equivalent to the 6.5-year cash flow? 
10.7. Verify that the 0.3-year zero-coupon bond in the cash-flow-mapping 
example in Table 10.2 is mapped into a $37,397 position in a 3-month 
bond and a $11,793 position in a 6-month bond. 
10.8. Suppose that the daily change in the value of a portfolio is, to a good 
approximation, linearly dependent on two factors, calculated from a 
principal components analysis. The delta of a portfolio with respect to 
the first factor is 6 and the delta with respect to the second factor is -4. 
The standard deviations of the factor are 20 and 8, respectively. What is 
the 5-day 90% VaR? 
10.9. The text calculates a VaR estimate for the example in Table 4.11 
assuming two factors. How does the estimate change if you assume 
(a) one factor and (b) three factors. 
10.10. A bank has a portfolio of options on an asset. The delta of the options is 
-30 and the gamma is -5 . Explain how these numbers can be interpreted. 
The asset price is 20 and its volatility is 1 % per day. Using the quadratic 
model calculate the first three moments of the change in the portfolio 
value. Calculate a 1-day 99% VaR using (a) the first two moments and 
(b) the first three moments. 
10.11. Suppose that in Problem 10.10 the vega of the portfolio is —2 per 1% 
change in the annual volatility. Derive a model relating the change in the 
portfolio value in 1 day to delta, gamma, and vega. Explain, without doing 
detailed calculations, how you would use the model to estimate a VaR. 
10.12. Explain why the linear model can provide only approximate estimates of 
VaR for a portfolio containing options. 
10.13. Some time ago a company entered into a forward contract to buy 
£1 million for $1.5 million. The contract now has 6 months to maturity. 
The daily volatility of a 6-month zero-coupon sterling bond (when 
its price is translated to dollars) is 0.06% and the daily volatility of 
a 6-month zero-coupon dollar bond is 0.05%. The correlation between 
returns from the two bonds is 0.8. The current exchange rate is 1.53. 
Calculate the standard deviation of the change in the dollar value of the 
forward contract in 1 day. What is the 10-day 99% VaR? Assume that 
the 6-month interest rate in both sterling and dollars is 5% per annum 
with continuous compounding. 
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ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
10.14. Consider a position consisting of a $300,000 investment in gold and a 
$500,000 investment in silver. Suppose that the daily volatilities of these 
two assets are 1.8% and 1.2% respectively, and that the coefficient of 
correlation between their returns is 0.6. What is the 10-day 97.5% VaR 
for the portfolio? By how much does diversification reduce the VaR? 
10.15. Consider a portfolio of options on a single asset. Suppose that the delta 
of the portfolio is 12, the value of the asset is $10, and the daily volatility 
of the asset is 2%. Estimate the 1-day 95% VaR for the portfolio from 
the delta. 
10.16. Suppose you know that the gamma of the portfolio in Problem 10.15 is 
-2.6. Derive a quadratic relationship between the change in the portfolio 
value and the percentage change in the underlying asset price in 1 day. 
(a) Calculate the first three moments of the change in the portfolio value. 
(b) Using the first two moments and assuming that the change in the 
portfolio is normally distributed, calculate the 1-day 95% VaR for the 
portfolio, (c) Use the third moment and the Cornish-Fisher expansion to 
revise your answer to (b). 
10.17. A company has a long position in a 2-year bond and a 3-year bond as 
well as a short position in a 5-year bond. Each bond has a principal of 
$100 and pays a 5% coupon annually. Calculate the company's exposure 
to the 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year, and 5-year rates. Use the data in 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 to calculate a 20-day 95% VaR on the assumption that 
rate changes are explained by (a) one factor, (b) two factors, and (c) three 
factors. Assume that the zero-coupon yield curve is flat at 5%. 
10.18. A company has a position in bonds worth $6 million. The modified 
duration of the portfolio is 5.2 years. Assume that only parallel shifts 
in the yield curve can take place and that the standard deviation of the 
daily yield change (when yield is measured in percent) is 0.09. Use the 
duration model to estimate the 20-day 90% VaR for the portfolio. 
Explain carefully the weaknesses of this approach to calculating VaR 
Explain two alternatives that give more accuracy. 
10.19. A bank has written a call option on one stock and a put option on 
another stock. For the first option the stock price is 50, the strike price is 
51, the volatility is 28% per annum, and the time to maturity is 9 months. 
For the second option the stock price is 20, the strike price is 19, the 
volatility is 25% per annum, and the time to maturity is 1 year. Neither 
stock pays a dividend, the risk-free rate is 6% per annum, and the 
correlation between stock price returns is 0.4. Calculate a 10-day 99% 
VaR (a) using only deltas, (b) using the partial simulation approach, and 
(c) using the full simulation approach. 
Credit Risk: 
Estimating Default 
Probabilities 
This is the first of three chapters concerned with credit risk. Credit risk 
arises from the possibility that borrowers, bond issuers, and counter-
parties in derivatives transactions may default. As explained in Chapter 7, 
regulators have for a long time required banks to keep capital for credit 
risk. In Basel II, banks can, with approval from bank supervisors, use 
their own estimates of default probabilities to determine the amount of 
capital they are required to keep. This has led banks to devote a lot of 
resources to developing better ways of estimating default probabilities. 
In this chapter we discuss a number of different approaches to estimating 
default probabilities and explain the key difference between risk-neutral 
and real-world estimates. The material we cover will be used in both 
Chapters 12 and 13. In Chapter 12 we examine the nature of the credit 
risk in over-the-counter derivatives transactions and discuss the calculation 
of credit value at risk. In Chapter 13 we cover credit derivatives. 
11.1 CREDIT RATINGS 
Rating agencies such as Moody's and S&P are in the business of provid-
ing ratings describing the creditworthiness of corporate bonds. Using the 
Moody's system, the best rating is Aaa. Bonds with this rating are 
considered to have almost no chance of defaulting. The next best rating 
is Aa. Following that comes A, Baa, Ba, B, and Caa. Only bonds with 
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ratings of Baa or above are considered to be investment grade. The S&P 
ratings corresponding to Moody's Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and Caa are 
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC, respectively. To create finer rating 
measures, Moody's divides the Aa rating category into Aal, Aa2, and 
Aa3; it divides A into Al, A2 and A3; and so on. Similarly S&P divides 
its AA rating category into AA+, AA, and AA-; it divides its A rating 
category into A+, A, and A- ; and so on. (Only the Aaa category for 
Moody's and the AAA category for S&P are not subdivided.) 
A credit rating is designed to provide information about default 
probabilities. As such one might expect frequent changes in a company's 
credit rating as positive and negative information reaches the market.1 In 
fact, ratings change relatively infrequently. When rating agencies assign 
ratings, one of their objectives is ratings stability. For example, they want 
to avoid ratings reversals where a company is downgraded and then 
upgraded a few weeks later. Ratings therefore change only when there 
is reason to believe that a long-term change in the company's credit-
worthiness has taken place. The reason for this is that bond traders are 
major users of ratings. Often they are subject to rules governing what the 
credit ratings of the bonds they hold must be. If these ratings changed 
frequently they might have to do a large amount of trading (and incur 
high transactions costs) just to satisfy the rules. 
A related point is that rating agencies try to "rate through the cycle". 
Suppose that the economy exhibits a downturn and this has the effect of 
increasing the probability of a company defaulting in the next six months, 
but makes very little difference to the company's cumulative probability 
of defaulting over the next three to five years. A rating agency would not 
change the company's credit rating. 
Internal Credit Ratings 
Most banks have procedures for rating the creditworthiness of their 
corporate and retail clients. This is a necessity. The ratings published 
by rating agencies are only available for relatively large corporate clients-
Many small and medium-sized businesses do not issue publicly traded 
bonds and therefore are not rated by rating agencies. As explained in 
Chapter 7, the internal ratings based (IRB) approach in Basel II allows 
banks to use their internal ratings in determining the probability of 
1
 In theory, a credit rating is an attribute of a bond issue, not a company. However, in 
most cases all bonds issued by a company have the same rating. A rating is therefor 
often referred to as an attribute of a company. 
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default, PD. Under the advanced IRB approach, they are also allowed to 
use their own internal procedures for estimating the loss given default, 
LGD, the exposure at default, EAD, and the maturity, M. 
Internal ratings based approaches for PD typically involve profitability 
ratios, such as return on assets, and balance-sheet ratios, such as the 
current ratio and the debt-to-equity ratio. Banks recognize that it is cash 
rather than profits that is necessary to repay a loan. They typically take 
the financial information provided by a company and convert it to the 
type of cash-flow statement that allows them to estimate how easy it will 
be for a company to service its debt. 
Altman's Z-Score 
Edward Altman has pioneered the use of accounting ratios to predict 
default. In 1968 he developed what has become known as the Z-score.2 
Using a statistical technique known as discriminant analysis, he attempted 
to predict defaults from five accounting ratios: 
X1: Working capital/Total Assets 
X2: Retained earnings/Total assets 
X3: Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
X4: Market value of equity/Book value of total liabilities 
X5: Sales/Total assets 
The Z-score was calculated as 
If the Z-score is greater than 3.0, the company is unlikely to default. If it is 
between 2.7 and 3.0, we should be "on alert". If it is between 1.8 and 2.7, 
there is a good chance of default. If it is less than 1.8, the probability of a 
financial embarrassment is very high. The Z-score was calculated from a 
sample of 66 publicly traded manufacturing companies. Of these, 33 failed 
within one year and 33 did not fail. The model proved very accurate when 
tested on a sample of firms different from that used to obtain equation 
(11.l). Both Type I errors (companies that were predicted not to go 
bankrupt but did do so) and Type II errors (companies that were predicted 
to go bankrupt, but did not do so) were small.3 Variations on the model 
2
 See E.I. Altman, "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis, and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, 23, No. 4 (September 1968), 589-609. 
Clearly Type I errors are much more costly to the lending department of a commercial 
bank than Type II errors. 
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have been developed for manufacturing companies that are not publicly 
traded and nonmanufacturing companies. 
Example 11.1 
Consider a company for which working capital is 170,000, total assets are 
670,000, earnings before interest and taxes is 60,000, sales are 2,200,000, the 
market value of equity is 380,000, total liabilities is 240,000, and retained 
earnings is 300,000. In this case X1 = 0.254, X2 = 0.448, X3 = 0.0896, 
X4 = 1.583, and X5 = 3.284. The Z-score is 
1.2 x 0.254 + 1.4 x 0.448 + 3.3 x 0.0896 + 0.6 x 1.583 + 0.999 x 3.284 = 5.46 
The Z-score indicates that the company is not in danger of defaulting in the 
near future. 
11.2 HISTORICAL DEFAULT PROBABILITIES 
Table 11.1 is typical of the data that is produced by rating agencies. It 
shows the default experience through time of companies that started with 
a certain credit rating. For example, Table 11.1 shows that a bond issue 
with an initial credit rating of Baa has a 0.20% chance of defaulting by 
the end of the first year, a 0.57% chance of defaulting by the end of the 
second year, and so on. The probability of a bond defaulting during a 
particular year can be calculated from the table. For example, the 
probability that a bond initially rated Baa will default during the second 
year of its life is 0.57 - 0.20 = 0.37%. 
Table 11.1 shows that, for investment-grade bonds, the probability of 
default in a year tends to be an increasing function of time. (For example, 
Rating 
Aaa 
Aa 
A 
Baa 
Ba 
B 
Caa 
1 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.20 
1.26 
6.21 
23.65 
Term (years) 
2 
0.00 
0.03 
0.09 
0.57 
3.48 
13.76 
37.20 
3 
0.00 
0.06 
0.23 
1.03 
6.00 
20.65 
48.02 
4 
0.04 
0.15 
0.38 
1.62 
8.59 
26.66 
55.56 
5 
0.12 
0.24 
0.54 
2.16 
11.17 
31.99 
60.83 
7 
0.29 
0.43 
0.91 
3.24 
15.44 
40.79 
69.36 
10 
0.62 
0.68 
1.59 
5.10 
21.01 
50.02 
77.91 
15 
1.21 
1.51 
2.94 
9.12 
30.88 
59.21 
80.23 
20 
1.55 
2.70 
5.24 
12.59 
38.56 
60.73 
80.23 
Table 11.1 Average cumulative default rates (%), 1970-2003 
(Source: Moody's). 
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the probability of an A-rated bond defaulting during years 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
are 0.02%, 0.07%, 0.14%, 0.15%, and 0.16%, respectively.) This is 
because the bond issuer is initially considered to be creditworthy, and 
the more time that elapses, the greater the possibility that its financial 
health will decline. For bonds with a poor credit rating, the probability of 
default is often a decreasing function of time. (For example, the probabil-
ities that a Caa-rated bond will default during years 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 
23.65%, 13.55%, 10.82%, 7.54%, and 5.27%, respectively.) The reason 
here is that, for a bond with a poor credit rating, the next year or two may 
be critical. If the issuer survives this period, its financial health is likely to 
have improved. 
Default Intensities 
From Table 11.1 we can calculate the probability of a Caa bond default-
ing during the third year as 48.02 - 37.20 = 10.82%. We will refer to this 
as the unconditional default probability. It is the probability of default 
during the third year as seen at time zero. The probability that the Caa-
rated bond will survive until the end of year 2 is 100 - 37.20 = 62.80%. 
The probability that it will default during the third year, conditional on 
no earlier default, is therefore 0.1082/0.6280, or 17.23%. 
The 17.23% we have just calculated is for a one-year time period. By 
considering the probability of default between times t and condi-
tional on no earlier default, we obtain what is known as the default 
intensity or hazard rate at time t. The default intensity at time t is 
defined so that is the probability of default between time t and 
conditional on no default between time 0 and time t. If V(t) is the 
cumulative probability of the company surviving to time t (i.e., no default 
by time t), then 
Taking limits, we obtain 
from which we get 
or 
where is the average default intensity between time zero and time t. 
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Define Q(t) as the probability of default by time t. It follows that 
or 
11.3 RECOVERY RATES 
When a company goes bankrupt, those that are owed money by the 
company file claims against the assets of the company.4 Sometimes there 
is a reorganization in which these creditors agree to a partial payment of 
their claims. In other cases the assets are sold by the liquidator and the 
proceeds are used to meet the claims as far as possible. Some claims 
typically have priorities over other claims and are met more fully. 
The recovery rate for a bond is normally defined as the bond's market 
value immediately after a default as a percent of its face value. It equals one 
minus the loss given default, LGD. Table 11.2 provides historical data on 
average recovery rates for different categories of bonds in the United 
States. It shows that senior secured debtholders had an average recovery 
rate of 57.4 cents per dollar of face value, while junior subordinated 
debtholders had an average recovery rate of only 28.9 cents per dollar of 
face value. 
Recovery rates are significantly negatively correlated with default rates. 
Moody's looked at average recovery rates and average default rates each 
Table 11.2 Recovery rates on corporate bonds as a 
percent of face value, 1982-2004. Source: Moody's. 
4
 In the United States, the claim made by a bondholder is the bond's face value plus 
accrued interest. 
Class 
Senior secured 
Senior unsecured 
Senior subordinated 
Subordinated 
Junior subordinated 
Average recovery 
rate (%) 
57.4 
44.9 
39.1 
32.0 
28.9 
Credit Risk: Estimating Default Probabilities 261 
year between 1983 and 2004. It found that the following relationship 
provides a good fit to the data:5 
Average recovery rate = 0.52 — 6.9 x Average default rate 
This relationship means that a bad year for the default rate is usually 
doubly bad because it is accompanied by a low recovery rate. For 
example, when the average default rate in a year is only 0.1%, we expect 
the recovery rate to be relatively high at 51.3%. When it is relatively high 
at 3%, we expect the recovery rate to be 31.3%. 
11.4 ESTIMATING DEFAULT PROBABILITIES FROM 
BOND PRICES 
The probability of default for a company can be estimated from the prices 
of bonds it has issued. The usual assumption is that the only reason a 
corporate bond sells for less than a similar risk-free bond is the possibility 
of default.6 
Consider first an approximate calculation. Suppose that a bond yields 
200 basis points more than a similar risk-free bond and that the expected 
recovery rate in the event of a default is 40%. The holder of a corporate 
bond must be expecting to lose 200 basis points (or 2% per year) from 
defaults. Given the recovery rate of 40%, this leads to an estimate of the 
probability of a default per year conditional on no earlier default of 
0.02/(1 - 0.4), or 3.33%. In general, 
where h is the default intensity per year, s is the spread of the 
corporate bond yield over the risk-free rate, and R is the expected 
recovery rate. 
5
 See D. T. Hamilton, P. Varma, S. Ou, and R. Cantor, "Default and Recovery Rates of 
Corporate Bond Issuers, 1920-2004," Moody's Investor's Services, January 2005. The R2 
of the regression is 0.65. The correlation is also identified and discussed in E. I. Altman, 
B. Brady, A. Resti, and A. Sironi, "The Link between Default and Recovery Rates: 
Implications for Credit Risk Models and Procyclicality," Working Paper, New York 
University, 2003. 
6
 We discuss this point later. The assumption is not perfect. In practice, the price of a 
corporate bond is also affected by its liquidity. The lower the liquidity, the lower the 
price. 
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A More Exact Calculation 
For a more exact calculation, suppose that the corporate bond we have 
been considering lasts for five years, provides a coupon of 6% per annum 
(paid semiannually), and yields 7% per annum (with continuous com-
pounding). The yield on a similar default-free bond is 5% (with continuous 
compounding). The yields imply that the price of the corporate bond is 
95.34 and the price of the default-free bond is 104.09. The expected loss 
from default over the five-year life of the bond is therefore 104.09 - 95.34, 
or $8.75. Suppose that the probability of default per year (assumed in this 
simple example to be the same each year) is Q. Table 11.3 calculates the 
expected loss from default in terms of Q on the assumption that defaults 
can happen at times 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.5 years (immediately before 
coupon payment dates). Risk-free rates for all maturities are assumed to 
be 5% (with continuous compounding). 
To illustrate the calculations, consider the 3.5-year row in Table 11.3. 
The expected value of the default-free bond at time 3.5 years (calculated 
using forward interest rates) is 
Given the definition of recovery rates in the previous section, the amount 
recovered if there is a default is 40, so that the loss is 104.34 - 40, or 
$64.34. The present value of this loss is 54.01 and the expected loss is 
therefore 54.01 Q. 
The total expected loss is 288.48(2. Setting this equal to 8.75, we obtain a 
value for Q equal to 3.03%. The calculations we have given assume that 
Table 11.3 Calculation of loss from default on a bond in terms of the default 
probabilities per year, Q. Notional principal = $100. 
Time 
(years) 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
Total 
Default 
probability 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Recovery 
amount 
($) 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
Default-free 
value ($) 
106.73 
105.97 
105.17 
104.34 
103.46 
Loss 
($) 
66.73 
65.97 
65.17 
64.34 
63.46 
Discount 
factor 
0.9753 
0.9277 
0,8825 
0.8395 
0.7985 
PV of 
expectea 
loss ($) 
65.08Q 
61.20Q 
57.52Q 
54.01Q 
50.67Q 
288.48Q 
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the default probability is the same each year and that defaults take place 
once a year. We can extend the calculations to assume that defaults can 
take place more frequently. Furthermore, instead of assuming a constant 
unconditional probability of default, we can assume a constant default 
intensity or a particular pattern for the variation of default probabilities 
with time. 
With several bonds we can estimate several parameters describing the 
term structure of default probabilities. Suppose, for example, we have 
bonds maturing in 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. We could use the first bond to 
estimate a default probability per year for the first three years, the second 
to estimate a default probability per year for years 4 and 5, the third to 
estimate a default probability for years 6 and 7, and the fourth to estimate 
a default probability for years 8, 9, and 10 (see Problems 11.11 and 
11.17). The approach is analogous to the bootstrap procedure we dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 for calculating a zero-coupon yield curve. 
The Risk-Free Rate 
A key issue when bond prices are used to estimate default probabilities is 
the meaning of the terms "risk-free rate" and "risk-free bond". In equa-
tion (11.3) the spread s is the excess of the corporate bond yield over the 
yield on a similar risk-free bond. In Table 11.3 the default-free value of the 
bond must be calculated using risk-free rates. The benchmark risk-free rate 
that is usually used in quoting corporate bond yields is the yield on similar 
Treasury bonds (e.g., a bond trader might quote the yield on a particular 
corporate bond as being a spread of 250 basis points over Treasuries). 
As discussed in Section 4.4, traders usually use LIBOR/swap rates as 
proxies for risk-free rates when valuing derivatives. Traders also use 
LIBOR/swap rates as risk-free rates when calculating default probabil-
ities. For example, when they determine default probabilities from bond 
Prices, the spread s in equation (11.3) is the spread of the bond yield over 
the LIBOR/swap rate. Also, the risk-free discount rates used in the 
calculations such as those in Table 11.3 are LIBOR/swap zero rates. 
Credit default swaps (which will be discussed in Chapter 13) can be 
used to imply the risk-free rate assumed by traders. The rate used appears 
to be approximately equal to the LIBOR/swap rate minus 10 basis points 
on average.7 This estimate is plausible. As explained in Section 4.4, the 
7
 See J. Hull, M. Predescu, and A. White, "The Relationship between Credit Default 
swap Spreads, Bond Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements," Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 28 (November 2004), 2789-2811. 
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credit risk in a swap rate is the credit risk from making a series of six-
month loans to AA-rated counterparties and 10 basis points is a reason-
able default risk premium for an AA-rated six-month instrument. 
Asset Swaps 
In practice, traders often use asset swap spreads as a way of extracting 
default probabilities from bond prices. This is because asset swap spreads 
provide a direct estimate of the spread of bond yields over the LIBOR/ 
swap curve. 
To explain how asset swaps work, consider the situation where an asset 
swap spread for a particular bond is quoted as 150 basis points. There are 
three possible situations: 
1. The bond sells for its par value of 100. The swap then involves one 
side (Company A) paying the coupon on the bond and the other 
side (Company B) paying LIBOR plus 150 basis points.8 
2. The bond sells below its par value, say, for 95. The swap is then 
structured so that, in addition to the coupons, Company A pays $5 
per $100 of notional principal at the outset. 
3. The underlying bond sells above par, say, for 108. The swap is then 
structured so that Company B makes a payment of $8 per $100 of 
principal at the outset. After that, Company A pays the bond's 
coupons and Company B pays LIBOR plus 150 basis points. 
The effect of all this is that the present value of the asset swap spread is 
the amount by which the price of the corporate bond is exceeded by the 
price of a similar risk-free bond, where the risk-free rate is assumed to be 
given by the LIBOR/swap curve (see Problem 11.12). Consider again the 
example in Table 11.3 where the LIBOR/swap zero curve is flat at 5%. 
Suppose that instead of knowing the bond's price we know that the asset 
swap spread is 150 basis points. This means that the amount by which the 
value of the risk-free bond exceeds the value of the corporate bond is the 
present value of 150 basis points per year for five years. Assuming 
semiannual payments, this is $6.55 per $100 of principal. 
The total loss in Table 11.3 would be set equal to $6.55 in this case. This 
means that the default probability per year, Q, would be 6.55/288.48, 
or 2.27%. 
8
 Note that it is the promised coupons that are exchanged. The exchanges take place 
regardless of whether the bond defaults. 
Credit Risk: Estimating Default Probabilities 265 
11.5 COMPARISON OF DEFAULT PROBABILITY 
ESTIMATES 
The default probabilities estimated from historical data are much less than 
those derived from bond prices. Table 11.4 illustrates this.9 It shows, for 
companies that start with a particular rating, the seven-year average annual 
default intensity calculated from (a) historical data and (b) bond prices. 
The calculation of default intensities using historical data is based on 
equation (11.2) and Table 11.1. From equation (11.2), we have 
where is the average default intensity (or hazard rate) by time t 
and Q(t) is the cumulative probability of default by time t. The values 
of Q{1) are taken directly from Table 11.1. Consider, for example, an 
A-rated company. The value of Q{7) is 0.0091. The average seven-year 
default intensity is therefore 
or 0.13%. 
The calculations using bond prices are based on equation (11.3) and 
bond yields published by Merrill Lynch. The results shown are averages 
between December 1996 and July 2004. The recovery rate is assumed to be 
40% and, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, the risk-free 
interest rate is assumed to be the seven-year swap rate minus 10 basis 
points. For example, for A-rated bonds the average Merrill Lynch yield was 
Table 11.4 Seven-year average default intensities (% per annum). 
Rating 
Aaa 
Aa 
A 
Baa 
Ba 
B 
Caa 
Historical default 
intensity 
0.04 
0.06 
0.13 
0.47 
2.40 
7.49 
16.90 
Default intensity 
from bonds 
0.67 
0.78 
1.28 
2.38 
5.07 
9.02 
21.30 
Ratio 
16.8 
13.0 
9.8 
5.1 
2.1 
1.2 
1.3 
Differeice 
0.63 
0.72 
1.15 
1.91 
2.67 
1.53 
4.40 
9
 Tables 11.4 and 11.5 are taken from J. Hull, M. Predescu, and A. White, "Bond Prices, 
Default Probabilities, and Risk Premiums," Journal of Credit Risk, 1, No. 2 (2004), 53-60. 
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Table 11.5 Expected excess return on bonds (basis points). 
Rating 
Aaa 
Aa 
A 
Baa 
Ba 
B 
Caa 
Bond yield 
spread over 
Treasuries 
83 
90 
120 
186 
347 
585 
1321 
Spread of risk-
free rate over 
Treasuries 
43 
43 
43 
43 
43 
43 
43 
Spread for 
historical 
defaults 
2 
4 
8 
28 
144 
449 
1014 
Expected 
excess 
return 
38 
43 
69 
115 
160 
93 
264 
6.274%. The average swap rate was 5.605%, so that the average risk free 
rate was 5.505%. This gives the average seven-year default probability as 
or 1.28%. 
Table 11.4 shows that the ratio of the default probability backed out of 
bond prices to the default probability calculated from historical data is 
high for investment-grade companies and tends to decline as the credit 
quality declines. By contrast, the difference between the two default 
probabilities tends to increase as credit quality declines. 
Table 11.5 gives another way of looking at these results. It shows the 
excess return over the risk-free rate (still assumed to be the seven-year swap 
rate minus 10 basis points) earned by investors in bonds with different 
credit ratings. Consider again an A-rated bond. The average spread over 
Treasuries is 120 basis points. Of this, 43 basis points represent the average 
spread between seven-year Treasuries and our proxy for the risk-free rate. 
A spread of 8 basis points is necessary to cover expected defaults. (This 
equals the real-world probability of default from Table 11.4 times 1 minus 
the assumed recovery rate of 0.4.) This leaves an expected excess return 
(after expected defaults have been taken into account) of 69 basis points. 
Tables 11.4 and 11.5 show that a large percentage difference between 
default probability estimates translates into a relatively small expected 
excess return on the bond. For Aaa-rated bonds the ratio of the two 
default probabilities is 16.8, but the expected excess return is only 38 basis 
points. The expected return tends to increase as credit quality declines. 
10 
The results for B-rated bonds in Tables 11.4 and 11.5 run counter to the overall pattern. 
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Interestingly, the excess return on bonds varies through time. It in-
creased steadily between 1997 and 2002 and then declined sharply in 
2003 and 2004. For example, for the A-rated category the excess return 
ranged from 35 basis points in 1997 to 119 basis points in 2002. 
Real-World vs. Risk-Neutral Probabilities 
The risk-neutral valuation argument is explained in Business Snap-
shot 11.1. It shows that we can value cash flows on the assumption that 
all investors are risk neutral (i.e., on the assumption that they do not 
require a premium for bearing risks). When we do this, we get the right 
answer in the real world as well as in the risk-neutral world. 
Business Snapshot 11.1 Risk-Neutral Valuation 
The single most important idea in the valuation of derivatives is risk-neutral 
valuation. It shows that we can value a derivative by 
1. Assuming that all investors are risk neutral 
2. Calculating expected cash flows 
3. Discounting the cash flows at the risk-free rate 
As a simple example of the application of risk-neutral valuation, suppose that 
the price of a non-dividend-Paying stock is $30 and consider a derivative that 
pays off $100 in one year if the stock price is greater than $40 at that time. 
(This is known as a binary cash-or-nothing call option.) Suppose that the risk-
free rate (continuously compounded) is 5%, the expected return on the stock 
(also continuously compounded) is 10%, and the stock price volatility is 30% 
per annum. In a risk-neutral world the expected growth of the stock price is 
5%. It can be shown (with the usual Black-Scholes lognormal assumptions) 
that when the stock price has this growth rate the probability that the stock 
price will be greater than $40 in one year is 0.1730. The expected payoff from 
the derivatives is therefore 100 x 0.1730 = $17.30. The value of the derivative 
is calculated by discounting this at 5%. It is $16.46. 
The real-world (physical) probability of the stock price being greater than $40 
in one year is calculated by assuming a growth rate of 10%. It is 0.2190. The 
expected payoff in the real world is therefore $21.90. The problem with using 
this expected cash flow is that we do not know the correct discount rate. The 
stock price has risk associated with it that is priced by the market (otherwise the 
expected return on the stock would not be 5% more than the risk-free rate). The 
derivative has the effect of "leveraging this risk", so that a very high discount 
rate is required for its expected payoff. Since we know the correct value of the 
derivative is $16.46, we can deduce that the correct discount rate to apply to the 
real-world expected payoff of $21.90 must be 28.6%. 
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The default probabilities implied from bond yields are risk-neutral 
default probabilities (i.e., they are the probabilities of default in a world 
where all investors are risk neutral). To understand why this is so, consider 
the calculations of default probabilities in Table 11.3. These assume that 
expected default losses can be discounted at the risk-free rate. The risk-
neutral valuation principle shows that this is a valid procedure provided the 
expected losses are calculated in a risk-neutral world. This means that the 
default probability Q in Table 11.3 must be a risk-neutral probability. 
By contrast, the default probabilities implied from historical data are 
real-world default probabilities (sometimes also called physical probabil-
ities). The expected excess return in Table 11.5 arises directly from the 
difference between real-world and risk-neutral default probabilities. If 
there was no expected excess return, the real-world and risk-neutral 
default probabilities would be the same, and vice versa. 
Reasons for the Difference 
Why do we see such big differences between real-world and risk-neutral 
default probabilities? As we have just argued, this is the same as asking 
why corporate bond traders earn more than the risk-free rate on average. 
There are a number of potential reasons: 
1. Corporate bonds are relatively illiquid and bond traders demand an 
extra return to compensate for this. This may account for perhaps 
25 basis points of the excess return. This is a significant part of the 
excess return for high-quality bonds, but a relatively small part for 
bonds rated Baa and below. 
2. The subjective default probabilities of bond traders may be much 
higher than the those given in Table 11.1. Bond traders may be 
allowing for depression scenarios much worse than anything seen 
during the 1970 to 2003 period. To test this, we can look at a table 
produced by Moody's that is similar to Table 11.1, but applies to the 
1920 to 2003 period instead of 1970 to 2003 period. When the 
analysis is based on this table, historical default intensities for 
investment-grade bonds in Table 11.4 rise somewhat. The Aaa 
default intensity increases from 4 to 6 basis points; the Aa increases 
from 6 to 22 basis points; the A increases from 13 to 29 basis points, 
the Baa increases from 47 to 73 basis points. However, non-
investment-grade historical default intensities decline somewhat. 
3. Bonds do not default independently of each other. This is the most 
important reason for the results in Tables 11.4 and 11.5. There are 
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periods of time when default rates are very low and periods of time 
when they are very high. (Evidence for this can be obtained by 
looking at the defaults rates in different years. Moody's statistics 
show that between 1970 and 2003 the default rate per year ranged 
from a low of 0.09% in 1979 to a high of 3.81% in 2001.) This gives 
rise to systematic risk (i.e., risk that cannot be diversified away) and 
bond traders should require an expected excess return for bearing the 
risk. The variation in default rates from year to year may be because 
of overall economic conditions or because a default by one company 
has a ripple effect resulting in defaults by other companies. (The latter 
is referred to by researchers as credit contagion.) 
4. Bond returns are highly skewed with limited upside. As a result it is 
much more difficult to diversify risks in a bond portfolio than in an 
equity portfolio.11 A very large number of different bonds must be 
held. In practice, many bond portfolios are far from fully diversified. 
As a result bond traders may require an extra return for bearing 
unsystematic risk as well as for bearing the systematic risk mentioned 
in 3 above. 
Which Estimates Should Be Used? 
At this stage it is natural to ask whether we should use real-world or risk-
neutral default probabilities in the analysis of credit risk. The answer 
depends on the purpose of the analysis. When valuing credit derivatives 
or estimating the impact of default risk on the pricing of instruments, we 
should use risk-neutral default probabilities. This is because the analysis 
calculates the present value of expected future cash flows and almost 
invariably (implicitly or explicitly) involves using risk-neutral valuation. 
When carrying out scenario analyses to calculate potential future losses 
from defaults, we should use real-world default probabilities. The PD 
used to calculate regulatory capital is a real-world default probability. 
11.6 USING EQUITY PRICES TO ESTIMATE DEFAULT 
PROBABILITIES 
When we use a table such as Table 11.1 to estimate a company's real-
world probability of default, we are relying on the company's credit 
11
 See J. D. Amato and E. M. Remolona, "The Credit Spread Puzzle," BIS Quarterly 
Review, 5 (December 2003), 51-63. 
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rating. Unfortunately, credit ratings are revised relatively infrequently. 
This has led some analysts to argue that equity prices can provide more 
up-to-date information for estimating default probabilities. 
In 1974, Merton proposed a model where a company's equity is an 
option on the assets of the company.12 Suppose, for simplicity, that a firm 
has one zero-coupon bond outstanding and that the bond matures at 
time T. Define: 
Value of company's assets today 
Value of company's assets at time T 
Value of company's equity today 
Value of company's equity at time T 
Amount of debt interest and principal due to be repaid at time T 
Volatility of assets (assumed constant) 
Instantaneous volatility of equity 
If VT < D, it is (at least in theory) rational for the company to default on 
the debt at time T. The value of the equity is then zero. If VT > D, the 
company should make the debt repayment at time T and the value of the 
equity at this time is VT — D. Merton's model, therefore, gives the value of 
the firm's equity at time T as 
ET = max(VT - D, 0) 
This shows that the equity of a company is a call option on the value of 
the assets of the company with a strike price equal to the repayment 
required on the debt. The Black-Scholes formula (see Appendix C at the 
end of this book) gives the value of the equity today as 
where 
and N is the cumulative normal distribution function. The value of the 
debt today is V0 — E0. 
The risk-neutral probability that the company will default on the debt 
is N(-d2). To calculate this, we require V0 and Neither of these are 
12
 See R. Merton "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest 
Rates." Journal of Finance, 29 (1974), 449-470 . 
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directly observable. However, if the company is publicly traded, we can 
observe E0. This means that equation (11.4) provides one condition that 
must be satisfied by V0 and We can also estimate From a result in 
stochastic calculus known as lemma, we have 
or 
This provides another equation that must be satisfied by V0 and 
Equations (11.4) and (11.5) provide a pair of simultaneous equations 
that can be solved for V0 and 13 
Example 11.2 
The value of a company's equity is $3 million and the volatility of the equity is 
80%. The debt that will have to be paid in one year is $10 million. The risk-
free rate is 5% per annum. In this case, E0 — 3, = 0.80, r = 0.05, T = 1, 
and D=10. Solving equations (11.4) and (11.5) yields V0 = 12.40 and 
= 0.2123. The parameter d2 is 1.1408, so that the probability of default 
is N(-d2) = 0.127, or 12.7%. The market value of the debt is V0 - E0, or 9.40. 
The present value of the promised payment on the debt is 10e-0.05xl = 9.51. 
The expected loss on the debt is therefore (9.51 — 9.40)/9.51, or about 1.2% of 
its no-default value. Comparing this with the probability of default gives the 
expected recovery in the event of a default as (12.7 — 1.2)/12.7, or about 91%. 
Distance to Default 
Moody's KMV has coined the term distance to default to describe the 
output from Merton's model. This is the number of standard deviations 
by which the asset price must change for default to be triggered T years in 
the future. It is given by 
As the distance to default decreases, the company becomes more likely to 
default. In Example 11.2 the one-year distance to default is 1.14 standard 
deviations. 
13
 To solve two nonlinear equations of the form F(x, y) = 0 and G(x, y) = 0, we can use 
the Solver routine in Excel to find the values of x and y that minimize [F(x, y)]2+ 
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Extensions of the Basic Model 
The basic Merton model we have just presented has been extended in a 
number of ways. For example, one version of the model assumes that a 
default occurs whenever the value of the assets falls below a barrier level. 
Another allows payments on debt instruments to be required at more than 
one time. Many analysts have found the implied volatility of equity issued 
by a company to be a good predictor of the probability of default. (The 
higher the implied volatility, the higher the probability of default.) Hull et 
al. show that this is consistent with Merton's model.14 They provide a way 
of implementing Merton's model using two equity implied volatilities and 
show that the resulting model provides results comparable to those 
provided by the usual implementation of the model. 
Performance of the Model 
How well do the default probabilities produced by Merton's model and 
its extensions correspond to actual default experience? The answer is that 
Merton's model and its extensions produce a good ranking of default 
probabilities (risk neutral or real world). This means that a monotonic 
transformation can be estimated to convert the probability of default 
output from Merton's model into a good estimate of either the real-world 
or risk-neutral default probability.15 It may seem strange to use a default 
probability, N(—d2), that is in theory a risk-neutral default probability to 
estimate a real-world default probability. Given the nature of the calibra-
tion process we have just described, the underlying assumption is that the 
ranking of risk-neutral default probabilities of different companies is the 
same as that of their real-world default probabilities. 
SUMMARY 
The probability that a company will default during a particular period 0f 
time in the future can be estimated from historical data, bond prices, or 
equity prices. The default probabilities calculated from bond prices are 
risk-neutral probabilities, whereas those calculated from historical data 
14
 See J. Hull, I. Nelken, and A. White, "Merton's Model, Credit Risk, and Volatility 
Skews," Journal of Credit Risk, 1, No. 1 (2004), 1-27. 
15
 Moody's KMV provides a service that transforms a default probability produced by 
Merton's model into a real-world default probability (which it refers to as an EDF, short 
for expected default frequency). CreditGrades uses Merton's model to estimate credit 
spreads, which are closely linked to risk-neutral default probabilities. 
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are real-world probabilities. The default probabilities calculated from 
equity prices using Merton's model are in theory risk-neutral default 
probabilities. However, the output from the model can be calibrated so 
that either risk-neutral or real-world default probabilities are produced. 
Real-world probabilities should be used for scenario analysis and the 
calculation of credit VaR. Risk-neutral probabilities should be used for 
valuing credit-sensitive instruments. Risk-neutral default probabilities are 
usually significantly higher than real-world probabilities. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
11.1. How many ratings does Moody's use for companies that have not 
defaulted? What are they? 
11.2. How many ratings does S&P use for companies that have not defaulted? 
What are they? 
11.3. Calculate the average default intensity for B-rated companies during the 
first year from the data in Table 11.1. 
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11.4. Calculate the average default intensity for Ba-rated companies during the 
third year from the data in Table 11.1. 
11.5. The spread between the yield on a 3-year corporate bond and the yield on 
a similar risk-free bond is 50 basis points. The recovery rate is 30%, 
Estimate the average default intensity per year over the 3-year period. 
11.6. The spread between the yield on a 5-year bond issued by a company and 
the yield on a similar risk-free bond is 80 basis points. Assume a recovery 
rate of 40%. Estimate the average default intensity per year over the 
5-year period. If the spread is 70 basis points for a 3-year bond, what do 
your results indicate about the average default intensity in years 4 and 5? 
11.7. Should researchers use real-world or risk-neutral default probabilities for 
(a) calculating credit value at risk and (b) adjusting the price of a 
derivative for defaults? 
11.8. How are recovery rates usually defined? 
11.9. Verify (a) that the numbers in the second column of Table 11.4 are 
consistent with the numbers in Table 11.1 and (b) that the numbers in 
the fourth column of Table 11.5 are consistent with the numbers in 
Table 11.4 and a recovery rate of 40%. 
11.10. A 4-year corporate bond provides a coupon of 4% per year payable 
semiannually and has a yield of 5% expressed with continuous compound-
ing. The risk-free yield curve is flat at 3% with continuous compounding. 
Assume that defaults can take place at the end of each year (immediately 
before a coupon or principal payment) and the recovery rate is 30%. 
Estimate the risk-neutral default probability on the assumption that it is 
the same each year. 
11.11. A company has issued 3- and 5-year bonds with a coupon of 4% per 
annum payable annually. The yields on the bonds (expressed with 
continuous compounding) are 4.5% and 4.75%, respectively. Risk-free 
rates are 3.5% with continuous compounding for all maturities. The 
recovery rate is 40%. Defaults can take place halfway through each year. 
The risk-neutral default rates per year are Q1 for years 1 to 3 and Q2 for 
years 4 and 5. Estimate Q1 and Q2. 
11.12. Suppose that in an asset swap B is the market price of the bond per dollar 
of principal, B* is the default-free value of the bond per dollar 01 
principal, and V is the present value of the asset swap spread per dollar 
of principal. Show that V = B* — B. 
11.13. Show that under Merton's model in Section 11.6 the credit spread on a 
T-year zero-coupon bond is 
-ln[N{d2) + N(-d1)/L]/T 
where L = De-rT/V0. 
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11.14. The value of a company's equity is $2 million and the volatility of its 
equity is 50%. The debt that will have to be repaid in one year is 
$5 million. The risk-free interest rate is 4% per annum. Use Merton's 
model to estimate the probability of default. {Hint: The Solver function 
in Excel can be used for this question.) 
11.15. Suppose that the LIBOR/swap curve is flat at 6% with continuous 
compounding and a 5-year bond with a coupon of 5% (paid semiannu-
ally) sells for 90.00. How would an asset swap on the bond be 
structured? What is the asset swap spread that would be calculated in 
this situation? 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
11.16. Suppose a 3-year corporate bond provides a coupon of 7% per year 
payable semiannually and has a yield of 5% (expressed with semiannual 
compounding). The yields for all maturities on risk-free bonds is 4% per 
annum (expressed with semiannual compounding). Assume that defaults 
can take place every 6 months (immediately before a coupon payment) 
and the recovery rate is 45%. Estimate the default probabilities, assuming 
(a) that the unconditional default probabilities are the same on each 
possible default date and (b) that the default probabilities conditional on 
no earlier default are the same on each possible default date. 
11.17. A company has 1- and 2-year bonds outstanding, each providing a 
coupon of 8% per year payable annually. The yields on the bonds 
(expressed with continuous compounding) are 6.0% and 6.6%, respect-
ively. Risk-free rates are 4.5% for all maturities. The recovery rate is 
35%. Defaults can take place halfway through each year. Estimate the 
risk-neutral default rate each year. 
11.18. The value of a company's equity is $4 million and the volatility of its 
equity is 60%. The debt that will have to be repaid in 2 years is 
$15 million. The risk-free interest rate is 6% per annum. Use Merton's 
model to estimate the expected loss from default, the probability of 
default, and the recovery rate in the event of default. Explain why 
Merton's model gives a high recovery rate. {Hint: The Solver function 
in Excel can be used for this question.) 
Credit Risk Losses 
and Credit VaR 
This chapter starts by discussing the nature of the credit risk in deriva-
tives transactions. It shows how expected credit losses can be calculated 
and looks at the various ways in which a financial institution can 
structure its contracts so as to reduce these expected credit losses. 
The last part of the chapter covers the calculation of credit VaR. The 
1986 amendment to Basel I allows banks to develop their own models for 
calculating VaR for market risk in the trading book. However, Basel II 
does not give banks quite the same freedom to calculate credit VaR for 
the banking book. The development of internal models for calculating 
credit VaR is nevertheless an important activity for banks. These models 
can be used to determine regulatory capital for credit risk in the trading 
book (the specific risk capital charge). They can also be used when 
economic capital is calculated, as we will explain in Chapter 16. 
Chapter 11 covered the important difference between real-world and 
risk-neutral default probabilities (see Section 11.5). Real-world default 
Probabilities can be estimated from historical data. Risk-neutral default 
Probabilities can be estimated from bond prices. In the first part of this 
chapter, when calculating expected credit losses, we will use risk-neutral 
default probabilities. This is because we are calculating the present value 
of future cash flows. Later in the chapter, when calculating credit VaR, 
we will use real-world default probabilities. This is because we are looking 
at future scenarios and not calculating present values. 
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12.1 ESTIMATING CREDIT LOSSES 
Credit losses on a loan depend primarily on the probability of default and 
the recovery rate. We covered estimates of the probability of default in 
Chapter 11. The estimate of recovery rate (or equivalently loss given 
default) depends on the nature of the collateral, if any. When making 
estimates, a financial institution is likely to use a mixture of its own 
experience and statistics published by rating agencies such as those in 
Table 11.2. 
Derivatives Transactions 
The credit exposure on a derivatives transaction is more complicated than 
that on a loan. This is because the claim that will be made in the event of 
a default is more uncertain than in the case of a loan. Consider a financial 
institution that has one derivatives contract outstanding with a counter-
party. We can distinguish three possible situations: 
1. The contract is always a liability to the financial institution. 
2. The contract is always an asset to the financial institution. 
3. The contract can become either an asset or a liability to the financial 
institution. 
An example of a derivatives contract in the first category is a short option 
position; an example in the second category is a long option position; an 
example in the third category is a forward contract or a swap. 
Derivatives in the first category have no credit risk to the financial 
institution. If the counterparty goes bankrupt, there will be no loss. The 
derivative is one of the counterparty's assets. It is likely to be retained, 
closed out, or sold to a third party. The result is no loss (or gain) to the 
financial institution. 
Derivatives in the second category always have credit risk to the 
financial institution. If the counterparty goes bankrupt, a loss is likely 
to be experienced. The derivative is one of the counterparty's liabilities. 
The financial institution has to make a claim against the assets of the 
counterparty and may eventually realize some percentage of the value of 
the derivative.1 
Derivatives in the third category may or may not have credit risk. If 
the counterparty defaults when the value of the derivative is positive to 
1
 Counterparties to derivatives transactions usually rank equally with unsecure 
creditors in the event of a liquidation. 
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the financial institution, then a claim will be made against the assets of 
the counterparty and a loss is likely to be experienced. If the counter-
party defaults when the value is negative to the financial institution, no 
loss is made because the derivative will be retained, closed out, or sold to 
a third party.2 
Adjusting Derivatives Valuations for Counterparty Default Risk 
How should a financial institution (or end-user of derivatives) adjust the 
value of a derivative to allow for counterparty credit risk? Consider a 
derivative that has a value of f0 today assuming no defaults. Let us 
suppose that defaults can take place at times t1, t2,..., tn and that the 
value of the derivative to the financial institution (assuming no defaults) 
at time ti is fi. Define the risk-neutral probability of default at time ti as 
qi and the expected recovery rate as R.3 
The exposure at time ti is the financial institution's potential loss. This is 
max(fi, 0) as illustrated in Figure 12.1. Assume that the expected recovery 
in the event of a default is R times the exposure. Assume also that the 
recovery rate and the probability of default are independent of the value of 
the derivative. The risk-neutral expected loss from default at time ti is 
where denotes expected value in a risk-neutral world. Taking present 
values leads to the cost of defaults being 
where ui equals qi{1 — R) and vi is the value today of an instrument that 
Pays off the exposure on the derivative under consideration at time ti. 
Consider again the three categories of derivatives mentioned earlier. 
The first category (where the derivative is always a liability to the financial 
institution) is easy to deal with. The value of fi is always negative, and so 
the total expected loss from defaults given by equation (12.1) is always 
zero. The financial institution needs to make no adjustments for the cost 
2
 A company usually defaults because of the total amount of its liabilities, not because of 
the value of any one transaction. At the time a company defaults it is likely that some of 
its contracts will have positive values. 
3
 This probability of default can be calculated from bond prices in the way described in 
Section 11.4. 
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Figure 12.1 Exposure on a derivative as a function of 
its no-default value. 
of defaults. (Of course, the counterparty may want to take account of the 
possibility of the financial institution defaulting in its own analysis.) 
For the second category (where the derivative is always an asset to the 
financial institution), the value of fi is always positive. The expression 
max(fi, 0) is always equal to fi. Since vi is the present value of fi, it 
always equals f 0 . 4 The expected loss from default is therefore f0 times the 
total probability of default during the life of the derivative times 1 — R. 
Example 12.1 
Consider a two-year over-the-counter option with a value (assuming no 
defaults) of $3. Suppose that the company selling the option has a risk-
neutral probability of defaulting during the two-year period of 4% and the 
recovery in the event of a default is 25%. The expected cost of defaults is 
3 x 0.04 x (1 - 0.25), or $0.09. The buyer of the option should therefore be 
prepared to pay only $2.91. 
For the third category of derivatives, the sign of fi is uncertain. The 
variable vi is a call option on fi with a strike price of zero. One way of 
calculating all the vi with a single analysis is to simulate the underlying 
market variables over the life of the derivative. Sometimes approximate 
analytic calculations are possible (see Problems 12.7, 12.8, and 12.14). 
4
 This assumes no payoffs from the derivative prior to time ti. The analysis can be 
adjusted to cope with situations where there are intermediate payoffs. 
Credit Risk Losses and Credit VaR 281 
Example 12.2 
Consider an interest rate swap where a bank is receiving fixed and paying 
floating. The exposure on the swap at a particular future time ti is 
maxfV(ti), 0] 
where V(ti) is the value of the swap at time ti. This is the payoff from a swap 
option. The variable vi is therefore the value today of a type of European swap 
option exercisable at time ti. 
The analyses we have presented assume that the probability of default is 
independent of the value of the derivative. This is likely to be a reasonable 
approximation in circumstances when the derivative is a small part of the 
portfolio of the counterparty or when the counterparty is using the 
derivative for hedging purposes. When a counterparty wants to enter into 
a large derivatives transaction for speculative purposes, a financial institu-
tion should be wary. When the transaction has a large negative value for 
the counterparty (and a large positive value for the financial institution), 
the probability of the counterparty declaring bankruptcy may be much 
higher than when the situation is the other way round. 
Interest Rate Swaps vs. Currency Swaps 
The impact of default risk on interest rate swaps is considerably less than 
that on currency swaps. Figure 12.2 shows the reason for this. It compares 
the expected exposure for a bank on a pair of offsetting interest rate swaps 
Figure 12.2 Expected exposure on a matched pair of interest 
rate swaps and a matched pair of currency swaps. 
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with different counterparties to the expected exposure on a pair of 
offsetting currency swaps with different counterparties. The expected 
exposure on the interest rate swaps starts at zero, increases, and then 
decreases to zero. By contrast, expected exposure on a the currency swaps 
increases steadily with the passage of time.5 The reason for the difference 
is largely that principals are exchanged at the end of the life of a currency 
swap and there is uncertainty about the exchange rate at that time.6 
Two-Sided Default Risk 
One of the interesting aspects of contracts in the third category (i.e., 
contracts that can become assets or liabilities) is that there is two-sided 
default risk. For example, if Company X enters into a currency swap with 
Company Y, Company X may lose money if Company Y defaults and 
vice versa. Human nature being what it is, most financial and nonfinan-
cial companies consider that there is no chance that they themselves will 
default but want to make an adjustment to contract terms for a possible 
default by their counterparty. In our example, Company X wants to be 
compensated for the possibility that Company Y will default and Com-
pany Y wants to be compensated for the possibility that Company X will 
default. This can make it very difficult for the two companies to agree on 
terms and explains why it is difficult for financial institutions that are not 
highly creditworthy to be active in the derivatives market. 
In theory, the value of the currency swap to Company X should be 
f-y+ x 
where f is the value if both sides were default-free, y is the adjustment 
necessary for the possibility of Company Y defaulting, and x is the 
adjustment necessary for Company X itself defaulting. Similarly, the value 
to Company Y should be 
-f - x + y 
In practice, Company X is likely to calculate a value of f — y and 
Company Y is likely to calculate a value of — f — x. Unless x and y are 
small, it is unlikely that the companies will be able to agree on a price. 
Continuing with our currency swap example, suppose that interest rates 
in the foreign and domestic currency are the same and that Company X 
5
 The expected exposure affects the vi in equation (12.1). The ui are the same for both 
types of swaps. 
6
 Currency swaps with no final exchange of principal have become more common in 
recent years. These have less credit risk and market risk than traditional currency swaps. 
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and Company Y are equally creditworthy. The swap is symmetrical in the 
sense that it has just as much chance of moving in the money for 
Company X as for Company Y. In this case, x = y and neither side 
should in theory make any adjustment for credit risk. 
12.2 CREDIT RISK MITIGATION 
In many cases the analysis we have just presented overstates the credit risk 
in a derivatives transaction. This is because there are a number of clauses 
that derivatives dealers include in their contracts to mitigate credit risk. 
Netting 
We discussed netting in Section 7.5. A netting clause in a derivatives 
contract states that if a company defaults on one contract it has with a 
counterparty then it must default on all outstanding contracts with the 
counterparty. Netting has been successfully tested in the courts in most 
jurisdictions and can substantially reduce credit risk for a financial 
institution. We can extend the analysis presented in the previous section 
so that equation (12.1) gives the present value of the expected loss from 
all contracts with a counterparty when netting agreements are in place. 
This is achieved by redefining vi in the equation as the present value of a 
derivative that pays off the exposure at time ti on the portfolio of all 
contracts with a counterparty. 
A challenging task for a financial institution when considering whether 
it should enter into a new derivatives contract with a counterparty is to 
calculate the incremental effect on expected credit losses. This can be 
done by using equation (12.1) in the way just described to calculate 
expected default costs with and without the contract. It is interesting to 
note that, because of netting, the incremental effect of a new contract on 
expected default losses can be negative. This tends to happen when the 
value of the new contract is highly negatively correlated with the value of 
eisting contracts. 
It might be thought that in well-functioning capital markets a company 
wanting to enter into a derivatives transaction will get the same quote 
from all dealers. Netting shows that this is not necessarily the case. The 
company is likely to get the most favorable quote from a financial 
institution it has done business with in the past—particularly if that 
business gives rise to exposures for the financial institution that are 
opposite to the exposure generated by the new transaction. 
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Collateralization 
Another clause frequently used to mitigate credit risks is known as 
Collateralization. Suppose that a company and a financial institution have 
entered into a number of derivatives contracts. A typical Collateralization 
agreement specifies that the contracts be marked to market periodically 
using a pre-agreed formula. If the total value of the contracts to the 
financial institution is above a certain threshold level on a certain day, it 
can ask the company to post collateral. The amount of collateral posted, 
when added to collateral already posted, by the company is equal to the 
difference between the value of the contracts to the financial institution 
and the threshold level. When the contracts move in favor of the com-
pany, so that the difference between value of the contracts to the financial 
institution and the threshold level is less than the total margin already 
posted, the company can reclaim margin. In the event of a default by the 
company, the financial institution can seize the collateral. If the company 
does not post collateral as required, the financial institution can close out 
the contracts. Long-Term Capital Management made extensive use of 
Collateralization agreements (see Business Snapshot 12.1). 
Suppose, for example, that the threshold level for the company is 
$10 million and contract is marked to market daily for the purposes of 
Collateralization. If on a particular day the value of the contract to the 
financial institution is $10.5 million, it can ask for $0.5 million of col-
lateral. If on the next day the value of the contract rises to $11.4 million, it 
can ask for a further $0.9 million of collateral. If the value of the contract 
falls to $10.8 million on the following day, the company can ask for 
$0.6 million of the collateral to be returned. Note that the threshold 
($10 million in this case) can be regarded as a line of credit that the 
financial institution is prepared to grant to the company. 
Collateral must be deposited by the company with the financial institu-
tion in cash or in the form of acceptable securities such as bonds. Interest 
is normally paid on cash. The securities are subject to a discount known 
as a haircut applied to their market value for the purposes of collateral 
calculations. 
If the Collateralization agreement is a two-way agreement, a threshold 
will also be specified for the financial institution. The company can then 
ask the financial institution to post collateral when the marked-to-market 
value of the outstanding contracts to the company exceeds the threshold. 
Collateralization agreements provide a great deal of protection against 
the possibility of default (just as the margin accounts discussed in 
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Chapter 2 provide protection for people who trade on an exchange). 
However, the threshold amount is not subject to protection. Furthermore, 
even when the threshold is zero, the protection is not total. When a 
company gets into financial difficulties it is likely to stop responding to 
requests to post collateral. By the time the counterparty exercises its right 
to close out contracts, their value may have moved further in its favor. 
Downgrade Triggers 
Another credit mitigation technique used by a financial institution is 
known as a downgrade trigger. This is a clause stating that if the credit 
Business Snapshot 12.1 Long-Term Capital Management's Big Loss 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund formed in the mid-
1990s, always collateralized its transactions. The hedge fund's investment 
strategy was known as convergence arbitrage. A very simple example of what 
it might do is the following. It would find two bonds, X and Y, issued by the 
same company, promising the same payoffs, with X being less liquid (i.e., less 
actively traded) than Y. The market always places a value on liquidity. As a 
result, the price of X would be less than the price of Y. LTCM would buy X and 
short Y, and wait, expecting the prices of the two bonds to converge at some 
future time. 
When interest rates increased, the company expected both bonds to move 
down in price by about the same amount, so that the collateral it paid on bond 
X would be about the same as that which it received on bond Y. Similarly, when 
interest rates decreased, LTCM expected both bonds to move up in price by 
about the same amount, so that the collateral it received on bond X would be 
about the same as that which it paid on bond Y. It therefore expected no 
significant outflow of funds as a result of its Collateralization agreements. 
In August 1998, Russia defaulted on its debt and this led to what is termed a 
"flight to quality" in capital markets. One result was that investors valued 
liquid instruments more highly than usual and the spreads between the prices 
of the liquid and illiquid instruments in LTCM's portfolio increased dramatic-
ally. The prices of the bonds LTCM had bought went down and the prices of 
those it had shorted increased. It was required to post collateral on both. The 
company was highly leveraged and unable to make the payments required 
under the Collateralization agreements. The result was that positions had to be 
closed out and there was a total loss of about $4 billion. If the company had 
been less highly leveraged, it would probably have been able to survive the 
flight to quality and could have waited for the prices of the liquid and illiquid 
bonds to become closer. 
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rating of the counterparty falls below a certain level, say Baa, then the 
financial institution has the option to close out a derivatives contract at its 
market value. (A procedure for determining the value of the contract 
must be agreed to in advance.) 
Downgrade triggers do not provide protection from a big jump in a 
company's credit rating (e.g., from A to default). Also, downgrade 
triggers work well only when relatively little use is made of them. If a 
company has entered into downgrade triggers with many counterparties' 
they are liable to provide relatively little protection to the counterparties 
(see Business Snapshot 12.2). 
Business Snapshot 12.2 Downgrade Triggers and Enron's Bankruptcy 
In December 2001, Enron, one of the largest companies in the United States, 
went bankrupt. Right up to the last few days, it had an investment-grade credit 
rating. The Moody's rating immediately prior to default was Baa3 and the 
S&P rating was BBB—. The default was, however, anticipated to some extent 
by the stock market because Enron's stock price fell sharply in the period 
leading up to the bankruptcy. The probability of default estimated by models 
such as the one described in Section 11.6 increased sharply during this period. 
Enron had entered into a huge number of derivatives contracts with down-
grade triggers. The downgrade triggers stated that, if its credit rating fell below 
investment grade (i.e., below Baa3/BBB—), its counterparties would have the 
option of closing out contracts. Suppose that Enron had been downgraded to 
below investment grade in, say, October 2001. The contracts that counter-
parties would choose to close out would be those with a negative values to 
Enron (and positive values to the counterparties). As a result Enron would 
have been required to make huge cash payments to its counterparties. It would 
not have been able to do this and immediate bankruptcy would result. 
This example illustrates that downgrade triggers provide protection only 
when relatively little use is made of them. When a company enters into a huge 
number of contracts with downgrade triggers, they may actual cause a com-
pany to go bankrupt prematurely. In Enron's case we could argue that it was 
going to go bankrupt anyway and accelerating the event by two months would 
not have done any harm. In fact, Enron did have a chance of survival in 
October 2001. Attempts were being made to work out a deal with another 
energy company, Dynergy, and so forcing bankruptcy in October 2001 was 
not in the interests of either creditors or shareholders. 
The credit rating companies found themselves in a difficult position. If they 
downgraded Enron to recognize its deteriorating financial position, they were 
signing its death warrant. If they did not do so, there was a chance of Enron 
surviving. 
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12.3 CREDIT VaR 
Credit value at risk can be defined in the same way as we defined market 
value at risk in Chapter 8. For example, a credit VaR with a confidence 
level of 99.9% and a one-year time horizon is the credit loss that we are 
99.9% confident will not be exceeded over one year. Whereas the time 
horizon for market risk is usually between one day and one month that 
for credit risk is usually much longer—often one year. 
For regulatory purposes banks using the internal ratings based 
approach must calculate credit VaR for items in the banking book using 
the methodology prescribed by the Basel Committee. Banks are given 
freedom in making their own estimates of probability of default, PD.7 
However, they must use the correlation model and correlation parameters 
specified by the Basel Committee. 
When calculating credit VaR for specific risk, banks have more free-
dom. Specific risk is the risk in the trading book that is related to the 
credit quality of individual companies. Although standard rules for 
determining specific risk have been specified, banks can, with regulatory 
approval, use their own models. For a model to be approved, the bank 
supervisor must be satisfied that concentration risk, spread risk, down-
grade risk, and default risk are appropriately captured. The capital charge 
for specific risk is the product of a multiplier and the ten-day 99% VaR, 
with the minimum level for the multiplier being 4. 
12.4 VASICEK'S MODEL 
Vasicek's model, which we discussed in Sections 6.5 and 7.8, provides an 
easy way to estimate credit VaR for a loan portfolio. From 
equation (6.12), there is a probability X that the percentage of defaults 
on a large portfolio by time T is, in a one-factor Gaussian copula model, 
less than 
where Q(T) is the cumulative probability of each loan defaulting by time T 
and is the copula correlation. When multiplied by the average exposure 
per loan and by the average loss given default, this gives the T-year VaR for 
7
 As mentioned earlier, the probability of default in credit VaR calculations should be a 
real-world probability of default, not a risk-neutral probability of default. 
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an X% confidence level. As explained in Chapter 7, the Basel Committee 
has based the capital it requires for credit risk in the banking book on this 
model. The time horizon T is one year, the confidence level X is 99.9% 
and the value of is determined by the Basel Committee. As we saw in 
Chapter 7, in some cases depends on the one-year probability of default. 
12.5 CREDIT RISK PLUS 
In 1998 Credit Suisse Financial Products proposed a methodology for 
calculating VaR that it termed Credit Risk Plus.8 It utilizes ideas that are 
well established in the insurance industry. We will present a simplified 
version of the approach. 
Suppose that a financial institution has N counterparties of a certain 
type and the probability of default by each counterparty in time T is p. 
The expected number of defaults, for the whole portfolio is given by 
Assuming that default events are independent and that p is 
small, the probability of n defaults is given by the Poisson distribution as 
This can be combined with a probability distribution for the losses 
experienced on a single counterparty default (taking account of the 
impact of netting) to obtain a probability distribution for the total default 
losses from the counterparties. To estimate the probability distribution 
for losses from a single counterparty default, we can look at the current 
probability distribution of our exposures to counterparties and adjust this 
according to historical recovery rates. 
In practice, it is likely to be necessary for the financial institution to 
consider several categories of counterparties. This means that the analysis 
just described must be done for each category and the results combined. 
Another complication is that default rates vary significantly from year to 
year. Data provided by Moody's show that the default rate per year for all 
bonds during the 1970 to 1999 period ranged from 0.09% in 1979 to 3.52% 
in 2001. To account for this, we can assume a probability distribution for 
the overall default rate based on historical data such as that provided by 
8
 See Credit Suisse Financial Products, "Credit Risk Management Framework, 
October, 1997. 
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Figure 12.3 Probability distribution of default losses. 
Moody's. The probability of default for each category of counterparty can 
then be assumed to be linearly dependent on the overall default rate. 
Credit Suisse Financial Products show that, if certain assumptions are 
made, the total loss probability distribution can be calculated analytically. 
To accommodate more general assumptions, Monte Carlo simulation can 
be used. The procedure is as follows: 
1. Sample an overall default rate. 
2. Calculate a probability of default for each category. 
3. Sample a number of defaults for each category. 
4. Sample a loss for each default. 
5. Calculate total loss. 
6. Repeat Steps 1 to 5 many times. 
The effect of assuming a probability distribution for default rates in the 
way just described is to build in default correlations. This makes the 
Probability distribution of total default losses positively skewed, as 
indicated in Figure 12.3. 
12-6 CREDITMETRICS 
Credit Risk Plus estimates the probability distribution of losses arising 
from defaults. As indicated earlier, regulators like the internal models 
used for specific risk to reflect losses from downgrades and credit spread 
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changes as well as defaults. This has led many banks to implement 
CreditMetrics for specific risk calculations. 
CreditMetrics was proposed by J.P. Morgan in 1997. It is based on an 
analysis of credit migration. This is the probability of a company moving 
from one rating category to another during a certain period of time. A 
typical one-year ratings transition matrix is shown in Table 12.1. \\ 
indicates that the percentage probability of a bond moving from one 
rating category to another during a one-year period. For example, a bond 
that starts with an A credit rating has a 91.83% chance of still having an 
A rating at the end of one year. It has a 0.02% chance of defaulting 
during the year, a 0.13% chance of dropping to B, and so on. 
Consider a bank with a portfolio of corporate bonds. Calculating a one-
year VaR for the portfolio using CreditMetrics involves carrying out 
Monte Carlo simulation of ratings transitions for bonds in the portfolio 
over a one-year period. On each simulation trial the final credit rating of all 
bonds is calculated and the bonds are revalued to determine total credit 
losses for the year. The 99% worst result is the one-year 99% VaR for the 
portfolio. 
It is interesting to note that if both the CreditMetrics and the Credit 
Risk Plus models are accurate, they should predict the same probability 
distribution for losses over the long term. It is the timing of losses that is 
different. Suppose, for example, that you hold a certain bond in your 
portfolio. In year 1 it gets downgraded from A to BBB; in year 2 it gets 
downgraded from BBB to B; in year 3 it defaults. You could assume that 
there are no losses in years 1 and 2 and calculate the loss in year 3 (the 
Credit Risk Plus approach). Alternatively, you can calculate separate 
Table 12.1 One-year ratings transition matrix (probabilities expressed as 
percentages). From results reported by Moody's in 2004. 
Initial 
rating 
Aaa 
Aa 
A 
Baa 
Ba 
B 
Caa 
Default 
Rating at year-end 
Aaa 
92.18 
1.17 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Aa 
7.06 
90.85 
2.39 
0.24 
0.05 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
A 
0.73 
7.63 
91.83 
5.20 
0.50 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
Baa 
0.00 
0.26 
5.07 
88.48 
5.45 
0.43 
0.58 
0.00 
Ba 
0.02 
0.07 
0.50 
4.88 
85.13 
6.52 
1.74 
0.00 
B 
0.00 
0.01 
0.13 
0.80 
7.05 
83.20 
4.18 
0.00 
Caa 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.16 
0.55 
3.04 
67.99 
0.00 
Default 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.18 
1.2? 
6.64 
25.50 
100.00 
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revaluation losses in years 1, 2, and 3 (the CreditMetrics approach). The 
losses under the second approach should in theory add up to the losses 
under the first approach. 
There are two key issues in the implementation of CreditMetrics. One is 
handling correlations between bonds. The other is calculating credit 
spreads for valuing the bonds at the end of the year. 
The CreditMetrics Correlation Model 
In sampling to determine credit losses, the credit rating changes for 
different counterparties should not be assumed to be independent. A 
Gaussian copula model can be used to construct a joint probability 
distribution of rating changes (see Section 6.4 for a discussion of copula 
models). The copula correlation between the rating transitions for two 
companies is typically set equal to the correlation between their equity 
returns using a factor model similar to that in Section 6.3. 
As an illustration of the CreditMetrics approach, suppose that we are 
simulating the rating change of an A-rated and a B-rated company over a 
one-year period using the transition matrix in Table 12.1. Suppose that 
the correlation between the equity returns of the two companies is 0.2. On 
each simulation trial we would sample two variables xA and xB from 
standard normal distributions, so that their correlation is 0.2. The 
variable xA determines the new rating of the A-rated company and 
variable xB determines the new rating of the B-rated company. Since 
the A-rated company gets upgraded to Aaa if xA < —3.2905, it becomes 
Aa if -3.2905 <xA< -1.9703, it stays A if -1.9703 <xA< 1.5779, and 
so on. Similarly, since 
the B-rated company becomes Aaa if xB < —3.7190, it becomes Aa if 
-3.7190 < xB < -3.3528, it becomes A if -3.3528 < xB < -2.9290, and 
so on. The A-rated company defaults if xA > that is, when 
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Figure 12.4 The CreditMetrics correlation model: transition of an A-rated and 
a B-rated company to a new rating after one year. Here xA and xB are sampled 
from standard normal distributions with the correlation equal to the correlation 
between the equity returns of A and B. 
xA > 3.5401. The B-rated company defaults when xB > N -1 (0.9336), that 
is, when xB > 1.5032. This example is illustrated in Figure 12.4. 
Spread Changes 
In order to revalue the portfolio of bonds on each simulation trial, it is 
necessary to calculate spread changes. One way of proceeding is to use a 
one-factor regression model to divide the spread changes for each bond 
into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. The sys-
tematic component is the spread change that affects all bonds in the 
rating category being considered. The idiosyncratic component affects 
only one particular bond. 
If the systematic component of spread changes is reflected in market risk 
VaR calculations, it is only necessary to take account of the idiosyncratic 
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spread changes in specific risk VaR calculations. On each trial, therefore, 
we calculate not only what happens to the rating of each bond but also an 
idiosyncratic spread change for the bond. For each bond on each simula-
tion trial, one of three things can happen: 
1. The credit rating of the bond stays the same. In this case the bond is 
revalued in a way that reflects the idiosyncratic spread change for the 
bond. 
2. The credit rating of the bond changes. In this case the bond is 
revalued using a spread corresponding to the new rating category. 
3. The bond defaults. In this case a recovery rate is sampled. Often the 
recovery rate is assumed to have a beta distribution centered on the 
mean recovery rate published by rating agencies (see Table 11.2). 
Time Horizon 
Regulators require a bank's credit VaR for specific risk to be a ten-day 
99% VaR. In practice, this means a bank has two choices. One is to 
calculate a one-year 99% VaR in the way we have just outlined and then 
use the square-root rule to scale it to a ten-day 99% VaR. If we assume 
250 days in a year, this means that the calculated VaR is divided by 5. The 
other is to convert the transition matrix in Table 12.1 from a one-year 
transition matrix to a ten-day transition matrix and use the procedure we 
have just described. to calculate a ten-day loss distribution directly. 
Assuming that ratings transitions in successive periods are independent, 
the second approach involves finding a matrix B such that 
B25 = A 
where A is the matrix in Table 12.1. A procedure for doing this is outlined 
in Appendix E at the end of the book. 
12.7 INTERPRETING CREDIT CORRELATIONS 
Care should be taken in interpreting credit correlations. Different ways of 
calculating a credit correlation can give quite different answers. We 
illustrate this by considering the binomial correlation measure that is 
sometimes used by rating agencies and comparing it with the Gaussian 
copula correlation measure that underlies Vasicek's model. 
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For two companies, A and B, the binomial correlation measure is the 
coefficient of correlation between: 
1. A variable that equals 1 if Company A defaults between times 0 and 
T and zero otherwise; and 
2. A variable that equals 1 if Company B defaults between times 0 and 
T and zero otherwise. 
The measure is 
where P A B ( T ) is the joint probability of A and B defaulting between time 
0 and time T, QA{T) is the cumulative probability that Company A will 
default by time T, and QB(T) is the cumulative probability that Company 
B will default by time T. Typically depends on T, the length of the 
time period considered. Usually it increases as T increases. 
In the Gaussian copula model, PAB(T) = M[xA(T), xB(T); ], where 
xA(T) = and xB(T) = are the transformed times 
to default for companies A and B, and is the Gaussian copula 
correlation for the times to default for A and B. The quantity 
is the probability that, in a bivariate normal distribution where 
the correlation between the variables is the first variable is less than a 
and the second variable is less than b.9 It follows that 
This shows that, if QA(T) and QB(T) are known, can be calculated 
from and vice versa. Usually is markedly greater than as 
is illustrated by the following example. 
Example 12.3 
Suppose that the probability of Company A defaulting in one-year period 
is 1% and the probability of Company B defaulting in a one-year period 
is also 1%. In this case, =-2.326. If is 
0.20, M(xA(l),xB(l), ) = 0.000337, and equation (12.2) shows that 
= 0.024 when T=1. 
9
 An Excel function for calculating is on the author's website. 
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SUMMARY 
The credit risk on a loan depends on the probability of default and the 
recovery rate (or equivalently the loss given default). The credit risk in a 
derivatives transaction is more complicated than that in a loan because 
the exposure at the time of default is uncertain. Some derivatives trans-
actions (e.g., written options) are always liabilities and give rise to no 
credit risk. Some (e.g., long positions in options) are always assets and 
entail significant credit risks. The most difficult types of derivatives 
transactions to deal with from a credit risk perspective are those that 
may become either assets or liabilities during their life. Examples are 
forward contracts and swaps. 
The over-the-counter market has developed a number of ways of 
mitigating credit risk. The most important of these is netting. This is a 
clause in most contracts written by a financial institution stating that, if a 
counterparty defaults on one contract it has with the financial institution, 
then it must default on all contracts it has with that financial institution. 
Another credit mitigation technique is Collateralization. This requires a 
counterparty to post collateral. If the value of the contract moves against 
the counterparty, more collateral is required. In the event that collateral is 
not posted in a timely fashion the contract is closed out using a pre-agreed 
procedure for valuation. A third credit mitigation technique is downgrade 
trigger. This gives a company the option to close out a contract if the credit 
rating of the counterparty falls below a certain level. 
Credit VaR can be defined similarly to the way VaR is defined for market 
risk. It is the credit loss that will not be exceeded over some time horizon 
with a specified confidence level. Basel II calculates credit VaR for the 
banking book using a one-factor Gaussian copula model of time to default 
that was originally developed by Vasicek. An approach for calculating 
credit VaR that is similar to procedures used in the insurance industry is 
Credit Risk Plus which was proposed by Credit Suisse Financial Products 
in 1997. For specific risk in the trading book most large banks use 
CreditMetrics which was proposed by J.P. Morgan in 1997. This involves 
simulating rating changes for companies. The correlation between different 
companies is handled using a Gaussian copula model for rating changes. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
12.1. A bank already has one transaction with a counterparty on its books. 
Explain why a new transaction by a bank with a counterparty can have 
the effect of increasing or reducing the bank's credit exposure to the 
counterparty. 
12.2. Suppose that the measure in equation (12.2) is the same in the real 
world and the risk-neutral world. Is the same true of the Gaussian copula 
measure 
12.3. What is meant by a "haircut" in a Collateralization agreement. A com-
pany offers to post its own equity as collateral. How would you respond? 
12.4. Explain the difference between Vasicek's model, the Credit Risk Plus 
model, and CreditMetrics as far as the following are concerned: (a) when 
a credit loss is recognized, and (b) the way in which default correlation is 
modeled. 
12.5. Suppose that the probability of Company A defaulting during a 2-year 
period is 0.2 and the probability of Company B defaulting during this 
period is 0.15. If the Gaussian copula measure of default correlation is 
0.3, what is the binomial correlation measure? 
12.6. Suppose that a financial institution has entered into a swap dependent on 
the sterling interest rate with counterparty X and an exactly offsetting 
swap with counterparty Y. Which of the following statements are true 
and which are false? (a) The total present value of the cost of defaults is 
the sum of the present value of the cost of defaults on the contract with X 
plus the present value of the cost of defaults on the contract with Y. 
(b) The expected exposure in 1 year on both contracts is the sum of the 
expected exposure on the contract with X and the expected exposure on 
the contract with Y. (c) The 95% upper confidence limit for the exposure 
in 1 year on both contracts is the sum of the 95% upper confidence limit 
for the exposure in 1 year on the contract with X and the 95% upper 
confidence limit for the exposure in 1 year on the contract with Y 
Explain your answers. 
12.7. A company enters into a 1-year forward contract to sell $100 for AUD 150 
The contract is initially at the money. In other words, the forward 
exchange rate is 1.50. The 1-year dollar risk-free rate of interest is 5% 
per annum. The 1-year dollar rate of interest at which the counterparty can 
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borrow is 6% per annum. The exchange rate volatility is 12% per annum. 
Estimate the present value of the cost of defaults on the contract. Assume 
that defaults are recognized only at the end of the life of the contract. 
12.8. Suppose that in Problem 12.7 the 6-month forward rate is also 1.50 and 
the 6-month dollar risk-free interest rate is 5% per annum. Suppose 
further that the 6-month dollar rate of interest at which the counterparty 
can borrow is 5.5% per annum. Estimate the present value of the cost of 
defaults assuming that defaults can occur either at the 6-month point or 
at the 1-year point? (If a default occurs at the 1-month point, the 
company's potential loss is the market value of the contract.) 
12.9. "A long forward contract subject to credit risk is a combination of a 
short position in a no-default put and a long position in a call subject to 
credit risk." Explain this statement. 
12.10. Explain why the credit exposure on a pair of offsetting forward contracts 
with different counterparties resembles a straddle. 
12.11. "When a bank is negotiating a pair of offsetting currency swaps, it should 
try to ensure that it is receiving the lower interest rate currency from a 
company with a low credit risk." Explain. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
12.12. Explain carefully the distinction between real-world and risk-neutral 
default probabilities. Which is higher? A bank enters into a credit 
derivative where it agrees to pay $100 at the end of 1 year if a certain 
company's credit rating falls from A to Baa or lower during the year. The 
1-year risk-free rate is 5%. Using Table 12.1, estimate a value for the 
derivative. What assumptions are you making? Do they tend to overstate 
or understate the value of the derivative. 
12.13. Suppose that a bank has a total of $10 million of exposures of a certain 
type. The one-year probability of default averages 1 % and the recovery 
rate averages 40%. The copula correlation parameter is 0.2. Estimate the 
1-year 99.5% credit VaR. 
12.14. Consider an option on a non-dividend-paying stock where the stock price 
is $52, the strike price $50, the risk-free rate is 5%, the volatility is 30%, 
and the time to maturity is 1 year. (a) What is the value of the option 
assuming no possibility of a default? (b) What is the value of the option 
to the buyer if there is a 2% chance that the option seller will default at 
maturity? (c) Suppose that, instead of paying the option price up front, 
the option buyer agrees to pay the forward value of the option price at 
the end of the life of the contract. By how much does this reduce the cost 
of defaults to the option buyer in the case where there is a 2% chance of 
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the option seller defaulting? (d) If in case (c) the option buyer has a 1 % 
chance of defaulting at the end of the life of the contract, what is the 
default risk to the option seller? Discuss the two-sided nature of default 
risk in this case and the value of the option to each side. 
12.15. Can the existence of downgrade triggers increase default risk? Explain 
your answer. 
Credit Derivatives 
The credit derivatives market has seen huge growth in recent years. 
In 2000 the total notional principal for outstanding credit derivative 
contracts was about $800 billion. By 2005 this had risen to $12 trillion. 
Credit derivatives are contracts where the payoff depends on the 
creditworthiness of one or more companies or countries. They allow 
companies to trade credit risks in much the same way that they trade 
market risks. Banks and other financial institutions, once they had 
assumed a credit risk, used to be in the position where they could do 
little except wait (and hope for the best). Now they can actively manage 
their portfolios of credit risks, keeping some and entering into credit 
derivative contracts to protect themselves from others. 
13.1 CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
The most popular credit derivative is a credit default swap (CDS). This is a 
contract that provides insurance against the risk of a default by particular 
company. The company is known as the reference entity and a default by 
the company is known as a credit event. The buyer of the insurance 
obtains the right to sell bonds issued by the company for their face value 
when a credit event occurs and the seller of the insurance agrees to buy 
the bonds for their face value when a credit event occurs.1 The total face 
1
 The face value (or par value) of a bond is the principal amount that the issuer will repay 
at maturity if it does not default. 
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value of the bonds that can be sold is known as the credit default swap's 
notional principal. 
The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the seller until the 
end of the life of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. These payments 
are typically made in arrears every quarter, every half year, or every year. 
The settlement in the event of a default involves either physical delivery of 
the bonds or a cash payment. 
An example will help to illustrate how a typical deal is structured. 
Suppose that two parties enter into a five-year credit default swap on 
March 1, 2006. Assume that the notional principal is $100 million and the 
buyer agrees to pay 90 basis points annually for protection against default 
by the reference entity. 
The CDS is shown in Figure 13.1. If the reference entity does not 
default (i.e., there is no credit event), the buyer receives no payoff and 
pays $900,000 on March 1 of each of the years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
and 2011. If there is a credit event a substantial payoff is likely. Suppose 
that the buyer notifies the seller of a credit event on June 1, 2009 
(a quarter of the way into the fourth year). If the contract specifies 
physical settlement, the buyer has the right to sell bonds issued by the 
reference entity with a face value of $100 million for $100 million. If the 
contract requires cash settlement, an independent calculation agent will 
conduct a poll of dealers at a predesignated number of days after the 
credit event to determine the mid-market value of the cheapest deliver-
able bond. Suppose this bond is worth $35 per $100 of face value. The 
cash payoff would be $65 million. 
The regular quarterly, semiannual, or annual payments from the buyer 
of protection to the seller of protection cease when there is a credit event. 
However, because these payments are made in arrears, a final accrual 
payment by the buyer is usually required. In our example, the buyer would 
be required to pay to the seller the amount of the annual payment accrued 
between March 1,2009, and June 1,2009 (approximately $225,000), but no 
further payments would be required. 
The total amount paid per year, as a percent of the notional principal. 
to buy protection is known as the CDS spread. Several large banks are 
Figure 13.1 Credit default swap. 
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market makers in the credit default swap market. When quoting on a new 
five-year credit default swap on Ford Motor Credit, a market maker 
might bid 250 basis points and offer 260 basis points. This means that 
the market maker is prepared to buy protection on Ford by paying 
250 basis points per year (i.e., 2.5% of the principal per year) and to sell 
protection on Ford for 260 basis points per year (i.e., 2.6% of the 
principal per year). 
As indicated in Business Snapshot 13.1, banks have been the largest 
buyers of CDS credit protection and insurance companies have been the 
largest sellers. 
Credit Default Swaps and Bond Yields 
A CDS can be used to hedge a position in a corporate bond. Suppose that 
an investor buys a five-year corporate bond yielding 7% per year for its 
face value and at the same time enters into a five-year CDS to buy 
Protection against the issuer of the bond defaulting. Suppose that the 
CDS spread is 2% per annum. The effect of the CDS is to convert the 
corporate bond to a risk-free bond (at least approximately). If the bond 
— 
Business Snapshot 13.1 Who Bears the Credit Risk? 
Traditionally banks have been in the business of making loans and then 
bearing the credit risk that the borrower will default. Since 1988 banks have 
been reluctant to keep loans to companies with good credit ratings on their 
balance sheets. This is because the capital required under Basel I is such that 
the expected return from the loans is less attractive than that from investments 
in other assets. During the 1990s banks created asset-backed securities to pass 
loans (and their credit risk) on to investors. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
banks have made extensive use of credit derivatives to shift the credit risk in 
their loans to other parts of the financial system. (Under Basel II the regulatory 
capital for loans to highly rated companies will decline and this may lead to 
banks being more willing to keep quality loans on their balance sheet.) 
If banks have been net buyers of credit protection, who have been net 
sellers? The answer is insurance companies. Insurance companies have not 
been regulated in the same way as banks and as a result are sometimes more 
willing to bear credit risks than banks. 
The result of all this is that the financial institution bearing the credit risk of 
a loan is often different from the financial institution that did the original 
credit checks. Whether this proves to be good for the overall health of the 
financial system remains to be seen. 
302 Chapter 13 
issuer does not default the investor earns 5% per year (when the CDS 
spread is netted against the corporate bond yield). If the bond does 
default, the investor earns 5% up to the time of the default. Under the 
terms of the CDS, the investor is then able to exchange the bond for its 
face value. This face value can be invested at the risk-free rate for the 
remainder of the five years. 
The n-year CDS spread should be approximately equal to the excess 
of the par yield on an n-year corporate bond over the par yield on an 
n-year risk-free bond.2 If it is markedly less than this, an investor can 
earn more than the risk-free rate by buying the corporate bond and 
buying protection. If it is markedly greater than this, an investor can 
borrow at less than the risk-free rate by shorting the corporate bond 
and selling CDS protection. These are not perfect arbitrages, but they 
are sufficiently good that the CDS spread cannot depart very much 
from the excess of the corporate bond par yield over the risk-free par 
yield. As we discussed in Section 11.4, a good estimate of the risk-free 
rate is the LIBOR/swap rate minus 10 basis points. 
The Cheapest-to-Deliver Bond 
As explained in Section 11.3, the recovery rate on a bond is defined as the 
value of the bond immediately after default as a percent of face value. 
This means that the payoff from a CDS is L(l — R), where L is the 
notional principal and R is the recovery rate. 
Usually a CDS specifies that a number of different bonds can be 
delivered in the event of a default. The bonds typically have the same 
seniority, but they may not sell for the same percentage of face value 
immediately after a default.3 This gives the holder of a CDS a Cheapest-
to-deliver bond option. When a default happens, the buyer of protection 
(or the calculation agent in the event of cash settlement) will review 
alternative deliverable bonds and choose for delivery the one that can be 
purchased most cheaply. In the context of CDS valuation, R should 
therefore be the lowest recovery rate applicable to a deliverable bond. 
2
 The par yield on an n-year bond is the coupon rate per year that causes the bond to sell 
for its par value (i.e., its face value). 
3
 There are a number of reasons for this. The claim that is made in the event of a default 
is typically equal to the bond's face value plus accrued interest. Bonds with high accrued 
interest at the time of default therefore tend to have higher prices immediately after 
default. The market may also judge that in the event of a reorganization of the company 
some bondholders will fare better than others. 
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13.2 CREDIT INDICES 
participants in credit derivatives markets have developed indices to track 
credit default swap spreads. In 2004 there were agreements between 
different producers of indices. This led to some consolidation. Among 
the indices now used are: 
1. The five- and ten-year CDX NA IG indices tracking the credit 
spread for 125 investment grade North American companies 
2. The five- and ten-year iTraxx Europe indices tracking the credit 
spread for 125 investment grade European companies 
In addition to monitoring credit spreads, indices provide a way market 
participants can easily buy or sell a portfolio of credit default swaps. For 
example, an investment bank, acting as market maker might quote the 
CDX NA IG five-year index as bid 65 basis points and offer 66 basis 
points. An investor could then buy $800,000 of five-year CDS protection 
on each of the 125 underlying companies for a total of $660,000 per year. 
The investor can sell $800,000 of five-year CDS protection on each of the 
125 underlying names for a total of $650,000 per year. When a company 
defaults the annual payment is reduced by $660,000/125 = $5,280.4 
13.3 VALUATION OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
Mid-market CDS spreads on individual reference entities (i.e., the average 
of the bid and offer CDS spreads quoted by brokers) can be calculated 
from default probability estimates. We will illustrate how this is done with 
a simple example. 
Suppose that the probability of a reference entity defaulting during a 
Year conditional on no earlier default is 2%.5 Table 13.1 shows survival 
probabilities and unconditional default probabilities (i.e., default prob-
abilities as seen at time zero) for each of the five years. The probability of a 
default during the first year is 0.02 and the probability the reference entity 
4
 The index is slightly lower than the average of the credit default swap spreads for the 
companies in the portfolio. To understand the reason for this, consider two companies, 
one with a spread of 1,000 basis points and the other with a spread of 10 basis points. To 
buy protection on both companies would cost slightly less than 505 basis points per 
company. This is because the 1,000 basis points is not expected to be paid for as long as 
the 10 basis points and should therefore carry less weight. 
.
5
 As mentioned in Section 11.2, conditional default probabilities are known as default 
intensities or hazard rates. 
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Table 13.1 Unconditional default probabilities 
and survival probabilities. 
will survive until the end of the first year is 0.98. The probability of a 
default during the second year is 0.02 x 0.98 = 0.0196 and the probability 
of survival until the end of the second year is 0.98 x 0.98 = 0.9604. The 
probability of default during the third year is 0.02 x 0.9604 = 0.0192, and 
so on. 
We will assume that defaults always happen halfway through a year and 
that payments on the credit default swap are made once a year, at the end 
of each year. We also assume that the risk-free (LIBOR) interest rate is 5% 
per annum with continuous compounding and the recovery rate is 40%. 
There are three parts to the calculation. These are shown in Tables 13.2, 
13.3, and 13.4. 
Table 13.2 shows the calculation of the expected present value of the 
payments made on the CDS assuming that payments are made at the rate 
of s per year and the notional principal is $1. For example, there is a 0.9412 
probability that the third payment of s is made. The expected payment is 
therefore 0.9412s and its present value is The 
total present value of the expected payments is 4.07045. 
Table 13.2 Calculation of the present value of expected payments. 
Payment = 5 per annum. 
Time 
(years) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Total 
Probability 
of survival 
0.9800 
0.9604 
0.9412 
0.9224 
0.9039 
Expected 
payment 
0.98005 
0.96045 
0.94125 
0.92245 
0.90395 
Discount 
factor 
0.9512 
0.9048 
0.8607 
0.8187 
0.7788 
PV of expected 
payment 
0.93225 
0.86905 
0.8101s 
0.75525 
0.70405 
4.07045 
Time 
(years) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Default 
probability 
0.0200 
0.0196 
0.0192 
0.0188 
0.0184 
Survival 
probability 
0.9800 
0.9604 
0.9412 
0.9224 
0.9039 
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Table 13.3 Calculation of the present value of expected payoff. 
Notional principal = $1. 
Time 
(years) 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
Total 
Probability 
of default 
0.0200 
0.0196 
0.0192 
0.0188 
0.0184 
Recovery 
rate 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
Expected 
payoff ($) 
0.0120 
0.0118 
0.0115 
0.0113 
0.0111 
Discount 
factor 
0.9753 
0.9277 
0.8825 
0.8395 
0.7985 
PV of expected 
payoff ($) 
0.0117 
0.0109 
0.0102 
0.0095 
0.0088 
0.0511 
Table 13.3 shows the calculation of the expected present value of the 
payoff assuming a notional principal of $1. As mentioned earlier, we are 
assuming that defaults always happen halfway through a year. For 
example, there is a 0.0192 probability of a payoff halfway through the 
third year. Given that the recovery rate is 40% the expected payoff at this 
time is 0.0192 x 0.6 x 1 = $0.0115, The present value of the expected 
payoff is 0.0115e-0.05x2.5 = $0.0102. The total present value of the ex-
pected payoffs is $0.0511. 
As a final step we evaluate in Table 13.4 the accrual payment made in 
the event of a default. For example, there is a 0.0192 probability that 
there will be a final accrual payment halfway through the third year. The 
accrual payment is 0.5s. The expected accrual payment at this time is 
therefore 0.0192 x 0.5s = 0.0096s. Its present value is 0.0096se-0.05x2.5 = 
0.0085s. The total present value of the expected accrual payments 
is 0.0426s. 
Table 13.4 Calculation of the present value of accrual payment. 
Time 
(years) 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
Total 
Probability 
of default 
0.0200 
0.0196 
0.0192 
0.0188 
0.0184 
Expected 
accrual payment 
0.01005 
0.00985 
0.00965 
0.00945 
0.00925 
Discount 
factor 
0.9753 
0.9277 
0.8825 
0.8395 
0.7985 
PV of expected 
accrual payment 
0.00975 
0.00915 
0.00855 
0.00795 
0.00745 
0.04265 
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From Tables 13.2 and 13.4, we see that the present value of the expected 
payments is 
4.0704s + 0.0426s = 4.1130s 
From Table 13.3 the present value of the expected payoff is $0.0511. 
Equating the two, the CDS spread for a new CDS is given by 
4.1130s = 0.0511 
or s = 0.0124. The mid-market spread should be 0.0124 times the principal 
or 124 basis points per year. This example is designed to illustrate the 
calculation methodology. In practice, we are likely to find that calculations 
are more extensive than those in Tables 13.2 to 13.4 because (a) payments 
are often made more frequently than once a year and (b) we might want to 
assume that defaults can happen more frequently than once a year. 
Marking to Market a CDS 
At the time it is negotiated, a CDS like most other swaps is worth close to 
zero. At later times it may have a positive or negative value. Suppose, for 
example, that the credit default swap in our example had been negotiated 
some time ago for a spread of 150 basis points, the present value of the 
payments by the buyer would be 4.1130x0.0150 = 0.0617 and the 
present value of the payoff would be 0.0511 as above. The value of the 
swap to the seller would therefore be 0.0617 - 0.0511, or 0.0106 times the 
principal. Similarly, the mark-to market value of the swap to the buyer of 
protection would be —0.0106 times the principal. 
Estimating Default Probabilities 
The default probabilities used to value a CDS should be risk-neutral 
default probabilities, not real-world default probabilities (see Section 11.5 
for a discussion of the difference between the two). Risk-neutral default 
probabilities can be estimated from bond prices or asset swaps, as 
explained in Chapter 11. An alternative is to imply them from CDS 
quotes. The latter approach is similar to the practice in options markets 
of implying volatilities from the prices of actively traded options. 
Suppose we change the example in Tables 13.2, 13.3, and 13.4 so that 
we do not know the default probabilities. Instead, we know that the mid-
market CDS spread for a newly issued five-year CDS is 100 basis points 
per year. We can then reverse-engineer our calculations to conclude that 
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the implied default probability (conditional on no earlier default) is 
1.61% per year.6 
Binary Credit Default Swaps 
A binary credit default swap is structured similarly to a regular credit 
default swap except that the payoff is a fixed dollar amount. Suppose, in 
the example we have considered in Tables 13.1 to 13.4, that the payoff is 
$1 instead of 1 - R dollars and that the swap spread is s. Tables 13.1, 
13.2, and 13.4 are the same. Table 13.3 is replaced by Table 13.5. The 
CDS spread for a new binary CDS is given by 
4.1130s = 0.0852 
so that the CDS spread s is 0.0207, or 207 basis points. 
How Important is the Recovery Rate? 
Whether we use CDS spreads or bond prices to estimate default prob-
abilities, we need an estimate of the recovery rate. However, provided that 
we use the same recovery rate for (a) estimating risk-neutral default 
probabilities and (b) valuing a CDS, the value of the CDS (or the 
estimate of the CDS spread) is not very sensitive to the recovery rate. 
This is because the implied probabilities of default are approximately 
proportional to 1/(1 - R) and the payoffs from a CDS are proportional 
to 1 - R. 
Table 13.5 Calculation of the present value of expected payoff from a 
binary credit default swap. Principal = $1. 
Time 
(years) 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
Total 
Probability 
of default 
0.0200 
0.0196 
0.0192 
0.0188 
0.0184 
Expected 
payoff'($) 
0.0200 
0.0196 
0.0192 
0.0188 
0.0184 
Discount 
factor 
0.9753 
0.9277 
0.8825 
0.8395 
0.7985. 
PV of expected 
payoff ($) 
0.0195 
0.0182 
0.0170 
0.0158 
0.0147 
0.0852 
6
 Ideally, we would like to estimate a different default probability for each year instead of 
a single default intensity. We could do this if we had spreads for 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year 
credit default swaps or bond prices. 
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This argument does not apply to the valuation of a binary CDS. The 
probabilities of default implied from a regular CDS are still proportional 
to 1/(1 — R). However, for a binary CDS, the payoffs from the CDS are 
independent of R. If we have CDS spreads for both a plain vanilla CDS 
and a binary CDS, we can estimate both the recovery rate and the 
default probability (see Problem 13.23). 
The Future of the CDS Market 
The market for credit default swaps has grown rapidly in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Credit default swaps have become important tools for 
managing credit risk. A financial institution can reduce its credit exposure 
to particular companies by buying protection. It can also use CDSs to 
diversify credit risk. For example, if a financial institution has too much 
credit exposure to a particular business sector, it can buy protection 
against defaults by companies in the sector and at the same time sell 
protection against default by companies in other unrelated sectors. 
Some market participants believe that the growth of the CDS market 
will continue and that it will be as big as the interest rate swap market by 
2010. Others are less optimistic. As pointed out in Business Snapshot 13.2, 
there is a potential asymmetric information problem in the CDS market 
that is not present in other over-the-counter derivatives markets. 
13.4 CDS FORWARDS AND OPTIONS 
Once the CDS market was well established, it was natural for derivatives 
dealers to trade forwards and options on credit default swap spreads. 
A forward credit default swap is the obligation to buy or sell a 
particular credit default swap on a particular reference entity at a 
particular future time T. If the reference entity defaults before time T 
the forward contract ceases to exist. Thus, a bank could enter into a 
forward contract to sell five-year protection on Ford Motor Credit for 
280 basis points starting one year from now. If Ford defaults during the 
next year, the bank's obligation under the forward contract ceases to exist. 
A credit default swap option is an option to buy or sell a particular 
credit default swap on a particular reference entity at a particular future 
time T. For example, an investor could negotiate the right to buy five-year 
7
 The valuation of these instruments is discussed in J.C. Hull and A. White, "The 
Valuation of Credit Default Swap Options," Journal of Derivatives, 10, No. 5 (Spring 
2003) 40-50. 
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protection on Ford Motor Credit starting in one year for 280 basis points. 
This is a call option. If the five-year CDS spread for Ford in one year 
turns out to be more than 280 basis points the option will be exercised; 
otherwise it will not be exercised. The cost of the option would be paid up 
front. Similarly, an investor might negotiate the right to sell five-year 
protection on Ford Motor Credit for 280 basis points starting in one year. 
This is a put option. If the five-year CDS spread for Ford in one year 
turns out to be less than 280 basis points the option will be exercised; 
otherwise it will not be exercised. Again the cost of the option would be 
Paid up front. Like CDS forwards, CDS options are usually structured so 
that they will cease to exist if the reference entity defaults before option 
maturity. 
An option contract that is sometimes traded in the credit derivatives 
market is a call option on a basket of reference entities. If there are m 
reference entities in the basket that have not defaulted by the option 
maturity, the option gives the holder the right to buy a portfolio of CDSs 
on the names for mK basis points, where K is the strike price. In addition, 
the holder gets the usual CDS payoff on any reference entities that do 
default during the life of the contract. 
Business Snapshot 13.2 Is the CDS Market a Fair Game? 
There is one important difference between credit default swaps and the other 
over-the-counter derivatives that we have considered in this book. The other 
over-the-counter derivatives depend on interest rates, exchange rates, equity 
indices, commodity prices, and so on. There is no reason to assume that any 
one market participant has better information than other market participants 
about these variables. 
Credit default swaps spreads depend on the probability that a particular 
company will default during a particular period of time. Arguably some 
market participants have more information to estimate this probability than 
others. A financial institution that works closely with a particular company by 
providing advice, making loans, and handling new issues of securities is likely 
:to have more information about the creditworthiness of the company than 
another financial institution that has no dealings with the company. Econo-
mists refer to this as an asymmetric information problem. 
Whether asymmetric information will curtail the expansion of the credit 
default swap market remains to be seen. Financial institutions emphasize that 
the decision to buy protection against the risk of default by a company is 
normally made by a risk manager and is not based on any special information 
that many exist elsewhere in the financial institution about the company. 
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13.5 TOTAL RETURN SWAPS 
A total return swap is a type of credit derivative. It is an agreement to 
exchange the total return on a bond (or any portfolio of assets) for 
LIBOR plus a spread. The total return includes coupons, interest, and 
the gain or loss on the asset over the life of the swap. 
An example of a total return swap is a five-year agreement with a 
notional principal of $100 million to exchange the total return on a 
corporate bond for LIBOR plus 25 basis points. This is illustrated in 
Figure 13.2. On coupon payment dates the payer pays the coupons earned 
on an investment of $100 million in the bond. The receiver pays interest at a 
rate of LIBOR plus 25 basis points on a principal of $100 million. (LIBOR 
is set on one coupon date and paid on the next as in a plain vanilla interest 
rate swap.) At the end of the life of the swap there is a payment reflecting 
the change in value of the bond. For example, if the bond increases in value 
by 10% over the life of the swap, the payer is required to pay $10 million 
(= 10% of $100 million) at the end of the five years. Similarly, if the bond 
decreases in value by 15%, the receiver is required to pay $15 million at the 
end of the five years. If there is a default on the bond, the swap is usually 
terminated and the receiver makes a final payment equal to the excess of 
$100 million over the market value of the bond. 
If we add the notional principal to both sides at the end of the life of 
the swap, we can characterize the total return swap as follows. The payer 
pays the cash flows on an investment of $100 million in the corporate 
bond. The receiver pays the cash flows on a $100 million bond paying 
LIBOR plus 25 basis points. If the payer owns the corporate bond, the 
total return swap allows it to pass the credit risk on the bond to the 
receiver. If it does not own the bond, the total return swap allows it to 
take a short position in the bond. 
Total return swaps are often used as a financing tool. One scenario that 
could lead to the swap in Figure 13.2 is as follows. The receiver wants 
financing to invest $100 million in the reference bond. It approaches the 
payer (which is likely to be a financial institution) and agrees to the swap. 
The payer then invests $100 million in the bond. This leaves the receiver in 
the same position as it would have been if it had borrowed money at 
Figure 13.2 Total return swap. 
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LIBOR plus 25 basis points to buy the bond. The payer retains ownership 
of the bond for the life of the swap and faces less credit risk than it would 
have done if it had lent money to the receiver to finance the purchase of 
the bond, with the bond being used as collateral for the loan. If the 
receiver defaults, the payer does not have the legal problem of trying to 
realize on the collateral.8 
The spread over LIBOR received by the payer is compensation for 
bearing the risk that the receiver will default. The payer will lose money 
if the receiver defaults at a time when the reference bond's price has 
declined. The spread therefore depends on the credit quality of the receiver 
and of the bond issuer, and on the default correlation between the two. 
There are a number of variations on the standard deal we have 
described. Sometimes, instead of a cash payment for the change in the 
value of the bond, there is physical settlement where the payer exchanges 
the underlying asset for the notional principal at the end of the life of the 
swap. Sometimes the change-in-value payments are made periodically 
rather than all at the end of the life of the swap. 
13.6 BASKET CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
In what is referred to as a basket credit default swap there are a number of 
reference entities. An add-up basket CDS provides a payoff when any of 
the reference entities default. A first-to-default CDS provides a payoff 
only when the first default occurs. A second-to-default CDS provides a 
payoff only when the second default occurs. More generally, an nth-to-
default CDS provides a payoff only when the nth default occurs. Payoffs 
are calculated in the same way as for a regular CDS. After the relevant 
default has occurred, there is a settlement. The swap then terminates and 
there are no further payments by either party. 
13.7 COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS 
A collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a way of creating securities with 
widely different risk characteristics from a portfolio of debt instruments. 
8
 Repos are structured to minimize credit risk in a similar way. A company requiring 
short-term funds sells securities to the lender and agrees to buy them back at a later time 
at a slightly higher price. The difference between the prices is the interest the lender earns. 
If the borrower defaults, the lender keeps the securities. If the lender defaults, the 
borrower keeps the funds. 
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Figure 13.3 Collateralized debt obligation. 
An example is shown in Figure 13.3, where four types of securities (or 
tranches) are created from a portfolio of bonds. The first tranche has 5% of 
the total bond principal and absorbs all credit losses from the portfolio 
during the life of the CDO until they have reached 5% of the total bond 
principal. The second tranche has 10% of the principal and absorbs all 
losses during the life of the CDO in excess of 5% of the principal up to a 
maximum of 15% of the principal. The third tranche has 10% of the 
principal and absorbs all losses in excess of 15% of the principal up to a 
maximum of 25% of the principal. The fourth tranche has 75% of the 
principal and absorbs all losses in excess of 25% of the principal. The 
yields in Figure 13.3 are the rates of interest paid to tranche holders. These 
rates are paid on the balance of the principal remaining in the tranche after 
losses have been paid. Consider the first tranche. Initially the return of 
35% is paid on the whole amount invested by the tranche holders. But after 
losses equal to 1 % of the total bond principal have been experienced, the 
tranche holders have lost 20% of their investment and the return is paid on 
only 80% of the original amount invested.9 Tranche 1 is referred to as the 
9
 When a bond with principal Q defaults and a recovery of QR is made, the usual 
arrangement is that a loss of (1 - Q)R is sustained by the most junior tranche. An 
amount QR is paid to the most senior tranche and this tranche's principal is reduce 
by QR. 
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equity tranche. A default loss of 2.5% on the bond portfolio translates into 
a loss of 50% of the tranche's principal. Tranche 4 is usually given an Aaa 
rating. Defaults on the bond portfolio must exceed 25% before the holders 
of this tranche are responsible for any credit losses. 
The creator of the CDO normally retains the equity tranche and sells 
the remaining tranches in the market. A CDO provides a way of creating 
high-quality debt from average-quality (or even low-quality) debt. 
Synthetic CDOs 
The CDO in Figure 13.3 is referred to as a cash CDO. An alternative 
structure which has become popular is a synthetic CDO, where the creator 
of the CDO sells a portfolio of credit default swaps to third parties. It 
then passes the default risk on to the synthetic CDO's tranche holders. 
Analogously to Figure 13.3, the first tranche might be responsible for the 
payoffs on the credit default swaps until they have reached 5% of the total 
notional principal; the second tranche might be responsible for the pay-
offs between 5% and 15% of the total notional principal; and so on. The 
income from the credit default swaps is distributed to the tranches in a 
way that reflects the risk they are bearing. For example, the first tranche 
might get 3,000 basis points; the second tranche 1,000 basis points, and 
so on. As with a cash CDO, losses on defaults would be netted against 
the principal to determine the amount on which interest is paid. 
Single-Tranche Trading 
In Section 13.2 we discussed the portfolios of 125 companies that are used 
to generate CDX and iTraxx indices. The market uses these portfolios to 
define standard CDO tranches. The trading of these standard tranches is 
known as single-tranche trading. A single-tranche trade is an agreement 
where one side agrees to sell protection against losses on a tranche and the 
other side agrees to buy the protection. The tranche is not part of a 
synthetic CDO, but cash flows are calculated in the same way as if it were 
part of a synthetic CDO. The tranche is referred to as "unfunded" because 
it has not been created by selling credit default swaps or buying bonds. 
In the case of the CDX NA IG index, the equity tranche covers losses 
between 0% and 3% of the principal. The second tranche, which is 
referred to as the mezzanine tranche, covers losses between 3% and 7%. 
The remaining tranches cover losses from 7% to 10%, 10% to 15%, and 
15% to 30%. In the case of the iTraxx Europe index, the equity tranche 
covers losses between 0% and 3%. The mezzanine tranche covers losses 
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Table 13.6 Five-year CDX IG NA and iTraxx Europe tranches on 
August 30, 2005. Quotes are in basis points except for 0-3% tranche. 
Source: Reuters 
CDX IG NA 
Tranche 0-3% 3-7% 7-10% 10-15% 15-30% 
Quote 40% 127 35.5 20.5 9.5 
iTraxx Europe 
Tranche 0-3% 3-6% 6-9% 9-12% 12-22% 
Quote 24% 81 26.5 15 9 
between 3% and 6%. The remaining tranches cover losses from 6% to 9%, 
9% to 12%, and 12% to 22%. 
Table 13.6 shows the mid-market quotes for the five-year CDX and 
iTraxx tranches on August 30, 2005. On that date the CDX index level was 
50 basis points and the iTraxx index was 36.375 basis points. For example, 
the mid-market price of mezzanine protection for the CDX IG NA was 
127 basis points per year, while that for iTraxx Europe was 81 basis points 
per year. Note that the equity tranche is quoted differently from the other 
tranches. The market quote of 40% for CDX means that the protection 
seller receives an initial payment of 40% of the principal plus a spread of 
500 basis points per year. Similarly, the market quote of 24% for iTraxx 
means that the protection seller receives an initial payment of 24% of the 
principal plus a spread of 500 basis points per year. 
13.8 VALUATION OF A BASKET CDS AND CDO 
The spread for an nth-to-default CDS or the tranche of a CDO is critically 
dependent on default correlation. Suppose that a basket of 100 reference 
entities is used to define a five-year nth-to-default CDS and that each 
reference entity has a risk-neutral probability of defaulting during the five 
years equal to 2%. When the default correlation between the reference 
entities is zero, the binomial distribution shows that the probability of one 
or more defaults during the five years is 86.74% and the probability often 
or more defaults is 0.0034%. A first-to-default CDS is therefore quite 
valuable, whereas a tenth-to-default CDS is worth almost nothing. 
As the default correlation increases the probability of one or more 
defaults declines and the probability of ten or more defaults increases. 
In the limit where the default correlation between the reference entities 
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is perfect, the probability of one or more defaults equals the probability 
of ten or more defaults and is 2%. This is because in this extreme 
situation the reference entities are essentially the same. Either they all 
default (with probability 2%) or none of them default (with prob-
ability 98%). 
The valuation of a tranche of a CDO is similarly dependent on default 
correlation. If the correlation is low, the junior equity tranche is very risky 
and the senior tranches are very safe. As the default correlation increases, 
the junior tranches become less risky and the senior tranches become more 
risky. In the limit where the default correlation is perfect the tranches are 
equally risky. 
Using the Gaussian Copula Model of Time to Default 
The one-factor Gaussian copula model of time to default presented in 
Section 6.5 has become the standard market model for valuing an nth-to-
default CDS or a tranche of a CDO. 
Consider a portfolio of N companies, each having a probability Q(T) 
of defaulting by time T. From equation (6.11), the probability of 
default, conditional on the level of the factor F, is 
The trick to valuing an nth-to-default CDS or a CDO is to calculate 
expected cash flows conditional on F and then integrate over F. The 
advantage of this is that, conditional on F, defaults are independent. The 
Business Snapshot 13.3 Correlation Smiles 
Credit derivatives dealers imply default correlations from the spreads on 
tranches. The compound correlation is the correlation that prices a particular 
tranche correctly. The base correlation is the correlation that prices all tranches 
up to a certain level of seniority correctly. If all implied correlations were the 
same, we could deduce that market prices are consistent with the one-factor 
Gaussian copula model for time to default. In practice, we find that compound 
correlations exhibit a "smile" with the correlations for the most junior (equity) 
and senior tranches higher than those for intermediate tranches. The base 
correlations exhibit a "skew" where the correlation increases with the level of 
seniority considered. 
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probability of exactly k defaults by time T, conditional on F, is 
Derivatives dealers calculate the implied copula correlation in 
equation (13.1) from the spreads quoted in the market for tranches of 
CDOs and tend to quote these rather than the spreads themselves (see 
Business Snapshot 13.3). This is similar to the practice in options markets 
of quoting Black-Scholes implied volatilities rather than dollar prices. 
SUMMARY 
Financial institutions use credit derivatives to actively manage their 
credit risks. They use them to transfer credit risk from one company 
to another and to diversify credit risk by swapping one type of exposure 
for another. 
The most common credit derivative is a credit default swap. This is a 
contract where one company buys insurance against another company 
defaulting on its obligations. The payoff is usually the difference between 
the face value of a bond issued by the second company and its value 
immediately after a default. Credit default swaps can be analyzed by 
calculating the present value of the expected payments and the present 
value of the expected payoff. 
A forward credit default swap is an obligation to enter into a particular 
credit default swap on a particular date. A credit default swap option is the 
right to enter into a particular credit default swap on a particular date. 
Both cease to exist if the reference entity defaults before the date. 
A total return swap is an instrument where the total return on a 
portfolio of credit-sensitive assets is exchanged for LIBOR plus a spread. 
Total return swaps are often used as financing vehicles. A company 
wanting to purchase a portfolio of bonds approaches a financial institu-
tion, who buys the bonds on its behalf. The financial institution then 
enters into a total return swap where it pays the return on the bonds to 
the company and receives LIBOR plus a spread. The advantage of this 
type of arrangement is that the financial institution reduces its exposure 
to defaults by the company. 
An nth-to-default CDS is defined as a CDS that pays off when the nth 
default occurs in a portfolio of companies. In a collateralized debt 
obligation, a number of different securities are created from a portfolio 
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of corporate bonds or commercial loans. There are rules for determining 
how credit losses are allocated to the securities. The result of the rules is 
that securities with both very high and very low credit ratings are created 
from the portfolio. A synthetic collateralized debt obligation creates a 
similar set of securities from credit default swaps. The standard market 
model for pricing both an nth-to-default CDS and tranches of a CDO is 
the one-factor Gaussian copula model for time to default. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
13.1. Explain the difference between a regular credit default swap and a binary 
credit default swap. 
13.2. A credit default swap requires a semiannual payment at the rate of 60 basis 
points per year. The principal is $300 million and the credit default swap is 
settled in cash. A default occurs after 4 years and 2 months, and the 
calculation agent estimates that the price of the cheapest deliverable bond 
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is 40% of its face value shortly after the default. List the cash flows and 
their timing for the seller of the credit default swap. 
13.3. Explain the two ways a credit default swap can be settled. 
13.4. Explain how a cash CDO and a synthetic CDO are created. 
13.5. Explain what a first-to-default credit default swap is. Does its value 
increase or decrease as the default correlation between the companies 
in the basket increases? Explain your answer. 
13.6. Explain the difference between risk-neutral and real-world default 
probabilities. 
13.7. Explain why a total return swap can be useful as a financing tool. 
13.8. Suppose that the risk-free zero curve is flat at 7% per annum with 
continuous compounding and that defaults can occur halfway through 
each year in a new 5-year credit default swap. Suppose that the recovery 
rate is 30% and the default probabilities each year conditional on no 
earlier default is 3%. Estimate the credit default swap spread. Assume 
payments are made annually. 
13.9. What is the value of the swap in Problem 13.8 (per dollar of notional 
principal) to the protection buyer if the credit default swap spread is 
150 basis points? 
13.10. What is the credit default swap spread in Problem 13.8 if it is a binary 
CDS? 
13.11. How does a 5-year nth-to-default credit default swap work? Consider a 
basket of 100 reference entities where each reference entity has a prob-
ability of defaulting in each year of 1%. As the default correlation 
between the reference entities increases, what would you expect to 
happen to the value of the swap when (a) n = 1 and (b) n = 25. Explain 
your answer. 
13.12. How is the recovery rate of a bond usually defined? 
13.13. Show that the spread for a new plain vanilla CDS should be (1 - R) 
times the spread for a similar new binary CDS, where R is the recovery 
rate. 
13.14. A company enters into a total return swap where it receives the return on 
a corporate bond paying a coupon of 5% and pays LIBOR. Explain the 
difference between this and a regular swap where 5% is exchanged for 
LIBOR. 
13.15. Explain how forward contracts and options on credit default swaps are 
structured. 
13.16. "The position of a buyer of a credit default swap is similar to the position 
of someone who is long a risk-free bond and short a corporate bond-
Explain this statement. 
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13.17. Why is there a potential asymmetric information problem in credit 
default swaps? 
13.18. Does valuing a CDS using real-world default probabilities rather than 
risk-neutral default probabilities overstate or understate the value of the 
protection? Explain your answer. 
13.19. What is the difference between a total return swap and an asset swap? 
13.20. Suppose that in a one-factor Gaussian copula model the 5-year prob-
ability of default for each of 125 names is 3% and the pairwise copula 
correlation is 0.2. Calculate, for factor values of —2, — 1, 0, 1, and 2, 
(a) the default probability conditional on the factor value and (b) the 
probability of more than 10 defaults conditional on the factor value. 
13.21. What is a CDO squared? How about a CDO cubed? 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
13.22. Suppose that the risk-free zero curve is flat at 6% per annum with 
continuous compounding and that defaults can occur at times 0.25 years, 
0.75 years, 1.25 years, and 1.75 years in a 2-year plain vanilla credit 
default swap with semiannual payments. Suppose that the recovery rate is 
20% and the unconditional probabilities of default (as seen at time zero) 
are 1% at times 0.25 years and 0.75 years, and 1.5% at times 1.25 years 
and 1.75 years. What is the credit default swap spread? What would the 
credit default spread be if the instrument were a binary credit default 
swap? 
13.23. Assume that the default probability for a company in a year, conditional 
on no earlier defaults is and the recovery rate is R. The risk-free interest 
rate is 5% per annum. Default always occurs halfway through a year. 
The spread for a 5-year plain vanilla CDS where payments are made 
annually is 120 basis points and the spread for a 5-year binary CDS 
where payments are made annually is 160 basis points. Estimate R and 
13.24. Explain how you would expect the yields offered on the various tranches 
in a CDO to change when the correlation between the bonds in the 
portfolio increases. 
13.25. Suppose that (a) the yield on a 5-year risk-free bond is 7%, (b) the yield on 
a 5-year corporate bond issued by company X is 9.5%, and (c) a 5-year 
credit default swap providing insurance against company X defaulting 
costs 150 basis points per year. What arbitrage opportunity is there in this 
situation? What arbitrage opportunity would there be if the credit default 
spread were 300 basis points instead of 150 basis points? Give two reasons 
why arbitrage opportunities such as those you have identified are less than 
perfect. 
Operational Risk 
In 1999, bank supervisors announced plans to assign capital for opera-
tional risk in the new Basel II regulations. This met with some opposition 
from banks. The chairman and CEO of one major international bank 
described it as "the dopiest thing I have ever seen". However, bank super-
visors persisted. They argued that operational risk was a major issue for 
banks. They pointed out that during a ten-year period more than 100 
operational risk losses, each exceeding $100 million, had occurred. Some of 
these losses, listed by the categories used by the Bank for International 
Settlements, are: 
Internal fraud: Allied Irish Bank, Barings, and Daiwa lost $700 million, 
$1 billion, and $1.4 billion, respectively, from fraudulent trading. 
External fraud: Republic New York Corp. lost $611 million because of 
fraud committed by a custodial client. 
Employment practices and workplace safety: Merrill Lynch lost $250 mil-
lion in a legal settlement regarding gender discrimination. 
Clients, products, & business practices: Household International lost 
$484 million from improper lending practices; Providian Financial Cor-
poration lost $405 million from improper sales and billing practices. 
Damage to physical assets: Bank of New York lost $140 million because of 
damage to its facilities related to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack. 
Business disruption and system failures: Solomon Brothers lost $303 mil-
lion from a change in computing technology. 
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Execution, delivery and process management: Bank of America and Wells 
Fargo Bank lost $225 million and $150 million, respectively, from systems 
integration failures and transactions processing failures. 
Most banks have always had some framework in place for managing 
operational risk. However, the prospect of new capital requirements has 
led them to greatly increase the resources they devote to measuring and 
monitoring operational risk. 
It is much more difficult to quantify operational risk than credit or 
market risk. Operational risk is also more difficult to manage. Banks make 
a conscious decision to take a certain amount of credit and market risk, 
and there are many traded instruments that can be used to reduce these 
risks. Operational risk, by contrast, is a necessary part of doing business. 
An important part of operational risk management is identifying the types 
of risks that are being taken and which should be insured against. There is 
always a danger that a huge loss will be incurred from taking an opera-
tional risk that ex ante was not even recognized as a risk. 
It might be thought that a loss such as that which brought down 
Barings Bank was a result of market risk because it was movements in 
market variables that led to it. However, it should be classified as 
operational risk because it involved fraud by one of its traders, Nick 
Leeson (see Business Snapshot 2.4). Suppose there was no fraud. If it was 
the bank's policy to let traders take huge risks, then the loss would be 
classified as market risk. But if this was not the bank's policy and there 
was a breakdown in its controls, then it would be classified as operational 
risk. Operational risk losses are often contingent on market movements. 
If the market had moved in Leeson's favor, there would have been no 
loss. The fraud and breakdown in the bank's control systems would 
probably never have come to light. 
There are some parallels between the operational risk losses of banks 
and the losses of insurance companies. Insurance companies face a small 
probability of a large loss arising from a hurricane, earthquake, or other 
natural disaster. Similarly, banks face a small probability of a large 
operational risk loss. But there is one important difference. When insur-
ance companies lose a large amount of money because of a natural 
disaster, all companies in the industry tend to be affected and premiums 
rise the next year to cover losses. Operational risk losses tend to affect only 
one bank. Since it operates in a competitive environment, the bank does 
not have the luxury of increasing prices for the services it offers during the 
following year. 
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14.1 WHAT IS OPERATIONAL RISK? 
There are many different ways in which operational risk can be defined. It 
is tempting to consider operational risk as a residual risk and define it as 
any risk faced by a bank that is not market risk or credit risk. To produce 
an estimate of operational risk, we could then look at the bank's financial 
statements and remove from the income statement (a) the impact of credit 
losses and (b) the profits or losses from market risk exposure. The variation 
in the resulting income would then be attributed to operational risk. 
Most people agree that this definition of operational risk is too broad. 
It includes the risks associated with entering new markets, developing new 
products, economic factors, and so on. Another possible definition is that 
operational risk, as its name implies, is the risk arising from operations. 
This includes the risk of mistakes in processing transactions, making 
payments, etc. This definition of risk is too narrow. It does not include 
major risks such as the "rogue trader" risk. 
We can distinguish between internal risks and external risks. Internal 
risks are those over which the company has control. The company chooses 
whom it employs, what computer systems it develops, what controls are in 
place, and so on. Some people define operational risks as all internal risks. 
Operational risk then includes more than just the risk arising from opera-
tions. It includes risks arising from inadequate controls such as the rogue 
trader risk and the risks of other sorts of employee fraud. 
Regulators favor including more than just internal risks in their defini-
tion of operational risk. They include the impact of external events, such as 
natural disasters (e.g., a fire or an earthquake that affects the bank's 
operations), political or regulatory risk (e.g., being prevented from operat-
ing in a foreign country by that country's government), security breaches, 
and so on. All of this is reflected in the following definition of operational 
risk produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2001: 
The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people, and systems or from external events. 
Note that this definition includes legal risk, but does not include reputa-
tion risk or the risk resulting from strategic decisions. 
Some operational risks result in increases in the bank's operating cost 
or decreases in its revenue. Other operational risks interact with credit 
and market risk. For example, when mistakes are made in a loan's 
documentation, it is usually the case that losses result if and only if 
the counterparty defaults. When a trader exceeds limits and misreports 
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positions, losses result if and only if the market moves against the 
trader. 
14.2 DETERMINATION OF REGULATORY CAPITAL 
Banks have three alternatives for determining operational risk regulatory 
capital. The simplest approach is the basic indicator approach. Under this 
approach, operational risk capital is set equal to 15% of annual gross 
income over the previous three years. Gross income is defined as net 
interest income plus noninterest income.1 A slightly more complicated 
approach is the standardized approach, in which a bank's activities are 
divided into eight business lines: corporate finance, trading and sales, 
retail banking, commercial banking, payment and settlement, agency 
services, asset management, and retail brokerage. The average gross 
income over the last three years for each business line is multiplied by a 
"beta factor" for that business line and the result summed to determine 
the total capital. The beta factors are shown in Table 14.1. The third 
alternative is the advanced measurement approach (AMA), in which the 
operational risk regulatory capital requirement is calculated by the bank 
internally using qualitative and quantitative criteria. 
The Basel Committee has listed conditions that a bank must satisfy in 
order to use the standardized approach or the AMA approach. It expects 
large internationally active banks to move toward adopting the AMA 
Table 14.1 Beta factors in standardized 
approach. 
Business line 
Corporate finance 
Trading and sales 
Retail banking 
Commercial banking 
Payment and settlement 
Agency services 
Asset management 
Retail brokerage 
Beta factor 
18% 
18% 
12% 
15% 
18% 
15% 
12% . .. 
12% 
1
 Net interest income is the excess of income earned on loans over interest paid on 
deposits and other instruments that are used to fund the loans (see Section 1.3). 
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approach through time. To use the standardized approach, a bank must 
satisfy the following conditions: 
1. The bank must have an operational risk management function that 
is responsible for identifying, assessing, monitoring, and controlling 
operational risk. 
2. The bank must keep track of relevant losses by business line and 
must create incentives for the improvement of operational risk. 
3. There must be regular reporting of operational risk losses through-
out the bank. 
4. The bank's operational risk management system must be well 
documented. 
5. The bank's operational risk management processes and assessment 
system must be subject to regular independent reviews by internal 
auditors. It must also be subject to regular review by external 
auditors or supervisors or both. 
To use the AMA approach, the bank must satisfy additional require-
ments. It must be able to estimate unexpected losses based on an analysis 
of relevant internal and external data, and scenario analyses. The bank's 
system must be capable of allocating economic capital for operational risk 
Figure 14.1 Calculation of VaR for operational risk. 
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across business lines in a way that creates incentives for the business lines 
to improve operational risk management. 
The objective of banks using the AMA approach for operational risk is 
analogous to their objectives when they attempt to quantify credit risk. 
They would like to produce a probability distribution of losses such as 
that shown in Figure 14.1. Assuming that they can convince regulators 
that their expected operational risk cost is incorporated into their pricing 
of products, capital is assigned to cover unexpected costs. The confidence 
level is 99.9% and the time horizon is one year. 
14.3 CATEGORIZATION OF OPERATIONAL RISKS 
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision has identified seven categories 
of operational risk.2 These are: 
1. Internal fraud: Acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate 
property or circumvent regulations, the law, or company policy 
(excluding diversity or discrimination events which involve at least 
one internal party). Examples include intentional misreporting of 
positions, employee theft, and insider trading on an employee's own 
account. 
2. External fraud: Acts by third party of a type intended to defraud, 
misappropriate property or circumvent the law. Examples include 
robbery, forgery, check kiting, and damage from computer hacking. 
3. Employment practices and workplace safety: Acts inconsistent with 
employment, health or safety laws or agreements, or which result in 
payment of personal injury claims, or claims relating to diversity or 
discrimination issues. Examples include workers compensation 
claims, violation of employee heath and safety rules, organized 
labor activities, discrimination claims, and general liability (e.g., a 
customer slipping and falling at a branch office). 
4. Clients, products, and business practices: Unintentional or negligent 
failure to meet a professional obligation to specific clients (including 
fiduciary and suitability requirements), or from the nature or design 
of a product. Examples include fiduciary breaches, misuse of 
confidential customer information, improper trading activities on 
2
 See Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, "Sound Practices for the Management and 
Supervision of Operational Risk," Bank for International Settlements, July 2002. 
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the bank's account, money laundering, and the sale of unauthorized 
products. 
5. Damage to physical assets: Loss or damage to physical assets from 
natural disasters or other events. Examples include terrorism, 
vandalism, earthquakes, fires, and floods. 
6. Business disruption and system failures: Disruption of business or 
system failures. Examples include hardware and software failures, 
telecommunication problems, and utility outages. 
7. Execution, delivery, and process management: Failed transaction 
processing or process management, and relations with trade counter-
parties and vendors. Examples include data entry errors, collateral 
management failures, incomplete legal documentation, unapproved 
access given to clients accounts, nonclient counterparty misperform-
ance, and vendor disputes. 
Banks must assess their exposure to each type of risk for each of the 
eight business lines listed in Table 14.1. Ideally this will lead to a result 
where VaR is estimated for each of 7 x 8 = 56 risk-type/business-line 
combinations. 
14.4 LOSS SEVERITY AND LOSS FREQUENCY 
There are two distributions that are important in estimating potential 
operational risk losses. One is the loss frequency distribution and the other 
is the loss severity distribution. The loss frequency distribution is the 
distribution of the number of losses observed during the time horizon 
(usually one year). The loss severity distribution is the distribution of the 
size of a loss, given that a loss occurs. It is usually assumed that loss 
severity and loss frequency are independent. 
For loss frequency, the natural probability distribution to use is a 
Poisson distribution. This distribution assumes that losses happen ran-
domly through time so that in any short period of time there is a 
probability of a loss being sustained. The probability of n losses in 
time T is 
The parameter can be estimated as the average number of losses per unit 
time. For example, if during a 10-year period there were a total 12 losses, 
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then is 1.2 per year or 0.1 per month. A Poisson distribution has the 
property that the mean frequency of losses equals the variance of the 
frequency of losses.3 
For the loss severity probability distribution, a lognormal probability 
distribution is often used. The parameters of this probability distribution 
are the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of the loss. 
The loss frequency distribution must be combined with the loss 
severity distribution for each loss type and business line to determine a 
total loss distribution. Monte Carlo simulation can be used for this 
purpose.4 As mentioned earlier, the usual assumption is that loss severity 
is independent of loss frequency. On each simulation trial, we proceed as 
follows: 
1. We sample from the frequency distribution to determine the number 
of loss events (= n). 
2. We sample n times from the loss severity distribution to determine 
the loss experienced for each loss event 
3. We determine the total loss experienced 
When many simulation trials are used, we obtain a total loss distribution. 
Figure 14.2 illustrates the procedure. In this example the expected loss 
frequency is 3 per year and the loss severity is drawn from a lognormal 
distribution. The logarithm of a loss ($ millions) is assumed to have a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.4. The Excel worksheet used to 
produce Figure 14.2 is on the author's website. 
Data Issues 
Unfortunately there is usually relatively little historical data available 
within a bank to estimate loss severity and loss frequency distributions. 
Many banks have not kept records of losses arising from different types 
of operational risks for different business lines. As a result of regulatory 
pressure, they are starting to do so, but it may be some time before a 
reasonable amount of historical data is available. It is interesting to 
compare operational risk losses with credit risk losses in this respect. 
3
 If the mean frequency is greater than the variance of the frequency, a binomial 
distribution may be more appropriate. If the mean frequency is less than the variance, a 
negative binomial distribution (mixed Poisson distribution) may be more appropriate-
4
 Combining the loss severity and loss frequency distribution is a very common problem 
in insurance. Apart from Monte Carlo simulation, two approaches that are used are 
Panjer's algorithm and fast Fourier transforms. See H.H. Panjer, "Recursive Evaluation 
of a Family of Compound Distributions," ASTIN Bulletin, 12 (1981), 22-29. 
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Figure 14.2 Calculation of loss distribution from loss frequency and 
loss severity. 
Traditionally banks have done a much better job at documenting their 
credit risk losses than their operational risk losses. Moreover, in the case 
of credit risks, a bank can rely on a wealth of information published by 
credit-rating agencies to assess probabilities of default and expected losses 
given default. Similar data on operational risk has not in the past been 
collected in such a systematic way. It may also be a problem that banks 
sometimes conceal a large operational risk loss from the market because 
they feel it will damage their reputation. 
As indicated above, the Poisson distribution is often used for loss 
frequency and the lognormal distribution is often used for loss severity. 
Available data is usually used to estimate the parameters of these 
distributions. The loss frequency distribution should be estimated from 
the bank's own data as far as possible. For the loss severity distribu-
ion, regulators encourage banks to use their own data in conjunction 
with external data. There are two sources of external data. The first is 
data obtained through sharing arrangements between banks. (The 
insurance industry has had mechanisms for sharing loss data for many 
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years and banks are now beginning to do this as well.) The second is 
publicly available data that has been collected in a systematic way by 
data vendors. 
Both internal and external historical data must be adjusted for infla-
tion. In addition, a scale adjustment should be made to external data. If a 
bank with a revenue of $10 billion reports a loss of $8 million, how 
should the loss be scaled for a bank with a revenue of $5 billion? A 
natural assumption is that a similar loss for a bank with a revenue of 
$5 billion would be $4 million. This estimate is probably too small. For 
example, research by Shih et al. suggests that the effect of firm size on the 
size of a loss experience is relatively small.5 Their estimate is 
Estimated loss for Bank A 
= Observed loss for Bank B x 
where = 0.23. This means that in our example the bank with a revenue 
of $5 billion would experience a loss of 8 x 0.50.23 = 6.82 million. 
After the appropriate scale adjustment, data obtained through sharing 
arrangements with other banks can be merged with the bank's own data 
to obtain a larger sample for determining the loss severity distribution. 
Public data purchased from data vendors cannot be used in this way 
because it is subject to biases. For example: 
1. Only large losses are publicly reported, and the larger the loss, the 
more likely it is to be reported. 
2. Institutions with weak controls are more likely to be represented in 
the database because they suffer more losses. Moreover, their losses 
tend to be larger. 
Public data is most useful for determining relative loss severity. Suppose 
that a bank has good information on the mean and standard deviation of 
its loss severity distribution for internal fraud in corporate finance, but not 
for external fraud in corporate finance or for internal fraud in trading and 
sales. Suppose that the mean and standard deviation of its internal loss 
severity distribution for internal fraud in corporate finance are $50,000 and 
$30,000. Suppose further that external data indicates that for external 
fraud in corporate finance the mean severity is twice that for internal fraud 
5
 See J. Shih, A. Samad-Khan, and P. Medapa, "Is the Size of an Operational Loss 
Related to Firm Size," Operational Risk, January 2000. Whether Shih et a/.'s results apply 
to legal risks is debatable. It often seems that the size of a settlement in a large lawsuit 
against a bank is governed by how much the bank can afford. 
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in corporate finance and the standard deviation of the severity is 1.5 times 
as great. In the absence of a better alternative, the bank might assume that 
jts own severity for external fraud in corporate finance has a mean of 
2 x 50,000 = $100,000 and a standard deviation of severity equal to 
1.5 x 30,000 = $45,000. Similarly, if the external data indicates that the 
mean severity for internal fraud in trading and sales is 2.5 times that for 
internal fraud in corporate finance and the standard deviation is twice as 
great, the bank might assume that its own severity for internal fraud in 
trading and sales has a mean of 2.5 x 50,000 = $100,000 and a standard 
deviation of 2 x 30,000 = $60,000. 
Scenario Analysis 
Since historical data is relatively difficult to obtain, regulators encourage 
banks to use scenario analyses in addition to internal and external loss 
data. This involves using managerial judgement to generate scenarios 
where large losses occur. Managers estimate the loss frequency parameter 
associated with each scenario and the parameters of the loss severity 
distribution. The advantage of scenario analysis is that it can include 
losses that the financial institution has never experienced, but, in the 
judgement of senior management, could occur. It reflects the controls 
in place in the bank and the type of business it is currently doing. 
One advantage of the scenario analysis approach is that it leads to 
management thinking actively and creatively about potential adverse 
events. This can have a number of benefits. In some cases strategies for 
responding to an event so as to minimize its severity are likely to be 
developed. In other cases, proposals may be made for reducing the 
probability of the event occurring at all. 
The main drawback of scenario analysis is that it requires a great deal 
of senior management time. It seems likely that standard scenarios will be 
developed by consultants and by banks themselves to make the process 
less of a burden. 
14.5 FORWARD LOOKING APPROACHES 
Risk managers should try to be proactive in preventing losses from 
occurring. One approach is to monitor what is happening at other banks 
and try and learn from their mistakes. When a $700 million rogue trader 
loss happened at a Baltimore subsidiary of Allied Irish Bank in 2002, risk 
managers throughout the world studied the situation carefully and asked: 
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"Could this happen to us?" Business Snapshot 14.1 describes a situation 
concerning a British local authority in the late 1980s. It immediately led 
to all banks instituting procedures for checking that counterparties had 
the authority to enter into derivatives transactions. 
Causal Relationships 
Operational risk managers should try and establish causal relations 
between decisions taken and operational risk losses. Does increasing the 
average educational qualifications of employees reduce losses arising from 
mistakes in the way transactions are processed? Will a new computet 
system reduce the probabilities of losses from system failures? Are opera-
tional risk losses correlated with the employee turnover rate? If so, can 
they be reduced by measures taken to improve employee retention? Can 
the risk of a rogue trader be reduced by the way responsibilities are divide 
between different individuals and by the way traders are motivated? 
Business Snapshot 14.1 The Hammersmith and Fulham Story 
Between 1987 to 1989 the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham in 
Great Britain entered into about 600 interest rate swaps and related instruments 
with a total notional principal of about 6 billion pounds. The transactions 
appear to have been entered into for speculative rather than hedging purposes. 
The two employees of Hammersmith and Fulham that were responsible for the 
trades had only a sketchy understanding of the risks they were taking and how 
the products they were trading worked. 
By 1989, because of movements in sterling interest rates, Hammersmith and 
Fulham had lost several hundred million pounds on the swaps. To the banks 
on the other side of the transactions, the swaps were worth several hundred 
million pounds. The banks were concerned about credit risk. They had entered 
into offsetting swaps to hedge their interest rate risks. If Hammersmith and 
Fulham defaulted, they would still have to honor their obligations on the 
offsetting swaps and would take a huge loss. 
What actually happened was not a default. Hammersmith and Fulham's 
auditor asked to have the transactions declared void because Hammersmith 
and Fulham did not have the authority to enter into the transactions. The 
British courts agreed. The case was appealed and went all the way to the 
House of Lords, Britain's highest court. The final decision was that Hammer-
smith and Fulham did not have the authority to enter into the swaps, but that 
they ought to have the authority to do so in the future for risk management 
purposes. Needless to say, banks were furious that their contracts were over-
turned in this way by the courts. 
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One approach to establishing causal relationships is statistical. If we 
look at 12 different locations where a bank operates and find a high 
negative correlation between the education of back office employees and 
the cost of mistakes in processing transactions, it might well make sense 
to do a cost-benefit analysis of changing the educational requirements for 
a back-office job in some of the locations. In some cases, a detailed 
analysis of the cause of losses may provide insights. For example, if 
40% of computer failures can be attributed to the fact that the current 
hardware is several years old and less reliable than newer versions, a cost-
benefit analysis of upgrading is likely to be useful. 
RCSA and KRIs 
Risk and control self assessment (RCSA) is an important way in which 
banks try and achieve a better understanding of their operational risk 
exposures. This involves asking the managers of the business units 
themselves to identify their operational risks. Sometimes questionnaires 
designed by senior management are used. 
A by-product of any program to measure and understand operational 
risk is likely to be the development of key risk indicators (KRIs). Risk 
indicators are key tools in the management of operational risk. The most 
important indicators are prospective. They provide an early-warning 
system to track the level of operational risk in the organization. Examples 
of key risk indicators are staff turnover and number of failed transactions. 
The hope is that key risk indicators can identify potential problems and 
allow remedial action to be taken before losses are incurred. 
It is important for a bank to quantify operational risks, but it is even 
more important to take action to control and manage those risks. 
14.6 ALLOCATION OF OPERATIONAL RISK CAPITAL 
Operational risk capital should be allocated to business units in a way 
that encourages them to improve their operational risk management. If a 
business unit can show that it has taken steps to reduce the frequency or 
severity of a particular risk, it should be allocated less capital. This will 
have the effect of improving the business unit's return on capital (and 
possibly lead to the business unit manager receiving an increased 
bonus). 
Note that it is not always optimal for a manager to reduce a 
particular operational risk. Sometimes the costs of reducing the risk 
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outweigh the benefits of reduced capital, so that return on allocated 
capital decreases. A business unit should be encouraged to make appro-
priate calculations and determine the amount of operational risk that 
maximizes return on capital. 
Scorecard Approaches 
Some banks use Scorecard approaches to allocate operational risk capital. 
Experts identify the key determinants of each type of risk and then 
formulate questions for managers of business units to enable risk levels 
to be quantified. The total number of different business units is likely to 
be greater than the eight listed in Table 14.1 because each region of the 
world in which the bank operates often has to be considered separately. 
Examples of the questions that might be used are: 
• What is the number of sensitive positions filled by temps? 
• What is the ratio of supervisors to staff? 
• Does your business have confidential client information? 
• What is the employee turnover rate per annum? 
• How many open employee positions are there at any time? 
• What percentage of your staff has a performance-based component to 
their remuneration? 
• What percentage of your staff did not take ten consecutive days leave in 
the last 12 months? 
Scores are assigned to the answers. The total score for a particular 
business unit indicates the amount of risk present in the business unit 
and can be used as a basis for allocating capital to the business unit. The 
scores given by a Scorecard approach should be validated by comparing 
scores with actual loss experience whenever possible. 
The overall result of operational risk assessment and operational risk 
capital allocation should be that business units become more sensitive to 
the need for managing operational risk. Hopefully operational risk 
management will be seen to be an important part of every manager's 
job. A key ingredient for the success of any operational risk program is 
the support of senior management. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision is very much aware of this. It recommends that the bank 
board of directors be involved in the approval of a risk management 
program and that it reviews the program on a regular basis. 
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14.7 USE OF THE POWER LAW 
In Section 5.4 we introduced the power law. This states that for a wide 
range of variables 
where v is the value of the variable, x is a relatively large value of and K 
and are constants. We covered the theoretical underpinnings of the 
power law and maximum-likelihood estimation procedures when we 
looked at extreme value theory in Section 9.4. 
De Fountnouvelle et al, using data on losses from external vendors, 
find that the power law holds well for the large losses experienced by 
banks.6 This makes the calculation of VaR with high degrees of confidence 
such as 99.9% possible. Loss data (internal or external) is used to estimate 
the power law parameters using the maximum-likelihood approach in 
Chapter 9. The 99.9% quantile of the loss distribution is then estimated 
using equation (9.6). 
When loss distributions are aggregated, the distribution with the 
heaviest tails tends to dominate. This means that the loss with the lowest 
defines the extreme tails of the total loss distribution.7 Therefore, if all 
we are interested in is calculating the extreme tail of the total operational 
risk loss distribution, it may only be necessary to consider one or two 
business-line/loss-type combinations. 
14.8 INSURANCE 
An important decision for operational risk managers is the extent to 
which operational risks should be insured against. Insurance policies 
are available on many different kinds of risk ranging from fire losses to 
rogue trader losses. Provided that the insurance company's balance sheet 
satisfies certain criteria, a bank using AMA can reduce the capital it is 
required to hold by entering into insurance contracts. In this section we 
review some of the key issues facing insurance companies in the design of 
their insurance contracts and show how these are likely to influence the 
type of contracts that banks can negotiate. 
6
 See p. De Fountnouvelle, V. DeJesus-Rueff, J. Jordan, and E. Rosengren, "Capital and 
Risk: New Evidence on Implications of Large Operational Risk Losses," Federal Reserve 
Board of Boston, Working Paper, September 2003. 
7
 In Chapter 9 the parameter equals so it is the loss distribution with the largest 
that defines the extreme tails. 
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Moral Hazard 
One of the risks facing an insurance company is moral hazard. This is the 
risk that the existence of the insurance contract will cause the bank to 
behave differently than it otherwise would. This changed behavior in-
creases the risks to the insurance company. Consider, for example, a bank 
that insures itself against robberies. As a result of the insurance policy, it 
may be tempted to be lax in its implementation of security measures— 
making a robbery more likely than it would otherwise have been. 
Insurance companies have traditionally dealt with moral hazard in a 
number of ways. Typically there is a deductible in any insurance policy. 
This means that the bank is responsible for bearing the first part of any 
loss. Sometimes there is a coinsurance provision in a policy. The insurance 
company then pays a predetermined percentage (less than 100%) of losses 
in excess of the deductible. In addition, there is nearly always a policy limit. 
This is a limit on the total liability of the insurer. Consider again a bank 
that has insured itself against robberies. The existence of deductibles, 
coinsurance provisions, and policy limits are likely to provide an incentive 
for a bank not to relax security measures in its branches. The moral hazard 
problem in rogue trader insurance in discussed in Business Snapshot 14.2. 
Adverse Selection 
The other major problem facing insurance companies is adverse selection. 
This is where an insurance company cannot distinguish between good 
and bad risks. It offers the same price to everyone and inadvertently 
attracts more of the bad risks. For example, banks without good internal 
controls are more likely to enter into rogue trader insurance contracts; 
banks without good internal controls are more likely to buy insurance 
policies to protect themselves against external fraud. 
To overcome the adverse selection problem, an insurance company must 
try to understand the controls that exist within banks and the losses that 
have been experienced. As a result of its initial assessment of risks, it may 
not charge the same premium for the same contract to all banks. Over time 
it gains more information about the bank's operational risk losses and may 
increase or reduce the premium charged. This is much the same as the 
approach adopted by insurance companies when they sell automobile 
insurance to a driver. At the outset the insurance company obtains as 
much information on the driver as possible. As time goes by, it collects 
more information on the driver's risk (number of accidents, number of 
speeding tickets, etc.) and modifies the premium charged accordingly. 
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14.9 SARBANES-OXLEY 
Largely as a result of the Enron bankruptcy the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
Passed in the United States in 2002. This provides another dimension to 
operational risk management for financial and nonfinancial institutions 
in the United States. The Act requires boards of directors to become 
mtuch more involved with day-to-day operations. They must monitor 
internal controls to ensure risks are being assessed and handled well. 
The Act specifies rules concerning the composition of the board of 
directors of public companies and lists the responsibilities of the board. 
It gives the SEC the power to censure the board or give it additional 
responsibilities. A company's auditors are not allowed to carry out any 
significant nonauditing services for the company.8 Audit partners must be 
rotated. The audit committee of the board must be made aware of 
alternative accounting treatments. The CEO and CFO must prepare a 
8
 Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen, provided a wide range of services in addition to 
auditing. It did not survive the litigation that followed the downfall of Enron. 
Business Snapshot 14.2 Rogue Trader Insurance 
A rogue trader insurance policy presents particularly tricky moral hazard 
problems. An unscrupulous bank could enter into an insurance contract to 
protect itself against losses from rogue trader risk and then choose to be lax in 
jits implementation of trading limits. If a trader exceeds the trading limit and 
makes a large profit, the bank is better off than it would be otherwise. If a 
large loss results, a claim can be made under the rogue trader insurance policy. 
Deductibles, coinsurance provisions, and policy limits may mean that the 
amount recovered is less than the loss incurred by the trader. However, 
potential net losses to the bank are likely to be far less than potential profits, 
making the lax trading limits strategy a good bet for the bank. 
Given this problem, it is perhaps surprising that some insurance companies 
do offer rogue trader insurance policies. These companies tend to specify 
carefully how trading limits are implemented. They may also require that the 
existence of the insurance policy not be revealed to anyone on the trading floor. 
They are likely to want to retain the right to investigate the circumstances 
underlying any loss. It is also worth pointing out that, from the bank's point of 
view, the lax trading limits strategy we have outlined may be very shortsighted. 
The bank might well find that future insurance costs rise significantly as a result 
of a rogue trader claim. Furthermore, a large rogue trader loss (even if insured) 
would cause its reputation to suffer. 
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statement to accompany the audit report to the effect that the financial 
statements are accurate. The CEO and CFO are required to return bonuses 
in the event that financial statements are restated. Other rules concern 
insider trading, disclosure, personal loans to executives, reporting of trans-
actions by directors, and the monitoring of internal controls by directors. 
SUMMARY 
In 1999, bank supervisors indicated their intention to charge capital for 
operational risk. This has led banks to carefully consider how they should 
measure and manage operational risk. Bank supervisors have identified 
seven different types of operational risk and eight different business lines. 
They encourage banks to quantify risks for each of the 56 risk-type/ 
business-line combinations. 
One approach that has been developed is the statistical approach. This 
treats operational risk losses in much the same way as actuaries treat losses 
from insurance policies. A frequency of loss distribution and a severity of 
loss distribution is estimated and these are combined to form a total 
operational loss distribution. If possible, the frequency of loss distribution 
is estimated from internal data. The loss severity distribution is estimated 
from a combination of internal and external data. 
There are two sources of external data. One is data obtained from other 
banks via sharing arrangements; the other is publicly available data on 
large losses collected by data vendors. Increasingly banks are augmenting 
loss data with scenario analyses where senior managers develop loss-event 
scenarios and estimate parameters describing loss frequency and severity. 
Risk managers should try to be forward-looking in their approach to 
operational risk. They should try to understand what determines opera-
tional risk losses and develop key risk indicators to track the level of 
operational risk in different parts of the organization. 
Once operational risk capital has been estimated, it is important to 
develop procedures for allocating it to business units. This should be done 
in a way that encourages business units to reduce operational risk when 
they can do so without incurring excessive costs. One approach to 
allocation is the use of scorecards. 
The power law introduced in Chapter 5 seems to apply to operational 
risk losses. This makes it possible to use extreme value theory to estimate 
the tails of a loss distribution from empirical data. When several loss 
distributions are aggregated, it is the loss distribution with the heaviest 
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tail that dominates. In principle, this makes the calculation of VaR for 
total operational risk easier. 
Many operational risks can be insured against. However, most policies 
include deductibles, coinsurance provisions, and policy limits. As a result 
a bank is always left bearing part of any risk itself. Moreover, the way 
insurance premiums change as time passes is likely to depend on the 
claims made and other indicators that the insurance company has of how 
well operational risks are being managed. 
The whole process of measuring, managing, and allocating operational 
risk is still in its infancy. As time goes by and data is accumulated, more 
precise procedures than those we have mentioned in this chapter are likely 
to emerge. One of the key problems is that there are two sorts of 
operational risk: high-frequency low-severity risks and low-frequency 
high-severity risks. The former are relatively easy to quantify, but opera-
tional risk VaR is largely driven by the latter. 
Bank supervisors seem to be succeeding in their objective of making 
banks more sensitive to the importance of operational risk. In many ways 
the key benefit of an operational risk management program is not the 
numbers that are produced, but the process that banks go through in 
producing the numbers. If well handled, the process can sensitize man-
agers to the importance of operational risk and perhaps lead to them 
thinking about it differently. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
14.1. What risks are included by regulators in their definition of operational 
risks? What risks are not included? 
14.2. Suppose that external data shows that a loss of $100 million occurred at a 
bank with annual revenues of $1 billion. Your bank has annual revenues 
of $3 billion. What is the implication of the external data for losses that 
could occur at your bank. 
14.3. Suppose that there is a 90% probability that operational risk losses of a 
certain type will not exceed $20 million. The power law parameter is 0.8. 
What is the probability of losses exceeding (a) $40 million, (b) $80 million, 
and (c) $200 million. 
14.4. Discuss how moral hazard and adverse selection are handled in car 
insurance. 
14.5. Give two ways Sarbanes-Oxley affects the CEOs of public companies. 
14.6. When is a trading loss classified as a market risk and when is it classified 
as an operational risk? 
14.7. Discuss whether there is (a) moral hazard and (b) adverse selection in life 
insurance contracts. 
14.8. What is external loss data? How is it obtained? How is it used in 
determining operational risk loss distributions for a bank? 
14.9. What distributions are commonly used for loss frequency and loss 
severity? 
14.10. Give examples of key risk indicators that might be monitored by a central 
operational risk management group within a bank. 
14.11. The worksheet used to produce Figure 14.2 is on the author's website 
What is the mean and standard deviation of the loss distribution. Modify 
the inputs to the simulation to test the effect of changing the loss 
frequency from 3 to 4. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
14.12. Suppose that there is a 95% probability that operational risk losses of a 
certain type exceed $10 million. Use the power law to estimate the 
99.97% worst-case operational risk loss when the parameter equals 
(a) 0.25, (b) 0.5, (c) 0.9, and (d) 1.0. ,. 
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14.13. Consider the following two events: (a) a bank loses $1 billion from an 
unexpected lawsuit relating to its transactions with a counterparty and 
(b) an insurance company loses $1 billion because of an unexpected 
hurricane in Texas. Suppose you own shares in both the bank and the 
insurance company. Which loss are you more concerned about? Why? 
14.14. The worksheet used to produce Figure 14.2 is on the author's website. 
How does the loss distribution change when the loss severity has a beta 
distribution with an upper bound of 5, a lower bound of 0, and the other 
parameters both 1? 
Model Risk and 
Liquidity Risk 
In this chapter we discuss two additional types of risk faced by financial 
institutions: model risk and liquidity risk. Model risk is the risk related to 
the models a financial institution uses to value derivatives. Liquidity risk 
is the risk that there may not be enough buyers (or sellers) in the market 
for a financial institution to execute the trades it desires. The two risks are 
related. Sophisticated models are only necessary to price products that are 
relatively illiquid. When there is an active market for a product, prices can 
be observed in the market and models play a less important role. 
There are two main types of model risk. One is the risk that the model 
will give the wrong price at the time a product is bought or sold. This can 
result in a company buying a product for a price that is too high or selling 
it for a price that is too low. The other risk concerns hedging. If a 
company uses the wrong model, the Greek letters it calculates—and the 
hedges it sets up based on those Greek letters—are liable to be wrong. 
Liquidity risk is the risk that, even if a financial institution's theoretical 
Price is in line with the market price and the price of its competitors, it 
cannot trade in the volume required at the price. Suppose that the offer 
Price for a particular option is $40. The financial institution could 
Probably buy 10,000 options at this price. But it is likely to be quite 
difficult to buy 10 million options at or close to the price. If the financial 
institution went into the market and started buying large numbers of 
options from different market makers, then the price of the option would 
Probably go up, making the rest of its trades more expensive. 
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15.1 THE NATURE OF MODELS IN FINANCE 
Many physicists work in the front and middle office of banks and many of 
the models they use are similar to those encountered in physics. For 
example, the differential equation that leads to the famous Black-Scholes 
model is the heat-exchange equation that has been used by physicists for 
many years. However, as Derman has pointed out, there is an important 
difference between the models of physics and those of finance.1 The models 
of physics describe physical processes and are highly accurate. By contrast, 
the models of finance describe the behavior of market variables. This 
behavior depends on the actions of human beings. As a result the models 
are at best approximate descriptions of the market variables. This is why 
the use of models in finance entails what is referred to as "model risk". 
One important difference between the models of physics and the 
models of finance concerns model parameters. The parameters of models 
in the physical sciences are usually constants that do not change. The 
parameters in finance models are often assumed to be constant for the 
whole life of the model when the model is used to calculate an option 
price on any particular day. But the parameters are changed from day to 
day so that market prices are matched. The process of choosing model 
parameters is known as calibration. 
An example of calibration is the choice of the volatility parameter in the 
Black-Scholes model. This model assumes that volatility remains constant 
for the life of the model. However, the volatility parameter that is used in 
the model changes daily. For a particular option maturing in three months, 
the volatility parameter might be 20% when the option is valued today, 
22% when valued tomorrow, and 19% when valued on the next day. For 
some models in finance, the calibration process is quite involved. For 
example, calibrating an interest rate model on a particular day involves 
(a) fitting the zero-coupon yield curve observed on that day and (b) fitting 
the market prices of actively traded interest rate options such as caps and 
swap options. 
Sometimes parameters in finance models have to be calibrated to 
historical data rather than to market prices. Consider a model involving 
both an exchange rate and an equity index. It is likely that the correlation 
between the exchange rate movements and the equity price movements 
would be estimated from historical data because there are no actively 
traded instruments from which the correlation can be implied. 
1
 See E. Derman, My Life as a Quant: Reflections on Physics and Finance, Wiley, 2004 
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15.2 MODELS FOR LINEAR PRODUCTS 
Pricing linear products such as forward contracts and swaps is straight-
forward and relies on little more than present value arithmetic. There is 
usually very little disagreement in the market on the correct pricing models 
for these products and very little model risk. However, this does not mean 
that there is no model risk. As indicated in Business Snapshot 15.1, Kidder 
Peabody's computer system did not account correctly for funding costs 
when a linear product was traded. As a result the system indicated that one 
of the company's traders was making a large profit when in fact he was 
making a huge loss. 
Another type of model risk arises when a financial institution assumes 
a product is simpler than it actually is. Consider the interest rate swap 
market. A plain vanilla interest rate swap such as that described in 
Section 2.3 can be valued by assuming that forward interest rates will 
be realized as described in Appendix B. For example, if the forward 
interest rate for the period between 2 and 2.5 years is 4.3%, we value the 
swap on the assumption that the floating rate that is exchanged for fixed 
at the 2.5-year point is 4.3%. 
Business Snapshot 15.1 Kidder Peabody's Embarrassing Mistake 
Investment banks have developed a way of creating a zero-coupon bond, called 
a strip, from a coupon-bearing Treasury bond by selling each of the cash flows 
underlying the coupon-bearing bond as a separate security. Joseph Jett, a 
trader working for Kidder Peabody, had a relatively simple trading strategy. 
He would buy strips and sell them in the forward market. The forward price of 
the strip was always greater than the spot price and so it appeared that he had 
found a money machine! In fact the difference between the forward price and 
the spot price represents nothing more than the cost of funding the purchase 
of the strip. Suppose, for example, that the three-month interest rate is 4% per 
annum and the spot price of a strip is $70. The three-month forward price of 
the strip is 70e0.04x3/12 = $70.70. 
Kidder Peabody's computer system reported a profit on each of Jett's trades 
equal to the excess of the forward price over the spot price ($0.70 in our 
example). By rolling his contracts forward, Jett was able to prevent the 
funding cost from accruing to him. The result was that the system reported 
a profit of $100 million on Jett's trading (and Jett received a big bonus) when 
in fact there was a loss in the region of $350 million. This shows that even large 
financial institutions can get relatively simple things wrong! 
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It is tempting to generalize from this and argue that any agreement to 
exchange cash flows can be valued on the assumption that forward rates 
are realized. This is not so. Consider, for example, what is known as a 
LIBOR-in-arrears swap. In this instrument the floating rate that is observed 
on a particular date is paid on that date (not one accrual period later as is 
the case for a plain vanilla swap). A LIBOR-in-arrears swap should be 
valued on the assumption that the realized interest rate equals the forward 
interest rate plus a "convexity adjustment". As indicated in Business 
Snapshot 15.2, financial institutions that did not understand this lost 
money in the mid-1990s. 
15.3 MODELS FOR ACTIVELY TRADED PRODUCTS 
When a product trades actively in the market, we do not need a model to 
know what its price is. The market tells us this. Suppose, for example, 
that a certain option on a stock index trades actively and is quoted by 
market makers as bid $30 and offer $31. Our best estimate of its current 
value is the mid-market price of $30.50. 
A model is often used as a communication tool in these circumstances. 
Traders like to use models where only one of the variables necessary to 
determine the price of a product is not directly observable in the market. 
The model then provides a one-to-one mapping of the product's price to 
Business Snapshot 15.2 Exploiting the Weaknesses of a 
Competitor's Model 
A LIBOR-in-arrears swap is an interest rate swap where the floating interest 
rate is paid on the day it is observed, not one accrual period later. Whereas a 
plain vanilla swap is correctly valued by assuming that future rates will be 
today's forward rates, a LIBOR-in-arrears swap should be valued on the 
assumption that the future rate is today's forward interest rate plus a "convexity 
adjustment". 
In the mid-1990s sophisticated financial institutions understood the correct 
approach for valuing a LIBOR-in-arrears swap. Less sophisticated financial 
institutions used the naive "assume forward rates will be realized" approach 
The result was that by choosing trades judiciously sophisticated financial 
institutions were able to make substantial profits at the expense of their less 
sophisticated counterparts. 
The derivatives business is one where traders do not hesitate to exploit the 
weaknesses of their competitor's models! 
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the variable and vice versa. The Black-Scholes model (see Appendix C) is a 
case in point. The only unobservable variable in the model is the volatility 
of the underlying asset. The model therefore provides a one-to-one map-
ping of option prices to volatilities and vice versa. As explained in Chapter 
5, the volatility calculated from the market price is known as the implied 
volatility. Traders frequently quote implied volatilities rather than the 
dollar prices. The reason is that the implied volatility is more stable than 
the price. For example, when the underlying asset price or the interest rate 
changes, there is likely to be a much bigger percentage jump in the dollar 
price of an option than in its implied volatility. 
Consider again the index option that has a mid-market price of 
$30.50. Suppose it is a one-year European call option where the strike 
price is 1,000, the one-year forward price of the index is 1,100, and the 
one-year risk-free interest rate is 3%. The mid-market implied volatility 
would be quoted as 15.37%.2 The bid-offer spread might be "bid 
15.24%, offer 15.50%". 
Volatility Smiles 
The volatility implied by Black-Scholes (or by a binomial tree calcula-
tion such as that in Appendix D) as a function of the strike price for a 
particular option maturity is known as a volatility smile.3 If traders really 
believed the assumptions underlying the Black-Scholes model, the 
Figure 15.1 Volatility smile for foreign currency options. 
2
 Implied volatility calculations can be done with the DerivaGem software available on 
the author's website. 
3
 It can be shown that the relationship between strike price and implied volatility should 
be exactly the same for calls and puts in the case of European options and approximately 
the same in the case of American options. 
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Figure 15.2 Volatility smile for equity options. 
implied volatility would be the same for all options and the volatility 
smile would be flat. In fact, this is rarely the case. 
The volatility smile used by traders to price foreign currency options 
has the general form shown in Figure 15.1. The volatility is relatively low 
for at-the-money options. It becomes progressively higher as an option 
moves either in the money or out of the money. The reason for the 
volatility smile is that Black-Scholes assumes 
1. The volatility of the asset is constant. 
2. The price of the asset changes smoothly with no jumps. 
In practice, neither of these conditions is satisfied for an exchange rate. The 
volatility of an exchange rate is far from constant, and exchange rates 
frequently exhibit jumps.4 It turns out that the effect of both a nonconstant 
volatility and jumps is that extreme outcomes become more likely. This 
leads to the volatility smile in Figure 15.1. 
The volatility smile used by traders to price equity options (both those 
on individual stocks and those on stock indices) has the general form 
shown in Figure 15.2. This is sometimes referred to as a volatility skew. The 
4
 Often the jumps are in response to the actions of central banks. 
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volatility decreases as the strike price increases. The volatility used to price 
a low-strike-price option (i.e., a deep-out-of-the-money put or a deep-in-
the-money call) is significantly higher than that used to price a high-strike-
price option (i.e., a deep-in-the-money put or a deep-out-of-the-money 
call). One possible explanation for the smile in equity options concerns 
leverage. As a company's equity declines in value, the company's leverage 
increases. This means that the equity becomes more risky and its volatility 
increases. As a company's equity increases in value, leverage decreases. 
The equity then becomes less risky and its volatility decreases. This 
argument shows that we can expect the volatility of equity to be a 
decreasing function of price and is consistent with Figure 15.2. Another 
explanation is Crashophobia (see Business Snapshot 15.3). 
Volatility smiles and skews such as those shown in Figures 15.1 and 15.2 
are liable to change on a daily basis. This means that the volatilities 
traders use change from day to day as well as from option to option. Why 
does the market continue to use Black-Scholes (and its extensions) when 
it provides such a poor fit to market prices? The answer is that traders like 
the model. They find it easy to use and easy to understand. 
Volatility Surfaces 
Figures 15.1 and 15.2 are for options with a particular maturity. Traders 
like to combine the volatility smiles for different maturities into a volatility 
surface. This shows implied volatility as a function of both strike price 
and time to maturity. Table 15.1 gives a typical volatility surface for 
currency options. The table indicates that the volatility smile becomes less 
Business Snapshot 15.3 Crashophobia 
It is interesting that the pattern in Figure 15.2 for equities has existed only 
since the stock market crash of October 1987. Prior to October 1987 implied 
volatilities were much less dependent on strike price. This has led Mark 
Rubinstein to suggest that one reason for the equity volatility smile may be 
"Crashophobia". Traders are concerned about the possibility of another crash 
similar to October 1987 and assign relatively high prices (and therefore 
relatively high implied volatilities) for deep-out-of-the-money puts. 
There is some empirical support for this explanation. Declines in the 
S&P 500 tend to be accompanied by a steepening of the volatility skew, 
perhaps because traders become more nervous about the possibility of a crash. 
When the S&P increases, the skew tends to become less steep. 
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Table 15.1 Volatility surface. 
Time to 
maturity 
1 month 
3 month 
6 month 
1 year 
2 year 
5 year 
Strike price 
0.90 
14.2 
14.0 
14.1 
14.7 
15.0 
14.8 
0.95 
13.0 
13.0 
13.3 
14.0 
14.4 
14.6 
1.00 
12.0 
12.0 
12.5 
13.5 
14.0 
14.4 
1.05 
13.1 
13.1 
13.4 
14.0 
14.5 
14.7 
1.10 
14.5 
14.2 
14.3 
14.8 
15.1 
15.0 
pronounced as the time to maturity increases. This is what is usually 
observed in practice.5 
The volatility surface is produced primarily from information provided 
by brokers. Brokers are in the business of bringing buyers and sellers 
together in the over-the-counter market and have more information on 
the implied volatilities at which transactions are being done on any given 
day than individual derivatives dealers. Over time an options trader 
develops an understanding of what the volatility surface for a particular 
underlying asset should look like. 
To value a new option, traders look up the appropriate volatility in the 
table using interpolation. For example, to value a 9-month option with a 
strike price of 1.05, a trader would interpolate between 13.4 and 14.0 in 
Table 15.1 to obtain a volatility of 13.7%. This is the volatility that would 
be used in a Black-Scholes formula or a binomial tree calculation. When 
valuing a 1.5-year option with a strike price of 0.925, a two-dimensional 
interpolation would be used to give an implied volatility of 14.525%. 
Hedging 
It should be clear from the above discussion that models play a relatively 
minor role in the pricing of actively traded products. Dealers interpolate 
between prices observed in the market. A model such as Black-Scholes is 
nothing more than a tool to facilitate the interpolation. It is easier to 
interpolate between implied volatilities than between dollar prices. 
5
 If T is the time to maturity and F0 is the forward price of the asset, some traders choose 
to define the volatility smile as the relationship between implied volatility and 
rather than as the relationship between the implied volatility and K. The smile is 
usually much less dependent on the time to maturity. 
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Models are used in a more significant way when it comes to hedging. 
Traders must manage their exposure to delta, gamma, vega, etc. (see 
Chapter 3). We can distinguish between within-model hedging and 
outside-model hedging. Within-model hedging is designed to deal with 
the risk of changes in variables that are assumed to be uncertain by the 
model. Outside-model hedging deals with the risk of changes in variables 
that are assumed to be constant (or deterministic) by the model. When 
Black-Scholes is used, hedging against movements in the underlying stock 
price (delta and gamma hedging) is within-model hedging because the 
model assumes that stock price changes are uncertain. However, hedging 
against volatility (vega hedging) is outside-model hedging because the 
model assumes that volatility is constant. 
In practice, traders almost invariably do outside-model hedging as well 
as within-model hedging. This is because, as we have explained, the 
calibration process causes parameters such as volatilities to change daily. 
A natural assumption is that if hedging is implemented for all the 
variables that could change in a day (both those that are assumed to 
be constant by the model and those that are assumed to be stochastic) the 
value of hedger's position will not change. In fact, this is not necessarily 
the case. If the model used to calculate the hedge is wrong, then there may 
be an unexpected gain or loss. The good news here is that on average the 
gain or loss from hedging using the wrong model is approximately zero. 
The risk of imperfect hedging is likely to be largely diversified away across 
the portfolio of a large financial institution. 
Many financial institutions carefully evaluate the effectiveness of their 
hedging. They find it revealing to decompose the day-to-day change in a 
portfolio's value into the following: 
1. A change resulting from risks that were unhedged 
2. A change resulting from the hedging model being imperfect 
3. A change resulting from new trades done during the day 
This is sometimes referred to as a P&L decomposition. 
15.4 MODELS FOR STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 
Exotic options and other nonstandard products that are tailored to the 
needs of clients are referred to as structured products. Usually they do not 
trade actively and a financial institution must rely on a model to deter-
mine the price it charges the client. Note the important difference between 
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structured products and actively traded products. When a product trades 
actively, there is very little uncertainty about its price and the model 
affects only hedge performance. In the case of structured products, model 
risk is much greater because there is the potential for both pricing and 
hedging being incorrect. 
A financial institution should not rely on a single model for pricing 
structured products. Instead it should, whenever possible, use several 
different models. This leads to a price range for the instrument and a 
better understanding of the model risks being taken. 
Suppose that three different models give prices of $6 million, $7.5 million 
and $8.5 million for a particular product that a financial institution is 
planning to sell to a client. Even if the financial institution believes that the 
first model is the best one and plans to use that model as its standard model 
for daily repricing and hedging, it should ensure that the price it charges 
the client is at least $8.5 million. Moreover, it should be conservative about 
recognizing profits. If the product is sold for $9 million, it is tempting to 
recognize an immediate profit of $3 million ($9 million less the believed-to-
be-accurate price of $6 million). However, this is overly aggressive. A 
better, more conservative, practice is to put the $3 million into a reserve 
account and transfer it to profits slowly during the life of the product.6 
Most large financial institutions have model audit groups as part of 
their risk management teams. These groups are responsible for vetting 
new models proposed by traders for particular products. A model cannot 
usually be used until the model audit group has approved it. Vetting 
typically includes (a) checking that a model has been correctly imple-
mented, (b) examining whether there is a sound rationale for the model, 
(c) comparing the model with other models that can accomplish the same 
task, (d) specifying the limitations of the model, and (e) assessing 
uncertainties in the prices and hedge parameters given by the model. 
15.5 DANGERS IN MODEL BUILDING 
The art of model building is to capture what is important for valuing 
and hedging an instrument without making the model more complex 
than it needs to be. Sometimes models have to be quite complex to 
capture the important features of a product, but this is not always 
the case. 
6
 This is also likely to have sensible implications for the way bonuses are paid. 
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One danger in model building is Overfitting. Consider the problem 
posed by the volatility surface in Table 15.1. We can exactly match the 
volatility surface with a single model by extending Black-Scholes so that 
volatility is a complex function of the underlying asset price and time.7 
But when we do this, we may find that other properties of the model are 
less reasonable than those of simpler models. In particular, the joint 
probability of the asset prices at two or more times may be unrealistic.8 
Another danger in model building is Overparameterization. The Black-
Scholes model can be extended to include features such as a stochastic 
volatility or jumps in the asset price. This invariably introduces extra 
parameters that have to be estimated. It is usually claimed that the 
parameters in complex models are more stable those in simpler models 
and do not have to be adjusted as much from day to day. This may be 
true, but we should remember that we are not dealing with physical 
processes. The parameters in a complex model may remain relatively 
constant for a period of time and then change, perhaps because there 
has been what economists refer to as a regime shift. A financial institution 
may find that a complicated model is an improvement over a simple 
model until the parameters change. At that time it may not have the 
flexibility to cope with changing market conditions. 
As we have mentioned, traders like simple models that have just one 
unobservable parameter. They are skeptical of more complex models 
because they are "black boxes" and it is very difficult to develop intuition 
about them. In some situations their skepticism is well founded for the 
reasons we have just mentioned. 
15.6 DETECTING MODEL PROBLEMS 
The risk management function within a financial institution should care-
fully monitor the financial institution's trading patterns. In particular it 
7
 This is the implied volatility function model proposed by B. Dupire, "Pricing with a 
Smile," Risk, 7 (February 1994), 18-20; E. Derman and I. Kani, "Riding on a Smile," 
Risk, 7 (February 1994), 32-39; M. Rubinstein, "Implied Binomial Trees," Journal of 
Finance, 49, 3 (July 1994), 771-818. 
8
 Instruments such as barrier options and compound options depend on the joint 
Probability distribution of the asset price at different times. Hull and Suo find that the 
implied volatility function model works reasonably well for compound options, but 
sometimes gives serious errors for barrier options. See J. C. Hull and W. Suo, "A 
Methodology for the Assessment of Model Risk and its Application to the Implied 
Volatility Function Model," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37, 2 (June 
2002), 297-318. 
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should keep track of the following: 
1. The type of trading the financial institution is doing with other 
financial institutions 
2. How competitive it is in bidding for different types of structured 
transactions 
3. The profits being recorded from the trading of different products 
Getting too much of a certain type of business or making huge profits 
from relatively simple trading strategies can be a warning sign. Another 
clear indication that something is wrong is when the financial institution 
is unable to unwind trades at close to the prices given by its computer 
models. 
The high profits being recorded for Joseph Jett's trading at Kidder 
Peabody (see Business Snapshot 15.1) should have been a warning sign.9 
Furthermore, if in the mid-1990s a financial institution's risk manage-
ment team discovered that traders were entering into a large number of 
LIBOR-in-arrears swaps with other financial institutions (see Business 
Snapshot 15.2) where they were receiving fixed and paying floating, they 
could have alerted modelers to a potential problem and directed that 
trading in the product be temporarily stopped. 
There are other ways in which a derivatives dealer might find that one of 
its models is out of line with that used by other market participants. 
Dealers often subscribe to services that are designed to provide market 
quotes for representative trades. Typically the company providing this 
service periodically asks its dealer clients for quotes on specific hypo-
thetical transactions. It then averages the quotes (possibly after eliminating 
the highest and lowest) and feeds the results back to the dealers. 
15.7 TRADITIONAL VIEW OF LIQUIDITY RISK 
Liquidity is liable to affect both the funding and trading activities of a 
financial institution. We start by considering trading activities and move 
on to consider funding activities in Section 15.10. 
The traditional view of liquidity risk in trading is that there is a 
relationship between price and quantity. This relationship is shown in 
Figure 15.3. When the quantity of an asset that is traded is relatively 
9
 Barry Finer, risk manager for the government bond desk at Kidder Peabody, did point 
out the difficulty of making large arbitrage profits from a market as efficient as the US 
government bond market, but his concerns were dismissed out of hand. 
Model Risk and Liquidity Risk 355 
Figure 15.3 Bid and offer prices as a function of quantity 
transacted. 
small, bid-offer spreads are low. As the quantity increases, the price paid 
by the buyer of the asset increases and the price received by the seller of 
the asset decreases. 
How can a financial institution manage liquidity in the trading book? 
One way is by using position limits. If the size of the financial institution's 
position is limited, the size of a trade it has to do to unwind a position is 
also limited. It is often argued that the time horizon in a VaR calculation 
should reflect the time necessary to unwind a position. If a position can 
be unwound very quickly, a one-day time horizon is appropriate; in other 
circumstances, time horizons as long as one month may be needed. 
Liquidity-Adjusted VaR 
The percentage bid-offer spread for an asset can be defined as 
where the mid-price is halfway between the bid and the offer. In liquidat-
ing a position in the asset, a financial institution incurs a cost equal to 
where is the dollar value of the position. This reflects the fact that 
trades are not done at the mid-market price. A buy trade is done at a 
Proportional amount s/2 above the market price and a sell trade is done 
at a proportional amount s/2 below the market price. 
Risk managers sometimes calculate a liquidity-adjusted VaR by adding 
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for each position in the book. Formally, we have 
where n is the number of positions, is the percentage bid-offer spread for 
the ith position and is the amount of money invested in the ith position. 
As the number of positions, n, grows, VaR benefits from diversification but 
the liquidity adjustment does not. Consequently, the percentage difference 
between VaR and liquidity-adjusted VaR grows as n grows. 
A variation on this calculation that takes account of uncertainty in the 
spread has been suggested by Bangia et al.10 This involves estimating the 
mean and standard deviation of and defining 
The parameter gives the required confidence level for the spread on the 
assumption that spreads are normally distributed. For example, if a 95% 
confidence level is required, then = 1.64. Bangia et al.'s equation 
assumes (conservatively) that spreads in all instruments are perfectly 
correlated. 
15.8 LIQUIDITY BLACK HOLES 
The liquidity risk we have just described is real. Banks cannot trade at 
mid-market prices and the bigger the size of their transaction the higher 
the bid-offer spread that they face. However, there is a more serious 
liquidity risk. This is the risk that liquidity in a particular market will dry 
up completely because everyone wants to buy and no-one wants to sell, or 
vice versa. 
It is sometimes argued that technological and other developments have 
led to a steady improvement in the liquidity of financial markets. This is 
questionable. It is true that bid-offer spreads have on average declined. 
However, there has been an increasing tendency toward "herd behavior 
where almost everyone wants to do the same type of trade at particular 
10
 See A. Bangia, F. Diebold, T. Schuermann, and J. Stroughair, "Liquidity on the 
Outside," Risk, 12 (June), 68-73. 
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times. The result has been what Persaud refers to as "liquidity black 
holes" occurring with increasing frequency.11 
In a well-functioning market, the market may change its opinion about 
the price of an asset because of new information. However, the price does 
not overreact. If a price decrease is too great, traders will quickly move in 
and buy the asset and a new equilibrium price will be established. A 
liquidity black hole is created when a price decline causes more market 
participants to want to sell, driving prices well below where they will 
eventually settle. During the sell-off, liquidity dries up and the asset can 
be sold only at a fire-sale price.12 
Among the reasons for herd behavior and the creation of liquidity 
black holes are: 
1. The computer models used by different traders are similar. 
2. All financial institutions are regulated in the same way and respond 
in the same way to changes in volatilities and correlations. 
3. There is a natural tendency to feel that if other people are doing a 
certain type of trade then they must know something that you do not. 
Computer Models 
A classic example of computer models causing a liquidity black hole is 
the stock market crash of October 1987. In the period leading up to the 
crash, the stock market had performed very well. Increasing numbers of 
portfolio managers were using commercially available programs to 
synthetically create put options on their portfolios. These programs told 
them to sell part of their portfolio immediately after a price decline and 
buy it back immediately after a price increase. The result, as indicated in 
Business Snapshot 15.4, was prices plunging well below their long-run 
equilibrium levels on October 19, 1987. 
As another example of computer models leading to liquidity black 
holes, consider the situation where financial institutions are on one side 
of the market for a derivative and their clients are on the other side. When 
the price of the underlying asset moves, all financial institutions execute 
the same trades to maintain a delta-neutral position. This causes the price 
of the asset to move further in the same direction. An example of this is 
outlined in Business Snapshot 15.5. 
11
 See A. D. Persaud (ed.), Liquidity Black Holes: Understanding, Quantifying and 
Managing Financial Liquidity Risk, Risk Books, 1999. 
12
 Liquidity black holes tend to be associated with price decreases, but it is possible for 
thern to occur when there are price increases. 
\ 
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The Impact of Regulation 
In many ways it is a laudable goal on the part of regulators to seek to 
ensure that banks and other financial institutions throughout the world 
are regulated in the same way. As we explained in Chapter 7, capital 
requirements and the extent to which they were enforced varied from 
country to country prior to Basel I. Banks were competing globally and 
as a result a bank subject to low capital requirements, or capital require-
ments that were not strictly enforced, had a competitive edge. 
However, a uniform regulatory environment comes with costs. All 
banks tend to respond in the same way to external events. Consider, 
for example, market risk. When volatilities and correlations increase, 
market VaR and the capital required for market risks increase. As a 
result, banks tend to take steps to reduce their exposures. Since banks 
Business Snapshot 15.4 The Crash of 1987 
On Monday, October 19, 1987, the Dow J ones Industrial Average dropped by 
more than 20%. Portfolio insurance played a major role in this crash. In 
October 1987 between $60 billion and $90 billion of equity assets were subject 
to portfolio insurance schemes where put options were created synthetical 
using a type of "stop-loss" trading strategy. 
During the period Wednesday, October 14, 1987, to Friday, October 
1987, the market declined by about 10%, with much of this decline take 
place on Friday afternoon. The portfolio insurance schemes should have 
generated at least $12 billion of equity or index futures sales as a result 
this decline. In fact, portfolio insurers had time to sell only $4 billion and then 
approached the following week with huge amounts of selling already dictated 
by their models. It is estimated that, on Monday, October 19, sell programs 
three portfolio insurers accounted for almost 10% of the sales on the New 
York Stock Exchange, and that portfolio insurance sales amounted to 21.3% 
of all sales in index futures markets. It is likely that the decline in equity pri??? 
was exacerbated by investors other than portfolio insurers selling heavily 
anticipation of the actions of portfolio insurers. 
As the market declined so fast and the stock exchange systems were over-
loaded, many portfolio insurers were unable to execute the trades generated 
their models and failed to obtain the protection they required. Needless to say , 
the popularity of portfolio insurance schemes has declined significantly since 
1987. One of the morals of this story is that it is dangerous to follow a 
particular trading strategy—even a hedging strategy—when many other mar-
ket participants are doing the same thing. 
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often have similar positions to each other, they try to do similar trades. A 
liquidity black hole can then develop. 
Consider next credit risk. During the low point of the economic cycle, 
default probabilities are relatively high and capital requirements for loans 
under the Basel II internal ratings based models tend to be high. As a 
result banks may be less willing to make loans, creating a liquidity black 
hole for small and medium-sized businesses. The Basel Committee has 
recognized this as a problem and has dealt with it by asserting that the 
probability of default should be an average of the probability of default 
through the economic or credit cycle, rather than an estimate applicable 
to one particular point in time. 
The Importance of Diversity 
Economic models usually assume that market participants act independ-
ently. We have argued that this is often not the case. It is this lack of 
independence that causes liquidity black holes. To solve the problem of 
liquidity black holes, we need more diversity in financial markets. 
One conclusion from the arguments we have put forward is that a 
contrarian investment strategy has some merit. If markets overreact an 
investor can do quite well by buying when everyone else is selling and 
there is very little liquidity. However, it can be quite difficult for a fund to 
follow such a strategy if it is subject to the VaR-based risk management 
measures that have become standard. 
Business Snapshot 15.5 British Insurance Companies 
In the late 1990s, British insurance companies had entered into many contracts 
promising that the rate of interest applicable to an annuity received by an 
individual on retirement would be the greater of the market rate and a 
guaranteed rate. At about the same time, largely because of regulatory 
pressures, all insurance companies decided to hedge part of their risks on 
these contracts by buying long-dated swap options from financial institutions. 
The financial institutions they dealt with hedged their risks by buying large 
numbers of long-dated sterling bonds. As a result, bond prices rose and 
sterling long-term interest rates declined. More bonds had to be bought to 
maintain the dynamic hedge, long-term sterling interest rates declined further, 
and so on. Financial institutions lost money and, because long-term interest 
rates declined, insurance companies found themselves in a worse position on 
the risks that they had chosen not to hedge. 
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Volatilities and correlations tend to be "mean reverting". They some-
times increase but over time they get pulled back to long-run average 
levels. One way of creating diversity is to recognize in regulation and in 
risk management practices that not all market participants should be 
concerned about short-term changes in volatilities and correlations. Asset 
managers, for example, should base their decisions on long-term average 
volatilities and correlations. They should not join the herd when liquidity 
holes develop. 
Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds have become important participants in financial markets in 
recent years. A hedge fund is similar to a mutual fund in that it invests 
money on behalf of clients. However, unlike mutual funds hedge funds 
are not required to register under US federal securities law. This is 
because they accept funds only from financially sophisticated individuals 
and do not publicly offer their securities. Mutual funds are subject to 
regulations requiring that shares in the funds be fairly priced, that the 
shares be redeemable at any time, that investment policies be disclosed, 
that the use of leverage be limited, that no short positions be taken, and 
so on. Hedge funds are relatively free of these regulations. This gives them 
a great deal of freedom to develop sophisticated, unconventional, and 
proprietary investment strategies. The fees charged by hedge fund man-
agers are dependent on the fund's performance and are relatively high— 
typically 1 to 2% of the amount invested plus 20% of the profits. 
Hedge funds have grown in popularity with about $1 trillion being 
invested throughout the world for clients in 2004. "Funds of funds" have 
been set up to invest in a portfolio of other hedge funds. At the time of 
writing, hedge funds are still largely unregulated. This means that they do 
not have to assess risk in the same way as other financial institutions. As a 
result, hedge funds are in an ideal position to provide liquidity when black 
holes show signs of developing. If hedge funds are regulated in the future, it 
is to be hoped that the regulations will not be the same as those applying to 
other financial institutions. 
15.9 LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
Hedge funds themselves can run into liquidity problems and create or 
exacerbate liquidity black holes. The most famous example here is Long-
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Term Capital Management (LTCM) which was discussed in Business 
Snapshot 12.1. 
LTCM's problems were exacerbated by the fact that its leverage was 
huge. It had about $125 billion of assets (plus large numbers of off-
balance-sheet derivatives transactions such as swaps) and only $5 billion 
of capital. It was unable to make the payments required under its Collater-
alization agreements. There was a great deal of concern about the ability of 
the financial system to cope with a potential failure of LTCM. What 
actually happened was a cash injection by a group of banks and an orderly 
liquidation that led to a total loss of about $4 billion. If the fund had been 
less highly leveraged, it would probably have been able to survive the flight 
to quality and could have waited for the previous relationship between the 
prices of the liquid and illiquid securities to resume. 
Why was the flight to quality so large? One reason is that there were 
rumors in the market that LTCM was experiencing financial difficulties. 
These rumors led people to anticipate the sort of trades LTCM would 
have to do to close out its positions and the likely effect of those trades on 
market prices. When everyone anticipates that something will happen in 
financial markets it tends to happen. Another reason is that LTCM had 
been highly successful during the 1995 to 1997 period. As a result there 
were many other hedge funds trying to imitate its strategy. These hedge 
funds also experienced financial difficulties and tried to close out their 
positions. This accentuated market movements. 
15.10 LIQUIDITY vs. PROFITABILITY 
Finally it should be noted that there can be liquidity problems without 
profitability problems. For example, a profitable bank can experience a 
run on deposits and run into liquidity problems. Banking is to a large 
extent about confidence. A bank relies on the withdrawal of deposits 
being roughly balanced by new deposits so that funding from liabilities 
remains roughly constant (see Section 1.3). If there is a temporary short-
fall, it is handled by interbank borrowing.13 However, if there is a loss of 
confidence in the bank—however unjustified this might be—the bank is 
liable to experience catastrophic liquidity problems. 
Liquidity funding problems can be experienced by all sorts of com-
panies. We have all heard stories about profitable companies that for 
13
 Across the whole banking system the funds on deposit should remain roughly constant 
as a withdrawal from one bank usually becomes a deposit with another bank. 
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some reason "fell through the cracks" when trying to arrange venture 
capital funding or bank loans. An extreme example of a liquidity funding 
problem is provided by a German company, Metallgesellschaft, that 
entered into profitable fixed-price oil and gas contracts with its customers 
(see Business Snapshot 15.6). 
Liquidity funding problems can in part be avoided by carrying out 
scenario analyses and taking steps to avoid the possibility of outcomes 
where short-term cash drains are difficult to fund. 
SUMMARY 
Since the publication of the Black-Scholes model in 1973 a huge amount 
of effort has been devoted to the development of improved models for the 
behavior of asset prices. It might be thought that it is just a matter of time 
before the perfect model is produced. Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
Models in finance are different from those in the physical sciences because 
they are ultimately models of human behavior. They are always likely to 
be at best approximations to the way market variables behave. Further-
more, from time to time there are regime shifts where there are funda-
mental changes in the behavior of market variables. 
For products that trade actively, models are used primarily for com-
municating prices, interpolating between market prices, and hedging-
When hedging, traders use both within-model hedging and outside-model 
hedging. This means that they hedge against movements in variables that 
Business Snapshot 15.6 Metallgesellschaft 
In the early 1990s, Metallgesellschaft (MG) sold a large volume of five- to 
ten-year heating oil and gasoline fixed-price supply contracts to its customers 
at 6 to 8 cents above market prices. It hedged its exposure with long positions 
in short-dated futures contracts that were rolled forward. As it turned out, the 
price of oil fell and there were margin calls on the futures positions. Con-
siderable short-term cash-flow pressures were placed on MG. Those at MG 
who devised the hedging strategy argued that these short-term cash outflows 
were offset by positive cash flows that would ultimately be realized on the 
long-term fixed-price contracts. However, the company's senior management 
and its bankers became concerned about the huge cash drain. As a result, the 
company closed out all the hedge positions and agreed with its customers that 
the fixed-price contracts would be abandoned. The outcome was a loss to 
MG of $1.33 billion. 
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the model assumes to be constant (or deterministic) as well movements in 
variables that are assumed to be stochastic. This type of hedging is 
imperfect, but hopefully the unhedged risks are largely diversified in a 
large portfolio. 
For products that are highly structured or do not trade actively models 
are used for pricing. In this case choosing the right model is often more of 
an art than a science. It is a good practice to use several models and 
assumptions about the underlying parameters in order to obtain a 
realistic range for pricing and understand the accompanying model risk. 
Liquidity risk is the risk that the market will not be able to absorb the 
trades a financial institution wants to do at the time it wants to do them. 
In normal market conditions liquidity is characterized by a bid-offer 
spread. This spread widens as the size of a transaction increases. 
The most serious liquidity risks arise from what are sometimes termed 
liquidity black holes. These occur when all traders want to be on the same 
side of the market at the same time. This may be because they are using 
similar models or are subject to similar regulations, or because of a herd 
mentality that sometimes develops among traders. Traders that have 
long-term objectives should avoid allowing themselves to be influenced 
by the short-term overreaction of markets. 
FURTHER READING 
Derman, E., My Life as a Quant: Reflections on Physics and Finance. New York: 
Wiley, 2004. 
Persaud, A. D., (ed.), Liquidity Black Holes: Understanding, Quantifying and 
Managing Financial Liquidity Risk. London: Risk Books, 1999. 
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
15.1. Give two explanations for the volatility skew observed for options on 
equities. 
15.2. Give two explanations for the volatility smile observed for options on a 
foreign currency. 
15.3. "The Black-Scholes model is nothing more than a sophisticated inter-
polation tool." Discuss this viewpoint. 
15.4. Using Table 15.1, calculate the volatility a trader would use for an 
8-month option with a strike price of 1.04. 
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15.5. What is the key difference between the models of physics and the models 
of finance. 
15.6. How is a financial institution liable to find that it is using a model 
different from its competitors for a particular type of derivatives product 
15.7. What is a liquidity-adjusted VaR designed to measure? 
15.8. Explain how liquidity black holes occur. How can regulation lead to 
liquidity black holes? 
15.9. Distinguish between within-model and outside-model hedging. 
15.10. A stock price is currently $20. Tomorrow, news is expected to be 
announced that will either increase the price by $5 or decrease the price 
by $5. What are the problems in using Black-Scholes to value 1-month 
options on the stock? 
15.11. Suppose that a central bank's policy is to allow an exchange rate to 
fluctuate between 0.97 and 1.03. What pattern of implied volatilities for 
options on the exchange rate would you expect to see? 
15.12. "For actively traded products traders can mark to market. For structured 
products they mark to model." Explain this remark. 
15.13. "Hedge funds can either be the solution to black holes or the cause of 
black holes." Explain this remark. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
15.14. Suppose that all options traders decide to switch from Black-Scholes to 
another model that makes different assumptions about the behavior of 
asset prices. What effect do you think this would have on (a) the pricing 
of standard options and (b) the hedging of standard options? 
15.15. Using Table 15.1, calculate the volatility a trader would use for an 
11-month option with a strike price of 0.98. 
15.16. A futures price is currently $40. The risk-free interest rate is 5%. Some 
news is expected tomorrow that will cause the volatility over the next 
3 months to be either 10% or 30%. There is a 60% chance of the first 
outcome and a 40% chance of the second outcome. Use the DerivaGem 
software (available on the author's website) to calculate a volatility smile 
for 3-month options. 
Economic Capital 
and RAROC 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the role of capital in a bank is to protect 
depositors against losses. The capital of a bank consists of common 
shareholder's equity, preferred shareholder's equity, subordinated debt, 
and other similar items. 
In Chapter 7 we discussed the rules that the Basel Committee uses to 
determine regulatory capital. These rules are the same for all banks and, 
however carefully they have been chosen, it is inevitable that they will not 
be exactly appropriate for any particular bank. This has led banks to 
calculate economic capital (sometimes also referred to as risk capital). 
Economic capital is a bank's own internal estimate of the capital it needs 
for the risks it is taking. Economic capital can be regarded as a "cur-
rency" for risk-taking within a bank. A business unit can take a certain 
risk only when it is allocated the appropriate economic capital for that 
risk. The profitability of a business unit is measured relative to the 
economic capital allocated to the unit. 
In this chapter we discuss the approaches a bank uses to arrive at 
estimates of economic capital for particular risk types and particular 
business units and how these estimates are aggregated to produce a single 
economic capital estimate for the whole bank. We also discuss risk-
adjusted return on capital or RAROC. This is the return earned by a 
business unit on the capital assigned to it. RAROC can be used to assess 
the past performance of business units. It can also be used to forecast 
future performance of the units and decide on the most appropriate way 
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of allocating capital in the future. It provides a basis for determining 
whether some activities should be discontinued and others expanded. 
16.1 DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
Economic capital is defined as the amount of capital a bank needs to 
absorb losses over a certain time horizon with a certain confidence level. 
The time horizon is usually chosen as one year. The confidence level 
depends on the bank's objectives. A common objective for a large 
international bank is to maintain an AA credit rating. Corporations rated 
AA have a one-year probability of default of about 0.03%. This suggests 
that the confidence level should be 99.97%. For a bank wanting to 
maintain a BBB credit rating the confidence level is lower. A BBB-rated 
corporation has a probability of about 0.2% of defaulting in one year so 
that the confidence level is 99.80%. 
Capital is required to cover unexpected loss. This is defined as the 
difference between the actual loss and the expected loss. The idea here 
is that expected losses should be taken account of in the way a bank prices 
its products so that only unexpected losses require capital. As indicated in 
Figure 16.1, the economic capital for a bank that wants to maintain an 
Figure 16.1 Calculation of economic capital from one-year loss distribution 
for a AA-rated bank. 
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AA rating is the difference between expected losses and the 99.97 percen-
tile point on the probability distribution of losses. 
Example 16.1 
When lending in a certain region of the world an AA-rated bank estimates its 
losses as 1% of outstanding loans per year on average. The 99.97% worst-case 
loss (i.e., the loss exceeded only 0.03% of the time) is estimated as 5% of 
outstanding loans. The economic capital required per $100 of loans is therefore 
$4.0 (the difference between the 99.97% worst-case loss and the expected loss). 
Approaches to Measurement 
There are two broad approaches to measuring economic capital: the 
"top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches. In the top-down approach 
the volatility of the bank's assets is estimated and then used to calculate 
the probability that the value of the assets will fall below the value of the 
liabilities by the end of the time horizon. A theoretical framework that 
can be used for the top-down approach is Merton's model, which was 
discussed in Section 11.6. 
The approach most often used is the bottom-up approach, where loss 
distributions are estimated for different types of risk and different busi-
ness units and then aggregated. The first step in the aggregation can be to 
calculate probability distributions for total losses by risk type or total 
losses by business unit. A final aggregation gives a probability distribu-
tion of total losses for the whole financial institution. 
The various risks facing a bank are summarized in Figure 16.2. As we 
saw in Chapter 14, regulators have chosen to define operational risk as 
"the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
Figure 16.2 Categorization of risks faced by a bank in the Basel 
II regulatory environment. 
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people, and systems or from external events." Operational risk includes 
model risk and legal risk, but not risks arising from strategic decisions or 
business reputation. We will refer to the latter risks collectively as business 
risk. Regulatory capital is not required for business risk under Basel II, 
but some banks do assess economic capital for business risk. 
16.2 COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
In earlier chapters we covered approaches used to calculate loss distribu-
tions for different types of risks. Here we review some of the key points. 
Market Risk Economic Capital 
In Chapters 9 and 10 we discussed the historical simulation and model-
building approaches for estimating the probability distribution of the loss 
or gain from market risk. As explained, this distribution is usually calcu-
lated in the first instance with a one-day time horizon. Regulatory capital 
for market risk is calculated as a multiple (at least 3.0) of the ten-day 99% 
VaR and bank supervisors have indicated that they are comfortable 
calculating the ten-day 99% VaR as times the one-day 99% VaR. 
When calculating economic capital, we want to use the same time 
horizon and confidence level for all risks. The time horizon is usually 
one year and, as explained, the confidence level is often chosen as 99.97% 
for an AA-rated bank. The simplest assumptions are (a) that the prob-
ability distribution of gains and losses for each day during the next year 
will be the same as that estimated for the first day and (b) that the 
distributions are independent. We can then use the central limit theorem 
to argue that the one-year loss/gain distribution is normal. Assuming 252 
business days in the year, the standard deviation of the one-year loss/gain 
equals the standard deviation of the daily loss/gain multiplied by 
The mean loss/gain is much more difficult to estimate than the standard 
deviation. A reasonable, if somewhat conservative, assumption is that the 
mean loss/gain is zero. The 99.97% worst-case loss is then 3.43 times the 
standard deviation of the one-year loss/gain. The 99.8% worst-case loss is 
2.88 times the standard deviation of the one-year loss/gain. 
Example 16.2 
Suppose that the one-day standard deviation of market risk losses/gains for a 
bank is $5 million. The one-year 99.8% worst-case loss is 2.88 x x 5 = 
228.6, or $228.6 million. 
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Note that we are not assuming that the daily losses/gains are normal. 
All we are assuming is that they are independent and identically 
distributed. The central limit theorem of statistics tells us that the 
sum of many independent identically distributed variables is approxi-
mately normal. If losses on successive days are correlated, we can 
assume first-order autocorrelation, estimate the correlation parameter 
from historical data, and use the results in Section 8.4. When the 
autocorrelation is not too high, it is still reasonable to assume that 
the one-year loss distribution is normal. If a more complicated model 
for the relationship between losses on successive days is considered 
appropriate, then the one-year loss distribution can be calculated using 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
Credit Risk Economic Capital 
Although Basel II gives banks that use the internal ratings based approach 
for regulatory capital a great deal of freedom, it does not allow them to 
choose their own credit correlation model and correlation parameters. 
When calculating economic capital, banks are free to make the assump-
tions they consider most appropriate for their situation. As explained in 
Section 12.6, CreditMetrics is often used to calculate the specific risk 
capital charge for credit risk in the trading book. It is also sometimes used 
when economic capital is calculated for the banking book. A bank's own 
internal rating system can be used instead of that of Moody's or S&P when 
this method is used. 
Another approach that is sometimes used is Credit Risk Plus, which is 
described in Section 12.5. This approach borrows a number of ideas from 
actuarial science to calculate a probability distribution for losses from 
defaults. Whereas CreditMetrics calculates the loss from downgrades and 
defaults, Credit Risk Plus calculates losses from defaults only. 
In calculating credit risk economic capital, a bank can choose to adopt 
a conditional or unconditional model. In a conditional (cycle-specific) 
model, the expected and unexpected losses take account of current 
economic conditions. In an unconditional (cycle-neutral) model, they 
are calculated by assuming economic conditions that are in some sense 
an average of those experienced through the cycle. Rating agencies aim 
to produce ratings that are unconditional. Moreover, when regulatory 
capital is calculated using the internal ratings based approach, the PD 
and LGD estimates should be unconditional. Obviously it is important 
to be consistent when economic capital is calculated. If expected losses 
370 Chapter 16 
are conditional, unexpected losses should also be conditional. If ex-
pected losses are unconditional, the same should be true of unexpected 
losses. 
A particularly challenging task is to take counterparty risk on deriva-
tives into account when credit risk loss distributions are calculated. In 
practice, banks often use approximations to the approach outlined in 
Section 12.1. For example, they might develop look-up tables for expected 
exposure during the life of an instrument and assume that exposure 
remains constant at this level. When a bank has several different exposures 
with the same counterparty and there are netting agreements, algorithms 
for calculating expected exposure can be developed. Other features of 
derivative contracts such as Collateralization and downgrade triggers can 
be incorporated. 
Operational Risk Economic Capital 
Banks are given a great deal of freedom in the assessment of regulatory 
capital for operational risk under the advanced measurement approach. It 
is therefore likely that most banks using this approach will calculate 
operational risk economic capital and operational risk regulatory capital 
in the same way. As noted in Chapter 14, methods for calculating 
operational risk capital are still evolving. Some approaches are statistical 
and others are more subjective. 
Business Risk Economic Capital 
As mentioned earlier, business risk includes strategic risk (relating to a 
bank's decision to enter new markets and develop new products) and 
reputational risk. Business risk is even more difficult to quantify than 
operational risk and estimates are likely to be largely subjective. It is 
important that senior risk managers within a financial institution have a 
good understanding of the portfolio of business risks being taken. This 
should enable them to assess the capital required for the risks and, more 
importantly, the marginal impact on total risk of new strategic initiatives 
that are being contemplated. 
16.3 SHAPES OF THE LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS 
The loss probability distributions for market, credit, and operational risk 
are very different. Rosenberg and Schuermann used data from a variety of 
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Figure 16.3 Loss density distribution for market risk. 
different sources to estimate typical shapes for these distributions.1 These 
are shown in Figures 16.3, 16.4, and 16.5. The market risk loss distribution 
(see Figure 16.3) is symmetrical, but not perfectly normally distributed. A 
t-distribution with 11 degrees of freedom provides a good fit. The credit 
risk loss distribution in Figure 16.4 is quite skewed, as one would expect. 
The operational risk distribution in Figure 16.5 has a quite extreme shape. 
Most of the time losses are modest, but occasionally they are very large. 
We can characterize a distribution by its second, third, and fourth 
moments. Loosely speaking, the second moment measures standard 
deviation (or variance), the third Skewness, and the fourth kurtosis 
Figure 16.4 Loss density distribution for credit risk. 
1
 See J. V. Rosenberg and T. Schuermann, "A General Approach to Integrated Risk 
Management with Skewed, Fat-Tailed Risks," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff 
Report No. 185, May 2004. 
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Figure 16.5 Loss density distribution for 
operational risk. 
(i.e., the heaviness of tails). Table 16.1 summarizes the properties of 
typical loss distributions for market, credit, and operational risk. 
16.4 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF RISKS 
The relative importance of different types of risks depends on the business 
mix. For a bank whose prime business is taking deposits and making 
loans, credit risk is of paramount importance. For an investment bank, 
credit risk and market risk are both important. For an asset manager, the 
greatest risk is operational risk. If rules on the ways funds are to be 
invested are not followed, there are liable to be expensive investor law 
suits. Business Snapshot 16.1 gives one example of this. Another high-
profile example is provided by the Unilever's pension plan. Mercury Asset 
Management, owned by Merrill Lynch, pledged not to underperform a 
benchmark index by more than 3%. Between January 1997 and March 
1998 it underperformed the index by 10.5%. Unilever sued Merrill Lynch 
for $185 million and the matter was settled out of court. 
Table 16.1 Characteristics of loss distributions for different risk types. 
Market risk 
Credit risk 
Operational risk 
Second moment Third moment 
(standard deviation) (skewness) 
High Zero 
Moderate Moderate 
Low High 
Fourth moment 
(kurtosis) 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
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Interactions between Risks 
There are interactions between the different types of risk. For example, 
when a derivative such as a swap is traded, there are interactions between 
credit and market risk. If the counterparty defaults, credit risk exists only 
if market variables have moved so that the value of the derivative to the 
financial institution is positive. Another interaction is that the probability 
of default by a counterparty may depend on the value of a financial 
institution's contract (or contracts) with the counterparty.2 If the counter-
party has entered into the contract for hedging purposes, this is not likely 
to be the case. However, if the contract has been entered into for 
speculative purposes and the contract is large in relation to the size of 
the counterparty, there is likely to be some dependence. 
As the Long-Term Capital Management saga clearly shows there can 
be interactions between liquidity risks and market risks (see Section 15.9). 
There are also interactions between operational risks and market risks. It 
is unlikely that we would know about the activities of Nick Leeson at 
Barings Bank if he had guessed right about the Nikkei index (see Business 
Snapshot 2.3). It is also unlikely that we would hear about a violation of 
the rules for a fund (such as the one in Business Snapshot 16.1) if it had 
led to a gain rather than a loss. 
16.5 AGGREGATING ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
Typically a financial institution calculates market, credit, operational, and 
(possibly) business risk loss distributions for a number of different business 
2
 When calculating the expected cost of counterparty default risk in Section 12.1, we 
(assumed no dependence. 
Business Snapshot 16.1 The EGT Fund 
In 1996 Peter Young was fund manager at Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, a 
subsidiary of Deutsche Bank. He was responsible for managing a fund called 
the European Growth Trust (EGT). It had grown very large and Young had 
responsibilities for managing over one billion pounds of investors' money. 
Certain rules applied to EGT. One of these was that no more than 10% of 
the fund could be invested in unlisted securities. Peter Young violated this rul 
in a way, it can be argued, that benefited him personally. When the facts were 
uncovered, he was fired and Deutsche bank had to compensate investors. The 
total cost to Deutsche Bank was over 200 million pounds. 
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units. It is then faced with the problem of aggregating the loss distributions 
to calculate a total economic capital for the whole enterprise. 
The simplest approach is to assume that the total economic capital for a 
set of n different risks is the sum of the economic capital amounts for each 
risk considered separately so that 
where is the total economic capital for the financial institution 
facing n different risks and is the economic capital for the ith risk 
considered on its own. This is what the Basel Committee does for 
regulatory capital. The total regulatory capital a bank is required to keep 
under Basel II is the sum of the regulatory capital amounts for credit, 
market, and operational risks. 
Equation (16.1) is clearly a very conservative assumption. It assumes 
perfect correlation. In the context of economic capital calculations where 
the confidence level is 99.97%, it would mean that, if a financial institution 
experiences the 99.97% worst-case loss for market risk, it also experiences 
the 99.97% worst-case loss for credit risk and operational risk. Rosenberg 
and Schuermann estimate the correlation between market risk and credit 
risk to be approximately 50 % and the correlation between each of these 
risks and operational risk to be approximately 20%. They estimate that 
equation (16.1), when used as a way of aggregating market, credit, and 
operational risk, overstates the total capital required by about 40%. 
Assuming Normal Distributions 
A simple assumption when aggregating loss distributions is that they are 
normally distributed. The standard deviation of the total loss from 
n sources of risk is then 
where is the standard deviation of the loss from the ith source of risk 
and is the correlation between risk i and risk j. The capital require-
ment can be calculated from this. For example, the excess of the 99.97% 
worst-case loss over the expected loss is 3.44 times the number calculated 
in equation (16.2). 
This approach tends to underestimate the capital requirement because 
it takes no account of the Skewness and kurtosis of the loss distributions. 
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Rosenberg and Schuermann estimate that, when the approach is applied 
to aggregating market, credit, and operational risk, the total capital is 
underestimated by about 40%. 
Using Copulas 
A more sophisticated approach to aggregating loss distributions is by using 
copulas. Copulas were discussed in Chapter 6. Each loss distribution is 
mapped on a percentile-to-percentile basis to a standard well-behaved 
distribution. A correlation structure between the standard distributions 
is defined and this indirectly defines a correlation structure between the 
original distributions. 
Many different copulas can be defined. In the Gaussian copula the 
standard distributions are assumed to be multivariate normal. An alter-
native is to assume that they are multivariate t. This leads to the joint 
probability of extreme values of two variables being higher than in the 
Gaussian copula. This is discussed further in Section 6.4. 
The Hybrid Approach 
A simple approach that seems to work well is known as the hybrid 
approach. This involves calculating the economic capital for a portfolio 
of risks from the economic capital for the individual risks using 
When the distributions are normal, this approach is exactly correct. When 
they are nonnormal, the hybrid approach gives an approximate answer— 
but one that reflects any heaviness in the tails of the individual loss 
distributions. Rosenberg and Schuermann find that the answers given by 
the hybrid approach are reasonably close to those given by copula models. 
Example 16.3 
Suppose that the estimates for economic capital for market, credit, and 
operational risk for two business units are as shown in Table 16.2. The 
correlations between the losses are shown in Table 16.3. The correlation 
between credit risk and market risk within the same business unit is 0.5, 
and the correlation between operational risk and either credit or market risk 
within the same business unit is 0.2. (These correspond to the estimates of 
Rosenberg and Schuermann mentioned above.) The correlation between two 
different risk types in two different business units is zero. The correlation 
between market risks across business units is 0.4. The correlation between 
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Table 16.2 Economic capital estimates for 
Example 16.3. 
credit risk across business units is 0.6. The correlation between operational 
risk across business units is zero. 
We can aggregate the economic capital in a number of ways. The total 
market risk economic capital is 
The total credit risk economic capital is 
The total operational risk economic capital is 
The total economic capital for Business Unit 1 is 
The total economic capital for Business Unit 2 is 
Table 16.3 Correlations between losses in Example 16.3. 
MR, CR, and OR refer to market risk, credit risk, and 
operational risk; 1 and 2 refer to business units. 
MR-1 
CR-1 
OR-1 
MR-2 
CR-2 
OR-2 
MR-1 
1.0 
0.5 
0.2 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
CR-1 
0.5 
1.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.6 
0.0 
OR-1 
0.2 
0.2 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
MR-2 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
1.0 
0.5 
0.2 
CR-2 
0.0 
0.6 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
0.2 
OR-2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.2 
1.0 
Market risk 
Credit risk 
Operational risk 
Business unit 
1 2 
30 40 
70 80 
30 90 
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The total enterprise-wide economic capital is the square root of 
302 + 402 + 702 + 802 + 302 + 902 + 2 x 0.4 x 30 x 40 + 2 x 0.5 x 30 x 70 
+ 2 x 0.2 x 30 x 30 + 2 x 0.5 x 40 x 80 + 2 x 0.2 x 40 x 90 
+ 2 x 0.6 x 70 x 80 + 2 x 0.2 x 70 x 30 + 2 x 0.2 x 80 x 90 
or 203.224. 
There are significant diversification benefits. The sum of the economic capital 
estimates for market, credit, and operational risk is 58.8 + 134.2 + 94.9 = 287.9 
and the sum of the economic capital estimates for two business units is 
100 + 153.7 = 253.7. Both of these are greater than the total economic capital 
estimate of 203.2. 
16.6 ALLOCATION OF THE DIVERSIFICATION 
BENEFIT 
Suppose that the sum of the economic capital for each business unit, 
is $2 billion and the total economic capital for the whole bank, 
after taking less-than-perfect correlations into account, is $1.3 billion 
(= 65% of the sum of the E's). The $0.7 billion is a diversification gain 
to the bank. How should it be allocated to the business units? 
A simple approach is to reduce the economic capital of each business 
unit by 35%. However, this is probably not the best approach. Suppose 
there are 50 business units and that two particular business units both 
have an economic capital of $100 million. Suppose that when the first 
business unit is excluded from the calculations the bank's economic 
capital reduces by $60 million and that when the second business unit 
is excluded from the calculation the bank's economic capital reduces by 
$10 million. Arguably the first business unit should have more economic 
capital than the second business unit because its incremental impact on 
the bank's total economic capital is greater. 
The issues here are analogous to the issues we discussed in Section 8.5 
concerned with allocating VaR. The theoretically best allocation scheme 
is to allocate an amount 
to the ith business unit, where E is the total economic capital and is the 
investment in the ith business unit. As we pointed out in Section 8.5, a 
result known as Euler's theorem ensures that the total of the allocated 
capital is E. 
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Define as the increase in the total economic capital when we 
increase by A discrete approximation for the amount allocated 
to business unit i is 
where 
Example 16.4 
Consider again Example 16.3. The total economic capital is 203.2. The 
economic capital calculated for Business Unit 1 is 100 and that calculated 
for Business Unit 2 is 153.7. 
A naive procedure would allocate 100/253.7 of the total economic capital to 
Business Unit 1 and 153.7/253.7 of the economic capital to Business Unit 2. 
This would result in 80.1 for Business Unit 1 and 123.1 for Business Unit 2. 
The incremental effect of Business Unit 1 on the total economic capital is 
203.2 - 153.7 = 49.5. Similarly, the incremental effect of Business Unit 2 is 
203.2 - 100 = 103.2. The two incremental capitals do not add up to the total 
capital (as is usually the case). We could use them as a basis for allocating the 
total capital. We would then allocate 49.5/(49.5+ 103.2) of the capital to 
Business Unit 1 and 103.2/(49.5 + 103.2) of it to Business Unit 2. This would 
result in 65.9 for Business Unit 1 and 137.3 for Business Unit 2. 
To apply equation (16.4), we could calculate the partial derivative analytic-
ally. Alternatively, we can use a numerical approximation. When we increase 
the size of Business Unit 1 by 1%, its economic capital amounts for market, 
credit, and operational risk in Table 16.2 increase to 30.3, 70.7, and 30.3, 
respectively. The total economic capital becomes 203.906, so that = 
203.906-203.224 = 0.682. 
When we increase the size of Business Unit 2 by 1%, its economic capital 
amounts for market, credit, and operational risk in Table 16.2 increase to 40.4, 
80.8, and 90.9, respectively. The total economic capital becomes 204.577, so 
that = 204.577 - 203.224 = 1.353. 
In this case, because we are considering 1 % increases in the size of each unit, 
= 0.01. From equation (16.4) the economic capital alloca-
tions to the two business units are 68.2 and 135.2. (These do not quite add up 
to the total economic capital of 203.2 because we approximated the partial 
derivative.) 
16.7 DEUTSCHE BANK'S ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
Deutsche Bank publishes the result of its economic capital calculation in 
its annual financial statements. Table 16.4 summarizes the economic 
capital and regulatory capital for 2004. Deutsche Bank calculated a 
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Table 16.4 Deutsche Bank's economic capital and regulatory 
capital (millions of euros). 
Credit risk 5,971 
Market risk 5,476 
Diversification benefit across credit and market risk (870) 
Operational risk 2,243 
Business risk 381 
Total economic capital 13,201 
Total risk-weighted assets 216,787 
Tier 1 capital held (% of risk-weighted assets) 8.6% 
Tier 2 capital held (% of risk-weighted assets) 4.6% 
Total capital held (% of risk-weighted assets) 13.2% 
diversification benefit for credit and market risk, but not for other risk-
type combinations. The total economic capital is about 13.2 billion euros. 
This is considerably less than the total regulatory capital which is 8% of 
216.8, or about 17.3 billion euros. The actual capital held is about 
18.6 billion euros of Tier 1 capital and 10.0 billion euros of Tier 2 capital. 
It would appear that Deutsche Bank is very well capitalized relative to the 
risks it is taking. 
16.8 RAROC 
Risk-adjusted performance measurement (RAPM) has become an import-
ant part of how business units are assessed. There are many different 
approaches, but all have one thing in common. They compare return with 
capital employed in a way that incorporates an adjustment for risk. 
The most common approach is to compare expected return with 
economic capital. This is usually referred to as RAROC (risk-adjusted 
return on capital). The formula is 
The numerator may be calculated on a pre-tax or post-tax basis. Very 
often, a risk-free rate of return on the economic capital is calculated and 
added to the numerator. 
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Example 16.5 
When lending in a certain region of the world, an AA-rated bank estimates its 
losses as 1 % of outstanding loans per year on average. The 99.97% worst-case 
loss (i.e., the loss exceeded only 0.03% of the time) is 5% of outstanding loans. 
As shown in Example 16.1, the economic capital required per $100 of loans is 
$4, which is the difference between the 99.97% worst-case loss and the expected 
loss. (This ignores diversification benefits that would in practice be allocated to 
the lending.) The spread between the cost of funds and the interest charged is 
2.5%. Subtracting from this the expected loan loss of 1%, the expected profit 
per $100 of loans is $1.50. Assume that the lending department's administrative 
costs total 0.7% of the amount loan, the expected profit is reduced to $0.80 per 
$100 in the loan portfolio. RAROC is therefore 
An alternative calculation would add the interest on the economic capital to the 
numerator. Suppose the risk-free interest rate is 2%. Then 0.02 x 4 = 0.08 is 
added to the numerator, so that RAROC becomes 
As pointed out by Matten, it is more accurate to refer to the approach in 
equation (16.5) as RORAC (return on risk-adjusted capital) rather than 
RAROC.3 In theory, RAROC should involve adjusting the return (i.e., 
the numerator) for risk. In equation (16.5) it is the capital (i.e., the 
denominator) that is adjusted for risk. 
There are two ways in which RAROC is used. One is as a tool to 
compare the past performance of different business units, decide on end-
of-the-year bonuses, etc. The other is as a tool to decide whether a 
particular business unit should be expanded or contracted. The latter 
involves predicting an average RAROC for the unit and comparing it 
with the bank's threshold return on capital. 
When RAROC is used for the second purpose, it should be noted that 
it could be low simply because the business unit had a bad year. Perhaps 
credit losses were much larger than average or there was an unexpectedly 
large operational risk loss. This is not necessarily an indication that the 
business unit should be shut down. When RAROC is used as a forward-
looking measure, the calculation should reflect average losses. The aim is 
to assess the long-term viability of the business unit, whether it should be 
expanded or scaled back, and so on. 
3
 See C. Matten, Managing Bank Capital: Capital Allocation and Performance 
Measurement, 2nd edn., Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2000. 
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SUMMARY 
Economic capital is the capital that a bank or other financial institution 
deems necessary for the risks it is bearing. When calculating economic 
capital, a financial institution is free to adopt any approach it likes. It 
does not have to use the one proposed by regulators. Typically, it 
estimates economic capital for credit risk, market risk, operational risk, 
and (possibly) business risk for its business units and then aggregates 
these estimates to produce an estimate of the economic capital for the 
whole enterprise. The one-year loss distributions for market risk, credit 
risk and operational risk are quite different. The loss distribution for 
market risk is symmetrical. For credit risk, it is skewed and for opera-
tional risk it is highly skewed with very heavy tails. 
The total economic capital for a financial institution is allocated to 
business units so that a return on capital can be calculated. There are a 
number of allocation schemes. The best are those that reflect the incre-
mental impact of the business unit on the total economic capital. The 
amount of capital allocated to a business unit is generally less than the 
capital estimated for the business unit as a stand-alone entity because of 
diversification benefits. 
FURTHER READING 
Dev, A., Economic Capital: A Practitioner's Guide. London: Risk Books, 2004. 
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Measurement, 2nd edn. Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2000. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
16.1. What is the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital? 
16.2. Why do AA-rated banks use a confidence level of 99.97% when calculat-
ing economic capital for a one-year time horizon? 
16.3. What is included in business risk? 
16.4. In what respects are the models used to calculate economic capital for 
market risk, credit risk, and operational risk likely to be different from 
those used to calculate regulatory capital? 
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16.5. Suppose the credit loss in a year has a lognormal distribution. The loga-
rithm of the loss is normal with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 4. What 
is the economic capital requirement if a confidence level of 99.97% is used? 
16.6. Suppose that the economic capital estimates for two business units are as 
follows: 
Market risk 
Credit risk 
Operational risk 
Business unit 
1 2 
20 40 
40 30 
70 10 
The correlations are as in Table 16.3. Calculate the total economic capital 
for each business unit and the two business units together. 
16.7. In Problem 16.6, what is the incremental effect of each business unit on 
the total economic capital? Use this to allocate economic capital to 
business units. What is the impact on the economic capital of each 
business unit increasing by 0.5%? Show that your results are consistent 
with Euler's theorem. 
16.8. A bank is considering expanding its asset management operations. The 
main risk is operational risk. It estimates that the expected operational 
risk loss from the new venture in one year is $2 million and the 99.97% 
worst-case loss (arising from a large investor law suit) is $40 million. The 
expected fees it will receive from investors for the funds under adminis-
tration are $12 million per year and administrative costs are expected to 
be $5 million per year. Estimate the before-tax RAROC? 
16.9. RAROC can be used in two different ways. What are they? 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
16.10. Suppose that daily gains and losses are normally distributed with a 
standard deviation of (a) Estimate the minimum regulatory capital 
the bank is required to hold for market risk. (Assume a multiplicative 
factor of 3.0.) (b) Estimate the economic capital for market risk using a 
one-year time horizon and a 99.97% confidence limit. (c) Why is the ratio 
of your answer in (a) to your answer in (b) not a good indication of the 
ratio of regulatory market risk capital to economic market risk capital in 
practice? 
16.11. Suppose that a bank's sole business is to lend in two regions of the world. 
The lending in each region has the same characteristics as in Example 16.5 
of Section 16.8. Lending to Region A is three times as great as lending to 
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Region B. The correlation between loan losses in the two regions is 0.4. 
Estimate the total RAROC. 
16.12. Suppose that the economic capital estimates for two business units are as 
follows: 
The correlation between market risk and credit risk in the same business 
unit is 0.3. The correlation between credit risk in one business unit and 
credit risk in another is 0.7. The correlation between market risk in one 
business unit and market risk in the other is 0.2. All other correlations are 
zero. Calculate the total economic capital. How much should be allocated 
to each business unit? 
Market risk 
Credit risk 
Operational risk 
Business unit 
1 2 
10 50 
30 30 
50 10 
Products to manage equity risks, interest rate risks, and foreign currency 
risks are well established and were covered in Chapter 2. This chapter 
examines the products that have been developed to manage risk in less 
traditional markets. Specifically, it considers weather risk, energy price 
risk, and insurance risks. The markets that we will talk about are in some 
cases in the early stages of their development. As they evolve, we may well 
see significant changes in both the products that are offered and the ways 
in which they are used. 
17.1 WEATHER DERIVATIVES 
Many companies are in the position where their performance is liable to 
be adversely affected by the weather.1 It makes sense for these companies 
to consider hedging their weather risk in much the same way as they 
hedge foreign exchange or interest rate risks. 
The first over-the-counter weather derivatives were introduced in 1997. 
To understand how they work, we explain two variables: 
HDD: Heating degree days 
CDD: Cooling degree days 
1
 The US Department of Energy has estimated that one-seventh of the US economy is 
subject to weather risk. 
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A day's HDD is defined as 
HDD = max(0, 65 - A) 
and a day's CDD is defined as 
CDD = max(0, A - 65) 
where A is the average of the highest and lowest temperature during the 
day at a specified weather station, measured in degrees Fahrenheit. For 
example, if the maximum temperature during a day (midnight to mid-
night) is 68° Fahrenheit and the minimum temperature is 44° Fahrenheit, 
A = 56. The daily HDD is then 9 and the daily CDD is 0. 
A typical over-the-counter product is a forward or option contract 
providing a payoff dependent on the cumulative HDD or CDD during 
a month (i.e., the total of the HDDs or CDDs for every day in the 
month). For example, a dealer could in January 2007 sell a client a call 
option on the cumulative HDD during February 2008 at the Chicago 
O'Hare Airport weather station with a strike price of 700 and a payment 
rate of $10,000 per degree day. If the actual cumulative HDD is 820, the 
payoff is $1.2 million. Often contracts include a payment cap. If the cap in 
our example is $1.5 million, the client's position is equivalent to a long 
call option on cumulative HDD with a strike price of 700 and a short call 
option with a strike price of 850. 
A day's HDD is a measure of the volume of energy required for heating 
during the day. A day's CDD is a measure of the volume of energy 
required for cooling during the day. Most weather derivative contracts are 
entered into by energy producers and energy consumers. But retailers, 
supermarket chains, food and drink manufacturers, health service com-
panies, agriculture companies, and companies in the leisure industry are 
also potential users of weather derivatives. The Weather Risk Manage-
ment Association (www.wrma.org) has been formed to serve the interests 
of the weather risk management industry. 
In September 1999, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange began trading 
weather futures and European options on weather futures. The contracts 
are on the cumulative HDD and CDD for a month observed at a weather 
station.2 The contracts are settled in cash just after the end of the month 
once the HDD and CDD are known. One futures contract is on $100 times 
2
 The CME has introduced contracts for ten different weather stations (Atlanta, 
Chicago, Cincinnati, Dallas, Des Moines, Las Vegas, New York, Philadelphia, Portland, 
and Tucson). 
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the cumulative HDD or CDD. The HDD and CDD are calculated by a 
company, Earth Satellite Corporation, using automated data collection 
equipment. 
17.2 ENERGY DERIVATIVES 
Energy companies are among the most active and sophisticated users of 
derivatives. Many energy products trade in both the over-the-counter 
market and on exchanges. In this section we will examine the trading in 
crude oil, natural gas, and electricity derivatives. 
Crude Oil 
Crude oil is one of the most important commodities in the world with 
global demand amounting to about 80 million barrels daily. Ten-year 
fixed-price supply contracts have been commonplace in the over-the-
counter market for many years. These are swaps where oil at a fixed 
price is exchanged for oil at a floating price. 
In the 1970s the price of oil was highly volatile. The 1973 war in the 
Middle East led to a tripling of oil prices. The fall of the Shah of Iran in 
the late 1970s again increased prices. These events led oil producers and 
users to a realization that they needed more sophisticated tools for 
managing oil price risk. In the 1980s both the over-the-counter market 
and the exchange-traded market developed products to meet this need. 
In the over-the-counter market, virtually any derivative that is available 
on common stocks or stock indices is now available with oil as the 
underlying asset. Swaps, forward contracts, and options are popular. 
Contracts sometimes require settlement in cash and sometimes require 
settlement by physical delivery (i.e., by delivery of the oil). 
Exchange-traded contracts are also popular. The New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) and the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) 
trade a number of oil futures and futures options contracts. Some of the 
futures contracts are settled in cash; others are settled by physical 
delivery. For example, the Brent crude oil futures traded on the IPE 
has cash settlement based on the Brent index price; the light sweet crude 
oil futures traded on NYMEX requires physical delivery. In both cases 
the amount of oil underlying one contract is 1,000 barrels. NYMEX also 
trades popular contracts on two refined products: heating oil and gas-
oline. In both cases one contract is for the delivery of 42,000 gallons. 
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Natural Gas 
The natural gas industry throughout the world has been going through a 
period of deregulation and the elimination of government monopolies 
The supplier of natural gas is now not necessarily the same company as 
the producer of the gas. Suppliers are faced with the problem of meeting 
daily demand. 
A typical over-the-counter contract is for the delivery of a specified 
amount of natural gas at a roughly uniform rate over a one-month 
period. Forward contracts, options, and swaps are available in the 
over-the-counter market. The seller of gas is usually responsible for 
moving the gas through pipelines to the specified location. 
NYMEX trades a contract for the delivery of 10,000 million British 
thermal units of natural gas. The contract, if not closed out, requires 
physical delivery to be made during the delivery month at a roughly 
uniform rate to a particular hub in Louisiana. The IPE trades a similar 
contract in London. 
Electricity 
Electricity is an unusual commodity because it cannot easily be stored.3 
The maximum supply of electricity in a region at any moment is 
determined by the maximum capacity of all the electricity-producing 
plants in the region. In the United States there are 140 regions known 
as control areas. Demand and supply are first matched within a control 
area, and any excess power is sold to other control areas. It is this excess 
power that constitutes the wholesale market for electricity. The ability of 
one control area to sell power to another control area depends on the 
transmission capacity of the lines between the two areas. Transmission 
from one area to another involves a transmission cost, charged by the 
owner of the line, and there are generally some energy transmission losses. 
A major use of electricity is for air-conditioning systems. As a result the 
demand for electricity, and therefore its price, is much greater in the 
summer months than in the winter months. The nonstorability of elec-
tricity causes occasional very large movements in the spot price. Heat 
waves have been known to increase the spot price by as much as 1000% 
for short periods of time. 
Like natural gas, electricity has been going through a period of 
3
 Electricity producers with spare capacity sometimes use it to pump water to the top of 
their hydroelectric plants so that it can be used to produce electricity at a later time. This 
is the closest they can get to storing this commodity. 
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deregulation and the elimination of government monopolies. This has 
been accompanied by the development of an electricity derivatives mar-
ket. NYMEX now trades a futures contract on the price of electricity, and 
there is an active over-the-counter market in forward contracts, options, 
and swaps. A typical contract (exchange-traded or over-the-counter) 
allows one side to receive a specified number of megawatt hours for a 
specified price at a specified location during a particular month. In a 
5 x 8 contract, power is received for five days a week (Monday to Friday) 
during the off-peak period (11 p.m. to 7 a.m.) for the specified month. In 
a 5 x 16 contract, power is received five days a week during the on-peak 
period (7 a.m. to 11 p.m.) for the specified month. In a 7 x 24 contract, it 
is received around the clock every day during the month. Option con-
tracts have either daily exercise or monthly exercise. In the case of daily 
exercise, the option holder can choose on each day of the month (by 
giving one day's notice) to receive the specified amount of power at the 
specified strike price. When there is monthly exercise a single decision on 
whether to receive power for the whole month at the specified strike price 
is made at the beginning of the month. 
An interesting contract in electricity and natural gas markets is what is 
known as a swing option or take-and-pay option. In this contract a 
minimum and maximum for the amount of power that must be purchased 
at a certain price by the option holder is specified for each day during a 
month and for the month in total. The option holder can change (or 
swing) the rate at which the power is purchased during the month, but 
usually there is a limit on the total number of changes that can be made. 
How an Energy Producer Can Hedge Risks 
There are two components to the risks facing an energy producer. One is 
the price risk; the other is the volume risk. Although prices do adjust to 
reflect volumes, there is a less-than-perfect relationship between the two, 
and energy producers have to take both into account when developing a 
hedging strategy. The price risk can be hedged using the energy derivative 
contracts discussed in this section. The volume risks can be hedged using 
the weather derivatives discussed in the previous section. 
Define: 
Y: Profit for a month 
P: Average energy prices for the month 
T: Relevant temperature variable (HDD or CDD) for the month 
An energy producer can use historical data to obtain a best-fit linear 
390 Chapter 17 
regression relationship of the form 
where is the error term. The energy producer can then hedge risks for 
the month by taking a position of —b in energy forwards or futures and a 
position of — c in weather forwards or futures. The relationship can also 
be used to analyze the effectiveness of alternative option strategies. 
17.3 INSURANCE DERIVATIVES 
When derivative contracts are used for hedging purposes, they have many 
of the same characteristics as insurance contracts. Both types of contracts 
are designed to provide protection against adverse events. It is therefore 
not surprising that many insurance companies have subsidiaries that 
trade derivatives and that many of the activities of insurance companies 
are becoming very similar to those of investment banks. 
Traditionally the insurance industry has hedged its exposure to cata-
strophic (CAT) risks such as hurricanes and earthquakes using a practice 
known as reinsurance. Reinsurance contracts can take a number of forms. 
Suppose that an insurance company has an exposure of $100 million to 
earthquakes in California and wants to limit this to $30 million. One 
alternative is to enter into annual reinsurance contracts that cover on a 
pro rata basis 70% of its exposure. If California earthquake claims in a 
particular year total $50 million, the costs to the company would then be 
only 0.3 x $50 or $15 million. Another more popular alternative, involving 
lower reinsurance premiums, is to buy a series of reinsurance contracts 
covering what are known as excess cost layers. The first layer might provide 
indemnification for losses between $30 million and $40 million; the next 
layer might cover losses between $40 million and $50 million; and so on. 
Each reinsurance contract is known as an excess-of-loss reinsurance con-
tract. The insurance company is long a call option with a strike price equal 
to the lower end of the layer and short a call option with a strike price equal 
to the upper end of the layer. 
The principal providers of CAT reinsurance have traditionally been 
reinsurance companies and Lloyds syndicates (unlimited liability syndi-
cates of wealthy individuals). In recent years the industry has come to the 
conclusion that its reinsurance needs have outstripped what can be pro-
vided from these traditional sources. It has searched for new ways in which 
capital markets can provide reinsurance. One of the events that caused the 
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industry to rethink its practices was Hurricane Andrew in 1992. This 
caused about $15 billion of insurance costs in Florida, which exceeded 
the total of relevant insurance premiums received there during the previous 
seven years. If the hurricane had hit Miami, it is estimated that insured 
losses would have exceeded $40 billion. Hurricane Andrew and other 
catastrophes have led to increases in insurance/reinsurance premiums. 
Exchange-traded insurance futures contracts have been developed by 
the CBOT, but have not been highly successful. The over-the-counter 
market has come up with a number of products that are alternatives to 
traditional reinsurance. The most popular is a CAT bond. This is a bond 
issued by a subsidiary of an insurance company that pays a higher-than-
normal interest rate. In exchange for the extra interest, the holder of the 
bond agrees to provide an excess-of-cost reinsurance contract. Depending 
on the terms of the CAT bond, the interest or principal (or both) can be 
used to meet claims. In the example considered above where an insurance 
company wants protection for California earthquake losses between 
$30 million and $40 million, the insurance company could issue CAT 
bonds with a total principal of $10 million. In the event that the insurance 
company's California earthquake losses exceed $30 million, bondholders 
will lose some or all of their principal. As an alternative, the insurance 
company could cover this excess cost layer by making a much bigger 
bond issue where only the bondholders' interest is at risk. 
CAT bonds typically give a high probability of an above-normal rate of 
interest and a low-probability of a high loss. Why would investors be 
interested in such instruments? The answer is that there are no statistically 
significant correlations between CAT risks and market returns.4 CAT 
bonds are therefore an attractive addition to an investor's portfolio. They 
have no systematic risk, so that their total risk can be completely 
diversified away in a large portfolio. If a CAT bond's expected return is 
greater than the risk-free interest rate (and typically it is), it has the 
potential to improve risk-return trade-offs. 
SUMMARY 
When there are risks to be managed, markets have been very innovative in 
developing products to meet the needs of market participants. 
4
 See R. H. Litzenberger, D. R. Beaglehole, and C. E. Reynolds, "Assessing Catastrophe 
Reinsurance-Linked Securities as a New Asset Class," Journal of Portfolio Management, 
Winter 1996, 76-86. 
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In the weather derivatives market, two measures, HDD and CDD, have 
been developed to describe the temperature during a month. These are 
used to define the payoffs on both exchange-traded and over-the-counter 
derivatives. As the weather derivatives market develops, we will see con-
tracts on rainfall, snow, and similar variables become more commonplace. 
In energy markets, oil derivatives have been important for some time 
and play a key role in helping oil producers and oil consumers manage 
their price risk. Natural gas and electricity derivatives are relatively new. 
They became important for risk management when these markets were 
deregulated and government monopolies discontinued. 
Insurance derivatives are beginning to become an alternative to tradi-
tional reinsurance as a way for insurance companies to manage the risks of 
a catastrophic event such as a hurricane or an earthquake. No doubt we 
will see other sorts of insurance (e.g., life insurance and automobile 
insurance) being securitized in a similar way as this market develops. 
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QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS (Answers at End of Book) 
17.1. What is meant by HDD and CDD? 
17.2. How is a typical natural gas forward contract structured? 
17.3. Suppose that each day during July the minimum temperature is 
68° Fahrenheit and the maximum temperature is 82° Fahrenheit. What 
is the payoff from a call option on the cumulative CDD during July with 
a strike of 250 and a payment rate of $5,000 per degree day? 
17.4. Why is the price of electricity more volatile than that of other energy 
sources? 
17.5. "HDD and CDD can be regarded as payoffs from options on tempera-
ture." Explain. 
17.6. Suppose that you have 50 years of temperature data at your disposal. 
Explain carefully the analyses you would carry out to value a forward 
contract on the cumulative CDD for a particular month. 
17.7. Would you expect the volatility of the one-year forward price of oil to be 
greater than or less than the volatility of the spot price. Explain. 
17.8. How can an energy producer use derivative markets to hedge risks? 
17.9. Explain how a 5 x 8 option contract on electricity for May 2006 with 
daily exercise works. Explain how a 5 x 8 option contract on electricity 
for May 2006 with monthly exercise works. Which is worth more? 
17.10. Explain how CAT bonds work. 
17.11. Consider two bonds that have the same coupon, time to maturity, and 
price. One is a B-rated corporate bond. The other is a CAT bond. An 
analysis based on historical data shows that the expected losses on the 
two bonds in each year of their life is the same. Which bond would you 
advise a portfolio manager to buy and why? 
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17.12. "Oil, gas, and electricity exhibit mean reversion." What is meant by this 
statement? Which product has the highest mean-reversion rate? Which 
has the lowest? 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTION 
17.13. An insurance company's losses of a particular type are to a reasonable 
approximation normally distributed with a mean of $150 million and a 
standard deviation of $50 million. (Assume no difference between losses 
in a risk-neutral world and losses in the real world.) The one-year risk-
free rate is 5%. Estimate the cost of the following: (a) a contract that will 
pay in one-year's time 60% of the insurance company's costs on a pro 
rata basis, and (b) a contract that pays $100 million in one-year's time if 
losses exceed $200 million. 
Big Losses and 
What We Can 
Learn from Them 
Since the mid-1980s there have been some spectacular losses in financial 
markets. This chapter explores the lessons we can learn from them and 
emphasizes some of the key points made in earlier chapters. The losses 
that we will consider are listed in Business Snapshot 18.1. 
One remarkable aspect of the list in Business Snapshot 18.1 is the 
number of times huge losses were caused by the activities of a single 
employee. In 1995, Nick Leeson's trading brought a 200-year-old British 
bank, Barings, to its knees; in 1994, Robert Citron's trading led to Orange 
County, a municipality in California, losing about $2 billion. Joseph Jett's 
trading for Kidder Peabody caused losses of $350 million. John Rusnak's 
losses of $700 million at Allied Irish Bank came to light in 2002. 
Some of the losses involve derivatives, but they should not be viewed as 
an indictment of the whole derivatives industry. The derivatives market is a 
vast multitrillion-dollar market that by most measures has been outstand-
ingly successful and has served the needs of its users well. Derivatives 
trades involving unacceptable risks represent a tiny proportion of total 
trades (both in number and in value). To quote Alan Greenspan, who was 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, in May 2003: 
The use of a growing array of derivatives and the related application of 
more-sophisticated methods for measuring and managing risk are key 
factors underpinning the enhanced resilience of our largest financial 
intermediaries. 
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Business Snapshot 18.1 Big Losses 
Allied Irish Bank 
This bank lost about $700 million from the unauthorized speculative activities 
of one of its foreign exchange traders, John Rusnak, that lasted a number of 
years. Rusnak covered up his losses by creating fictitious options trades. 
Barings (See Business Snapshot 2.4) 
This 200-year-old British bank was wiped out in 1995 by the activities of one 
trader, Nick Leeson, in Singapore. The trader's mandate was to arbitrage 
between Nikkei 225 futures quotes in Singapore and Osaka. Instead he made 
big bets on the future direction of the Nikkei 225 using futures and options. 
The total loss was close to $1 billion. 
Enron's Counterparties 
Enron managed to conceal its true situation from its shareholders with some 
creative contracts. Several financial institutions that allegedly helped Enron do 
this have had to settle shareholder lawsuits for over $1 billion. 
Hammersmith and Fulham (See Business Snapshot 14.1) 
This British Local Authority lost about $600 million on sterling interest rate 
swaps and options in 1988. The two traders responsible for the loss knew 
surprisingly little about the products they were trading. 
Kidder Peabody (See Business Snapshot 15.1) 
The activities of a single trader, Joseph Jett, led to this New York investment 
dealer losing $350 million trading US government securities. The loss arose 
because of a mistake in the way the company's computer system calculated 
profits. 
Long-Term Capital Management (See Business Snapshot 12.1) 
This hedge fund lost about $4 billion in 1998 carrying out convergence 
arbitrage strategies. The loss was caused by a flight to quality after Russia 
defaulted on its debt. 
National Westminster Bank 
This British bank lost about $130 million from using an inappropriate model 
to value swap options in 1997. 
Orange County (See Business Snapshot 4.1) 
The activities of the treasurer, Robert Citron, led to this California muni-
cipality losing about $2 billion in 1994. The treasurer was using derivatives to 
speculate that interest rates would not rise. 
Procter and Gamble (See Business Snapshot 2.2) 
The treasury department of this large US company lost about $90 million in 
1994 trading highly exotic interest rate derivatives contracts with Bankers 
Trust. It later sued Bankers Trust and settled out of court. 
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18.1 RISK LIMITS 
The first and most important lesson from the losses concerns risk limits. 
It is essential that all companies (financial and nonfinancial) define in a 
clear and unambiguous way limits to the financial risks that can be taken. 
They should then set up procedures for ensuring that the limits are 
obeyed. Ideally, overall risk limits should be set at board level. These 
should then be converted to limits applicable to the individuals respon-
sible for managing particular risks. Daily reports should indicate the gain 
or loss that will be experienced for particular movements in market 
variables. These should be checked against the actual gains and losses 
that are experienced to ensure that the valuation procedures underlying 
the reports are accurate. 
It is particularly important that companies monitor risks carefully 
when derivatives are used. This is because derivatives can be used for 
hedging or speculation or arbitrage. Without close monitoring, it is 
impossible to know whether a derivatives trader has switched from being 
a hedger to a speculator or from being an arbitrageur to a speculator. 
Barings is a classic example of what can go wrong. Nick Leeson's 
mandate was to carry out low-risk arbitrage between the Singapore and 
Osaka markets on Nikkei 225 futures. Unknown to his superiors in 
London, Leeson switched from being an arbitrageur to taking huge bets 
on the future direction of the Nikkei 225. Systems within Barings were so 
inadequate that nobody knew what he was doing. 
The argument here is not that no risks should be taken. A treasurer 
working for a corporation or a trader in a financial institution or a fund 
manager should be allowed to take positions on the future direction of 
relevant market variables. What we are arguing is that the sizes of the 
positions that can be taken should be limited and the systems in place 
should accurately report the risks being taken. 
A Difficult Situation 
What happens if an individual exceeds risk limits and makes a profit? 
This is a tricky issue for senior management. It is tempting to ignore 
violations of risk limits when profits result. However, this is shortsighted. 
It leads to a culture where risk limits are not taken seriously, and it paves 
the way for a disaster. The classic example here is Orange County. Robert 
Citron's activities in 1991-1993 had been very profitable for Orange 
County, and the municipality had come to rely on his trading for 
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additional funding. People chose to ignore the risks he was taking because 
he had produced profits. Unfortunately, the losses made in 1994 far 
exceeded the profits from previous years. 
The penalties for exceeding risk limits should be just as great when 
profits result as when losses result. Otherwise, traders that make losses are 
liable to keep increasing their bets in the hope that eventually a profit will 
result and all will be forgiven. 
Do Not Assume You Can Outguess the Market 
Some traders are quite possibly better than others. But no trader gets it 
right all the time. A trader who correctly predicts the direction in which 
market variables will move 60% of the time is doing well. If a trader has 
an outstanding track record (as Robert Citron did in the early 1990s), it is 
likely to be a result of luck rather than superior trading skill. 
Suppose that a financial institution employs 16 traders and one of 
those traders makes profits in every quarter of a year. Should the trader 
receive a good bonus? Should the trader's risk limits be increased? The 
answer to the first question is that inevitably the trader will receive a good 
bonus. The answer to the second question should be no. The chance of 
making a profit in four consecutive quarters from random trading is 0.5 
or one in 16. This means that just by chance one of the 16 traders will 
"get it right" every single quarter of the year. We should not assume that 
the trader's luck will continue and we should not increase the trader's risk 
limits. 
Do Not Underestimate the Benefits of Diversification 
When a trader appears good at predicting a particular market variable, 
there is a tendency to increase the trader's risk limits. We have just argued 
that this is a bad idea because it is quite likely that the trader has been 
lucky rather than clever. However, let us suppose that we are really 
convinced that the trader has special talents. How undiversified should 
we allow ourselves to become in order to take advantage of the trader's 
special skills? The answer, as indicated in Section 1.1, is that the benefits 
from diversification are huge, and it is unlikely that any trader is so good 
that it is worth foregoing these benefits to speculate heavily on just one 
market variable. 
An example will illustrate the point here. Suppose that there are 
20 stocks, each of which have an expected return of 10% per annum 
and a standard deviation of returns of 30%. The correlation between the 
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returns from any two of the stocks is 0.2. By dividing an investment 
equally among the 20 stocks, an investor has an expected return of 
10% per annum and standard deviation of returns of 14.7%. Diversifica-
tion enables the investor to reduce risks by over half. Another way of 
expressing this is that diversification enables an investor to double the 
expected return per unit of risk taken. The investor would have to be 
extremely good at stock picking to get a better risk-return trade-off by 
investing in just one stock. 
Carry out Scenario Analyses and Stress Tests 
The calculation of risk measures such as VaR should always be accom-
panied by scenario analyses and stress testing to obtain an understanding 
of what can go wrong. These techniques were mentioned in Section 8.7. 
They are very important. Human beings have an unfortunate tendency to 
anchor on one or two scenarios when evaluating decisions. In 1993 and 
1994, for example, Procter and Gamble was so convinced that interest 
rates would remain low that, in their decision-making, they ignored the 
possibility of a 100 basis point rate increase. 
It is important to be creative in the way scenarios are generated. One 
approach is to look at ten or twenty years of data and choose the most 
extreme events as scenarios. Sometimes there is a shortage of data on a 
key variable. It is then sensible to choose a similar variable for which 
much more data is available and use historical daily percentage 
changes in that variable as a proxy for possible daily percentage 
changes in the key variable. For example, if there is little data on 
the prices of bonds issued by a particular country, we can look at 
historical data on prices of bonds issued by other similar countries to 
develop possible scenarios. 
18.2 MANAGING THE TRADING ROOM 
In trading rooms there is a tendency to regard high-performing traders as 
"untouchable" and to not subject their activities to the same scrutiny as 
other traders. Apparently Joseph Jett, Kidder Peabody's star trader of 
Treasury instruments, was often "too busy" to answer questions and 
discuss his positions with the company's risk managers. 
It is important that all traders—particularly those making high 
profits—be fully accountable. It is important for the financial institution 
to know whether the high profits are being made by taking unreasonably 
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high risks. It is also important to check that the financial institution's 
computer systems and pricing models are correct and are not being 
manipulated in some way. 
Separate the Front, Middle, and Back Office 
The front office in a financial institution consists of the traders who are 
executing trades, taking positions, etc. The middle office consists of risk 
managers who are monitoring the risks being taken. The back office is 
where the record-keeping and accounting takes place. Some of the worst 
derivatives disasters have occurred because these functions were not kept 
separate. Nick Leeson controlled both the front and back office for 
Barings in Singapore and was, as a result, able to conceal the disastrous 
nature of his trades from his superiors in London for some time. 
Do Not Blindly Trust Models 
We discussed model risk in Chapter 15. Some of the large losses experi-
enced by financial institutions arose because of the models and computer 
systems being used. Kidder Peabody was misled by its own systems. 
Another example of an incorrect model leading to losses is provided by 
National Westminster Bank. This bank had an incorrect model for 
valuing swap options that led to significant losses. 
If large profits are reported when relatively simple trading strategies 
are followed, there is a good chance that the models underlying the 
calculation of the profits are wrong. Similarly, if a financial institution 
appears to be particularly competitive on its quotes for a particular type 
of deal, there is a good chance that it is using a different model from 
other market participants, and it should analyze what is going on 
carefully. To the head of a trading room, getting too much business 
of a certain type can be just as worrisome as getting too little business 
of that type. 
Be Conservative in Recognizing Inception Profits 
When a financial institution sells a highly exotic instrument to a non-
financial corporation, the valuation can be highly dependent on the 
underlying model. For example, instruments with long-dated embedded 
interest rate options can be highly dependent on the interest rate model 
used. In these circumstances, a phrase used to describe the daily marking 
to market of the deal is marking to model. This is because there are no 
market prices for similar deals that can be used as a benchmark. 
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Suppose that a financial institution manages to sell an instrument to a 
client for $10 million more than it is worth—or at least $10 million more 
than its model says it is worth. The $10 million is known as an inception 
profit. When should it be recognized? There appears to be a lot of 
variation in what different investment banks do. Some recognize the 
$10 million immediately, whereas others are much more conservative 
and recognize it slowly over the life of the deal. 
Recognizing inception profits immediately is very dangerous. It 
encourages traders to use aggressive models, take their bonuses, and 
leave before the model and the value of the deal come under close 
scrutiny. It is much better to recognize inception profits slowly so that 
traders are motivated to investigate the impact of several different models 
and several different sets of assumptions before committing themselves to 
a deal. 
Do Not Sell Clients Inappropriate Products 
It is tempting to sell corporate clients inappropriate products, particularly 
when they appear to have an appetite for the underlying risks. But this is 
shortsighted. The most dramatic example of this is provided by the 
activities of Bankers Trust (BT) in the period leading up to the spring 
of 1994. Many of BT's clients were persuaded to buy high-risk and totally 
inappropriate products. A typical product would give the client a good 
chance of saving a few basis points on its borrowings and a small chance 
of costing a large amount of money. The products worked well for BT's 
clients in 1992 and 1993, but blew up in 1994 when interest rates rose 
sharply. The bad publicity that followed hurt BT greatly. The years it had 
spent building up trust among corporate clients and developing an 
enviable reputation for innovation in derivatives were largely lost as a 
result of the activities of a few overly aggressive salesmen. BT was forced 
to pay large amounts of money to its clients to settle lawsuits out of 
court. It was taken over by Deutsche Bank in 1999. 
Enron provides another example of how overly aggressive deal makers 
cost their banks billions of dollars. One lesson from Enron is: "The fact 
that many banks are pushing hard to get a certain type of business should 
not be taken as an indication that the business will be ultimately profit-
able." Businesses where high profits seem easy to achieve should be 
looked at closely for potential operational, credit, or market risks. A 
number of banks have had to settle lawsuits with Enron shareholders for 
over $1 billion. 
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18.3 LIQUIDITY RISK 
We discussed liquidity risk in Chapter 15. Financial engineers usually 
base the pricing of exotic instruments and other instruments that trade 
relatively infrequently on the prices of actively traded instruments. For 
example: 
1. A financial engineer often calculates a zero curve from actively 
traded government bonds (known as on-the-run bonds) and uses it 
to price bonds that trade less frequently (off-the-run bonds). 
2. A financial engineer often implies the volatility of an asset from 
actively traded options and uses it to price less actively traded 
options. 
3. A financial engineer often implies information about the behavior of 
interest rates from actively traded interest rate caps and swap 
options and uses it to price products that are highly structured. 
These practices are not unreasonable. However, it is dangerous to assume 
that less actively traded instruments can always be traded at close to their 
theoretical price. When financial markets experience a shock of one sort 
or another, liquidity black holes may develop (see Section 15.8). Liquidity 
then becomes very important to investors, and illiquid instruments often 
sell at a big discount to their theoretical values. Trading strategies that 
assume large volumes of relatively illiquid instruments can be sold at 
short notice at close to their theoretical values are dangerous. 
An example of liquidity risk is provided by Long-Term Capital Man 
agement (LTCM), which we discussed in Business Snapshot 12.1. This 
hedge fund followed a strategy known as convergence arbitrage. It at 
tempted to identify two securities (or portfolios of securities) that should 
in theory sell for the same price. If the market price of one security was 
less that of the other, it would buy that security and sell the other. The 
strategy is based on the idea that if two securities have the same 
theoretical price their market prices should eventually be the same. 
In the summer of 1998 LTCM made a huge loss. This was largely 
because a default by Russia on its debt caused a flight to quality. LTCM 
tended to be long illiquid instruments and short the corresponding liquid 
instruments. (For example, it was long off-the-run bonds and short on-the-
run bonds.) The spreads between the prices of illiquid instruments and the 
corresponding liquid instruments widened sharply after the Russian de 
fault. LTCM was highly leveraged. It experienced huge losses and there 
were margin calls on its positions that it was unable to meet. 
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The LTCM story reinforces the importance of carrying out scenario 
analyses and stress testing to look at what can happen in the worst of all 
worlds. LTCM could have tried to examine other times in history when 
there have been extreme flights to quality to quantify the liquidity risks it 
was facing. 
Beware When Everyone Is Following the Same Trading Strategy 
It sometimes happens that many market participants are following essen-
tially the same trading strategy. This creates a dangerous environment 
where there are liable to be big market moves, liquidity black holes, and 
large losses for the market participants. 
We gave one example of this in Business Snapshot 15.4 when discussing 
portfolio insurance and the market crash of October 1987. In the months 
leading up to the crash, increasing numbers of portfolio managers were 
attempting to insure their portfolios by creating synthetic put options. 
They bought stocks or stock index futures after a rise in the market and 
sold them after a fall. This created an unstable market. A relatively small 
decline in stock prices could lead to a wave of selling by portfolio 
insurers. The latter would lead to a further decline in the market, which 
could give rise to another wave of selling, and so on. There is little doubt 
that without portfolio insurance the crash of October 1987 would have 
been much less severe. 
Another example is provided by LTCM in 1998. Its position was made 
more difficult by the fact that many other hedge funds were following 
similar convergence arbitrage strategies. After the Russian default and the 
flight to quality, LTCM tried to liquidate part of its portfolio to meet 
margin calls. Unfortunately, other hedge funds were facing similar pro-
blems to LTCM and trying to do similar trades. This exacerbated the 
situation, causing liquidity spreads to be even higher than they would 
otherwise have been and reinforcing the flight to quality. Consider, for 
example, LTCM's position in US Treasury bonds. It was long the illiquid 
off-the-run bonds and short the liquid on-the-run bonds. When a flight to 
quality caused spreads between yields on the two types of bonds to widen, 
LTCM had to liquidate its positions by selling off-the-run bonds and 
buying on-the-run bonds. Other large hedge funds were doing the same. 
As a result, the price of on-the-run bonds rose relative to off-the-run 
bonds and the spread between the two yields widened even more than it 
had already. 
A further example is provided by British insurance companies in the 
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late 1990s. This is discussed in Business Snapshot 15.5. All insurance 
companies decided to hedge their exposure to a fall in long-term rates at 
about the same time. The result was a fall in long-term rates! 
The chief lesson to be learned from these stories is that it is important 
to see the big picture of what is going on in financial markets and to 
understand the risks inherent in situations where many market partici-
pants are following the same trading strategy. 
18.4 LESSONS FOR NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
We conclude with some lessons applicable primarily to nonfinancial 
corporations. 
Make Sure You Fully Understand the Trades You Are Doing 
Corporations should never undertake a trade or a trading strategy that 
they do not fully understand. This is a somewhat obvious point, but it is 
surprising how often a trader working for a nonfinancial corporation will, 
after a big loss, admit to not really understanding what was going on and 
claim to have been misled by investment bankers. Robert Citron, the 
treasurer of Orange County, did this. So did the traders working for 
Hammersmith and Fulham, who in spite of their huge positions were 
surprisingly uninformed about how the swaps and other interest rate 
derivatives they traded really worked. 
If a senior manager in a corporation does not understand a trade 
proposed by a subordinate, the trade should not be approved. A simple 
rule of thumb is that if a trade and the rationale for entering into it are 
so complicated that they cannot be understood by the manager, it is 
almost certainly inappropriate for the corporation. The trades under-
taken by Procter and Gamble would have been vetoed using this 
criterion. 
One way of ensuring that you fully understand a financial instrument is 
to value it. If a corporation does not have the in-house capability to value 
an instrument, it should not trade it. In practice, corporations often rely 
on their investment bankers for valuation advice. This is dangerous, as 
Procter and Gamble found out. When it wanted to unwind its trans-
actions, it found it was facing prices produced by Bankers Trust's 
proprietary models, which it had no way of checking. 
Big Losses and What We Can Learn from Them 405 
Make Sure a Hedger Does Not Become a Speculator 
One of the unfortunate facts of life is that hedging is relatively dull, 
whereas speculation is exciting. When a company hires a trader to 
manage foreign exchange, commodity price, or interest rate risk there is 
a danger that the following happens. At first the trader does the job 
diligently and earns the confidence of top management. He or she 
assesses the company's exposures and hedges them. As time goes by, 
the trader becomes convinced that he or she can outguess the market. 
Slowly the trader becomes a speculator. At first things go well, but then a 
loss is made. To recover the loss, the trader doubles up the bets. Further 
losses are made, and so on. The result is likely to be a disaster. 
As mentioned earlier, clear limits to the risks that can be taken should 
be set by senior management. Controls should be put in place to ensure 
that the limits are obeyed. The trading strategy for a corporation should 
start with an analysis of the risks facing the corporation in foreign 
exchange, interest rate, commodity markets, and so on. A decision 
should then be taken on how the risks are to be reduced to acceptable 
levels. It is a clear sign that something is wrong within a corporation if 
the trading strategy is not derived in a very direct way from the 
company's exposures. 
Be Cautious about Making the Treasury Department a 
Profit Center 
In the last 20 years there has been a tendency to make the treasury 
department within a corporation a profit center. This seems to have much 
to recommend it. The treasurer is motivated to reduce financing costs and 
manage risks as profitably as possible. The problem is that the potential 
for the treasurer to make profits is limited. When raising funds and 
investing surplus cash, the treasurer is facing an efficient market. The 
treasurer can usually improve the bottom line only by taking additional 
risks. The company's hedging program gives the treasurer some scope for 
making shrewd decisions that increase profits, but it should be remem-
bered that the goal of a hedging program is to reduce risks, not to 
increase expected profits. The decision to hedge will lead to a worse 
outcome than the decision not to hedge roughly 50% of the time. The 
danger of making the treasury department a profit center is that the 
treasurer is motivated to become a speculator. An outcome like that of 
Orange County or Procter and Gamble is then liable to occur. 
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SUMMARY 
The key lesson to be learned from the losses is the importance of internal 
controls. The risks taken by traders, the models used, and the amount of 
different types of business done should all be controlled. It is important 
to "think outside the box" about what could go wrong. LTCM, Enron's 
bank counterparties, and many other financial institutions have failed to 
do this, with huge adverse financial consequences. 
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Valuing Forward 
and Futures 
Contracts 
The forward or futures price of an investment asset that provides no 
income is given by 
where S0 is the spot price of the asset today, T is the time to maturity of 
the forward or futures contract, and r is the continuously compounded 
risk-free rate for maturity T. When the asset provides income during the 
life of the contract that has a present value I, this becomes 
When it provides a yield at rate q, it becomes 
A foreign currency can be regarded as an investment asset that provides a 
yield equal to the foreign risk-free rate. 
The value of a forward contract where the holder has the right to buy 
the asset for a price of K is in all cases 
where F is the forward price. The value of a forward contract where the 
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holder has the right to sell the asset for a price of K is similarly 
Example A.1 
Consider a six-month futures contract on the S&P 500. The current value of 
the index is 1200, the six-month risk-free rate is 5% per annum, and the 
average dividend yield on the S&P 500 over the next six months is expected to 
be 2% per annum (both rates continuously compounded). The futures price is 
1200e(0.05 - 0.02)x0.5, or 1,218.14. 
Example A.2 
The current forward price of gold for a contract maturing in nine months is 
$550. A company has a forward contract to buy 1,000 ounces of gold for a 
delivery price of $530 in nine months. The nine-month risk-free rate is 4% per 
annum continuously compounded. The value of the forward contract is 
1,000 x (550 - 530)e-0.04x9/12, or $19,409. 
Valuing Swaps 
An interest rate swap can be valued by assuming that the interest rates 
that are realized in the future equal today's forward interest rates. As an 
example, consider an interest rate swap has 14 months remaining and a 
notional principal of $100 million. A fixed rate of 5% per annum is 
received and LIBOR is paid, with exchanges taking place every six 
months. Assume that (a) four months ago the six-month LIBOR rate 
was 4%, (b) the forward LIBOR interest rate for a six-month period 
starting in two months is 4.6%, and (c) the forward LIBOR for a six-
month period starting in eight months is 5.2%. All rates are expressed 
with semiannual compounding. Assuming that forward rates are realized, 
the cash flows on the swap are as shown in Table B.l. (For example, in 
eight months the fixed-rate cash flow received is 0.5 x 0.05 x 100, or 
$2.5 million; the floating-rate cash flow paid is 0.5 x 0.046 x 100, or 
Table B.1 Valuing an interest rate swap by assuming forward 
rates are realized. 
Time 
2 months 
8 months 
14 months 
Fixed cash flow 
($ million) 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
Floating cash flow 
($ million) 
-2.0 
-2.3 
-2.6 
Net cash flow 
($ million) 
0.5 
0.2 
-0.1 
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Table B.2 Valuing a currency swap by assuming forward exchange rates are 
realized (all cash flows in millions). 
Time 
1 
2 
3 
3 
USD 
cash flow 
-0.6 
-0.6 
-0 .6 
-10.0 
GBP 
cash flow 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
5.0 
Forward 
exchange rate 
1.8000 
1.8400 
1.8800 
1.8800 
USD value of 
GBP cash flow 
0.360 
0.368 
0.376 
9.400 
Net cash flow 
in USD 
-0.240 
-0.232 
-0.224 
-0.600 
$2.3 million.) The value of the swap is the present value of the net cash 
flows in the final column.1 
An alternative approach (which gives the same valuation) is to assume 
that the swap principal of $100 million is paid and received at the end of 
the life of the swap. This makes no difference to the value of the swap but 
allows it to be regarded as the exchange of interest and principal on a 
fixed-rate bond for interest and principal on a floating-rate bond. The 
fixed-rate bond's cash flows can be valued in the usual way. A general rule 
is that the floating-rate bond is always worth an amount equal to the 
principal immediately after an interest payment. In our example, the value 
of the floating rate bond is worth $100 million immediately after the 
payment in two months. This payment (determined four months ago) is 
$2 million. The value of the floating-rate bond is therefore $102 million 
immediately before the payment at the two-month point. The value of the 
swap is therefore the present value of the fixed-rate bond less the present 
value of a cash flow of $102 million in two months. 
Currency Swaps 
A currency swap can be valued by assuming that exchange rates in the 
future equal today's forward exchange rates. As an example consider a 
currency swap in which 4% will be received in GBP and 6% will be paid 
in USD once a year. The principals in the two currencies are 10 million 
USD and 5 million GBP. The swap will last for another three years. The 
swap cash flows are shown in the second and third columns of Table B.2. 
The forward exchange rates are (we assume) those shown in the fourth 
column. These are used to convert the GBP cash flows to USD. The final 
1
 Note that this is not perfectly accurate because it does not take account of day count 
conventions and holiday calendars. 
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column shows the net cash flows. The value of the swap is the present 
value of these cash flows. 
An alternative approach (which gives the same valuation) is to regard 
the swap as a long position in a GBP bond and a short position in a USD 
bond. Each bond can be valued in its own currency in the usual way and 
the current exchange rate can be used to convert the value of the GBP 
bond from GBP to USD. 
Valuing 
European Options 
The Black-Scholes-Merton formulas for valuing European call and put 
options on an investment asset that provides no income are 
and 
where 
The function N(x) is the cumulative probability distribution function for 
a standardized normal distribution (see tables at the end of the book). 
The variables c and p are the European call and European put price, S0 is 
the stock price at time zero, K is the strike price, r is the continuously 
compounded risk-free rate, is the stock price volatility, and T is the time 
to maturity of the option. 
When the underlying asset provides a cash income, the present value of 
the income during the life of the option should be subtracted from S0. 
When the underlying asset provides a yield at rate q, the formulas become 
and 
where 
Options on a foreign currency can be valued by setting q equal to the 
foreign risk-free rate. 
Table C.l gives formulas for the Greek letters. N'(x) is the standard 
normal density function, given by 
Example C.1 
Consider a six-month European option on a stock index. The current value of 
the index is 1200, the strike price is 1250, the risk-free rate is 5%, the dividend 
yield on the index is 2%, and the index volatility is 20%. In this case, 
S0 = 1200, K = 1250, r = 0.05, q = 0.02, = 0.2, and T = 0.5. The value of 
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Table C.1 Greek letters for options on an asset that provides a yield at rate q. 
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the option is 53.44, the delta of the option is 0.45, the gamma is 0.0023, the 
theta is -0.22, the vega is 3.33, and rho is 2.44. Note that the formula in 
Table C.l gives theta per year. The theta quoted here is per calendar day. 
The calculations in this appendix can be done with the DerivaGem 
software on the author 's website by selecting Analytic European for the 
Option Type. Option valuation is described more fully in Hull (2006).1 
1
 See J. C. Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 6th edn., Prentice Hall, 2006. 
Valuing 
American Options 
To value American-style options, we divide the life of the option into n 
time steps of length Suppose that the asset price at the beginning of a 
step is S. At the end of the time step it moves up to Su with probability p 
and down to Sd with probability 1 — p. For an investment asset that 
provides no income, the values of u, d and p are given by 
Figure D.l shows the tree constructed for valuing a five-month American 
put option on a non-dividend-paying stock where the initial stock price is 
50, the strike price is 50, the risk-free rate is 10%, and the volatility is 
40%. In this case, there are five steps, so that = 0.08333, u = 1.1224, 
d = 0.8909, a — 1.0084, and p = 0.5073. The upper number at each node 
is the stock price and the lower number is the value of the option. 
At the final nodes of the tree the option price is its intrinsic value. For 
example, at node G the option price is 50 — 35.36 = 14.64. At earlier nodes 
we first calculate a value assuming that the option is held for a further time 
period of length At and then check to see whether early exercise is optimal. 
Consider first node E. If the option is held for a further time period it will 
be worth 0.00 if there is an up move (probability: p) and 5.45 if there is a 
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Figure D.1 Binomial tree from DerivaGem for an American put on a 
non-dividend-paying stock. 
down move (probability: 1 — p). The expected value in time is therefore 
0.5073 x 0 + 0.4927 x 5.45, or 2.686, and the 2.66 value at node E is 
calculated by discounting this at the risk-free rate of 10% for one month. 
The option should not be exercised at node E as the payoff from early 
exercise would be zero. Consider next node A. A similar calculation to that 
just given shows that, assuming it is held for a further time period, the 
option's value at node A is 9.90. If exercised, its value is 50 — 39.69 = 
10.31. In this case, it should be exercised and the value of being at node A 
is 10.31. 
Continuing to work back from the end of the tree to the beginning, the 
value of the option at the initial node D is found to be 4.49. As the number 
of steps on the tree is increased, the accuracy of the option price increases. 
At each node: 
Upper value = Underlying Asset Price 
Lower value = Option Price 
Shading indicates where option is exercised 
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With 30, 50, and 100 time steps, we get values for the option of 4.263, 
4.272, and 4.278. 
To calculate delta, we consider the two nodes at time In our 
example, as we move from the lower node to the upper node the option 
price changes from 6.96 to 2.16 and the stock price changes from 44.55 to 
56.12. The estimate of delta is the change in the option price divided by 
the change in the stock price: 
To calculate gamma, we consider the three nodes at time The delta 
calculated from the upper two nodes (C and F) is —0.241. This can be 
regarded as the delta for a stock price of (62.99 + 50)/2 = 56.49. The 
delta calculated from the lower two nodes (B and C) is —0.639. This can 
be regarded as the delta for a stock price of (50 + 39.69)/2 = 44.84. The 
estimate of gamma is the change in delta divided by the change in the 
stock price: 
We estimate theta from nodes D and C as 
or —4.30 per year. This is -0.0118 per calendar day. Vega is estimated by 
increasing the volatility, constructing a new tree, and observing the effect 
of the increased volatility on the option price. Rho is calculated similarly. 
When the asset underlying the option provides a yield at rate q the 
procedure is exactly the same except that a = instead of in the 
equation for p. The calculations we have described can be done using the 
DerivaGem software by selecting Binomial American for the Option 
Type. Binomial trees and other numerical procedures are described more 
fully in Hull (2006). 1 
1
 See J. C. Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 6th edn., Prentice Hall, 2006. 
Suppose that A is an N x N matrix of credit rating changes in one year. 
This is a matrix such as the one shown in Table 12.1. The matrix of credit 
rating changes in m years is Am. This can be readily calculated using the 
normal rules for matrix multiplication. 
The matrix corresponding to a shorter period than one year, say six 
months or one month, is more difficult to compute. We first use standard 
routines to calculate eigenvectors and the corresponding 
eigenvalues These have the property that 
Define X as a matrix whose ith row is and a s a diagonal matrix 
where the ith diagonal element is A standard result in matrix algebra 
shows that 
From this it is easy to see that the nth root of A is 
where is a diagonal matrix where the ith diagonal element is 
Some authors, such as Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull,1 prefer to handle 
1
 See R. A. Jarrow, D. Lando, and S. M. Turnbull, "A Markov Model for the Term 
Structure of Credit Spreads," Review of Financial Studies, 10 (1997), 481-523. 
The Manipulation 
of Credit Transition 
Matrices 
422 Appendix E 
this problem in terms of what is termed a generator matrix. This is a 
matrix such that the transition matrix for a short period of time is 
I + where I is the identity matrix, and the transition matrix for a 
longer period of time t is 
Answers to Questions 
and Problems 
CHAPTER 1 
1.1. Expected return is 12.5%. SD of return is 17.07%. 
1.2. From equations (1.1) and 1.2), expected return is 12.5%. SD of 
return is 
or 12.94%. 
1.3. 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
15% 
14% 
13% 
12% 
11% 
10% 
( =0.3) 
24.00% 
20.39% 
17.42% 
15.48% 
14.96% 
16.00% 
( =1) 
24.00% 
22.40% 
20.80% 
19.20% 
17.60% 
16.00% 
( = - 1 ) 
24.00% 
16.00% 
8.00% 
0.00% 
8.00% 
16.00% 
1.4. Nonsystematic risk can be diversified; systematic risk cannot. Sys-
tematic risk is most important to an equity investor. Either type of risk 
can lead to the bankruptcy of a corporation. 
1.5. We assume that investors trade off mean return and standard 
deviation of return. For a given mean return, they want to minimize 
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standard deviation of returns. All make the same estimates of means 
standard deviations, and coefficients of correlation for returns on indi-
vidual investments. Furthermore they can borrow or lend at the risk-free 
rate. The result is that they all want to be on the "new efficient frontier" 
in Figure 1.4. They choose the same portfolio of risky investments 
combined with borrowing or lending at the risk-free rate. 
1.6. (a) 7.2%, (b) 9%, (c) 14.4%. 
1.7. The capital asset pricing theory assumes that there is one factor 
driving returns. Arbitrage pricing theory assumes multiple factors. 
1.8. In many jurisdictions, interest on debt is deductible to the corporation 
whereas dividends are not deductible. It can therefore be more tax efficient 
for a company to fund itself with debt. However, as debt increases, the 
probability of bankruptcy increases. 
1.9. When potential losses are large, we cannot aggregate them and 
assume they will be diversified away. It is necessary to consider them 
one by one and handle them with insurance contracts, tighter internal 
controls, etc. 
1.10. This is the probability that profit is no worse than —4% of assets. 
This profit level is 4.6/1.5 = 3.067 standard deviations from the mean. The 
probability that the bank will have a positive equity is therefore N(3.067), 
where N is the cumulative normal distribution function. This is 99.89%. 
1.11. Banks have the privilege of being allowed to take money from 
depositors. Companies in retailing and manufacturing do not. 
1.12. There was an interest rate mismatch at Continental Illinois. About 
$5.5 billion of loans with maturities more than a year were financed by 
deposits with maturities less than a year. If interest rates rose 1%, the 
deposits would be rolled over at higher rates while the loans would 
continue to earn the same rate. The cost to Continental Illinois would 
be $55 million. 
1.13. S&Ls financed long-term fixed-rate mortgages with short-term 
deposits creating a serious interest rate mismatch. As a result, they lost 
money when interest rates rose. 
1.14. In this case, the interest rate mismatch is $10 billion. The bank's net 
interest income declines $100 million each year for the next three years. 
1.15. Professional fees ($5 million per month), lost sales (people are 
reluctant to do business with a company that is being reorganized), and 
key senior executives left (lack of continuity). 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1. When a trader enters into a long forward contract, she is agreeing to 
buy the underlying asset for a certain price at a certain time in the future. 
When a trader enters into a short forward contract, she is agreeing to sell 
the underlying asset for a certain price at a certain time in the future. 
2.2. A trader is hedging when she has an exposure to the price of an asset 
and takes a position in a derivative to offset the exposure. In a speculation 
the trader has no exposure to offset. She is betting on the future move-
ments in the price of the asset. Arbitrage involves taking a position in two 
or more different markets to lock in a profit. 
2.3. In the first case, the trader is obligated to buy the asset for $50 (she 
does not have a choice). In the second case, the trader has an option to 
buy the asset for $50 (she does not have to exercise the option). 
2.4. Selling a call option involves giving someone else the right to buy an 
asset from you for a certain price. Buying a put option gives you the right 
to sell the asset to someone else. 
2.5. (a) The investor is obligated to sell pounds for 1.5000 when they are 
worth 1.4900. The gain is (1.5000 - 1.4900) x 100,000 = $1,000. (b) The 
investor is obligated to sell pounds for 1.5000 when they are worth 1.5200. 
The loss is (1.5200 - 1.5000) x 100,000 = $2,000. 
2.6. (a) The trader sells for 50 cents per pound something that is worth 
48.20 cents per pound. Gain = ($0.5000 - $0.4820) x 50,000 = $900. 
(b) The trader sells for 50 cents per pound something that is worth 51.30 
cents per pound. Loss = ($0.5130 - $0.5000) x 50,000 = $650. 
2.7. You have sold a put option. You have agreed to buy 100 shares for 
$40 per share if the party on the other side of the contract chooses to 
exercise the right to sell for this price. The option will be exercised only 
when the price of stock is below $40. Suppose, for example, that the 
option is exercised when the price is $30. You have to buy at $40 shares 
that are worth $30; you lose $10 per share, or $1,000 in total. If the 
option is exercised when the price is $20, you lose $20 per share, or $2,000 
in total. The worst that can happen is that the price of the stock declines 
to almost zero during the three-month period. This highly unlikely event 
would cost you $4,000. In return for the possible future losses, you receive 
the price of the option from the purchaser. 
2.8. The over-the-counter (OTC) market is a telephone- and computer-
linked network of financial institutions, fund managers, and corporate 
treasurers where two participants can enter into any mutually acceptable 
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contract. An exchange-traded market is a market organized by an ex-
change where traders either meet physically or communicate electronically 
and the contracts that can be traded have been defined by the exchange 
(a) OTC, (b) exchange, (c) both, (d) OTC, (e) OTC. 
2.9. One strategy would be to buy 200 shares. Another would be to buy 
2,000 options. If the share price does well, the second strategy will give 
rise to greater gains. For example, if the share price goes up to $40, you 
gain [2, 000 x ($40 - $30)] - $5,800 = $14,200 from the second strategy 
and only 200 x ($40 - $29) = $2,200 from the first. However, if the 
share price does badly, the second strategy gives greater losses. For 
example, if the share price goes down to $25, the first strategy leads 
to a loss of 200 x ($29 — $25) = $800, whereas the second strategy leads 
to a loss of the whole $5,800 investment. This example shows that 
options contain built in leverage. 
2.10. You could buy 5,000 put options (or 50 contracts) with a strike 
price of $25 and an expiration date in 4 months. This provides a type of 
insurance. If at the end of 4 months the stock price proves to be less than 
$25, you can exercise the options and sell the shares for $25 each. The 
cost of this strategy is the price you pay for the put options. 
2.11. A stock option provides no funds for the company. It is a security 
sold by one trader to another. The company is not involved. By contrast, 
a stock when it is first issued is a claim sold by the company to investors 
and does provide funds for the company. 
2.12. Ignoring the time value of money, the holder of the option will 
make a profit if the stock price in March is greater than $52.50. This is 
because the payoff to the holder of the option is, in these circumstances, 
greater than the $2.50 paid for the option. The option will be exercised if 
the stock price at maturity is greater than $50.00. Note that if the stock 
price is between $50.00 and $52.50 the option is exercised, but the holder 
of the option takes a loss overall. 
2.13. Ignoring the time value of money, the seller of the option will make 
a profit if the stock price in June is greater than $56.00. This is because 
the cost to the seller of the option is in these circumstances less than the 
price received for the option. The option will be exercised if the stock 
price at maturity is less than $60.00. Note that if the stock price is 
between $56.00 and $60.00 then the seller of the option makes a profit 
even though the option is exercised. 
2.17. (a) The trader buys a 180-day call option and takes a short position 
in a 180-day forward contract. (b) The trader buys 90-day put options 
and takes a long position in a 90-day forward contract. 
2.18. It enters into a 5-year swap where it pays 6.51% and receives 
LIBOR. Its investment is then at LIBOR minus 1.51%. 
2.19. It enters into a 5-year swap where it receives 6.47% and pays 
LIBOR. Its net cost of borrowing is LIBOR +0.53%. 
2.20. It enters into a three-year swap where it receives LIBOR and pays 
6.24%. Its net borrowing cost for the three years is then 7.24% per 
annum. 
2.21. Suppose that the weather is bad and the farmer's production is 
lower than expected. Other farmers are likely to have been affected 
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2.14. A long position in a four-month put option can provide insurance 
against the exchange rate falling below the strike price. It ensures that the 
foreign currency can be sold for at least the strike price. 
2.15. The company could enter into a long forward contract to buy 
1 million Canadian dollars in six months. This would have the effect of 
locking in an exchange rate equal to the current forward exchange rate. 
Alternatively the company could buy a call option giving it the right (but 
not the obligation) to purchase 1 million Canadian dollars at a certain 
exchange rate in six months. This would provide insurance against a 
strong Canadian dollar in six months while still allowing the company 
to benefit from a weak Canadian dollar at that time. 
2.16. The payoff from an ICON is the payoff from (a) a regular bond, 
(b) a short position in call options to buy 169,000 yen with an exercise 
price of 1/169, (c) a long position in call options to buy 169,000 yen with 
an exercise price of 1/84.5. This is demonstrated by the following table: 
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similarly. Corn production overall will be low and as a consequence the 
price of corn will be relatively high. The farmer is likely to be overhedged 
relative to actual production. The farmer's problems arising from the bad 
harvest will be made worse by losses on the short futures position. This 
problem emphasizes the importance of looking at the big picture when 
hedging. The farmer is correct to question whether hedging price risk 
while ignoring other risks is a good strategy. 
2.22. It may well be true that there is just as much chance that the 
company will lose as that it will gain. This means that the use of a futures 
contract for speculation would be like betting on whether a coin comes up 
heads or tails. But it might make sense for the airline to use futures for 
hedging rather than speculation. The futures contract then has the effect 
of reducing risks. It can be argued that an airline should not expose its 
shareholders to risks associated with the future price of oil when there are 
contracts available to hedge the risks. 
2.23. The optimal hedge ratio is 
The beef producer requires a long position in 200,000 x 0.6 = 120,000 lbs 
of cattle. The beef producer should therefore take a long position in three 
December contracts closing out the position on November 15. 
2.24. Microsoft is choosing an option on a portfolio of assets instead of 
the corresponding portfolio of options. The former is always less expen-
sive because there is the potential for an increase in the price of one asset 
to be netted off against a decrease in the price of another. Compare (a) an 
option with a strike price of $20 on a portfolio of two assets each worth 
$10 and (b) a portfolio of two options with a strike price of $10, one on 
each of assets. If both assets increase in price or both assets decrease in 
price, the payoffs are the same. But if one decreases and the other 
increases, the payoff from (a) is less than that from (b). Both the Asian 
feature and the basket feature in Microsoft's options help to reduce the 
cost of the options because of the possibility of gains and loss being 
netted. 
CHAPTER 3 
3.1. The value of the portfolio decreases by $10,500. 
3.2. The value of the portfolio increases by $400. 
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3.3. In both cases it increases by 0.5 x 30 x 22, or $60. 
3.4. A delta of 0.7 means that, when the price of the stock increases by a 
small amount, the price of the option increases by 70% of this amount. 
Similarly, when the price of the stock decreases by a small amount, the 
price of the option decreases by 70% of this amount. A short position in 
1,000 options has a delta of —700 and can be made delta neutral with the 
purchase of 700 shares. 
3.5. A theta of — 100 per day means that if one day passes with no change 
in either the stock price or its volatility, the value of the option position 
declines by $100. If a trader feels that neither the stock price nor its 
implied volatility will change, she should write an option with as high a 
theta as possible. Relatively short-life at-the-money options have the 
highest theta. 
3.6. The gamma of an option position is the rate of change of the delta of 
the position with respect to the asset price. For example, a gamma of 0.1 
would indicate that, when the asset price increases by a certain small 
amount, delta increases by 0.1 of this amount. When the gamma of an 
option-writer's position is large and negative and the delta is zero, the 
option writer will lose significant amounts of money if there is a large 
movement (either an increase or a decrease) in the asset price. 
3.7. To hedge an option position, it is necessary to create the opposite 
option position synthetically. For example, to hedge a long position in a 
put, it is necessary to create a short position in a put synthetically. It 
follows that the procedure for creating an option position synthetically is 
the reverse of the procedure for hedging the option position. 
3.8. A long position in either a put or a call option has a positive gamma. 
From Figure 15.8, when gamma is positive the hedger gains from a large 
change in the stock price and loses from a small change in the stock price. 
Hence the hedger will fare better in case (b). When the portfolio contains 
short option position, the hedger will similarly fare better in (a). 
3.9. The delta indicates that, when the value of the euro exchange rate 
increases by $0.01, the value of the bank's position increases by 
0.01 x 30,000 = $300. The gamma indicates that, when the euro exchange 
rate increases by $0.01, the delta of the portfolio decreases by 
0.01 x 80,000 = 800. For delta neutrality, 30,000 euros should be shorted. 
When the exchange rate moves up to 0.93, we expect the delta of the 
portfolio to decrease by (0.93 - 0.90) x 80,000 = 2,400, so that it becomes 
27,600. To maintain delta neutrality, it is therefore necessary for the bank 
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to unwind its short position 2,400 euros so that a net 27,600 have been 
shorted. When a portfolio is delta neutral and has a negative gamma, a loss 
is experienced when there is a large movement in the underlying asset price 
We can conclude that the bank is likely to have lost money. 
3.10. When used in the way described in the text, it does assume volatility 
is constant. In theory, we could implement a static options replication 
scheme where there are three dimensions: time, the stock price, and volatil-
ity. Prices are then matched on a surface in the three-dimensional space. 
3.11. Ten regular options are likely to be needed. This is because there are 
ten equations to be satisfied, one for each point on the boundary. 
3.12. The payoff from an Asian option becomes more certain with the 
passage of time. As a result, the amount of uncertainty that needs to be 
hedged decreases with the passage of time. 
3.13. Consider a portfolio of options dependent on a single market 
variable. A single trade is all that is necessary to make the position delta 
neutral, regardless of the size of the position. 
3.14. The price, delta, gamma, vega, theta, and rho are 0.0217, -0.396, 
5.415, 0.00203, -0.0000625, and -0.00119. Delta predicts that the option 
price should decrease by approximately 0.000396 when the exchange rate 
increases by 0.001. This is what we find. When the exchange rate is 
increased to 0.751, the option price decreases to 0.0213. 
CHAPTER 4 
4.1. (a) 13.76% per annum, (b) 14.75% per annum. 
4.2. (a) 10% per annum, (b) 9.76% per annum, (c) 9.57%> per annum, 
(d) 9.53%o per annum. 
4.3. The equivalent rate of interest with quarterly compounding is 
12.18%o. The amount of interest paid each quarter is therefore 
or $304.55. 
4.4. The rate of interest is 14.91%) per annum. 
4.5. The forward rates with continuous compounding for the 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, and 5th years are 4.0%, 5.1%, 5.7%, and 5.7%, respectively. 
4.6. The forward rates with continuous compounding for the 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, 5th, and 6th quarters are 8.4%, 8.8%, 8.8%, 9.0%, and 9.2%, 
respectively. 
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4.7. When the term structure is upward sloping, c > a > b. When it is 
downward sloping, b > a > c. 
4.8. Suppose the bond has a face value of $100. Its price is obtained by 
discounting the cash flows at 10.4%. The price is 
If the 18-month zero rate is R, we must have 
which gives R = 10.42%. 
4.9. The bond pays $2 in 6, 12, 18, and 24 months, and $102 in 
30 months. The cash price is 
4.10. The bond pays $4 in 6, 12, 18, 24, and 30 months, and $104 in 
36 months. The bond yield is the value of y that solves 
Using the Goal Seek tool in Excel, we get y = 0.06407, or 6.407%. 
4.11. There are three reasons: (i) Treasury bills and Treasury bonds must 
be purchased by financial institutions to fulfill a variety of regulatory 
requirements. This increases demand for these Treasury instruments driv-
ing the price up and the yield down. (ii) The amount of capital a bank is 
required to hold to support an investment in Treasury bills and bonds is 
substantially smaller than the capital required to support a similar invest-
ment in other very-low-risk instruments. (iii) In the United States, Treas-
ury instruments are given a favorable tax treatment compared with most 
other fixed-income investments because they are not taxed at the state level. 
4.12. Duration provides information about the effect of a small parallel 
shift in the yield curve on the value of a bond portfolio. The percentage 
decrease in the value of the portfolio equals the duration of the portfolio 
multiplied by the amount by which interest rates are increased in the 
small parallel shift. Its limitation is that it applies only to parallel shifts in 
the yield curve that are small. 
4.13. (a) The bond's price is 86.80, (b) the bond's duration is 4.256 years, 
(c) the duration formula shows that when the yield decreases by 0.2% the 
bond's price increases by 0.74, (d) recomputing the bond's price with a 
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yield of 10.8% gives a price of 87.54, which is approximately consistent 
with (a) and (c). 
4.14. (a) The bond's price is 88.91, (b) the bond's modified duration is 
3.843 years, (c) the duration formula estimates that when the yield 
decreases by 0.2% the bond's price increases by 0.68, (d) recomputing 
the bond's price with a yield of 10.8% (annually compounded) gives a 
price of 89.60 which is approximately consistent with (a) and (c). 
4.15. The bond price is 104.80. The duration of the bond is 5.35. The 
convexity is 30.60. The effect of a 1 % increase in the yield is estimated by 
equation (4.14) as 
104.80(-0.01 x 5.35 + 0.5 x 30.60 x 0.0001) = -5.44 
The bond price actually changes to 99.36, which is consistent with the 
estimate. 
4.16. We can (a) perturb points on the yield curve (see Figure 4.4), 
(b) perturb sections of the yield curve (see Figure 4.6), and (c) perturb 
the market quotes used to create the yield curve. 
4.17. The deltas are 10.7 and -190,1. 
CHAPTER 5 
5.1. 4.16%. 
5.2. The standard deviation of the percentage price change in one day is 
1.57%. The 95% confidence limits are from -3.09% to +3.09%. 
5.3. Volatility is much higher when markets are open than when they are 
closed. Traders therefore measure time in trading days rather than 
calendar days when applying volatility. 
5.4. Implied volatility is the volatility that leads to the option price 
equaling the market price when Black-Scholes assumptions are used. It 
is found by "trial and error". Because different options have different 
implied volatilities, traders are not using the same assumptions as Black-
Scholes. (See Chapter 15 for a further discussion of this.) 
5.5. The approach in Section 5.3 gives 0.547% per day. The simplified 
approach in equation 5.4 gives 0.530%) per day. 
5.6. (a) 0.25%, (b) 0.0625%. 
5.7. The variance rate estimated at the end of day n equals times the 
variance rate estimated at the end of day n — 1 plus 1 — times the 
squared return on day n. 
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5.8. GARCH(1, 1) adapts the EWMA model by giving some weight to a 
long-run average variance rate. Whereas the EWMA has no mean rever-
sion, GARCH(1,1) is consistent with a mean-reverting variance rate 
model. 
5.9. In this case, = 0.015 and = 0.5/30 = 0.01667, so that equa-
tion (19.7) gives 
= 0.94 x 0.0152 + 0.06 x 0.016672 = 0.0002281 
The volatility estimate on day n is therefore = 0.015103, or 
1.5103%. 
5.10. Reducing from 0.95 to 0.85 means that more weight is put on 
recent observations of and less weight is given to older observations. 
Volatilities calculated with — 0.85 will react more quickly to new 
information and will "bounce around" much more than volatilities 
calculated with — 0.95. 
5.11. With the usual notation, = 20/1040 = 0.01923, so that 
= 0.000002 + 0.06 x 0.019232 + 0.92 x 0.012 = 0.0001162 
This gives = 0.01078. The new volatility estimate is therefore 1.078% 
per day. 
5.12. The proportional daily change is -0.005/1.5000 = -0.003333. The 
current daily variance estimate is 0.006 = 0.000036. The new daily 
variance estimate is 
0.9 x 0.000036 + 0.1 x 0.0033332 = 0.000033511 
The new daily volatility is the square root of this. It is 0.00579, or 0.579%. 
5.13. The weight given to the long-run average variance rate is 
and the long-run average variance rate is Increasing 
increases the long-run average variance rate; increasing increases the 
weight given to the most recent data item, reduces the weight given to the 
long-run average variance rate, and increases the level of the long-run 
average variance rate. Increasing increases the weight given to the 
previous variance estimate, reduces the weight given to the long-run 
average variance rate, and increases the level of the long-run average 
variance rate. 
5.14. The long-run average variance rate is or 
0.000004/0.03 = 0.0001333. The long-run average volatility is 
or 1.155%. The equation describing the way the variance 
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rate reverts to its long-run average is 
In this case, 
If the current volatility is 20% per year, = 0.0126. The 
expected variance rate in 20 days is 
0.0001333 + 0.9720(0.01262 - 0.0001333) = 0.0001471 
The expected volatility in 20 days is therefore =0.0121, or 
1.21% per day. 
5.15. The FTSE expressed in dollars is XY where X is the FTSE 
expressed in sterling and Y is the exchange rate (value of one pound in 
dollars). Define as the proportional change in X on day i and as the 
proportional change in Y on day i. The proportional change in XY is 
approximately The standard deviation of is 0.018 and the 
standard deviation of is 0.009. The correlation between the two is 
0.4. The variance of is therefore 
0.0182 + 0.0092 + 2 x 0.018 x 0.009 x 0.4 = 0.0005346 
so that the volatility of is 0.0231, or 2.31 %. This is the volatility of 
the FTSE expressed in dollars. Note that it is greater than the volatility of 
the FTSE expressed in sterling. This is the impact of the positive correla-
tion. When the FTSE increases, the value of sterling measured in dollars 
also tends to increase. This creates an even bigger increase in the value of 
FTSE measured in dollars. Similarly for a decrease in the FTSE. 
5.16. In this case, VL = 0.00015 and the expected variance rate in 30 days 
is 0.000123. The volatility is 1.11% per day. 
5.17. In equation (5.15), VL =0.0001, a = 0.0202, T = 20, and V(0) = 
0.000169, so that the volatility is 19.88%. 
CHAPTER 6 
6.1. You need the standard deviations of the two variables. 
6.2. Loosely speaking correlation measures the extent of linear depen-
dence. It does not measure other types of dependence. When y = x2 there 
is perfect dependence between x and y. However E(xy) = E(x3). This is 
zero for a symmetrical distribution such as the normal showing that the 
coefficient of correlation between x and y is zero. 
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6.3. In a factor model the correlation between two variables arises 
entirely because of their correlation with one or more other variables. 
The latter are known as factors. A factor model reduces the number of 
estimates that have to be made when correlations between large numbers 
of variables are being produced. 
6.4. A Positive-semidefinite matrix is a matrix that satisfies equation (6.4) 
for all vectors If a correlation matrix is not positive semidennite, the 
correlations are internally inconsistent. 
6.5. (a) The volatilities and correlation imply that the current estimate of 
the Covariance is 0.25 x 0.016 x 0.025 = 0.0001. (b) If the prices of the 
assets at close of trading are $20.5 and $40.5, the proportional changes 
are 0.5/20 = 0.025 and 0.5/40 = 0.0125. The new Covariance estimate is 
0.95 x 0.0001 + 0.05 x 0.025 x 0.0125 = 0.0001106 
The new variance estimate for asset A is 
0.95 x 0.0162 + 0.05 x 0.0252 = 0.00027445 
so that the new volatility is 0.0166. The new variance estimate for asset B is 
0.95 x 0.0252 + 0.05 x 0.01252 = 0.000601562 
so that the new volatility is 0.0245. The new correlation estimate is 
6.6. Using the notation in the text, = 0.01 and =0.012 and 
the most recent estimate of the Covariance between the asset returns is 
= 0.01 x 0.012 x 0.50 = 0.00006 
The variable = 1/30 = 0.03333 and the variable = 1/50 = 0.02. 
The new estimate of the Covariance, covn, is 
0.000001 + 0.04 x 0.03333 x 0.02 + 0.94 x 0.00006 = 0.0000841 
The new estimate of the variance of the first asset, is 
0.000003 + 0.04 x 0.033332 + 0.94 x 0.012 = 0.0001414 
so that = 0.01189, or 1.189%. The new estimate of the 
variance of the second asset, is 
0.000003 + 0.04 x 0.022 + 0.94 x 0.0122 = 0.0001544 
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so that , = 0.01242, or 1.242%. The new estimate of the 
correlation between the assets is therefore 
0.0000841/(0.01189 x 0.01242) = 0.569 
6.7. Continuing with the notation in Problem 5.15, define as the pro-
portional change in the value of the S&P 500 on day i. The Covariance 
between and is 0.7 x 0.018 x 0.016 = 0.0002016. The Covariance 
between and is 0.3 x 0.009 x 0.016 = 0.0000432. The Covariance 
between and equals the Covariance between and plus the 
Covariance between and It is 
0.0002016 + 0.0000432 = 0.0002448 
The correlation between and is 
Note that the volatility of the S&P 500 drops out in this calculation. 
6.8. 
V1 
0.25 
0.5 
0.75 
0.25 
0.095 
0.163 
0.216 
V2 
0.5 
0.163 
0.298 
0.413 
0.75 
0.216 
0.413 
0.595 
6.9. Suppose x1, x2, and x3 are random samples from three independent 
normal distributions. Random samples with the required correlation 
structure are where 
where 
This means that 
6.10. Tail dependence is the tendency for extreme values for two or more 
variables to occur together. The choice of copula affects tail dependence. 
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For example, the Student t-copula gives more tail dependence than the 
Gaussian copula. 
6.11. Sample from a bivariate Student t-distribution as in Figure 6.5. 
Convert each sample to a normal distribution on a "percentile-to-
percentile" basis. 
6.12. The probability that V1 < 0.1 is 0.05. The conditional probability 
that V 2 < 0 . 1 is 0.006/0.05 = 0.12. The conditional probability that 
V2 < 0.2 is 0.017/0.05 = 0.34, etc. 
6.13. When V1= 0.2, we have U1 = —0.84. From the properties of the 
bivariate normal distribution, the median of U2 is —0.5 x 0.84 = —0.42. 
This translates into a median value for V2 of 0.458. 
6.14. In this case, 
The "99.5% worst case" is that there is a loss of 500 x 0.7 x 0.127 = 
44.62, or $44.62 million. 
CHAPTER 7 
7.1. The removal of a competitor may be beneficial. However, banks 
enter into many contracts with each other. When one bank goes bank-
rupt, other banks are liable to lose money on the contracts they have with 
the bank. Also, other banks will be adversely affected if the bankruptcy 
reduces the public's overall level of confidence in the banking system. 
7.2. Deposit insurance means that depositors are safe regardless of the 
risks taken by their financial institution. It is liable to lead to financial 
institutions taking more risks than they otherwise would because they can 
do so without the risk of losing deposits. This in turn leads to more bank 
failures and more claims under the deposit insurance system. Regulation 
requiring the capital held by a bank to be related to the risks taken is 
necessary to avoid this happening. 
7.3. The credit risk on the swap is the risk that the counterparty defaults 
at some future time when the swap has a positive value to the bank. 
7.4. The value of a currency swap is liable to deviate further from zero 
than the value of an interest rate swap because of the final exchange of 
principal. As a result the potential loss from a counterparty default is 
higher. 
438 Answers to Problems and Questions 
7.5. There is some exposure. If the counterparty defaulted now there 
would be no loss. However, interest rates could change so that at a future 
time the swap has a positive value to the financial institution. If the 
counterparty defaulted at that time there would be a loss to the financial 
institution. 
7.6. The risk-weighted assets for the three transactions are (a) $1.875 
million, (b) $2 million, and (c) $3 million, for a total of $6.875 million. 
Capital is 0.08 x 6.875, or $0.55 million. 
7.7. The NRR is 2.5/4.5 = 0.556. The credit equivalent amount is 
2.5+ (0.4 +0.6 x 0.556) x 9.25, or $9.28 million. The risk-weighted 
assets is $4.64 million and the capital required is $0.371 million. 
7.8. In this case there is no value to the netting provisions. 
7.9. This converts the estimated capital requirement to an estimated risk-
weighted assets. Capital required equals 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
7.10. The trading book consists of instruments that are actively traded 
and marked to market daily. The banking book consists primarily of 
loans and is not market to market daily. Prior to the change the bank 
keeps credit risk capital calculated according to Basel I or Basel II. The 
effect of the change is to move the clients borrowings from the banking 
book to the trading book. The bank will be required to hold specific risk 
capital for the securities reflecting the credit exposure, as well as market 
risk capital reflecting the market risk exposure. The previous credit risk 
capital is no longer required. 
7.11. Under Basel I the capital charged for lending to a corporation is the 
same regardless of the credit rating of the corporation. This leads to a 
bank's return on capital being relatively low for lending to highly credit-
worthy corporations. Under Basel II the capital requirements of a loan are 
tied much more carefully to the creditworthiness of the borrower. As a 
result lending to highly creditworthy companies may become attractive 
again. 
7.12. Regulatory arbitrage involves entering into a transaction or series 
of transactions solely to reduce regulatory capital requirements. 
7.13. EAD is the estimated exposure at default. LGD is the loss given 
default, that is, the proportion of the exposure that will be lost if a default 
occurs. WCDR is the one-year probability of default in a bad year that 
occurs only one time in 1,000. PD is the probability of default in an 
average year. MA is the maturity adjustment. The latter allows for the fact 
that in the case of instruments lasting longer than a year there may be 
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losses arising from a decline in the creditworthiness of the counterparty 
during the year as well as from a default during the year. 
7.14. Under the simple approach, the risk weight of the counterparty is 
replaced by the risk weight of the collateral for the part of the exposure 
covered by the collateral. Under the comprehensive approach, the exposure 
is adjusted for possible increases and the collateral is adjusted for possible 
decreases in value. The counterparty's risk weight is applied to the excess 
of the adjusted exposure over the adjusted collateral. 
7.15. The standardized approach uses external ratings to determine 
capital requirements (but in a more sophisticated way than in Basel I). 
In the IRB approach the Basel II correlation model is used with PD being 
determined by the bank. In the advanced IRB approach, the Basel II 
correlation model is used with PD, LGD, EAD, and MA being deter-
mined by the bank. 
7.16. In the basic indicator approach total capital is 15% of the average 
total annual gross income. In the standardized approach, gross income is 
calculated for different business lines and capital as a percentage of gross 
income is different for different business lines. In the advanced measure-
ment approach, the bank uses internal models to determine the 1-year 
99.9% VaR. 
7.17. =0.1216, WCDR = 0.0914, and the capital requirement is 
200 x 0.7 x 0.0814, or $11.39 million. At least half of this must be Tier I. 
CHAPTER 8 
8.1. VaR is the loss that is not expected to be exceeded with a certain 
confidence level. Expected shortfall is the expected loss conditional that 
the loss is worse than the VaR level. Expected shortfall has the 
advantage that it always satisfies the Subadditivity (diversification is 
good) condition. 
8.2. A spectral risk measure is a risk measure that assigns weights to the 
quantiles of the loss distribution. For the Subadditivity condition to be 
satisfied the weight assigned to the qth quantile must be a nondecreasing 
function of q. 
8.3. There is a 5% chance that you will lose $6,000 or more during a one-
month period. 
8.4. Your expected loss during a "bad month" is $6,000. Bad months are 
defined as the worst 5% of months. 
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8.5. (a) $1 million, (b) $9.1 million, (c) $11 million, (d) $11.07 million 
(e) 1 + 1 < 11 but 9.2 + 9.2 > 11.07. 
8.6. (a) $3.92 million, (b) $8.77 million, (c) $10.40 million. 
8.7. (b) becomes $9.96 million and (c) becomes $11.82 million. 
8.8. Marginal VaR is the rate of change of VaR with the amount invested 
in the ith asset. Incremental VaR is the incremental effect of the ith asset 
on VaR (i.e., the difference between VaR with and without the asset). 
Component VaR is the part of VaR that can be attributed the ith asset 
(the sum of component VaRs equals the total VaR). 
8.9. The probability of 17 or more exceptions is 
1 - BINOMDIST(16,1000,0.01,TRUE) 
or 2.64%. The model should be rejected at the 5% confidence level. 
8.10. Bunching is the tendency for exceptions to be bunched rather than 
occurring randomly throughout the time period considered. 
8.11. Either historical data or brainstorming by senior management can 
be used to develop extreme scenarios. 
8.12. We are interested in the standard deviation of R1 + R2 + ... + Rn 
where Ri is the return on day i. This is where 
is the standard deviation of Ri and is the correlation between Ri and 
Rj. In this case, for all i, and when i > j. After further 
algebraic manipulations this leads directly to equation (8.3). 
8.13. The probability of 5 or more exceptions is 
1 - BINOMDIST(4,250,0.01,TRUE) 
or 10.8%. 
CHAPTER 9 
9.1. The assumption is that the statistical process driving changes in 
market variables over the next day is the same as that over the last 500 days. 
9.2. 
This shows that, as approaches 1, the weights approach \/n. 
9.3. The tenth-worst outcome is a return of —3.78%. The estimate of the 
1-day 99% VaR is therefore $3.78 million. 
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9.4. The 1-day 99% VaR is estimated as $1.36 million. This is much less 
than that given in Problem 9.3 because most of the really bad returns were 
more than 500 days ago and carry relatively little weight. 
9.5. The volatility is initially 1.14% per day. It varies from 0.428% per 
day to 2.97% per day. After adjustment, the tenth-worst outcome is 
1.77%. The VaR estimate is therefore $1.77 million. 
9.6. The VaR estimates given by u equal to 0.005, 0.01, and 0.015 are 
3.34, 3.34, and 3.30, respectively. 
9.7. The standard error of the VaR estimate is 
or $0.69 million. 
CHAPTER 10 
10.1. The standard deviation of the daily change in the investment in 
each asset is $1,000. The variance of the portfolio's daily change is 
1,0002 + 1,0002 + 2 x 0.3 x 1,000 x 1,000 = 2,600,000 
The standard deviation of the portfolio's daily change is the square root 
of this, or $1,612.45. The 5-day 99% VaR is therefore 
2.33 x x 1,612.45 = $8,401 
10.2. The three alternative procedures mentioned in the chapter for 
handling interest rates when the model-building approach is used to 
calculate VaR involve (a) the use of the duration model, (b) the use of 
cash-flow mapping, and (c) the use of principal components analysis. 
10.3. When a final exchange of principal is added in, the floating side is 
equivalent to a zero-coupon bond with a maturity date equal to the date 
of the next payment. The fixed side is a coupon-bearing bond, which is 
equivalent to a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds. The swap can therefore 
be mapped into a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds with maturity dates 
corresponding to the payment dates. Each of the zero-coupon bonds can 
then be mapped into positions in the adjacent standard-maturity zero-
coupon bonds. 
10.4. = 56 x The standard deviation of is 56 x 1.5 x 
0.007 = 0.588. It follows that the 10-day 99% VaR for the portfolio is 
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10.6. The 6. 5-year cash flow is equivalent to a position of $48.56 in a 
5-year zero-coupon bond and a position of $605.49 in a 7-year zero-
coupon bond. The equivalent 5-year and 7-year cash flows are 
48.56 x 1.065 = 64.98 and 605.49 x 1.077 = 972.28. 
10.7. A similar calculation to that in the text shows that $37,397 of the 
value is allocated to the 3-month bond worth and $11,793 of the value is 
allocated to the 6-month bond. 
10.8. The daily variance of the portfolio is 
62 x 202 + 42 x 82 = 15,424 
and the daily standard deviation is = $124.19. Since 
N(-1.282) = 0.9, the 5-day 90% VaR is 
124.19 x x 1.282 = $356.01 
10.9. (a) 3.26, (b) 63.87. 
10.10. The delta of the options is the rate of change of the value of the 
options with respect to the price of the asset. When the asset price 
increases by a small amount, the value of the options decreases by 30 
times this amount. The gamma of the options is the rate of change of 
their delta with respect to the price of the asset. When the asset price 
increases by a small amount, the delta of the portfolio decreases by five 
times this amount. 
In this case, = -0.10, = 36.03, and = -32.415. 
The mean change in the portfolio value in 1 day is —0.1 and the standard 
deviation of the change in 1 day is = 6.002. The Skewness is 
Using only the first two moments, we find that the 1-day 99% VaR is 
$14.08. When three moments are considered in conjunction with a 
Cornish-Fisher expansion, it is $14.53. 
10.11. Define as the volatility per year, as the change in in 1 day, 
and as the proportional change in in 1 day. We measure in as a 
multiple of 1% so that the current value of is 1 x = 15.87. The 
delta-gamma-vega model is 
Answers to Problems and Questions 443 
or 
where which simplifies to 
The change in the portfolio value now depends on two market variables. 
Once the daily volatility of and the correlation between a nd S have 
been estimated, we can estimate moments of and use a Cornish-
Fisher expansion. 
10.12. The change in the value of an option is not linearly related to the 
change in the value of the underlying variables. When the change in the 
values of underlying variables is normal, the change in the value of the 
option is not normal. The linear model assumes that it is normal and is, 
therefore, only an approximation. 
10.13. The contract is a long position in a sterling bond combined with a 
short position in a dollar bond. The value of the sterling bond is 
or $1.492 million. The value of the dollar bond is 
or $1.463 million. The variance of the change in the value 
of the contract in 1 day is 
1.4922 x 0.00062 + 1.4632 x 0.00052 
- 2 x 0.8 x 1.492 x 0.0006 x 1.463 x 0.0005 = 0.000000288 
The standard deviation is therefore $0.000537 million. The 10-day 99% 
VaR is 0.000537 x x 2.33 = $0.00396 million. 
CHAPTER 11 
11.1 Moody's has 19 ratings (excluding the "in default" rating): Aaa, 
Aal, Aa2, Aa3, Al , A2, A3, Baal, Baa2, Baa3, Bal, Ba2, Ba3, Bl, B2, 
B3, Caal, Caa2, Caa3. 
11.2. S&P has 19 ratings (excluding the "in default" rating): AAA, AA+, 
AA, A A - , A+, A, A - , BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, B - , B+, B, B - , 
CCC+, CCC, CCC- . 
11.3. Average default intensity is where = 0.9379. It is 6.41% per 
year. 
11.4. Conditional on no default by year 2, the probability of no default 
by year 3 is 0.8926/0.9526 = 0.9370. Average default intensity for the third 
year is where = 0.9370. It is 6.51% per year. 
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11.5. From equation (11.3) the average default intensity over the 3 years 
is 0.0050/(1 - 0.3) = 0.0071, or 0.71% per year. 
11.6. From equation (11.3) the average default intensity over 5 years is 
0.0080/(1-0.4), or 1.333% per year. Similarly the average default 
intensity over 3 years is 1.1667% per year. This means that the average 
default intensity for years 4 and 5 is 1.58%. 
11.7. Real-world probabilities of default should be used for calculating 
credit value at risk. Risk-neutral probabilities of default should be used 
for adjusting the price of a derivative for default. 
11.8. The recovery rate for a bond is the value of the bond immediately 
after the issuer defaults as a percentage of its face value. 
11.9. The first number in the second column of Table 11.4 is calculated as 
or 0.04% per year. Other numbers in the column are calculated similarly. 
The numbers in the fourth column of Table 11.5 are the numbers in the 
second column of Table 11.4 multiplied by one minus the expected 
recovery rate. In this case, the expected recovery rate is 0.4. 
11.10. The bond's market value is 96.19. Its risk-free value is 103.66. If Q 
is the default probability per year, the loss from defaults is 272.69Q. The 
implied probability of default is therefore 2.74% per year. 
11.11. The market price of the first bond is 98.35 and its risk-free value is 
101.23. If Q1 is the default probability at times 0.5, 1.5, and 2.5 years the 
loss from defaults for the first bond is 178.31Q1. It follows that 
Q1 =0.0161. If Q2 is the probability of default at times 3.5 and 4.5, 
the loss from default from the second bond is 180.56Q1 + 108.53Q2. The 
market price for the second bond is 96.24 and its risk-free value is 101.97. 
It follows that 180.56Q1 + 108.5302 = 5.73 and Q2 = 0.0260. 
11.12. We can assume that the principal is paid and received at the end of 
the life of the swap without changing the swap's value. If the spread were 
zero, then the present value of the floating payments per dollar of principal 
would be 1. The payment of LIBOR plus the spread therefore has a present 
value of 1 + V. The payment of the bond cash flows has a present value per 
dollar of principal of B*. The initial payment required from the payer of 
the bond cash flows per dollar of principal is 1 — B. (This may be negative; 
an initial amount of B — 1 is then paid by the payer of the floating rate.) 
Because the asset swap is initially worth zero, we have 
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so that 
V = B* -B 
11.13. The value of the debt in Merton's model is V0 — E0, or 
If the credit spread is s, this should equal so that 
Substituting we get 
so that 
11.14. In this case, E0 = 2, = 0.50, D = 5, r = 0.04, and T = 1 . 
Solving the simultaneous equations gives V0 = 6.80 and = 14.82. 
The probability of default is N(-d2), or 1.15%. 
11.15. Suppose that the principal is $100. The asset swap is structured so 
that the $10 is paid initially. After that, $2.50 is paid every 6 months. In 
return, LIBOR plus a spread is received on the principal of $100. The 
present value of the fixed payments is 
The spread over LIBOR must therefore have a present value of 5.3579. 
The present value of $1 received every 6 months for 5 years is 8.5105. The 
spread received every 6 months must therefore be 
5.3579/8.5105 = $0.6296 
The asset swap spread is therefore 2 x 0.6296 = 1.2592% per annum. 
CHAPTER 12 
12.1. The new transaction will increase the bank's exposure to the 
counterparty if it tends to have a positive value whenever the existing 
contract has a positive value and a negative value whenever the existing 
contract has a negative value. However, if the new transaction tends to 
offset the existing transaction, it is likely to have the incremental effect of 
reducing credit risk. 
12.2. Equation (12.3) gives the relationship between and This 
involves QA(T) and QB(T). These change as we move from the real world 
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to the risk-neutral world. It follows that the relationship between 
and in the real world is not the same as in the risk-neutral world. If 
is the same in the two worlds, then is not, and vice versa. 
12.3. When securities are pledged as collateral, the haircut is the discount 
applied to their market value for margin calculations. A company's own 
equity would not be good collateral. When the company defaults on its 
contracts, its equity is likely to be worth very little. 
12.4. In Vasicek's model and Credit Risk Plus, a credit loss recognized 
when a default occurs. In CreditMetrics, both downgrades and defaults 
lead to credit losses. In Vasicek's model, a Gaussian copula model of time 
to default is used. In Credit Risk Plus, a probability distribution is 
assumed for the default rate per year. In CreditMetrics, a Gaussian 
copula model is used to define rating transitions. 
12.5. The binomial correlation measure is 0.156. 
12.6. The statements in (a) and (b) are true. The statement in (c) is not. 
Suppose that and are the exposures to X and Y. The expected value 
of is the expected value of plus the expected value of The 
same is not true of 95% confidence limits. 
12.7. The cost of defaults is where u is percentage loss from defaults 
during the life of the contract and v is the value of an option that pays off 
max(150ST - 100, 0), where ST is the AUD/USD exchange rate in 1 year 
(USD per AUD). The value of u is 
The variable v is 150 times the value of a call option to buy 1 AUD for 
0.6667. This is 4.545. It follows that the cost of defaults is 
4.545 x 0.009950, or 0.04522. 
12.8. In this case, the cost of defaults is where 
is the value of a 6-month call option on 150 AUD with a strike price of 
$100, and is the value of a similar 1-year option. = 3.300 and 
= 4.545. The cost of defaults is 0.04211. 
12.9. Assume that defaults happen only at the end of the life of the 
forward contract. In a default-free world, the forward contract is the 
combination of a long European call and a short European put where the 
strike price of the options equals the delivery price and the maturity of the 
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options equals the maturity of the forward contract. If the no-default 
value of the contract is positive at maturity, the call has a positive value 
and the put is worth zero. The impact of defaults on the forward contract 
is the same as that on the call. If the no-default value of the contract is 
negative at maturity, the call has a zero value and the put has a positive 
value. In this case, defaults have no effect. Again the impact of defaults 
on the forward contract is the same as that on the call. It follows that the 
contract has a value equal to a long position in a call that is subject to 
default risk and short position in a default-free put. 
12.10. Suppose that the forward contract provides a payoff at time T. 
With our usual notation, the value of a long forward contract is 
ST — (see Appendix A). The credit exposure on a long forward 
contract is therefore max(ST — , 0); that is, it is a call on the asset 
price with strike price Similarly, the credit exposure on a short 
forward contract is max( — ST, 0); that is, it is a put on the asset 
price with strike price The total credit exposure is therefore a 
straddle with strike price 
12.11. As time passes, there is a tendency for the currency which has the 
lower interest rate to strengthen. This means that a swap where we are 
receiving this currency will tend to move in the money (i.e., have a 
positive value). Similarly, a swap where we are paying the currency will 
tend to move out of the money (i.e., have a negative value). From this it 
follows that our expected exposure on the swap where we are receiving 
the low-interest currency is much greater than our expected exposure on 
the swap where we are receiving the high-interest currency. We should 
therefore look for counterparties with a low credit risk on the side of the 
swap where we are receiving the low-interest currency. On the other side 
of the swap, we are far less concerned about the creditworthiness of the 
counterparty. 
CHAPTER 13 
13.1. Both provide insurance against a particular company defaulting 
during a period of time. In a credit default swap, the payoff is the 
notional principal amount multiplied by one minus the recovery rate. 
In a binary swap the payoff is the notional principal. 
13.2. The seller receives 300,000,000 x 0.0060 x 0.5 = $900,000 at times 
0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0 years. The seller also receives a final 
accrual payment of about $300,000 (= $300,000,000 x 0.060 x 2/12) at 
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the time of the default (4 years and 2 months). The seller pays 
300,000,000 x 0.6 = $180,000,000 at the time of the default. 
13.3. Sometimes there is physical settlement and sometimes there is cash 
settlement. In the event of a default when there is physical settlement, the 
buyer of protection sells bonds issued by the reference entity for their face 
value. Bonds with a total face value equal to the notional principal can be 
sold. In the event of a default when there is cash settlement, a calculation 
agent estimates the value of the Cheapest-to-deliver bond issued by the 
reference entity a specified number of days after the default event. The 
cash payoff is then based on the excess of the face value of these bonds 
over the estimated value. 
13.4. A cash CDO is created from a bond portfolio. The returns from the 
bond portfolio flow to a number of tranches (i.e., different categories of 
investors). The tranches differ as far as the credit risk they assume. The 
first tranche might have an investment in 5% of the bond portfolio and be 
responsible for the first 5% of losses. The next tranche might have an 
investment in 10% of the portfolio and be responsible for the next 10% 
of the losses, and so on. In a synthetic CDO there is no bond portfolio. 
Instead, a portfolio of credit default swaps is sold and the resulting credit 
risks are allocated to tranches in a similar way to that just described. 
13.5. In a first-to-default basket CDS, there are a number of reference 
entities. When the first one defaults, there is a payoff (calculated in the 
usual way for a CDS) and the basket CDS terminates. The value of the 
protection given by the first-to-default basket CDS decreases as the 
correlation between the reference entities in the basket increases. This is 
because the probability of a default decreases as the correlation increases. 
In the limit when the correlation is 1, there is in effect only one company 
and the probability of a default is quite low. 
13.6. Risk-neutral default probabilities are backed out from credit default 
swaps or bond prices. Real-world default probabilities are calculated from 
historical data. 
13.7. Suppose a company wants to buy some assets. If a total return swap 
is used, a financial institution buys the assets and enters into a swap with 
the company where it pays the company the return on the assets and 
receives from the company LIBOR plus a spread. The financial institu-
tion has less risk than it would have if it lent the company money and 
used the assets as collateral. This is because, in the event of a default by 
the company, it owns the assets. 
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13.8. An analysis similar to that in Tables 13.1 to 13.4 gives the PV of 
expected payments as 3.7364s, the PV of the expected payoff as 0.0838, 
and the PV of the expected accrual payment as 0.05985. The credit default 
swap spread is 221 basis points. 
13.9. If the credit default swap spread is 150 basis points, the value of the 
swap to the buyer of protection is 
0.0838 - (3.7364 + 0.0598) x 0.0150 = 0.0269 
per dollar of notional principal. 
13.10. If the swap is a binary CDS, the present value of expected payoffs 
is 0.1197 and the credit default swap spread is 315 basis points. 
13.11. A 5-year nth-to-default credit default swap works in the same way 
as a regular credit default swap except that there is a basket of companies. 
The payoff occurs when the nth default from the companies in the basket 
occurs. After the nth default has occurred, the swap ceases to exist. When 
n = 1 (so that the swap is a "first to default"), an increase in the default 
correlation lowers the value of the swap to the protection buyer. When 
n = 25 (so that the swap is a 25th to default), an increase in the default 
correlation increases the value of the swap to the protection buyer. 
13.12. The recovery rate of a bond is usually defined as the value of the 
bond a few days after a default occurs as a percentage of the bond's face 
value. 
13.13. The payoff from a plain vanilla CDS is 1 — R times the payoff 
from a binary CDS with the same principal. The payoff always occurs at 
the same time on the two instruments. It follows that the regular pay-
ments on a new plain vanilla CDS must be 1 - R times the payments on a 
new binary CDS. Otherwise there would be an arbitrage opportunity. 
13.14. In the case of a total return swap, a company receives (pays) the 
increase (decrease) in the value of the bond. In a regular swap this does 
not happen. 
13.15. When a company enters into a long (short) forward contract it is 
obligated to buy (sell) the protection given by a specified credit default 
swap with a specified spread at a specified future time. When a company 
buys a call (put) option contract, it has the option to buy (sell) the 
protection given by a specified credit default swap with a specified spread 
at a specified future time. Both contracts are normally structured so that 
they cease to exist if a default occurs during the life of the contract. 
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13.16. A credit default swap insures a corporate bond issued by the 
reference entity against default. Its approximate effect is to convert the 
corporate bond into a risk-free bond. The buyer of a credit default swap 
has therefore chosen to exchange a corporate bond for a risk-free bond 
This means that the buyer is long a risk-free bond and short a similar 
corporate bond. 
13.17. Payoffs from credit default swaps depend on whether a particular 
company defaults. Arguably some market participants have more 
information about this that others (see Business Snapshot 13.2). 
13.18. Real-world default probabilities are less than risk-neutral default 
probabilities. It follows that the use of real-world default probabilities 
will tend to understate the value of the protection. 
13.19. In an asset swap the bond's promised payments are swapped for 
LIBOR plus a spread. In a total return swap the bond's actual payments 
are swapped for LIBOR plus a spread. 
13.20. Using equation (13.2), we find that the probability of default 
conditional on a factor value of M is 
For M equal to - 2 , — 1, 0, 1, 2, the probabilities of default are 0.135, 
0.054, 0.018, 0.005, 0.001, respectively. To six decimal places, the prob-
ability of more that 10 defaults for these values of M can be calculated 
using the BINOMDIST function in Excel. They are 0.959284, 0.79851, 
0.000016, 0, 0, respectively. 
13.21. For a CDO squared we form a portfolio of CDO tranches and 
tranche the default losses in a similar way to Figure 13.3. For a CDO 
cubed we form a portfolio of CDO squared tranches and tranche the 
default losses in a similar way to Figure 13.3. 
CHAPTER 14 
14.1. The definition includes all internal risks and external risks except 
reputational risk and risks resulting from strategic decisions. 
14.2. Based on the results reported in Section 14.4, the loss would be 
100 x 30.23, or $127.8 million. 
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14.3. , When x = 20, the probability is 0.1. This 
means that K = 1.0986. The probability of the specified losses being 
exceeded are (a) 5.74%, (b) 3.30%, and (c) 1.58%. 
14.4. Moral hazard is handled by deductibles and by making premiums 
dependent on past claims. Adverse selection is handled by finding out as 
much as possible about a driver before insurance is granted and then 
modifying premiums as more information on the driver becomes available. 
14.5. CEOs must prepare a statement asserting that the financial state-
ments are accurate. They must return bonuses in the event that there is a 
restatement of financial statements. 
14.6. If a trader operates within established risk limits and takes a loss, it 
is part of market risk. If risk limits are violated, the loss becomes 
classified as an operational risk. 
14.7. (a) It is unlikely that an individual would not look after his or her 
health because of the existence of a life insurance contract. But it has been 
known for the beneficiary of a life insurance contract to commit murder 
to receive the payoff from the contract! (b) Individuals with short life 
expectancies are more likely to buy life insurance than individuals with 
long life expectancies. 
14.8. External loss data is data relating to the losses of other banks. It is 
data obtained from sharing agreements with other banks or from data 
vendors. External data is used to determine relative loss severity. It can be 
a useful indicator of the ratio of mean losses in Business Unit A to mean 
losses in Business Unit B or the ratio of the standard deviation of losses 
in Business Unit A to the standard deviation of losses in Business Unit B. 
14.9. The Poisson distribution is commonly used for loss frequency. The 
lognormal distribution is commonly used for loss severity. 
14.10. Two examples of key risk indicators are staff turnover and number 
of failed transactions. 
14.11. When the loss frequency is 3, the mean total loss is about 3.3 and 
the standard deviation is about 2.0. When the loss frequency is increased 
to 4, the mean loss is about 4.4 and the standard deviation is about 2.4. 
CHAPTER 15 
15.1. Leverage and Crashophobia. 
15.2. Uncertain volatility and jumps. 
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15.3. When plain vanilla call and put options are being priced, traders do 
use the Black-Scholes model as an interpolation tool. They calculate 
implied volatilities for the options that are actively traded. By interpolat-
ing between strike prices and between times to maturity, they estimate 
implied volatilities for other options. These implied volatilities are then 
substituted into Black-Scholes to calculate prices for these options. 
Black-Scholes is more than an interpolation tool when used for hedging. 
15.4. 13.45%. We get the same answer by (a) interpolating between strike 
prices of 1.00 and 1.05 and then between maturities of 6 months and 
1 year and (b) interpolating between maturities of 6 months and 1 year 
and then between strike prices of 1.00 and 1.05. 
15.5. The models of physics describe the behavior of physical processes. 
The models of finance ultimately describe the behavior of human beings. 
15.6. It might notice that it is getting a large amount of business of a 
certain type because it is quoting prices different from its competitors. 
The pricing differences may also become apparent if it decides to unwind 
transactions and approaches competitors for quotes. Also, it might 
subscribe to a service where it obtains the average price quotes by dealers 
for particular transactions. 
15.7. A loss equal to half the bid-offer spread is recognized when 
positions are liquidated. Liquidity VaR takes this loss into account. 
15.8. Liquidity black holes occur when most market participants want to 
be on one side of a market. Regulation is liable to lead to liquidity black 
holes. This is because when all financial institutions are regulated in the 
same way they tend to want to respond to external economic events in the 
same way. 
15.9. Within-model hedging involves hedging against changes in variables 
that the model assumes to be stochastic. Outside-model hedging involves 
hedging against parameters that the model assumes to be constant. 
15.10. The Black-Scholes model assumes that the probability distribu-
tion of the stock price in 1 month is lognormal. In this case it is clearly 
not lognormal. Possibly it consists of two lognormal distributions super-
imposed upon each other and is bimodal. Black-Scholes is clearly 
inappropriate. 
15.11. In this case the probability distribution of the exchange rate has a 
thin left tail and a thin right tail relative to the lognormal distribution. 
Deep-out-of-the-money calls and puts will have relatively low prices. 
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15.12. The term "marking to market" refers to the practice of revaluing 
instruments (usually daily) so that they are consistent with the market. 
The prices calculated for actively traded products do reflect market prices. 
The model is used merely as an interpolation tool. The term "marking to 
market" is therefore accurate for these products. The prices for structured 
products depend on the model being used. Hence the term "marking to 
model". 
15.13. Hedge funds are not regulated in the same way as other financial 
institutions and can therefore be contrarian investors buying whenever 
everyone else is selling and selling whenever everyone else is buying. 
However, black holes can be created when large numbers of hedge funds 
follow similar trading strategies. 
CHAPTER 16 
16.1. Economic capital is a bank's own estimate of the capital it requires. 
Regulatory capital is the capital it is required to keep by bank supervisors. 
16.2. A company with an AA rating has a 0.03% chance of defaulting in 
1 year. 
16.3. Business risk includes risks relating to strategic decisions and 
reputation. 
16.4. The models used for economic capital are likely to be broadly 
similar to those used to calculate regulatory capital in the case of market 
risk and operational risk. When calculating credit risk economic capital, a 
bank may consider it appropriate to use a different credit correlation 
model and different correlation parameters from those used in regulatory 
capital calculations. 
16.5. The 99.97% worst-case value of the logarithm of the loss is 
0.5 + 4 x 3.43 = 14.23. The 99.97% worst-case loss is therefore $1,510 
million. From the properties of the lognormal distribution, the expected 
loss is exp(0.5+ 42/2), or $4,915. The capital requirement is therefore 
$1.505 million. 
16.6. The economic capital for Business Unit 1 is 96.85. The economic 
capital for Business Unit 2 is 63.87. The total capital is 124.66. 
16.7. The incremental effect of Business Unit 1 on total economic 
capital is 60.78. The incremental effect of Business Unit 2 on total 
economic capital is 27.81. This suggests that 60.78/(60.78 + 27.81), or 
68.61%, of economic capital should be allocated to Business Unit 1 and 
27.81/(60.78 + 27.81), or 31.39%, to Business Unit 2. The marginal 
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effect of increasing the size of Business Unit 1 by 0.5% is 0.4182. The 
marginal effect of increasing the size of Business Unit 2 by 0.5% is 
0.2056. Euler's theorem is satisfied because the total economic capital is 
approximately equal to the sum of 0.4182/0.005 and 0.2056/0.005. 
16.8. The capital is 40 — 2 = $38 million and the return before tax is 
12 - 5 - 2 = $5 million. The before-tax RAROC is therefore 13.2%. In 
practice, the allocation of diversification benefits to this venture might 
reduce capital and increase RAROC. 
16.9. RAROC can be used to compare the past performance of different 
business units or to project the expected future performance of business 
units. 
CHAPTER 17 
17.1. A day's HDD is max(0, 65 - A) and a day's CDD is max(0, A - 65), 
where A is the average of the highest and lowest temperature during the day 
at a specified weather station, measured in degrees Fahrenheit. 
17.2. It is an agreement by one side to deliver a specified amount of gas at 
a roughly uniform rate during a month to a particular hub for a specified 
price. 
17.3. The average temperature each day is 75° Fahrenheit. The CDD each 
day is therefore 10 and the cumulative CDD for the month is 
10 x 31 = 310. The payoff from the call option is therefore 
(310 - 250) x 5,000 = $300,000 
17.4. Unlike most commodities electricity cannot be stored easily. If the 
demand for electricity exceeds the supply, as it sometimes does during the 
air-conditioning season, the price of electricity in a deregulated environ-
ment will skyrocket. When supply and demand become matched again, 
the price will return to former levels. 
17.5. HDD is max(65 — A, 0), where A is the average of the maximum 
and minimum temperature during the day. This is the payoff from a put 
option on A with a strike price of 65. CDD is max(A — 65, 0). This is the 
payoff from call option on A with a strike price of 65. 
17.6. It would be useful to calculate the cumulative CDD for July of each 
year of the last 50 years. A linear regression relationship 
CDD = a + bt + e 
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could then be estimated, where a and b are constants, t is the time in years 
measured from the start of the 50 years, and e is the error. This relation-
ship allows for linear trends in temperature through time. The expected 
CDD for next year (year 51) is then a + 5\b. This could be used as an 
estimate of the forward CDD. 
17.7. The volatility of the one-year forward price will be less than the 
volatility of the spot price. This is because, when the spot price changes 
by a certain amount, mean reversion will cause the forward price will 
change by a lesser amount. 
17.8. The energy producer faces quantity risks and price risks. It can use 
weather derivatives to hedge the quantity risks and energy derivatives to 
hedge against the price risks. 
17.9. A 5 x 8 contract for May 2006 is a contract to provide electricity 
for 5 days per week during the off-peak period (11 p.m. to 7 a.m.). When 
daily exercise is specified, the holder of the option is able to choose each 
weekday whether he or she will buy electricity at the strike price at the 
agreed rate. When there is monthly exercise, he or she chooses once at the 
beginning of the month whether electricity is to be bought at the strike 
price at the agreed rate for the whole month. The option with daily 
exercise is worth more. 
17.10. CAT bonds (catastrophe bonds) are an alternative to reinsurance 
for an insurance company that has taken on a certain catastrophic risk 
(e.g., the risk of a hurricane or an earthquake) and wants to get rid of it. 
CAT bonds are issued by the insurance company. They provide a higher 
rate of interest than government bonds. However, the bondholders agree 
to forego interest, and possibly principal, to meet any claims against the 
insurance company that are within a prespecified range. 
17.11. The CAT bond has very little systematic risk. Whether a particular 
type of catastrophe occurs is independent of the return on the market. 
The risks in the CAT bond are likely to be largely "diversified away" by 
the other investments in the portfolio. A B-rated bond does have sys-
tematic risk that cannot be diversified away. It is likely therefore that the 
CAT bond is a better addition to the portfolio. 
17.12. It means that the price of the energy source will be pulled back to 
a long-run average level. Electricity has the highest mean-reversion rate; 
oil has the lowest. 
Glossary of Terms 
Accrued Interest The interest earned on a bond since the last coupon 
payment date. 
Add-on Factor When the credit equivalent amount for a derivatives 
transaction is being calculated, this is the percentage of principal added 
to the current exposure to allow for possible future changes in the value 
of the derivative. 
Advanced Measurement Approach The way in which the most sophisti-
cated banks will be allowed to calculate regulatory capital for operational 
risk under Basel II. 
Adverse Selection The phenomenon that, if an insurance company 
offers the same premiums to everyone, it tends to end up providing 
coverage for the worst risks. 
American Option An option that can be exercised at any time during its 
life. 
Analytic Result Result where answer is in the form of an equation. 
Arbitrage A trading strategy that takes advantage of two or more secur-
ities being mispriced relative to each other. 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory A theory where the return from an investment 
is assumed to depend on several factors. 
Arbitrageur An individual engaging in arbitrage. 
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Asian Option An option with a payoff dependent on the average price 
of the underlying asset during a specified period. 
Ask Price The price that a dealer is offering to sell an asset. (Also called 
the offer price.) 
Asked Price See Ask Price. 
Asset Swap Exchanges the promised coupon on a bond for LIBOR plus 
a spread. 
At-the-money Option An option in which the strike price equals the 
price of the underlying asset. 
Autocorrelation The correlation between the value of a variable and 
the value of the same variable k days later (where k is referred to as the 
time lag). 
Average Price Call Option An option giving a payoff equal to the 
greater of zero and the amount by which the average price of the asset 
exceeds the strike price. 
Average Price Put Option An option giving a payoff equal to the greater 
of zero and the amount by which the strike price exceeds the average price 
of the asset. 
Back Testing Testing a value-at-risk or other model using historical 
data. 
Backwards Induction A procedure for working from the end of a tree to 
its beginning in order to value an option. 
Bankruptcy Costs Costs such as lost sales, loss of key managers, and 
professional fees arising from a declaration of bankruptcy. These costs 
are not associated with the adverse events leading to bankruptcy. 
Barrier Option An option whose payoff depends on whether the path of 
the underlying asset has reached a barrier (i.e., a certain predetermined 
level). 
Basel I The first international agreement on the regulation of banks 
in 1988. 
Basel II New international regulations for calculating bank capital 
expected to come into effect in 2007. 
Basic Indicator Approach The simplest way of calculating regulatory 
capital for operational risk under Basel II. 
Basis The difference between the spot price and the futures price of a 
commodity. 
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Basis Point When used to describe an interest rate, a basis point is one 
hundredth of one percent (= 0.01%). 
Basis Risk The risk to a hedger arising from uncertainty about the basis 
at a future time. 
Basket Credit Default Swap Credit default swap where there are several 
reference entities. 
Basket Option Option on a portfolio of assets. 
Beta A measure of the systematic risk of an asset. 
Bid-Ask Spread See Bid-Offer Spread. 
Bid-Offer Spread The amount by which the offer (or ask) price exceeds 
the bid price. 
Bid Price The price that a dealer is prepared to pay for an asset. 
Binary Credit Default Swap Instrument where there is a fixed dollar 
payoff in the event of a default by a particular company. 
Binary Option Option with a discontinuous payoff, for example, a cash-
or-nothing option or an asset-or-nothing option. 
Binomial Model A model where the price of an asset is monitored over 
successive short periods of time. In each short period, it is assumed that 
only two price movements are possible. 
Binomial Tree A tree that represents how an asset price can evolve 
under the binomial model. 
Bivariate Normal Distribution A distribution for two correlated vari-
ables, each of which is normal. 
Black's Model An extension of the Black-Scholes model for valuing 
European options on futures contracts. It is used extensively in practice to 
value European options when the distribution of the asset price at 
maturity is assumed to be lognormal. 
Black-Scholes Model A model for pricing European options on stocks, 
developed by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and Robert Merton. 
Bond Option An option where a bond is the underlying asset. 
Bond Yield Discount rate which, when applied to all the cash flows of a 
bond, causes the present value of the cash flows to equal the bond's 
market price. 
Bootstrap Method A procedure for calculating the zero-coupon yield 
curve from market data. Also a statistical procedure for calculating 
confidence levels when distributions are determined empirically. 
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Bunching A tendency for days when the loss is greater than the value at 
risk to be bunched close together. 
Business Risk When used for a bank, this refers to strategic risk (related 
to a bank's decision to enter new markets and develop new products) and 
reputation risk. 
Calendar Days Includes every day. 
Calibration Method for implying a model's parameters from the prices 
of actively traded options. 
Callable bond A bond containing provisions that allow the issuer to 
buy it back at a predetermined price at certain times during its life. 
Call Option An option to buy an asset at a certain price by a certain 
date. 
Cancelable Swap Swap that can be canceled by one side on prespecified 
dates. 
Cap See Interest Rate Cap. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model A model relating the expected return on an 
asset to its beta. 
Caplet One component of an interest rate cap. 
Cap Rate The rate determining payoffs in an interest rate cap. 
Cash Flow Mapping A procedure for representing an instrument as a 
portfolio of zero-coupon bonds for the purpose of calculating value at 
risk. 
Cash Settlement Procedure for settling a contract in cash rather than by 
delivering the underlying asset. 
CAT Bond Bond where the interest and, possibly, the principal paid are 
reduced if a particular category of "catastrophic" insurance claims exceed 
a certain amount. 
CDD Cooling degree days. The maximum of zero and the amount by 
which the daily average temperature is greater than 65° Fahrenheit. The 
average temperature is the average of the highest and lowest temperatures 
(midnight to midnight). 
CDO See Collateralized Debt Obligation. 
CDO Squared An instrument in which the default risks in a portfolio of 
CDO tranches are allocated to new securities. 
CDX An index of the credit quality of 125 North American investment-
grade companies. 
Glossary of Terms 461 
Cholesky Decomposition Method of sampling from a multivariate 
normal distribution. 
Clean Price of Bond The quoted price of a bond. The cash price paid 
for the bond (or dirty price) is calculated by adding the accrued interest to 
the clean price. 
Clearinghouse A firm that guarantees the performance of the parties in 
an exchange-traded derivatives transaction. (Also referred to as a clearing 
corporation.) 
Clearing margin A margin posted by a member of a clearinghouse. 
Coherent Risk Measure A risk measure that satisfies a number of 
conditions. 
Collar See Interest Rate Collar. 
Collateralization A system for posting collateral by one or both parties 
in a derivatives transaction. 
Collateralized Debt Obligation A way of packaging credit risk. Several 
classes of securities (known as tranches) are created from a portfolio of 
bonds and there are rules for determining how the cost of defaults are 
allocated to classes. 
Component VaR VaR corresponding to a component of a portfolio. 
Defined so that the sum of the component VaRs for the components of a 
portfolio equals the VaR for the whole portfolio. 
Compounding Frequency This defines how an interest rate is measured. 
Compound Option An option on an option. 
Compounding Swap Swap where interest compounds instead of being 
paid. 
Conditional Value at Risk (C-VaR) See Expected Shortfall. 
Confirmation Contract confirming verbal agreement between two parties 
to a trade in the over-the-counter market. 
Consumption Asset An asset held for consumption rather than invest-
ment. 
Continuous Compounding A way of quoting interest rates. It is the limit 
as the assumed compounding interval is made smaller and smaller. 
Convenience Yield A measure of the benefits from ownership of an 
asset that are not obtained by the holder of a long futures contract on the 
asset. 
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Conversion Factor Factor multiplied by principal to convert an off-
balance-sheet item to its credit equivalent amount. 
Convertible Bond A corporate bond that can be converted into a 
predetermined amount of the company's equity at certain times during 
its life. 
Convexity A measure of the curvature in the relationship between bond 
prices and bond yields. 
Convexity Adjustment An overworked term. For example, it can refer to 
the adjustment necessary to convert a futures interest rate to a forward 
interest rate. It can also refer to the adjustment to a forward rate that is 
sometimes necessary when instruments are valued. 
Cooke Ratio Ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets under Basel I. 
Copula A way of defining the correlation between variables with known 
distributions. 
Cornish-Fisher Expansion An approximate relationship between the 
fractiles of a probability distribution and its moments. 
Cost of Carry The storage costs plus the cost of financing an asset minus 
the income earned on the asset. 
Counterparty The opposite side in a financial transaction. 
Coupon Interest payment made on a bond. 
Covariance Measure of the linear relationship between two variables 
(equals the correlation between the variables times the product of their 
standard deviations). 
Covered Call A short position in a call option on an asset combined 
with a long position in the asset. 
Crashophobia The fear of a stock market crash similar to that in 1987 
that some people claim causes market participants to increase the value of 
deep-out-of-the-money put options. 
Credit Default Swap An instrument that gives the holder the right to 
sell a bond for its face value in the event of a default by the issuer. 
Credit Derivative A derivative whose payoff depends on the credit-
worthiness of one or more companies or countries. 
Credit Equivalent Amount Size of loan that is considered equivalent to 
an off-balance-sheet transaction in Basel I. 
Credit Rating A measure of the creditworthiness of a bond issue. 
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Credit Ratings Transition Matrix A table showing the probability that a 
company will move from one credit rating to another during a certain 
period of time. 
Credit Risk The risk that a loss will be experienced because of a default 
by the counterparty in a derivatives transaction. 
Credit Risk Migration Movement of a company from one rating category 
to another. 
Credit Risk Plus A procedure for calculating credit value at risk. 
Credit Value at Risk The credit loss that will not be exceeded at some 
specified confidence level. 
CreditMetrics A procedure for calculating credit value at risk. 
Cumulative Distribution Function The probability that a variable will 
be less than x as a function of x. 
Currency Swap A swap where interest and principal in one currency are 
exchanged for interest and principal in another currency. 
Day Count A convention for quoting interest rates. 
Day Trade A trade that is entered into and closed out on the same day. 
Default Correlation Measures the tendency of two companies to default 
at about the same time. 
Default Intensity See Hazard Rate. 
Delivery Price Price that will be paid or received in a forward contract. 
Delta The rate of change of the price of a derivative with the price of the 
underlying asset. 
Delta Hedging A hedging scheme that is designed to make the price of a 
portfolio of derivatives insensitive to small changes in the price of the 
underlying asset. 
Delta-neutral Portfolio A portfolio with a delta of zero so that there is 
no sensitivity to small changes in the price of the underlying asset. 
DerivaGem Software for valuing options, available on the author's 
website. 
Derivative An instrument whose price depends on, or is derived from, 
the price of another asset. 
Deterministic Variable A variable whose future value is known. 
Dirty Price of Bond Cash price of bond. 
Discount Bond See Zero-coupon Bond. 
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Discount Instrument An instrument, such as a Treasury bill, that 
provides no coupons. 
Discount Rate The annualized dollar return on a Treasury bill or 
similar instrument expressed as a percentage of the final face value. 
Distance to Default The number of standard deviations that the value 
of a company's assets must move for a default to be triggered. 
Dividend A cash payment made to the owner of a stock. 
Dividend Yield The dividend as a percentage of the stock price. 
Down-and-in Option An option that comes into existence when the 
price of the underlying asset declines to a prespecified level. 
Down-and-out Option An option that ceases to exist when the price of 
the underlying asset declines to a prespecified level. 
Downgrade Trigger A clause in a contract that states that the contract 
can be terminated by one side if the credit rating of the other side falls 
below a certain level. 
Duration A measure of the average life a bond. It is also an approxima-
tion to the ratio of the proportional change in the bond price to the 
absolute change in its yield. 
Duration Matching A procedure for matching the durations of assets 
and liabilities. 
Dynamic Hedging A procedure for hedging an option position by 
periodically changing the position held in the underlying asset. The 
objective is usually to maintain a delta-neutral position. 
EAD See Exposure at Default. 
Early Exercise Exercise prior to the maturity date. 
Economic Capital The capital that a bank's own calculation indicates it 
needs. 
Efficient Frontier The optimal trade-offs for an investor between 
expected return and standard deviation of return. 
Efficient Market Hypothesis A hypothesis that asset prices reflect 
relevant information. 
Electronic Trading System of trading where a computer is used to match 
buyers and sellers. 
Embedded Option An option that is an inseparable part of another 
instrument. 
Empirical Research Research based on historical market data. 
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Equity Swap A swap where the return on an equity portfolio is 
exchanged for either a fixed or a floating rate of interest. 
Eurocurrency A currency that is outside the formal control of the 
issuing country's monetary authorities. 
Eurodollar A dollar held in a bank outside the United States. 
Eurodollar Futures Contract A futures contract written on a Eurodollar 
deposit. 
Eurodollar Interest Rate The interest rate on a Eurodollar deposit. 
European Option An option that can be exercised only at the end of its 
life. 
EWMA Exponentially weighted moving average. 
Exchange-traded Market Market organized by an exchange such as the 
New York Stock Exchange or Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
Ex-dividend Date When a dividend is declared, an ex-dividend date is 
specified. Investors who own shares of the stock just before the ex-
dividend date receive the dividend. 
Exercise Price The price at which the underlying asset may be bought or 
sold in an option contract. (Also called the strike price.) 
Exotic Option A nonstandard option. 
Expectations Theory The theory that forward interest rates equal 
expected future spot interest rates. 
Expected Shortfall Expected loss during N days conditional on being in 
the (100 — X)% tail of the distribution of profits/losses. The variable N is 
the time horizon and X% is the confidence level. 
Expected Value of a Variable The average value of the variable obtained 
by weighting the alternative values by their probabilities. 
Expiration Date The end of life of a contract. 
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average Model A model where expo-
nential weighting is used to provide forecasts for a variable from historical 
data. It is sometimes applied to variances and covariances in value-at-risk 
calculations. 
Exponential Weighting A weighting scheme where the weight given to 
an observation depends on how recent it is. The weight given to an 
observation t time periods ago is times the weight given to an observa-
tion t — 1 time periods ago, where < 1. 
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Exposure at Default The maximum amount that could be lost (assum-
ing no recovery) when a default occurs. 
Extreme Value Theory A theory enabling the shape of the tails of a 
distribution to be estimated from data. 
Factor Source of uncertainty. 
Factor Analysis An analysis aimed at finding a small number of factors 
that describe most of the variation in a large number of correlated 
variables. (Similar to a principal components analysis.) 
Factor Loadings The values of variables in a factor model when we have 
one unit of a particular factor and no units of other factors. 
Factor Model Model where a set of correlated variables are assumed to 
depend linearly on a number of uncorrelated factors. 
Factor Scores In a factor model this is the amount of different factors 
present in a particular observation on the variables. 
Financial Intermediary A bank or other financial institution that facili-
tates the flow of funds between different entities in the economy. 
Floor See Interest Rate Floor. 
Floor-Ceiling Agreement See Collar. 
Floorlet One component of a floor. 
Floor Rate The rate in an interest rate floor agreement. 
Foreign Currency Option An option on a foreign exchange rate. 
Forward Contract A contract that obligates the holder to buy or sell an 
asset for a predetermined delivery price at a predetermined future time. 
Forward Exchange Rate The forward price of one unit of a foreign 
currency. 
Forward Interest Rate The interest rate for a future period of time 
implied by the rates prevailing in the market today. 
Forward Price The delivery price in a forward contract that causes the 
contract to be worth zero. 
Forward Rate Can refer to a forward interest rate or a forward exchange 
rate. 
Forward Rate Agreement (FRA) Agreement that a certain interest rate 
will apply to a certain principal amount for a certain time period in the 
future. 
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Futures Contract A contract that obligates the holder to buy or sell an 
asset at a predetermined delivery price during a specified future time 
period. The contract is settled daily. 
Futures Option An option on a futures contract. 
Futures Price The delivery price currently applicable to a futures 
contract. 
G-30 Policy Recommendations A set of recommendations concerning 
derivatives issued by nonregulators in 1993. 
Gamma The rate of change of delta with respect to the asset price. 
Gamma-neutral portfolio A portfolio with a gamma of zero. 
GARCH Model A model for forecasting volatility where the variance 
rate follows a mean-reverting process. 
Gaussian Copula Model A copula model based on the multivariate 
normal distribution. 
Glass-Steagall Act An act passed in the United States separating com-
mercial and investment banks. 
Greeks Hedge parameters such as delta, gamma, vega, theta, and rho. 
Haircut Discount applied to the value of an asset when it is used as 
collateral. 
Hazard Rate Measures probability of default in a short period of time 
conditional on no earlier default. 
HDD Heating degree days. The maximum of zero and the amount by 
which the daily average temperature is less than 65° Fahrenheit. The 
average temperature is the average of the highest and lowest temperatures 
(midnight to midnight). 
Hedge A trade designed to reduce risk. 
Hedge Funds Funds that are subject to less restrictions and less regula-
tion than mutual funds. They can take short positions and use derivatives, 
but they cannot publicly offer their securities. 
Hedger An individual who enters into hedging trades. 
Hedge Ratio The ratio of the size of a position in a hedging instrument 
to the size of the position being hedged. 
Historical Simulation A simulation based on historical data. 
Historic Volatility A volatility estimated from historical data. 
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Holiday Calendar Calendar defining which days are holidays for the 
purposes of determining payment dates in a financial transaction. 
Hybrid Approach Approach to aggregating different types of economic 
capital. 
Implied Volatility Volatility implied from an option price using the 
Black-Scholes or a similar model. 
Inception Profit Profit created by selling a derivative for more than its 
theoretical value. 
Incremental Value at Risk The difference between the value at risk with 
and without a particular component of the portfolio. 
Initial Margin The cash required from a futures trader at the time of the 
trade. 
Instantaneous Forward Rate Forward rate for a very short period of 
time in the future. 
Interest Rate Cap An option that provides a payoff when a specified 
interest rate is above a certain level. The interest rate is a floating rate that 
is reset periodically. 
Interest Rate Collar A combination of an interest rate cap and an 
interest rate floor. 
Interest Rate Derivative A derivative whose payoffs are dependent on 
future interest rates. 
Interest Rate Floor An option that provides a payoff when an interest 
rate is below a certain level. The interest rate is a floating rate that is reset 
periodically. 
Interest Rate Option An option where the payoff is dependent on the 
level of interest rates. 
Interest Rate Swap An exchange of a fixed rate of interest on a certain 
notional principal for a floating rate of interest on the same notional 
principal. 
In-the-money Option Either (a) a call option where the asset price is 
greater than the strike price or (b) a put option where the asset price is 
less than the strike price. 
Intrinsic Value For a call option, this is the greater of the excess of the 
asset price over the strike price and zero. For a put option, it is the greater 
of the excess of the strike price over the asset price and zero. 
Glossary of Terms 469 
Investment Asset An asset held by significant numbers of individuals 
for investment purposes. 
iTraxx An index of the credit quality of 125 European investment grade 
companies. 
IRB Approach Internal ratings based approach for assessing credit risk 
capital in Basel II. 
Key Risk Indicators Indicators to track the level of operational risk. 
Kurtosis A measure of the fatness of the tails of a distribution. 
LGD See Loss Given Default. 
LIBID London interbank bid rate. The rate bid by banks on Eurocur-
rency deposits (i.e., the rate at which a bank is willing to borrow from 
other banks). 
LIBOR London interbank offered rate. The rate offered by banks on 
Eurocurrency deposits (i.e., the rate at which a bank is willing to lend to 
other banks). 
LIBOR-in-arrears Swap Swap where the interest paid on a date is 
determined by the interest rate observed on that date (not by the interest 
rate observed on the previous payment date). 
LIBOR/Swap Zero Curve Zero rates as a function of maturity that are 
calculated from LIBOR rates, eurodollar futures, and swap rates. 
LIBOR Zero Curve See LIBOR/Swap Zero Curve. 
Linear Product Derivative product whose price depends linearly on one 
or more underlying variables. 
Liquidity-adjusted VaR A value-at-risk calculation that takes account of 
the impact of the bid-offer spread when positions are unwound. 
Liquidity Black Holes The risk that liquidity will dry up because every-
one wants to be on the same side of the market. 
Liquidity Preference Theory A theory leading to the conclusion that 
forward interest rates are above expected future spot interest rates. 
Liquidity Premium The amount that forward interest rates exceed 
expected future spot interest rates. 
Liquidity Risk Risk that it will not be possible to sell a holding of a 
particular instrument at its theoretical price. 
Lognormal Distribution A variable has a lognormal distribution when 
the logarithm of the variable has a normal distribution. 
Long Position A position involving the purchase of an asset. 
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Lookback Option An option whose payoff is dependent on the max-
imum or minimum of the asset price achieved during a certain period. 
Loss Given Default The percentage of the exposure to a counterparty 
that is lost when a default by the counterparty occurs. 
Maintenance Margin When the balance in a trader's margin account 
falls below the maintenance margin level, the trader receives a margin call 
requiring the account to be topped up to the initial margin level. 
Margin The cash balance (or security deposit) required from a futures 
or options trader. 
Margin Call A request for extra margin when the balance in the margin 
account falls below the maintenance margin level. 
Marginal Value at Risk The rate of change of the value at risk with the 
size of one component of the portfolio. 
Market Maker A trader who is willing to quote both bid and offer prices 
for an asset. 
Market Model A model most commonly used by traders. 
Market Portfolio A portfolio consisting of the universe of all possible 
investments. 
Market Risk Risk relating to movements in market variables. 
Marking to Market The practice of revaluing an instrument to reflect the 
current values of the relevant market variables. 
Maturity Date The end of the life of a contract. 
Maximum-likelihood Method A method for choosing the values of 
parameters by maximizing the probability of a set of observations 
occurring. 
Mean Reversion The tendency of a market variable (such as a volatility 
or an interest rate) to revert back to some long-run average level. 
Merton's Model Model using equity prices to estimate default prob-
abilities. (Other models developed by Merton are also sometimes referred 
to as Merton's model.) 
Model-building Approach The use of a model to estimate value at risk. 
Model Risk The risk relating to the use of models to price derivative 
products. 
Modified Duration A modification to the standard duration measure so 
that it more accurately describes the relationship between proportional 
changes in a bond price and actual changes in its yield. The modification 
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takes account of the compounding frequency with which the yield is 
quoted. 
Monte Carlo Simulation A procedure for randomly sampling changes in 
market variables. 
Moral Hazard The possibility that the behavior of an insured entity will 
change because of the existence of an insurance contract. 
Multivariate Normal Distribution The joint distribution of many vari-
ables, each of which is normal. 
Naked Position A short position in a call option that is not combined 
with a long position in the underlying asset. 
Net Interest Income The excess of interest earned over interest paid for 
a bank. 
Net Replacement Ratio The ratio of current exposure with netting to 
current exposure without netting. 
Netting The ability to offset contracts with positive and negative values 
in the event of a default by a counterparty. 
Nonlinear product Derivative product that is not linearly dependent on 
the underlying variables. 
Nonsystematic risk Risk that can be diversified away. 
Normal Distribution The standard bell-shaped distribution of statistics. 
Normal Market A market where futures prices increase with maturity. 
Notional Principal The principal used to calculate payments in an 
interest rate swap. The principal is "notional" because it is neither paid 
nor received. 
Numerical Procedure A method of calculation when no formula is 
available. 
Offer Price The price that a dealer is offering to sell an asset. (Also 
called the ask price.) 
Open Interest The total number of long positions outstanding in a 
futures contract (equals the total number of short positions). 
Open Outcry System of trading where traders meet on the floor of the 
exchange. 
Operational Risk The risk of loss arising from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people, and systems, or from external events. 
Option The right to buy or sell an asset. 
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Out-of-the-money Option Either (a) a call option where the asset price 
is less than the strike price or (b) a put option where the asset price is 
greater than the strike price. 
Over-the-counter Market A market where traders deal by phone. The 
traders are usually financial institutions, corporations, and fund managers. 
Par Value The principal amount of a bond. 
Par Yield The coupon on a bond that makes its price equal the 
principal. 
Parallel Shift A movement in the yield curve where each point on the 
curve changes by the same amount. 
Partial Duration Percentage change in value of a portfolio for a small 
change in one point on the zero-coupon yield curve. 
Payoff The cash realized by the holder of an option or other derivative 
at the end of its life. 
PD Probability of default. 
Plain Vanilla A term used to describe a standard deal. 
Poisson Distribution Distribution for number of events in a certain time 
period in a Poisson process. 
Poisson Process A process describing a situation where events happen at 
random. The probability of an event in time where is the 
intensity of the process. 
Portfolio Immunization Making a portfolio relatively insensitive to 
interest rates. 
Portfolio Insurance Entering into trades to ensure that the value of a 
portfolio will not fall below a certain level. 
Positive SemiDefinite Condition that must be satisfied by a Variance-
covariance matrix for it to be valid. 
Power Law Law describing the tails of many probability distributions 
that are encountered in practice. 
Premium The price of an option. 
Principal The par or face value of a debt instrument. 
Principal Components Analysis An analysis aimed at finding a small 
number of factors that describe most of the variation in a large number of 
correlated variables. (Similar to a factor analysis.) 
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Put-Call Parity The relationship between the price of a European call 
option and the price of a European put option when they have the same 
strike price and maturity date. 
Put Option An option to sell an asset for a certain price by a certain 
date. 
Puttable Bond A bond where the holder has the right to sell it back to 
the issuer at certain predetermined times for a predetermined price. 
Puttable Swap A swap where one side has the right to terminate early. 
Quadratic Model Quadratic relationship between change in portfolio 
value and percentage changes in market variables. 
Quantitative Impact Studies Studies by the Basel Committee of the 
effect of proposed new regulations on capital of banks. 
RAROC Risk-adjusted return on capital. 
Rebalancing The process of adjusting a trading position periodically. 
Usually the purpose is to maintain delta neutrality. 
Recovery Rate Amount recovered in the event of a default as a percent-
age of the face value. 
Regulatory arbitrage Transactions designed to reduce the total regula-
tory capital of the financial institutions involved. 
Regulatory capital Capital a financial institution is required by regu-
lators to keep. 
Repo Repurchase agreement. A procedure for borrowing money by 
selling securities to a counterparty and agreeing to buy them back later 
at a slightly higher price. 
Repo Rate The rate of interest in a repo transaction. 
Reset Date The date in a swap or cap or floor when the floating rate for 
the next period is set. 
Reversion Level The level that the value of a market variable (e.g., a 
volatility) tends to revert. 
Rho Rate of change of the price of a derivative with the interest rate. 
Risk-free Rate The rate of interest that can be earned without assuming 
any risks. 
Risk-neutral Valuation The valuation of an option or other derivative 
assuming the world is risk neutral. Risk-neutral valuation gives the 
correct price for a derivative in all worlds, not just in a risk-neutral world. 
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Risk-neutral World A world where investors are assumed to require no 
extra return on average for bearing risks. 
Risk-weighted Amount See Risk-weighted Assets. 
Risk-weighted Assets Quantity calculated in Basel I and Basel II. Total 
capital must be at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
Roll Back See Backwards Induction. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in the United States in 2002 increasing the 
responsibilities of directors, CEOs, and CFOs of public companies. 
Scenario Analysis An analysis of the effects of possible alternative 
future movements in market variables on the value of a portfolio. Also 
used to generate scenarios leading to operational risk losses. 
Scorecard Approach A self-assessment procedure used for operational 
risk. 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Short Position A position assumed when traders sell shares they do not 
own. 
Short Selling Selling in the market shares that have been borrowed from 
another investor. 
Simulation See Monte Carlo Simulation. 
Solvency II A new regulatory framework for insurance companies 
proposed by the European Union. 
Specific Risk Charge Capital requirement for idiosyncratic risks in the 
trading book. 
Spectral Risk Measure Risk measure that assigns weights to the quantiles 
of the loss distribution. 
Speculator An individual who is taking a position in the market. 
Usually the individual is betting that the price of an asset will go up or 
that the price of an asset will go down. 
Spot Interest Rate See Zero-coupon Interest Rate. 
Spot Price The price for immediate delivery. 
Spot Volatilities The volatilities used to price a cap when a different 
volatility is used for each caplet. 
Static Hedge A hedge that does not have to be changed once it is 
initiated. 
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Static Options Replication A procedure for hedging a portfolio that 
involves finding another portfolio of approximately equal value on some 
boundary. 
Stochastic Variable Variable whose future value is uncertain. 
Stock Index An index monitoring the value of a portfolio of stocks. 
Stock Index Futures Futures on a stock index. 
Stock Index Option An option on a stock index. 
Stock Option Option on a stock. 
Storage Costs The costs of storing a commodity. 
Stress Testing Testing of the impact of extreme market moves on the 
value of a portfolio. 
Strike Price The price at which the asset may be bought or sold in an 
option contract. (Also called the exercise price.) 
Structured Product Derivative designed by a financial institution to 
meet the needs of a client. 
Student t-Copula Copula based on the multivariate Student t-distribu-
Student t-Distribution Distribution with heavier tails than the normal 
distribution. 
Swap An agreement to exchange cash flows in the future according to a 
prearranged formula. 
Swap Rate The fixed rate in an interest rate swap that causes the swap to 
have a value of zero. 
Swap Zero Curve See LIBOR/Swap Zero Curve. 
Swaption An option to enter into an interest rate swap where a specified 
fixed rate is exchanged for floating. 
Synthetic CDO A CDO created by selling credit default swaps. 
Synthetic Option An option created by trading the underlying asset. 
Systematic Risk Risk that cannot be diversified away. 
Systemic Risk Risk that a default by one financial institution will lead to 
defaults by other financial institutions. 
Tail Correlation Correlation between the tails of two distributions. 
Measures the extent to which extreme values tend to occur together. 
Tail Loss See Expected Shortfall. 
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Taylor Series Expansion For a function of several variables, this relates 
changes in the value of the function to changes in the values of the 
variables when the changes are small. 
Term Structure of Interest Rates The relationship between interest rates 
and their maturities. 
Terminal Value The value at maturity. 
Theta The rate of change of the price of an option or other derivative 
with the passage of time. 
Tier 1 Capital Equity and similar sources of capital. 
Tier 2 Capital Subordinated debt (life greater than five years) and 
similar sources of capital. 
Tier 3 Capital Short-term subordinated debt (life between two and five 
years). 
Time Decay See Theta. 
Time Value The value of an option arising from the time left to 
maturity (equals an option's price minus its intrinsic value). 
Total Return Swap A swap where the return on an asset such as a bond 
is exchanged for LIBOR plus a spread. The return on the asset includes 
income such as coupons and the change in value of the asset. 
Trading Days Days when markets are open for trading. 
Tranche One of several securities that have different risk attributes. 
Examples are the tranches of a CDO. 
Transaction Costs The cost of carrying out a trade (commissions plus 
the difference between the price obtained and the midpoint of the bid-
offer spread). 
Treasury Bill A short-term non-coupon-bearing instrument issued by 
the government to finance its debt. 
Treasury Bond A long-term coupon-bearing instrument issued by the 
government to finance it debt. 
Treasury Note Treasury bond lasting less than 10 years. 
Treasury Note Futures A futures contract on Treasury notes. 
Tree Representation of the evolution of the value of a market variable 
for the purposes of valuing an option or other derivative. 
Underlying Variable A variable that the price of an option or other 
derivative depends on. 
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Unsystematic risk See Nonsystematic Risk. 
Up-and-in Option An option that comes into existence when the price 
of the underlying asset increases to a prespecified level. 
Up-and-out Option An option that ceases to exist when the price of the 
underlying asset increases to a prespecified level. 
Value at Risk A loss that will not be exceeded at some specified 
confidence level. 
Variance-covariance matrix A matrix showing variances of, and covari-
ances between, a number of different market variables. 
Variance Rate The square of volatility. 
Vasicek's Model Model of default correlation based on the Gaussian 
copula. (Other models developed by Vasicek are also sometimes referred 
to as Vasicek's model.) 
Vega The rate of change in the price of an option or other derivative 
with volatility. 
Vega-neutral Portfolio A portfolio with a vega of zero. 
Volatility A measure of the uncertainty of the return realized on an 
asset. 
Volatility Skew A term used to describe the volatility smile when it is 
nonsymmetrical. 
Volatility Smile The variation of implied volatility with strike price. 
Volatility Surface A table showing the variation of implied volatilities 
with strike price and time to maturity. 
Volatility Term Structure The variation of implied volatility with time 
to maturity. 
Weather Derivative Derivative where the payoff depends on the 
weather. 
Writing an Option Selling an option. 
Yield A return provided by an instrument. 
Yield Curve See Term Structure. 
Zero-coupon Bond A bond that provides no coupons. 
Zero-coupon Interest Rate The interest rate that would be earned on a 
bond that provides no coupons. 
Zero-coupon Yield Curve A plot of the zero-coupon interest rate 
against time to maturity. 
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Zero Curve See Zero-coupon Yield Curve. 
Zero Rate See Zero-coupon Interest Rate. 
Z-Score A number indicating how likely a company is to default. 
DerivaGem Software 
You can download the DerivaGem option calculator from the author's 
website: 
ht tp: / /www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull 
The software requires Microsoft Windows 98 or later and Microsoft Excel 
2000 or later. It consists of two files: DG151.dll and DG151.xls. To install 
the software, you should create a folder with the name DerivaGem (or 
some other name of your own choosing) and load the files into the folder. 
You MUST then move DG151.dll into the Windows\System folder or the 
Windows\System 32 folder.1 
Users should ensure that Security for Macros in Excel is set at Medium 
or Low. Check Tools followed by Macros followed by Security in Excel to 
change this. While using the software, you may be asked whether you 
want to enable macros. You should click Enable Macros. 
THE OPTIONS CALCULATOR 
DG151.xls is a user-friendly option calculator. It consists of three work--
sheets. The first worksheet is used to carry out computations for stock 
1
 Note that it is not uncommon for Windows Explorer to be set up so that *.dll files are 
not displayed. To change the setting so that the *.dll file can be seen proceed as follows. 
In Windows 98 and ME, click View, followed by File Options, followed by View, followed 
by Show All Files. In Windows 2000, XP, and NT, click Tools, followed by Folder 
Options, followed by View, followed by Show Hidden Files and Folders. 
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options, currency options, index options, and futures options; the second 
is used for European and American bond options; and the third is used 
for caps, floors, and European swap options. 
The software produces prices, Greek letters, and implied volatilities for 
a wide range of different instruments. It displays charts showing the way 
that option prices and the Greek letters depend on inputs. It also 
displays binomial and trinomial trees showing how the computations 
are carried out. 
General Operation 
To use the option calculator, you should choose a worksheet and click on 
the appropriate buttons to select Option Type, Underlying Type, and so 
on. You should then enter the parameters for the option you are 
considering, hit Enter on your keyboard, and click on Calculate. Deriva-
Gem will then display the price or implied volatility for the option you 
are considering together with Greek letters. If the price has been calcu-
lated from a tree, and you are using the first or second worksheet, you can 
then click on Display Tree to see the tree. If a tree is to be displayed, there 
must be no more than ten time steps. An example of the tree that is 
displayed is shown in Appendix D. Many different charts can be dis-
played in all three worksheets. To display a chart, you must first choose 
the variable you require on the vertical axis, the variable you require on 
the horizontal axis, and the range of values to be considered on the 
horizontal axis. Following that you should hit Enter on your keyboard 
and click on Draw Graph. Whenever the values in one or more cells are 
changed, it is necessary to hit Enter on your keyboard before clicking on 
one of the buttons. 
You may be asked whether you want to update to the new version 
when you first save the software. You should choose the Yes button. 
Options on Stocks, Currencies, Indices, and Futures 
The first worksheet (Equity_FX_Index_Futures) is used for options on 
stocks, currencies, indices, and futures. To use it, you should first select 
the Underlying Type (Equity, Currency, Index, or Futures). You should 
then select the Option Type. The alternatives are: Analytic European (i.e., 
Black-Scholes for a European option), Binomial European (i.e., Euro-
pean option using a binomial tree), Binomial American (i.e., American 
option using a binomial tree), Asian, Barrier Up and In, Barrier Up and 
Out, Barrier Down and In, Barrier Down and Out, Binary Cash or 
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Nothing, Binary Asset or Nothing, Chooser, Compound Option on Call, 
Compound Option on Put, or Lookback. You should then enter the data 
on the underlying asset and the data on the option. Note that all interest 
rates are expressed with continuous compounding. 
In the case of European and American equity options, a table pops up 
allowing you to enter dividends. Enter the time of each ex-dividend date 
(measured in years from today) in the first column and the amount of the 
dividend in the second column. Dividends must be entered in chronologi-
cal order. 
You must click on buttons to choose whether the option is a call or a 
put and whether you wish to calculate an implied volatility. If you do 
wish to calculate an implied volatility, the option price should be entered 
in the cell labeled Price. 
Once all the data has been entered you should hit Enter on your 
keyboard and click on Calculate. If Implied Volatility was selected, 
DerivaGem displays the implied volatility in the Volatility (% per year) 
cell. If Implied Volatility was not selected, it uses the volatility you 
entered in this cell and displays the option price in the Price cell. 
Once the calculations have been completed, the tree (if used) can be 
inspected and charts can be displayed. 
When Analytic European is selected, DerivaGem uses the equations in 
Appendix C to calculate prices and Greek letters. When Binomial Euro-
pean or Binomial American is selected, a binomial tree is constructed as 
described in Appendix D. Up to 500 time steps can be used. 
The input data are largely self-explanatory. In the case of an Asian 
option, the Current Average is the average price since inception. If the 
Asian option is new (Time since Inception equals zero), then the Current 
Average cell is irrelevant and can be left blank. In the case of a Lookback 
Option, the Minimum to Date is used when a Call is valued and the 
Maximum to Date is used when a Put is valued. For a new deal, these 
should be set equal to the current price of the underlying asset. 
Bond Options 
The second worksheet (Bond_Options) is used for European and 
American options on bonds. You should first select a pricing model 
(Black-European, Normal-Analytic European, Normal-Tree European, 
Normal-American, Lognormal-European, or Lognormal-American; 
these models are explained in John Hull's book Options, Futures, and 
Other Derivatives). You should then enter the Bond Data and the Option 
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Data. The coupon is the rate paid per year and the frequency of payments 
can be selected as Quarterly, Semi-Annual, or Annual. The zero-coupon 
yield curve is entered in the table labeled Term Structure. Enter maturities 
(measured in years) in the first column and the corresponding con-
tinuously compounded rates in the second column. The maturities should 
be entered in chronological order. DerivaGem assumes a piecewise linear 
zero curve similar to that in Figure 4.1. Note that, when valuing interest 
rate derivatives, DerivaGem rounds all times to the nearest whole number 
of days. 
When all data have been entered, hit Enter on your keyboard. The 
quoted bond price per $100 of principal, calculated from the zero curve, is 
displayed when the calculations are complete. You should indicate 
whether the option is a call or a put and whether the strike price is a 
quoted (clean) strike price or a cash (dirty) strike price. (The cash price is 
the quoted price plus accrued interest.) Note that the strike price is 
entered as the price per $100 of principal. You should indicate whether 
you are considering a call or a put option and whether you wish to 
calculate an implied volatility. If you select implied volatility and the 
normal model or lognormal model is used, DerivaGem implies the short-
rate volatility keeping the reversion rate fixed. 
Once all the inputs are complete, you should hit Enter on your key-
board and click Calculate. After that, the tree (if used) can be inspected 
and charts can be displayed. Note that the tree displayed lasts until the 
end of the life of the option. DerivaGem uses a much larger tree in its 
computations to value the underlying bond. 
Note that Black's model is similar to Black-Scholes and assumes that 
the bond price is lognormal at option maturity. The approximate dura-
tion relationship in Chapter 4 is used to convert bond yield volatilities to 
bond price volatilities. This is the usual market practice. 
Caps and Swap Options 
The third worksheet (Caps_and_Swap_Options) is used for caps and 
swap options. You should first select the Option Type (Swap Option or 
Cap/Floor) and Pricing Model (Black-European, Normal-European, or 
Lognormal-European; these products and the alternative models are 
explained in John Hull's book Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives). 
You should then enter data on the option you are considering. The 
Settlement Frequency indicates the frequency of payments and can be 
Annual, Semi-Annual, Quarterly, or Monthly. The software calculates 
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payment dates by working backward from the end of the life of the cap or 
swap option. The initial accrual period may be a nonstandard length 
between 0.5 and 1.5 times a normal accrual period. The software can be 
used to imply either a volatility or a cap rate/swap rate from the price. 
When a normal model or a lognormal model is used, DerivaGem implies 
the short-rate volatility keeping the reversion rate fixed. The zero-coupon 
yield curve is entered in the table labeled Term Structure. Enter maturities 
(measured in years) in the first column and the corresponding continu-
ously compounded rates in the second column. The maturities should be 
entered in chronological order. DerivaGem assumes a piecewise linear 
zero curve similar to that in Figure 4.1. 
Once all the inputs are complete, you should click Calculate. After that, 
charts can be displayed. Note that when Black's model is used, Deriva-
Gem assumes (a) that future interest rates are lognormal when caps are 
valued and (b) that future swap rates are lognormal when swap options 
are valued. 
Greek Letters 
In the Equity_FX_Index_Futures worksheet, the Greek letters are calcu-
lated as follows. 
Delta: Change in option price per dollar increase in underlying 
asset. 
Gamma: Change in delta per dollar increase in underlying asset. 
Vega: Change in option price per 1% increase in volatility (e.g., 
volatility increases from 20% to 21%). 
Rho: Change in option price per 1% increase in interest rate (e.g., 
interest increases from 5% to 6%>). 
Theta: Change in option price per calendar day passing. 
In the Bond_Options and Caps_and_Swap_Options worksheets, the 
Greek letters are calculated as follows: 
DV01: Change in option price per one basis point upward 
parallel shift in the zero curve. 
Gamma01: Change in DV01 per one basis point upward parallel shift 
in the zero curve, multiplied by 100. 
Vega: Change in option price when volatility parameter increases 
by 1%) (e.g., volatility increases from 20% to 21 %) 
Table for N(x) When x 0 
This table shows values of N(x) for x 0. The table should be used with interpolation. 
For example, 
N(-0.1234) = N(-0.12) - 0.34[N(-0.12) - N(-0.13)] 
= 0.4522 - 0.34 x (0.4522 - 0.4483) 
= 0.4509 
X 
- 0 . 0 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 . 4 
- 0 . 5 
- 0 . 6 
- 0 . 7 
- 0 . 8 
- 0 . 9 
- 1 . 0 
- 1 . 1 
- 1 . 2 
- 1 . 3 
- 1 . 4 
- 1 . 5 
- 1 . 6 
- 1 . 7 
- 1 . 8 
- 1 . 9 
- 2 . 0 
- 2 . 1 
- 2 . 2 
- 2 . 3 
- 2 . 4 
- 2 . 5 
- 2 . 6 
- 2 . 7 
- 2 . 8 
- 2 . 9 
- 3 . 0 
- 3 . 1 
- 3 . 2 
- 3 . 3 
- 3 . 4 
- 3 . 5 
- 3 . 6 
- 3 . 7 
- 3 . 8 
- 3 . 9 
- 4 . 0 
.00 
0.5000 
0 .4602 
0.4207 
0.3821 
0 .3446 
0 .3085 
0.2743 
0.2420 
0.2119 
0.1841 
0 .1587 
0 .1357 
0.1151 
0.0968 
0.0808 
0.0668 
0.0548 
0 .0446 
0 .0359 
0 .0287 
0.0228 
0 .0179 
0.0139 
0.0107 
0 .0082 
0.0062 
0.0047 
0 .0035 
0 .0026 
0 .0019 
0 .0014 
0 .0010 
0 .0007 
0 .0005 
0 .0003 
0 .0002 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0.0000 
.01 
0.4960 
0 .4562 
0.4168 
0 .3783 
0 .3409 
0 .3050 
0 .2709 
0 .2389 
0 .2090 
0 .1814 
0 .1562 
0 .1335 
0.1131 
0.0951 
0 .0793 
0 .0655 
0.0537 
0 .0436 
0.0351 
0.0281 
0 .0222 
0 .0174 
0 .0136 
0 .0104 
0 .0080 
0 .0060 
0 .0045 
0 .0034 
0 .0025 
0 .0018 
0 .0013 
0 .0009 
0 .0007 
0 .0005 
0 .0003 
0 .0002 
0 .0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
.02 
0.4920 
0.4522 
0 .4129 
0 .3745 
0 .3372 
0 .3015 
0 .2676 
0.2358 
0.2061 
0.1788 
0 .1539 
0 .1314 
0.1112 
0 .0934 
0.0778 
0.0643 
0 .0526 
0 .0427 
0 .0344 
0 .0274 
0.0217 
0.0170 
0.0132 
0 .0102 
0.0078 
0.0059 
0 .0044 
0.0033 
0 .0024 
0.0018 
0.0013 
0.0009 
0.0006 
0.0005 
0.0003 
0 .0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
.03 
0.4880 
0 .4483 
0 .4090 
0 .3707 
0 .3336 
0.2981 
0 .2643 
0 .2327 
0 .2033 
0 .1762 
0 .1515 
0.1292 
0 .1093 
0.0918 
0 .0764 
0 .0630 
0 .0516 
0 .0418 
0 .0336 
0.0268 
0.0212 
0.0166 
0 .0129 
0 .0099 
0 .0075 
0 .0057 
0 .0043 
0 .0032 
0 .0023 
0.0017 
0 .0012 
0.0009 
0 .0006 
0 .0004 
0.0003 
0 .0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
.04 
0.4840 
0 .4443 
0 .4052 
0 .3669 
0 .3300 
0 .2946 
0.2611 
0 .2296 
0 .2005 
0 .1736 
0 .1492 
0.1271 
0 .1075 
0.0901 
0 .0749 
0.0618 
0 .0505 
0 .0409 
0 .0329 
0 .0262 
0.0207 
0.0162 
0 .0125 
0 .0096 
0 .0073 
0 .0055 
0.0041 
0.0031 
0 .0023 
0 .0016 
0 .0012 
0.0008 
0 .0006 
0 .0004 
0 .0003 
0 .0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
.05 
0.4801 
0 .4404 
0.4013 
0 .3632 
0 .3264 
0 .2912 
0.2578 
0 .2266 
0.1977 
0.1711 
0 .1469 
0.1251 
0.1056 
0.0885 
0.0735 
0.0606 
0.0495 
0.0401 
0.0322 
0 .0256 
0.0202 
0.0158 
0.0122 
0 .0094 
0.0071 
0 .0054 
0.0040 
0 .0030 
0 .0022 
0 .0016 
0.0011 
0.0008 
0 .0006 
0 .0004 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0.0000 
.06 
0.4761 
0 .4364 
0 .3974 
0 .3594 
0.3228 
0 .2877 
0 .2546 
0 .2236 
0 .1949 
0 .1685 
0 .1446 
0 .1230 
0.1038 
0.0869 
0.0721 
0 .0594 
0 .0485 
0 .0392 
0 .0314 
0 .0250 
0 .0197 
0 .0154 
0 .0119 
0.0091 
0 .0069 
0 .0052 
0 .0039 
0 .0029 
0.0021 
0 .0015 
0.0011 
0.0008 
0 .0006 
0 .0004 
0 .0003 
0 .0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
.07 
0.4721 
0.4325 
0 .3936 
0 .3557 
0.3192 
0.2843 
0 .2514 
0 .2206 
0 .1922 
0 .1660 
0 .1423 
0 .1210 
0 .1020 
0.0853 
0.0708 
0.0582 
0.0475 
0 .0384 
0 .0307 
0 .0244 
0 .0192 
0 .0150 
0 .0116 
0.0089 
0.0068 
0.0051 
0.0038 
0.0028 
0.0021 
0.0015 
0.0011 
0.0008 
0 .0005 
0 .0004 
0 .0003 
0 .0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
.08 
0.4681 
0 .4286 
0 .3897 
0 .3520 
0 .3156 
0 .2810 
0 .2483 
0.2177 
0 .1894 
0 .1635 
0.1401 
0.1190 
0 .1003 
0.0838 
0 .0694 
0.0571 
0 .0465 
0 .0375 
0.0301 
0.0239 
0.0188 
0.0146 
0.0113 
0.0087 
0 .0066 
0 .0049 
0 .0037 
0 .0027 
0 .0020 
0 .0014 
0 .0010 
0.0007 
0 .0005 
0 .0004 
0.0003 
0 .0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
. 09 
0.4641 
0.4247 
0.3859 
0 .3483 
0.3121 
0.2776 
0.2451 
0.2148 
0.1867 
0.1611 
0.1379 
0.1170 
0.0985 
0.0823 
0.0681 
0.0559 
0.0455 
0.0367 
0.0294 
0.0233 
0.0183 
0.0143 
0 .0110 
0 .0084 
0 .0064 
0.0048 
0 .0036 
0 .0026 
0.0019 
0 .0014 
0 .0010 
0.0007 
0 .0005 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0 .0000 
0 .0000 
Table for N(x) When x 
This table shows values of N{x) for x 
For example, 
N(0.6278) = N(0.62) + 0.78[N(0.63) - N(0.62)] 
= 0.7324 + 0.78 x (0.7357 - 0.7324) 
= 0.7350 
X 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2.0 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3.0 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
3.9 
4.0 
.00 
0.5000 
0.5398 
0.5793 
0.6179 
0.6554 
0.6915 
0.7257 
0.7580 
0.7881 
0.8159 
0.8413 
0.8643 
0.8849 
0.9032 
0.9192 
0.9332 
0.9452 
0.9554 
0.9641 
0.9713 
0.9772 
0.9821 
0.9861 
0.9893 
0.9918 
0.9938 
0.9953 
0.9965 
0.9974 
0.9981 
0.9986 
0.9990 
0.9993 
0.9995 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.01 
0.5040 
0.5438 
0.5832 
0.6217 
0.6591 
0.6950 
0.7291 
0.7611 
0.7910 
0.8186 
0.8438 
0.8665 
0.8869 
0.9049 
0.9207 
0.9345 
0.9463 
0.9564 
0.9649 
0.9719 
0.9778 
0.9826 
0.9864 
0.9896 
0.9920 
0.9940 
0.9955 
0.9966 
0.9975 
0.9982 
0.9987 
0.9991 
0.9993 
0.9995 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.02 
0.5080 
0.5478 
0.5871 
0.6255 
0.6628 
0.6985 
0.7324 
0.7642 
0.7939 
0.8212 
0.8461 
0.8686 
0.8888 
0.9066 
0.9222 
0.9357 
0.9474 
0.9573 
0.9656 
0.9726 
0.9783 
0.9830 
0.9868 
0.9898 
0.9922 
0.9941 
0.9956 
0.9967 
0.9976 
0.9982 
0.9987 
0.9991 
0.9994 
0.9995 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.03 
0.5120 
0.5517 
0.5910 
0.6293 
0.6664 
0.7019 
0.7357 
0.7673 
0.7967 
0.8238 
0.8485 
0.8708 
0.8907 
0.9082 
0.9236 
0.9370 
0.9484 
0.9582 
0.9664 
0.9732 
0.9788 
0.9834 
0.9871 
0.9901 
0.9925 
0.9943 
0.9957 
0.9968 
0.9977 
0.9983 
0.9988 
0.9991 
0.9994 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.04 
0.5160 
0.5557 
0.5948 
0.6331 
0.6700 
0.7054 
0.7389 
0.7704 
0.7995 
0.8264 
0.8508 
0.8729 
0.8925 
0.9099 
0.9251 
0.9382 
0.9495 
0.9591 
0.9671 
0.9738 
0.9793 
0.9838 
0.9875 
0.9904 
0.9927 
0.9945 
0.9959 
0.9969 
0.9977 
0.9984 
0.9988 
0.9992 
0.9994 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.05 
0.5199 
0.5596 
0.5987 
0.6368 
0.6736 
0.7088 
0.7422 
0.7734 
0.8023 
0.8289 
0.8531 
0.8749 
0.8944 
0.9115 
0.9265 
0.9394 
0.9505 
0.9599 
0.9678 
0.9744 
0.9798 
0.9842 
0.9878 
0.9906 
0.9929 
0.9946 
0.9960 
0.9970 
0.9978 
0.9984 
0.9989 
0.9992 
0.9994 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.06 
0.5239 
0.5636 
0.6026 
0.6406 
0.6772 
0.7123 
0.7454 
0.7764 
0.8051 
0.8315 
0.8554 
0.8770 
0.8962 
0.9131 
0.9279 
0.9406 
0.9515 
0.9608 
0.9686 
0.9750 
0.9803 
0.9846 
0.9881 
0.9909 
0.9931 
0.9948 
0.9961 
0.9971 
0.9979 
0.9985 
0.9989 
0.9992 
0.9994 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.07 
0.5279 
0.5675 
0.6064 
0.6443 
0.6808 
0.7157 
0.7486 
0.7794 
0.8078 
0.8340 
0.8577 
0.8790 
0.8980 
0.9147 
0.9292 
0.9418 
0.9525 
0.9616 
0.9693 
0.9756 
0.9808 
0.9850 
0.9884 
0.9911 
0.9932 
0.9949 
0.9962 
0.9972 
0.9979 
0.9985 
0.9989 
0.9992 
0.9995 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.08 
0.5319 
0.5714 
0.6103 
0.6480 
0.6844 
0.7190 
0.7517 
0.7823 
0.8106 
0.8365 
0.8599 
0.8810 
0.8997 
0.9162 
0.9306 
0.9429 
0.9535 
0.9625 
0.9699 
0.9761 
0.9812 
0.9854 
0.9887 
0.9913 
0.9934 
0.9951 
0.9963 
0.9973 
0.9980 
0.9986 
0.9990 
0.9993 
0.9995 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.09 
0.5359 
0.5753 
0.6141 
0.6517 
0.6879 
0.7224 
0.7549 
0.7852 
0.8133 
0.8389 
0.8621 
0.8830 
0.9015 
0.9177 
0.9319 
0.9441 
0.9545 
0.9633 
0.9706 
0.9767 
0.9817 
0.9857 
0.9890 
0.9916 
0.9936 
0.9952 
0.9964 
0.9974 
0.9981 
0.9986 
0.9990 
0.9993 
0.9995 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9999 
1.0000 
1.0000 
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